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Introductory	remarks,	scope	of	the	work,	methodology,	structure	and	
literature	review	
This	 research	 project	 aims	 to	 analyse	 what	 in	 doctrine	 has	 been	 called	 the	
Achilles	 heel1	of	 ICSID	 arbitrations,	 i.e.	 the	 obstacle	 posed	 by	 the	 theory	 of	 State	
immunity	to	the	enforcement	of	arbitration	awards	rendered	against	sovereign	States	
by	arbitral	tribunals	constituted	under	the	provisions	of	the	Washington	Convention	of	
1965,	establishing,	under	the	auspices	of	the	World	Bank,	the	International	Centre	for	
the	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	(ICSID).	
Indeed,	in	practice	it	sometimes	happened	that	the	State,	condemned	to	pay	
damages	to	foreign	investors,	recurred	to	the	plea	of	immunity	in	order	to	prevent	the	
execution	 of	 the	 arbitral	 award	 on	 its	 assets.	 This	 is	 likely	 to	 whip	 the	 legitimate	
expectation	 of	 the	 individual	 who	 made	 the	 investment,	 even	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
guarantee	represented	by	the	presence	in	the	contract	or	in	its	BIT	of	the	ICSID	clause.	
The	 absence	 of	 a	 balanced	 policy	 to	 the	 enforcement	 problem	 of	 ICSID	
arbitral	 awards,	 and	 the	 consequent	 need	 to	 recompose	 the	 range	 of	 remedies	 that	
from	time	to	time	have	been	adopted	in	practice,	are	witnessed	by	the	recent	decision	
of	the	US	Second	Circuit	Court	of	Appeal	decision	in	the	Blue	Ridge	case,2	which	seems	
to	 have	 completely	 turned	upside	down	 the	 traditional	 approach	of	US	 courts	 to	 the	
issue	of	immunity	from	execution.3	
																																																													
1 	Cfr.	 A.	 K.	 Bjorklund,	 State	 immunity	 and	 the	 enforcement	 of	 investor-state	 arbitral	 awards,	 in	
International	Investment	Law	for	the	21st	Century:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Christoph	Schreuer,	(OUP	2009),	
321.	
2	Blue	Ridge	Invs.,	LLC	v.	Republic	of	Argentina,	United	States	Court	of	Appeals,Second	Circuit,	Docket	
No.	12–4139–cv	(19	August	2013).	Pursuant	to	a	first	arbitration	award	issued	between	the	investor,	CMS	
Gas	Transmission	Company	(CMS),	and	the	Argentine	State,	the	latter	was	obliged	to	pay	$	133.2	million.	
Subsequently,	 Argentina	 requested	 the	 annulment	 of	 the	 award,	which	was	 promptly	 rejected	 by	 the	
ICSID	 Tribunal.	 In	 2008,	 Blue	 Ridge	 Investments	 LLC	 notified	 the	 Argentine	 State	 the	 transfer	 in	 its	
favour	of	 the	award	 in	question	by	CMS.	Argentina	opposed	 its	 financial	obligation	under	a	number	of	
arguments,	 including	the	 lack	of	any	 legitimacy	of	Blue	Ridge,	given	the	mere	transferee	position.	This	
argument	 was	 rejected	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	 the	 second	 US	 circuit	 in	 the	 light	 of	 two	 sets	 of	
arguments.	First,	by	analysing	the	wording	of	the	Washington	Convention,	the	binding	effect	of	an	ICSID	
award	 is	 in	 no	way	 restricted	 to	 the	 original	 parties	 of	 the	 arbitration.	 Secondly,	 pursuant	 to	 the	New	
York’s	 law,	the	transferee	shall	enjoy	the	same	 legitimacy	of	the	transferor	to	request	the	execution	of	
the	award.	
3	The	ruling	marks	a	clear	break	with	the	general	trend	of	US	federal	courts	to	accept	too	often	immunity	
objections	raised	by	States	against	the	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards	on	their	assets.	Cfr.J.Thomas,	A.	
Bouhabib,	 Confirming	 ICSID	 awards	 in	 US	 courts	 over	 sovereign	 objections:	 Duke	 and	 Blue	 Ridge,	 in	
International	Litigation	News,	2013.	
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This	 outcome	 is	 part	 of	 the	 already	 fragmented	 picture	 of	 the	 possible	
remedies	to	an	issue	that	is	still	unresolved,	and	which,	constitutes,	as	evidenced	by	the	
most	recent	doctrine4,	a	necessary	step	for	the	improvement	of	the	ICSID	system	both	
for	the	protection	of	foreign	investors	and	for	the	compliance	with	the	principle	of	legal	
certainty.	 Not	 rarely,	 indeed,	 domestic	 courts,	 in	 the	 enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 awards,	
have	reached	conclusions	incompatible	with	the	international	obligations	contained	in	
the	Washington	Convention	concerning	enforceability	of	arbitration	awards.5	
	
Scope	of	the	work	and	delimitation	
The	issue	of	enforcement	of	investment	arbitration	awards	has	received	little	
attention	 by	 the	 doctrine,	 in	 the	 ICSID	 systems	 as	 in	 other	 instances,	 because	 the	
drafters	 of	 most	 investment	 arbitration	 Conventions	 assumed	 that	 States	 would	
comply	with	enforcement	based	on	the	principle	of	pacta	sunt	servanda,	and	in	light	of	
the	 adverse	 effect	 that	 non-compliance	 would	 have	 on	 a	 State's	 standing	 in	 the	
international	 investment	 community.	 But	 the	 experience	 from	nations	 like	Argentina	
who	was	plagued	by	myriad	of	investment	suits,	shows	that	enforcement	of	awards	can	
be	resisted	and	therefore	berates	such	assumption.	
This	 research	 project	 aims	 to	 analyse	 the	 various	 solutions	 that	 have	 been	
proposed	by	the	doctrine	and	practice	to	the	problem		of	enforcement	of	ICSID	awards	
and	to	propose	a	solution	that	will	be	a	balance	between	the	prerogatives	of	the	State	
and	the	investor's	rights.	 	 In	the	discussion	several	cases,	even	non	ICSID	ones,	will	be	
examined	 as	 their	 analysis	 is	 essential	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	 common	 issues	 and	draw	
common	 solutions.	 	 It	 is	 structured	 as	 follows:	 after	 a	 brief	 reconstruction	 of	 the	
regulatory	 framework,	 we	 will	 analyse	 the	 problems	 related	 to	 immunity	 from	
execution	 of	 the	 State	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ICSID	 arbitral	 awards	 and	 finally	we	will	
address	the	different	means	of	enforcing	awards	proposed	and	possible	approaches	to	
the	issue.		
	
Methodology	and	structure	of	the	work	
The	 methodology	 that	 will	 be	 used	 draws	 on	 comparative	 law	 and	
international	instruments.	
The	 first	 part	 of	 the	 research	will	 be	 devoted	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 existing	
Treaty	obligations	 to	honour	 arbitral	 awards	 in	 investment	 arbitration.	Due	attention	
will	be	given	also	to	the	related	concept	of	the	diplomatic	protection.	
The	 second	part	will	 focus	on	 sovereign	 immunity	 in	general	 including	both	
immunity	 from	 jurisdiction	and	 immunity	 from	enforcement	with	particular	 reference	
to	the	execution	of	the	ICSID	arbitral	awards	and	the	legislation	and	practices	adopted	
																																																													
4	Infra	 multis Y. BANIFATEMI,	 (2010)	 97	 	 Enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 in	 investment	 arbitration:	 taking	
stock	 and	 way	 forward.	
“http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/49893996.pdf”.	
5	In	 the	case	Siag	v.	The	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt,	 the	 ruling	would	seem	even	give	 the	 floodgates	 for	a	
possible	review	of	the	ICSID	award	by	the	national	courts,	prompting,	in	fact,	the	investor	to	sue	another	
jurisdiction	to	comply	with	the	ruling.	
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by	 the	 various	 national	 laws.	 The	 sovereign	 immunity	 issue	 is	 addressed	 through	 the	
ICSID	 Convention	 rules	 and	 the	 remedies	 adverse	 sovereign	 immunity	 and	 it	 argues	
how	 sovereign	 immunity	 affects	 compliance	 with	 ICSID	 awards.	 It	 will	 give	 also	 an	
overall	 review	 of	 the	 ICSID	 cases	 regarding	 sovereign	 immunity	 and	 how	 different	
countries	 deal	 with	 sovereign	 immunity	 question	 during	 the	 enforcement	 of	 ICSID	
awards.	
The	third	part	will	deal	with	the	means	of	enforcing	an	award	and	the	possible	
solution	 to	 heal	 the	 Achille’s	 heel.	 It	 will	 try	 to	 analyse	 few	 examples	 of	 the	 most	
significant	 national	 and	 international	 law	 framework	 relevant	 to	 attachment	 of	 and	
execution	against	Sovereign	Commercial	assets.	
The	investigation	will	be	concluded,	therefore,	with	a	moment	of	synthesis		of	
solutions	on	the	basis	of	the	spectrum	of	legal	experiences	considered	and	adopted	by	
scholars’	theories	and	practices.	
Moreover,	as	to	the	methods	used	in	this	research	project,	necessary	step	of	
argumentative	path	will	be	in-depth	analysis	of	decisions	of	ICSID	arbitration	courts	in	
their	 role	 of	 precedents	 according	 to	 the	 so-called	 theory	 of	 the	 taking	 into	 account	
approach.	
It	will,	therefore,	try	to	identify	a	systematic	solution	to	the	issue	of	immunity	
from	execution,	able	 to	 reconcile	 the	opposing	 interests	of	 the	parties,	 in	 the	 light	of	
their	equality	 in	 the	execution	phase	of	States-investor	disputes	and	 in	 respect	of	 the	
legal	certainty	principle.	
At	the	same	time,	the	research	should	take	into	account	the	impact	and	scope	
that	 the	United	Nations	 Convention	 on	 Jurisdictional	 Immunities	 of	 States	 and	 Their	
Property	(New	York	December	2,	2004),	which	aims	to	harmonize	the	regulations	on	of	
State	immunity.	
As	we	will	see	hereinafter,	possible	solutions	proposed	to	date	with	respect	to	
the	issue	of	immunity	from	execution	can	be	classified	in	three	categories.	
The	first	among	these,	is	the	possibility	of	including	in	the	BIT	clauses	where	
the	 host	 State	 explicitly	 waives	 its	 immunity	 from	 execution,	 or,	 alternatively,	 the	
obligation	 to	provide	a	 list	of	possible	assets	 that	will	be	available	 for	attachment,	or		
lastly,	 the	 subscription	 of	 an	 insurance	 policy	 against	 the	 risk	 of	 giving	 rise	 to	
enforcement	proceedings.	
It	 was	 also	 proposed	 to	 expand	 the	 framework	 of	 sanctions	 against	 the	
convenient	use	of	the	exception	of	immunity	from	execution.	This	is	achieved	through	
the	explicit	 recognition	of	 sanctioning	powers	 in	 the	hands	of	 the	World	Bank,	or	 the	
conferring	 of	 higher	 rate	 of	 interest	 to	 the	 damage	 suffered	 by	 the	 investor	 for	 the	
delay	in	the	execution.	
Finally,	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	aforementioned	 judgment	Blue	Ridge,	 the	chance	
to	 provide	 purchase	 agreements	 of	 the	 quantum	 obligation	 resulting	 from	 the	
arbitration	award.	
Correspondingly,	we	will	also	need	to	frame	the	procedural	issues	mentioned	
above.	These	include	the	possibility	of	adopting,	by	the	same	ICSID	tribunal,	of	interim	
measures	aimed	at	impeding	an	instrumental	change	of	destination	of	the	assets	made	
by	the	State.	
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Although	 the	execution	phase	of	 an	 ICSID	award	 is	only	 a	potential	 one,	 as	
there	 is	 often	 a	 spontaneous	 enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 by	 the	Member	 States,	
mostly	 due	 to	 sanctions	 that	 the	World	 Bank	 has	 adopted	 in	 practice	 for	 the	 States	
failing	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 arbitration	 decision;	 State	 immunity	
from	 execution	 still	 constitutes	 a	 bastion	 hardly	 scratched	 by	 the	 arrows	 of	 foreign	
investors.	Therefore,	the	need	to	find	a	systematic	solution	is	more	necessary	than	ever	
in	order	to	ensure	the	effectiveness	and	impartiality	of	ICSID	system.	
In	 conclusion,	 the	 ambition	of	 this	 research	project,	 therefore,	 is	 to	make	a	
valuable	contribution	to	the	improvement	of	an	institution	that	seems	more	than	ever	
vital	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 economic	 activity	 of	 companies	 now	 operating	 on	 a	
global	scale.	
	
Literature	review	
The	subject	of	enforcement	of	awards	in	investment	arbitration,	as	of	today,	
has	not	been	widely	discussed.	There	are,	however,	four	monographs	that	–	directly	or	
indirectly	 –	 regard	 the	 subject,	 as	 well	 as	 many	 articles.	 The	 American	 Arbitration	
Association,	due	 to	 the	uncertainty	 related	 to	 this	 topic,	dedicated	 its	28th	 chapter	of	
the	 Handbook	 on	 international	 arbitration	 practice	 to	 Sovereign	 Immunity	 and	 the	
enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 against	 State	 entities:	 Recent	 trends	 in	 practice. 6		
Moreover,	 the	 recent	 26TH	 2014	 Annual	 ITA	 Workshop	 in	 Dallas,	 focused	 on	
Enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards,	 and	 it	 was	 entitled			
Modern	Enforcement	Of	Arbitral	Awards:		 “Show	Me	The	Money”.	 In	 2016	 Burford	
Capital	research	published	the	latest	Enforcement	Survey	showing	that	in	April	2016	58	
percent	of	corporations	have	not	been	paid	the	full	face	value	of	judgments	secured	in	
the	 last	 five	 years	 and	 these	 unenforced	 judgments	 and	 arbitration	 awards	 cost	 14	
percent	 of	 companies	 over	 $50	 million.	 The	 starting	 point	 of	 a	 research	 aimed	 at	
studying	the	ICSID	system	was	of	course	the	Commentary	of	the	ICSID	Convention	of	
Prof.	 C.	 Schreuer.	 This	 book	 has	 been	 very	 helpful	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 legal	
framework	of	the	topic.	
The	 second	 main	 source	 for	 such	 a	 research	 is	 H.	 Fox,	 The	 Law	 of	 State	
Immunity,	 which	 analyses	 deeply	 the	 central	 issue	 of	 Sovereign	 immunity	 both	 from	
jurisdiction	 that	 from	 execution.	 	 On	 the	 same	 vein	 are	 P.	 Muchlinski,	F.	 Ortino,	C.	
Schreuer,	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Investment	Law	and	R.	O’Keefe	and	C.	
Tams,	The	Nations	Convention	on	Jurisdictional	Immunities	of	States	and	Their	Property:	
A	Commentary.	
Finally,	 the	main	 (and	only)	book	directly	 regarding	 the	 subject	 is	Mr.	Doak	
Bishop’s	 book,	 entitled	 Enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 against	 Sovereigns,	 in	 which	
sovereign	 immunity,	 the	 enforcement	 against	 Sovereigns	 and	 the	 attachment	 and	
execution	on	commercial	assets	are	largely	debated7.	However,	this	book	largely	differs	
																																																													
6		 An	 updated	 version	 of	 A.F.M.	Maniruzzaman,	 State	 Enterprise,	 Arbitration	 and	 Sovereign	 Immunity	
Issues:	A	Look	at	Recent	Trends,		Dispute	Resolution	Journal	-	Vol.	60,	No.	3.	
7	Enforcement	Of	Arbitral	Awards	Against	Sovereigns	(R.	Doak	Bishop,	Ed.,	2009),	in	particular	significant	
was	chapter	6,	Antonio	R.	Parra,	The	Enforcement	of	ICSID	Arbitral	Awards.	
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in	 its	scope	and	goals	from	the	present	one.	Definitely,	helpful	 for	 its	wide	analysis	of	
the	subject	and	for	its	very	extensive	bibliography,	does	not	propose	systemic	solutions	
to	the	problem	of	unenforced	awards.	
Only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 articles	 directly	 deal	with	 the	 enforcement	 issue	 in	
investment	 arbitration	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 possible	 solutions8.	 With	 regard	 to	
judicial	 and	 arbitral	 techniques	 for	 securing	 assets	 for	 enforcement,	 it	 is	 worth	
highlighting	few	articles.9	Finally,	some	books	and	articles	have	dealt	with	the	problem	
of	enforcement	in	general	terms10	and	in	investment	treaty	arbitration.11	
																																																													
8	Jorge	E.	Viñuales	&	Dolores	Bentolila,	The	Use	of	Alternative	(Non-Judicial)	Means	to	Enforce	Investment	
Awards	Against	States,	 in	DIPLOMATIC	AND	JUDICIAL	MEANS	OF	DISPUTE	SETTLEMENT	(L.	Boisson	
de	Chazournes,	Marcelo	G.	Kohen,	and	Jorge	E.	Viñuales,	eds.)	 (BRILL)	 (2012);	 Inna	Uchkunova	&	Oleg	
Temnikov,	Enforcement	of	Awards	Under	 the	 ICSID	Convention—What	Solutions	 to	 the	Problem	of	State	
Immunity?,	 29(1)	 ICSID	 REV.	 187	 (2014)	;	 Peter	 D.	 Fox	 &	 Charles	 B.	 Rosenberg,	 The	 Hidden	 Tool	 in	 a	
Foreign	Investorʼs	Toolbox:The	Trade	Preference	Program	as	a	‘Carrot	and	Stick’	to	Secure	Compliance	with	
International	Law	Obligations,	 34	NW.	 J.	 INT'L	L.	&	BUS.	53	 (2013);	Flávio	Spaccaquerche	Barbosa,	The	
Enforcement	 of	 International	 Investment	 Arbitral	 Awards:	 Is	 There	 A	 Better	 Way?	 TDM	 4	 (2009),	
www.transnational-disputemanagement.	com/article.asp?key=1488.	
9	Erin	 Collins,	 Pre-Tribunal	 Emergency	 Relief	 in	 International	 Commercial	 Arbitration,	 10	 LOY.	 U.	 CHI.	
INT'L	L.	REV.	105	(2012-2013);	Elliot	Friedman,	Enforcement	of	International	Arbitration	Awards	in	New	
York:	If	You	Take	Them	There,	You	Can	Collect	from	Anywhere,	27(4)	ARB.	INT'L	575	(2011);	Manuel	A.	
Gómez,	 The	 Global	 Chase:	 Seeking	 the	 Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 the	 Lago	 Agrio	 Judgment	
outside	of	Ecuador,	1	STAN.	J.	COMPLEX	LITIG.	429	(2013);	Chan	Leng	Sun	S.	C.	&	Tan	Weiyi,	Making	
Arbitration	 Effective:	 Expedited	 Procedures,	 Emergency	 Arbitrators	 and	 Interim	 Relief,	 6	 CONTEMP.	
ASIA	ARB.	J.	349	(2013)	;	Damien	H.	Weinstein,	New	York:	The	Next	Mecca	for	Judgment	Creditors?	An	
Analysis	 of	 Koehler	 v.	 Bank	 of	 Bermuda	 Ltd.	 78	 FORDHAM	 L.	 REV.	 3161	 (2010);	 Stephan	 Wilske,	
Collective	Action	 in	 Investment	Arbitration	 to	Enforce	Small	 Claims	 –Justice	 to	 the	Deprived	or	Death	
Knell	for	the	System	of	Investor-State	Arbitration?.	5(2)	CONTEMP.	ASIA	ARB.	J.,	165	(2012);	Jeffrey	L.	
Wilson,	 Three	 if	 by	 Equity:	 Mareva	 Orders	 &	 the	 New	 British	 Invasion,	 19	 ST.	 JOHN'S	 J.	 LEGAL	
COMMENT.	673	(2005).	 	
10	A.	Bjorklund,	State	Immunity	and	the	Enforcement	of	Investor-State	Arbitral	Award,	in	C.Binder	et	al,	
International	Investment	Law	for	the	21st	Century:	Essays	in	Honour	of	Christoph	Schreuer	(OUP	2009);	
A.	Reinisch,	European	Court	Practice	Concerning	State	Immunity	from	Enforcement	Measures,	in	17	The	
European	Journal	of	International	Law	(2006);	I.	Uchkunova,	O.	Temnikov,	Enforcement	of	Awards	Under	
the	 ICSID	 Convention—What	 Solutions	 to	 the	 Problem	 of	 State	 Immunity?,	 ICSID	 Review,	 (2013);	 J.	
Crawford,	 Execution	 of	 Judgments	 and	 Foreign	 Sovereign	 Immunity,	 75	 American	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	(1981);	J.Thomas,	A.	Bouhabib,	Confirming	ICSID	awards	 in	US	courts	over	sovereign	
objections:	 Duke	 and	 Blue	 Ridge,	 in	 International	 Litigation	 News,	 (2013);	 J.	 Paulsson,	 ICSID's	
Achievements	 and	 Prospects,	 in	 6	 ICSID	 Review–Foreign	 Investment	 Law	 Journal	 (1991);	 S.	W.	 Schill,	
Cross-Regime	 Harmonization	 through	 Proportionality	 Analysis:	 The	 Case	 of	 International	 Investment	
Law,	the	Law	of	State	Immunity	and	Human	Rights,	in	27	ICSID	Review	(2012);	Tai-Heng	Cheng,	The	Role	
of	 Justice	 in	 Annulling	 Investor-State	 Arbitration	 Awards,	 in	 31	 Berkeley	 Journal	 of	 International	 law	
(2013)	
11	Roger	 P.	 Alford,	 The	 Convergence	 of	 International	 Trade	 and	 Investment	 Arbitration,	 12	 SANTA	
CLARA	 J.	 INT’L	 L.	 35	 (2014);	 Flávio	 Spaccaquerche	 Barbosa,	 The	 Enforcement	 of	 International	
Investment	 Arbitral	 Awards:	 Is	 There	 A	 Better	 Way?	 TDM	 4	
(2009),www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=1488;	 Piero	 Bernardini,	 ICSID	
versus	non-ICSID	 Investment	Treaty	Arbitration	 in	LIBER	AMICORUM	BERNARDO	CREMADES	(Miguel	
Ángel	 Fernández-Ballesteros	 and	 David	 Arias,	 eds.)	 (Kluwer)	 (2010);	 ENFORCEMENT	 OF	 ARBITRAL	
AWARDS	 AGAINST	 SOVEREIGNS	 (Doak	 Bishop,	 ed.)	 (JurisNet)	 (2009);	 Andrea	 K.	 Bjorklund,	
Convergence	 or	 Complementarity?,	 12	 SANTA	 CLARA	 J.	 INT'L	 L.	 65	 (2014);	 Andrea	 K.	 Bjorklund,	
10	
	
Collaterally,	it	has	been	necessary	to	make	recourse,	first	of	all,	to	books	and	
articles	 related	 to	 general	 international	 law,	 secondly	 to	 works	 on	 international	
investment	 arbitration	 and,	 thirdly,	 to	 works	 related	 to	municipal	 systems.	 All	 these	
sources	have	been	of	extreme	utility	in	order	to	develop	new	approaches	and	solutions	
for	investment	arbitration.	
In	conclusion,	as	of	today,	the	available	literature	on	the	subject	is	still	in	fieri	
and	there	is	a	lack	of	solutions	for	the	enforcement	problem	in	investment	arbitration.	
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Introduction	
	
The	enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	against	Sovereigns	
	
The	past	two	decades	have	seen	an	unquestionable	explosion	and	development	
of	investment	treaties	and,	at	the	same	time,	a	veritable	increase	of	arbitration	claims	
brought	against	sovereigns.		
	Most	of	them	have	been	filed	before	the	International	Centre	for	Settlement	of	
Investment	 Claims	 (ICSID),	 pursuant	 to	 its	 constituent	 treaty,	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	
Settlement	of	investment	Disputes	between	States	and	Nationals	of	Other	States	(the	
ICSID	Convention).		As	of	April	12,	2016,	161	countries	had	signed	and	ratified	the	ICSID	
Convention	 to	 become	 Contracting	 States.12	The	 Convention	 provides	 for	 arbitration	
procedures	 of	 investment	 disputes	 they	 might	 have	 with	 individuals	 or	 companies	
(private	 investors)	 that	qualify	 as	national	 of	 other	Contracting	States.	But,	 the	most	
important	 aspect,	 for	 what	 concern	 our	 research,	 is	 that	 ICSID	 has	 its	 own	 self-
contained	rules	for	enforcement.		
Given	this	significant	proliferation	in	sovereign	cases	and	the	issues	attendant	to	
sovereign	 immunity,	 this	 thesis	will	 address	 the	 various	 issues	 that	 arise	 in	 enforcing	
arbitral	awards	against	sovereigns.	
One	 of	 the	 most	 novel	 elements	 of	 the	 recent	 advent	 of	 International	
Investment	Arbitration	 is	 its	ability	to	effectively	resolve	 investment	disputes.	 Indeed,	
one	of	the	first	questions	posed	by	clients	to	their	counsel	before	starting	an	arbitration	
proceeding	 against	 a	 sovereign	 state	 is	whether	 and	how	 the	 resulting	 award	 can	be	
enforced.		 If	 arbitral	 awards	 when	 rendered	 cannot	 be	 enforced	 against	 the	 debtor,	
then	 an	 essential-and	 I	would	 say	 vital-	 aspect	 of	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 defeated.	
The	 reason	 of	 the	 client’s	 question	 is	 usually	 based	 on	 the	 common	 knowledge	 that	
States	 possess	 sovereign	 immunity	 along	 with	 a	 concern	 about	 the	 difficulties	 of	
enforcement	against	a	sovereign’s	assets.	Last	of	all,	 to	make	matters	worse,	 there	 is	
also	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 exceptions	 to	 such	 immunity.	 	 This	 uncertainty	is	
sometimes	fueled	 by	 the	 fact	that	 often	the	decisions	 of	 national	 courts	 on	 the	
matter	are	confusing	or	even	contradictory.	
Ultimately,	 the	 value	 of	 international	 arbitration	 as	 a	 means	 of	 resolving	
disputes	 is	dependent	upon	 the	extent	 to	which	awards	are	either	honored	or	can	be	
enforced.	Few	claimants	will	pursue	a	time	consuming	and	often	expensive	process	of	
																																																													
12 See	 ICSID,	 List	 of	 Contracting	 States	 and	 other	 signatories	 of	 the	 Convention,	
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Pages/List-of-Member-States.aspx.	
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dispute	resolution	just	for	the	principle	of	establishing	a	point.	 It	 is	true	that	an	award	
has	 	 firstly	 legal	meaning	and	consequences	but	 in	 the	end	 it	 is	generally	pursued	 for	
practical	 ends.	 It	 is	 the	 enforceability	 and	 indeed	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	 award	 that	
gives	credence	to	the	entire	 International	 Investment	Arbitration	process	and	 justifies	
the	cost	and	time	that	the	parties	to	a	dispute	have	invested	in	the	resolution	process.13	
On	the	contrary,	the	problem	with	International	 Investment	Arbitration	is	that;	
this	desired	justification	is	often	compromised	when	States	that	enter	into	international	
agreements	such	as	the	International	ICSID	Convention	and	claim	their	sovereignty	as	a	
defence	and	therefore	when	it	comes	to	the	enforcement	of	awards	they	do	not	comply	
with	the	obligations	set	out	in	the	agreements.14	
	
Under	 ICSID,	 states	 reserve	 their	 immunity	 against	 enforcement	 of	 awards.	
However,	states	are	reluctant	to	use	this	right	as	the	damages	from	doing	so	outweigh	
its	benefits.	States	choosing	not	to	comply	with	awards	issued	by	ICSID	are	risking	a	lot.	
The	 consequences	 of	 having	 a	 reputation	 of	 not	 respecting	 the	 law	would	 be	 losing	
potential	 investments	and	 the	 flow	of	 foreign	capitals.	The	damages	 to	 the	economy	
may	be	severe	as	ICSID	is	a	multilateral	agreement	that	includes	161		signatory	states.			
This	creates	significant	pressure	on	members	to	comply	with	the	rule	of	the	convention	
as	 every	 state	 considers	 its	 image	 and	 reputation	 as	 priority.	 In	 addition,	 ICSID	 is	 an	
organization	of	the	World	Bank,	and	the	Chairman’s	of	ICSID	Administrative	Council	is	
also	the	World	Bank’s	President.		This	imposes	serious	concerns	for	states	intending	not	
to	comply	especially	if	they	are	not	financially	independent	and	rely	on	foreign	aids	and	
loans.	 Also,	 publication,	 whether	 officially	 or	 not,	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 and	 the	 media	
attention	 can	 lead	 to	 damages	 in	 states	 reputation	 which	 are	 known	 to	 have	 poor	
record	of	compliance.		An	example	of	a	state	with	a	reputation	of	refusing	enforcement	
is	 Argentina.	 The	US	 suspended	 commercial	 benefits	 to	 Argentina	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	
pile-up	of	unenforced	awards,	 including	 ICSID	awards,	 in	 favor	of	American	 investors.		
Nonetheless,	 the	 outstanding	 number	 of	 awards	 against	 Argentina	 has	 led	many	 to	
doubt	the	effectiveness	of	ICSID	mechanism.		
Although	 there	 are	 real	 legal	 obstacles	 to	 enforcing	 an	 award	 against	 a	
sovereign,	those	obstacles	are	limited	to	the	means	of	obtaining	enforcement	and	the	
types	of	assets	against	which	enforcement	may	be	sought.	But	those	obstacles	do	not	
diminish	 the	 legal	effect	or	 the	moral	 force	of	 the	award,	with	which	 the	sovereign	 is	
																																																													
13	Loukas	 	 Mistelis,	 ''Award	 as	 an	 Investment:	 The	 Value	 of	 an	 Arbitral	 Award	 or	 the	 Cost	 of	 Non-	
Enforcement''	(2013)	ICSID	Review,	pp.	1–24.	
14	Alan		Alexandroff	,	Ian		Laird	,	'Compliance	and	Enforcement;	Recognition,	Enforcement,	and	Execution	
of	Investment	Arbitration	Awards'(2008)	LLP,	p.45.	
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legally	 obligated	 to	 comply.	 There	 is	 no	 right	 in	 international	 law	 of	 non-compliance	
with	a	final	and	binding	award	that	has	not	been	properly	annulled	or	vacated.	
It	 must	 be	 emphasized	 that	 enforcement	 is	 the	 ultimate	 ratio	 in	 investment	
arbitration	 especially	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 it	 serves	 as	 a	 final	 security	 for	 investment	
protection	guaranteed	by	BITs.	More	than	one-	quarter	of	all	international	arbitrations	
settle	 before	 the	 tribunal	 issues	 a	 final	 award,	 and	 another	 47%	 end	 in	 voluntary	
compliance	 with	 a	 final	 award.	 In	 fact,	 recent	 studies	 demonstrate	 that	 only	 11%	 of	
international	investment	arbitrations	culminate	in	enforcement	proceedings.	
In	fact,	generally	speaking	legal	enforcement	is	not	the	norm	but	the	exception.	
This	 is	 the	 customary	 practice,	 and	 even	when	 litigation	 or	 arbitration	 is	 required	 to	
obtain	 recognition	 of	 a	 legal	 right	 or	 its	 breach,	 compliance	 with	 the	 decision	 is	
generally	voluntary.	And	so	it	 is	with	sovereigns	as	well.	Relatively	few	people	and	far	
fewer	 sovereigns	 want	 to	 be	 publicly	 branded	 as	 refusing	 to	 comply	 with	 their	 legal	
obligations.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 sovereign,	 the	 refusal	 to	 comply	 with	 its	 own	 legal	
obligation	may	 undermine	 its	 integrity,	 and	 perhaps	 even	 its	 legitimacy,	 since	 it	 is	 a	
primary	duty	of	the	government	itself	to	make	and	enforce	laws.	
A	 legitimate	 government	 that	 takes	 seriously	 its	 purposes	 of	 creation	 and	
enforcement	of	law	cannot	wish	to	be	seen	as	an	mechanism	for	violating	the	law,	with	
a	consequent	loss	of	public	confidence	and	trust.	Thus,	it	should	not	be	surprising	that	
most	arbitral	awards	against	sovereigns	are	voluntarily	honored.	This	 thesis	will	 focus	
on	 the	 legal	 tools	and	possible	 solutions	 to	ensure	 that	awards	are	either	honored	or	
enforced.	
Several	 reasons	 abound	 why	 States	 may	 not	 want	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
enforcement	of	an	award,	these	reasons	include:	the	sovereign	immunity	of	the	State,	
an	appeal	or	annulment	of	the	award,	dissipation	of	assets	attached	to	the	award	and	
general	 social,	 economic	 or	 political	 influence.	 Specifically,	 these	 challenges	 in	 the	
course	 of	 enforcement	 of	 award	 raise	 the	 question	 as	 to	 what	 extent	 investment	
arbitral	 award	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 tool	 that	 guarantees	 investors	 legitimate	
expectations	 provided	 for	 in	 BITs,	 it	 probes	 the	 relevance	 of	 BITs	 and	 reveals	 the	
limitations	in	the	adjudicatory	powers	of	investment	tribunals.		
The	 ICSID	 Convention	 and	many	 investment	 treaties	 expressly	 impose	 a	 duty	
upon	 sovereigns	 to	 honor	 arbitral	 awards	 issued	 against	 them	 that	 result	 from	
arbitrations	 under	 those	 treaties.15	This	 duty	 requires	 more	 than	 a	 mere	 pro	 forma	
statement,	but	a	solemn	undertaking	by	a	government	 to	comply	with	an	award,	 the	
breach	of	which	constitutes	a	violation	of	the	treaty,	and	thus,	of	international	law.16	It	
																																																													
15	See	ICSID	Convention	Art.	53	and	the	2004	U.S.	Model	BIT	art.	34(5).	
16	See	Decision	on	the	Argentine	Republic’s	Request	for	a	Continued	Stay	of	Enforcement	of	the	Award,	
Enron	Corp.	v.	Republic	of	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/3,	Annulment	Proceeding,	October	7,	2008.	
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is	 certainly	 at	 least	 partially	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 most	 ICSID	 and	 investment	 treaty	
awards	have	been	honored	by	respondent	governments.	A	former	Secretary	General	of	
ICSID	was	quoted	in	2003	as	saying	of	ICSID	awards	‘at	ICSID	there’s	never	been	a	case	
in	which	a	sovereign	had	failed	to	pay	an	award’.17	At	date,	this	statement	is		no	longer	
true.	 There	 have	 been	 at	 least	 five	 ICSID	 awards	 in	which	 enforcement	 actions	were	
filled	in	courts	in	order	to	enforce	the	award.18		
If	 a	 sovereign	 breaches	 its	 international	 law	 duty	 to	 pay	 an	 award,	 the	
government	 of	 the	 claimant	 can	 provide	 diplomatic	 protection	 to	 its	 national,	 using	
diplomatic	 means	 and	 perhaps	 even	 economic	 pressure	 to	 persuade	 the	 debtor	
government	 to	 pay	 the	 award.	 For	 ICSID	 cases,	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 suspends	 the	
right	of	diplomatic	protection	during	the	arbitral	process	but	resurrects	that	right	if	and	
when	a	state	has	‘failed	to	abide	by	and	comply	with’	an	award	as	it	is	obligated	to	do	
under	Article	53	of	the	Convention.19		
As	 we	 will	 see	 thereinafter,	 the	 Claimant	 may	 also	 attempt	 to	 persuade	 its	
national	 government	 to	 initiate	 a	 state-to-state	 arbitration	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 an	
applicable	 investment	treaty	or	 to	 file	a	case	before	the	 International	Court	of	Justice	
(ICJ)	 under	 Article	 64	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 seeking	 a	 finding	 of	 a	 violation	 of	
international	law	and	declaratory	relief.	With	an	ICSID	award,	it	may	also	be	possible	for	
an	investor	to	request	another	interested	State	to	file	an	action	before	the	ICJ.		
An	 investor	who	has	obtained	an	award	under	a	 contractual	 arbitration	 clause	
providing	 for	 arbitration	 under	 the	 arbitral	 rules	 of,	 for	 example,	 the	 International	
Chamber	of	Commerce	(ICC),	UNCITRAL,	the	Stockholm	Chamber	of	Commerce	(SCC),	
or	the	London	Court	of	International	Arbitration	(LCIA)	against	a	sovereign,	or	perhaps	
under	 certain	 circumstances	 against	 a	 state-owned	 company,	 may	 also	 be	 able	 to	
initiate	 an	 investment	 treaty	 arbitration	 against	 the	 sovereign	 to	 obtain	 declaratory	
relief	that	the	sovereign	is	in	breach	of	its	international	obligations	either	to	honor	the	
award	or	for	a	denial	of	justice	if	its	courts	improperly	refuse	to	enforce	the	award.	An	
analogous	case	is	Saipem	v.	Bangladesh,20	in	which	the	courts	of	Bangladesh	allegedly	
obstructed	 an	 ICC	 arbitration	 between	 the	 investor	 and	 a	 state-owned	 company,	
suggesting	the	investor	to	file	an	ICSID	arbitration	against	the	government.	
An	 investor	 who	 has	 obtained	 an	 ICSID	 award	 may	 also	 request	 that	 ICSID	
remind	 the	 debtor	 government	 of	 its	 treaty	 obligation	 to	 honor	 the	 award,	 as	 the	
Secretary	General	of	ICSID	has	done	in	the	past.	The	eminent	arbitration	specialist	Jan	
																																																													
17	Carolyn	Kolker,	When	Nations	go	Bust,	AM.	LAW.,	Nov.	2003,	at	90,92	quoting	KoYung	Tung,	former	
ICSID	Secretary	General	from	2000	to	April	2003.	
18	Georges	 R.	 Dalaume,	 Enforcement	 of	 State	 Contract	 Awards:	 Jurisdictional	 Pitfalls	 and	 Remedies,	
ICSID	Rev.	Foreign	Inv.	L.	J.,	Vol.	8,	No.	1,	(1993).	
19	ICSID	Convention	Art.	27(1).	
20	Saipem	S.p.A.	v.	The	People	Republic’s	of	Bangladesh,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/07.	
15	
	
Paulsson	has	confirmed	this	by	saying,	‘	the	[ICSID]	Secretary	General	has	seen	it	as	an	
appropriate	part	of	his	mission	to	communicate	officially	with	recalcitrant	parties	after	
awards	have	been	rendered,	reminding	the	of	their	 international	obligation	to	respect	
the	result	of	a	process	to	which	they	have	given	their	consent’.21	
The	 investor	 may	 also	 request	 that	 the	World	 Bank	 refuse	 to	 make	 any	 new	
loans	or	provide	any	further	financial	benefits	to	the	debtor	nation	until	it	complies	with	
its	 treaty	 obligations.	 The	 creditor	 may	 also	 request	 that	 other	 multilateral	 lending	
agencies	 and	 international	 financiers	 refrain	 from	providing	new	 loans	 as	 long	 as	 the	
debtor	nation	is	not	in	compliance	with	its	international	duties.	Cristoph	Schreuer,	one	
of	the	most	famous	expert	 in	 ICSID	arbitration	and	author	of	The	 ICSID	Convention:	A	
Commentary,	 the	 definitive	 treatise	 on	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 has	 said	 that	 ‘[m]ost	
States	will	find	it	unwise	to	jeopardize	their	good	standing	with	the	Bank	through	non	
compliance	with	an	ICSID	Award.’22		
Another	possible	option	for	the	investor	who	has	obtained	a	frustrated	award	is	
to	publicize	the	refusal	of	the	debtor	government	to	honor	an	award	either	in	the	host	
country’s	newspapers	or	in	the	international	press,	or	both.	Some	investors	apparently	
believe	 this	may	 be	 their	 best	 leverage	 in	 collecting	 an	 award.	 The	 significance	 of	 a	
government	being	tarnished	with	an	image	of	a	hostile	investment	climate	should	not	
be	underestimated.	Mr.	Paulsson	has	noted	that	‘[w]hen	an	ICSID	award	is	rendered	[..],	
it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 investment	 climate	 would	 be	 adversely	 affected	 if	 it	 were	 not	
respected.	Instances	of	post-award	litigation	before	national	courts	are	not	only	vexing	
to	the	party	seeking	to	rely	on	the	award,	but	also	detrimental	to	the	reputation	of	the	
non-complying	loser’.23	In	addition,	many	nations,	particularly	developing	countries,	are	
reliant	 on	 a	 continuing	 flow	 of	 new	 investment	 funds	 not	 only	 to	 develop	 their	
infrastructure,	 but	 also	 to	 maintain	 economic	 growth.	 A	 sudden	 stoppage	 of	
investment	 flows	may	create	problems	 for	 the	government’s	economy.	 In	 the	case	of	
Amco	Asia	v.	Indonesia,24	the	investor	orchestrated	a	public	relations	campaign	against	
Indonesia,	 and	 the	 government	 in	 turn	 sought	 provisional	 measures	 from	 an	 ICSID	
tribunal	to	restrain	the	investor	from	speaking	to	the	press	about	the	subject	of	the	case	
on	 grounds	 of	 confidentiality.	 The	 Tribunal	 found	 that	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 and	
Arbitration	 Rules	 do	 not	 impose	 an	 obligation	 on	 the	 parties	 to	 maintain	 the	
confidentiality	of	 the	arbitral	 proceeding,	 and	 it	 refused	 to	 restrain	 the	 investor	 from	
speaking	to	the	press	or	issuing	press	releases	concerning	the	proceedings.		
																																																													
21	Jan	Paulsson,	ICSID’	Achivements	and	Prospects,	6	ICSID	Rev.-Foreign	Inv.L.J.	380,	386,1991.	
22	Cristoph		H.	Schreuer	The	ICSID	Convention:	A	Commentary,	3	(2001).	
23	Jan	Paulsson,	ICSID’	Achivements	and	Prospects,	6	ICSID	Rev.-Foreign	Inv.L.J.	380,	386,1991.	
24		 Amco	 Asia	 Corp.	 V.	 Indonesia,	 ICSID	 Case	No.	 ARB/81/8,	 1	 ICSID	 Reports	 410,	 Decision	 on	 Interim	
Measures	of	9	December	1983.	
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For	 ICSID	 proceedings,	 the	 host	 government	 may	 seek	 to	 annul	 the	 award	
before	a	newly-constituted	ad	hoc	annulment	Committee.	 In	filing	such	a	proceeding,	
the	 government	 typically	 requests	 a	 stay	 of	 enforcement	 of	 the	 award	 during	 the	
pendency	of	the	annulment	proceeding.	In	response	to	such	a	request,	the	investor	may	
seek	 an	 order	 from	 the	 Committee	 that	 the	 government	 must	 post	 some	 form	 of	
security,	such	as	bank	guarantee,	a	bond,	or	an	escrow	fund,	as	a	condition	of	the	stay.	
Every	ad	hoc	annulment	committee	to	date	has	held	that	it	possesses	the	authority	to	
require	security	as	a	condition	of	a	 stay.25	In	determining	whether	 to	 require	security,	
recent	committees	have	looked	to	whether	the	government	will	likely	honor	its	Article	
53	obligation	to	comply	with	the	award	voluntarily	at	the	conclusion	of	the	annulment	
proceeding26.	
If	a	government	refuses	to	honor	its	international	obligations	to	comply	with	an	
award,	and	it	becomes	necessary	to	enforce	it,	 it	may	in	principle	be	enforced	against	
the	assets	of	the	sovereign	itself,	against	debts	owed	to	the	sovereign,	or	under	certain	
circumstances	 against	 the	 assets	 of	 a	 state-owned	 company	 or	 debts	 owed	 to	 such	
company.	 As	 a	 general	 rule,	 only	 the	 commercial	 (not	 sovereign)	 assets	 of	 the	
government	are	subject	to	attachment	to	satisfy	the	award.	In	some	jurisdictions,	there	
must	also	be	a	nexus	between	the	subject	matter	of	the	award	and	the	assets	attached.	
The	 rules	 in	 various	 countries	 are	 not	 uniform,	 and	 in	 any	 given	 country	 it	 can	 be	
difficult	to	predict	the	application	of	the	rules	to	specific	assets.	
Enforcement	take	place	in	two	stages.	The	first	stage	is	the	enforcement	phase,	
in	which	the	award	 is	accepted	by	the	court	for	enforcement.	At	this	stage,	sovereign	
immunity	is	not	relevant	and	may	not	prevent	a	court	order	of	enforcement.	In	at	least	
some	 countries,	 a	 stay	 of	 enforcement	 does	 not	 prevent	 the	 filing	 at	 this	 stage	 of	
conservatory	measures	 to	create	a	 lien	and	establish	a	priority	of	 rights.27	The	second	
stage	deals	with	execution	on	specific	assets.	It	is	at	this	stage	that	sovereign	immunity	
from	 enforcement	 becomes	 relevant	 and	 may	 prevent	 the	 attachment	 of	 specific	
assets.	 In	at	 least	 some	countries,	a	 stay	of	enforcement	only	 restrains	 the	execution	
stage.	
State	 immunity	 is	 a	 plea	 that	 can	 be	 used	 by	 a	 state	 against	 another	 state’s	
municipal	 court	 proceedings	 and	 judgments,	 as	 both	 would	 undermine	 the	 state’s	
																																																													
25 	See,	 e.g.,	 Enron	 Corp.	 and	 Ponderosa	 Assets,	 L.P.	 (Enron(	 v.	 Argentine	 Rep.	 (ICSID	 Case	 No.	
ARB/O1/3)-	Annulment	Proceeding,	Decision	on	the	Argentine	Republic’s	Request	for	a	Continued	Stay	
of	Enforcement	of	the	Award,	October	7,	2008.	
26	CMS	Gas	Transmission	Co	v.	Argentina	(ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8),	Annulment	Proceeding,	Decision	on	
the	Argentine	Republic’s	Request	for	a	Continued	Stay	of	Enforcement	fo	the	Award,	September	1,	2006;	
MTD	 Equity	 Sdn	 Bhd.	 &	 MTD	 Chile	 S.A.	 v.	 Chile	 (	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/01/7),Annulment	 Proceeding,	
Decision	on	the	Respondent’s	Request	for	a	Continued	Stay	of	Execution,	1	June	2005.	
27	See,e.g.,	Van	den	Bossche	v.	Hartford	Accident	and	 Indemnity	Co.,	125	B.R	571,	573	 (N.D.	Cal.	1991);	
Norbert	Beyrard	v.	la	Republique	de	Cote	d’Ivorie,	published	in	Revue	de	l’arbitrage	133	(1994).	
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sovereignty.28	In	1812,	the	state	immunity	principle	was	first	used	in	the	US	in	the	case	
of	Schooner	 Exchange	 v	MacFadden	 in	 which	 the	 French	 government	 seized	 a	 vessel	
owned	 by	 a	US	 citizen.	 The	 vessel	was	 then	 remodelled	 and	 used	 as	 an	 armed	 ship.	
However,	the	court	then	dismissed	the	case	filed	by	the	owner	on	the	grounds	of	state	
immunity.29	In	the	UK,	the	principle	was	adopted	by	the	court	in	the	case	of	Parlement	
Belge	 in	 which	 the	 court	 had	 granted	 the	 same	 immunity	 to	 a	 mail	 packet	 which	
belonged	to	a	Belgian	monarch.30	Subsequently,	the	doctrine	of	state	immunity,	which	
was	 described	 as	 “undisputed	 principle	 of	 customary	 international	 law”	 has	 evolved	
through	the	years.31	In	the	18th	and	19th	centuries,	state	immunity	was	an	absolute	right	
of	each	sovereign	state	against	any	court	proceedings.	This	generally	means	that	any	
judgment	 issued	by	a	court	 in	a	specific	 state	cannot	bind	another	state.	However,	 in	
the	20th	century,	states	became	significantly	more	involved	in	international	trade	which	
required	a	new	approach	to	the	principle	of	state	immunity.32	As	a	result,	theories	were	
developed	that	aimed	to	distinguish	between	the	acts	of	a	state	of	a	governmental	and	
sovereign	 nature	 with	 those	 which	 were	 made	 in	 a	 private	 capacity	 that	 mainly	 are	
concerned	with	commercial	activities.	The	defence	of	state	immunity	of	a	state	against	
court	proceedings	in	another	state	is	a	complex	area	of	law.	It	does	not	only	fall	under	
international	law,	but	also	the	local	laws	of	each	state.	Furthermore,	each	state	decides	
the	 limit	 through	 local	 laws	 on	 how	 and	 when	 a	 claimant	 may	 file	 a	 case33	against	
another	 state.	 	However,	 states	 in	 recent	 years	 recognised	 the	 importance	of	 foreign	
capitals	 and	 investments	 to	 their	 local	 economies.	 As	 a	 result,	 measures	 to	 attract	
foreign	 investors	 to	 invest	 became	 top	 priorities	 for	 many	 reasons	 such	 as	 seeking	
public	prosperity	or	 for	 local	political	advantages.	 It	also	became	a	challenge	because	
rigid	 rules	 that	 prevent	 suing	 the	 state	 had	 to	 be	 compromised	 to	 insure	 foreign	
investors	 the	 guarantee	 of	 accessing	 the	 justice	 system	 against	 the	 state.	 Therefore,	
conventions,	treaties	and	local	laws	have	been	enforced	to	reflect	this	new	international	
approach	 to	 promote	 investment.	 In	 addition,	many	 states	 have	 agreed	 to	 resort	 to	
arbitration,	such	as	ICSID,	through	waiving	their	right	to	both	refuse	to	litigate,	on	the	
grounds	 of	 immunity,	 and	 to	 resort	 to	 competent	 courts.	 However,	 in	 several	 cases,	
																																																													
28	Fox,	H.,	The	Law	of	State	Immunity	(2nd	ed.)	(Oxford:	OUP,	2008).	
29	See	Schooner	Exchange	v	MacFadden,	7	Cranch	116	(1812)	
30	The	Parlemnt	Belge	5	P.	D.	197	(1880)	
31	McNamara,	 T.,	 A	 Primer	 on	 Foreign	 Sovereign	 Immunity,	 Union	 Internationale	 des	 Avocats	 Winter	
Seminar	on	International	Civil	Litigation	and	the	United	States	of	America,	February/March	2006.	(1)
	
32	Caplan,	 L.,	 State	 Immunity,	 Human	 Rights,	 and	 Jus	 Cogens:	 A	 Critique	 of	 the	 Normative	 Hierarchy	
Theory,	97
	
Am.	J.	Int’l	L.	at	p.743	(2003)
	
33	For	 example,	 the	 High	 Court	 in	 England	 and	 House	 of	 Lords	 have	 dismissed	 claims	 of	 torture	 and	
human	rights	violations	against	the	Kuwaiti	government	on	the	basis	that	the	Kuwaiti	government	was	
protected	under	a	local	law,	UK	State	Immunity	Act	of	1978.
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although	governments	have	agreed	 to	 resort	 to	arbitration,	when	 the	 investor	 filed	a	
claim,	 states	 often	 used	 the	 principle	 of	 state	 immunity	 to	 avoid	 either	 to	 appear	 in	
front	of	a	tribunal	or	to	enforce	an	award.	This	thesis	will	discuss	the	issues	related	to	
states	when	using	 immunity	plea	against	 ICSID	arbitration	as	 it	 has	 its	 unique	 stance	
and	power	in	comparison	to	other	arbitral	institutions.	
In	 determining	 the	 immunity	 of	 certain	 assets	 from	 attachment,	 it	 may	 be	
necessary	to	refer	to	treatise	such	as	the	 ICSID	Convention,	the	New	York	or	Panama	
Conventions,	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 State	 Immunity,	 the	 United	 Nations	
Convention	 on	 Jurisdictional	 Immunities	 of	 States	 and	 their	 Property,	 the	 Vienna	
Convention	 on	 Diplomatic	 Relations, 34 	and	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 Consular	
Relations,	along	with	any	applicable	bilateral	treatise.		
To	attach	a	debt	owed	to	a	sovereign,	in	some	jurisdiction	it	is	necessary	to	show	
that	the	situs	of	the	debt	is	located	in	the	state	in	which	attachment	is	sought	and	that	
the	 debt	 or	 funds	 obtained	 from	 its	 payment	 are	 used	 by	 the	 state	whose	 debts	 are	
attached	 for	 commercial	 purposes	 in	 the	 enforcing’s	 state’s	 territory.	 Some	 states	
closely	examine	the	purpose	for	which	a	sovereign	debt	or	its	resulting	funds	are	used	in	
determining	 whether	 it	 is	 commercial	 in	 nature.	 Taxes	 of	 various	 sorts	 owed	 to	 a	
government	are	generally	considered	as	sovereign,	not	commercial,	property.		
The	 assets	 of	 a	 state-owned	 company	 may	 be	 attached	 to	 satisfy	 an	 award	
against	 the	 state	 that	 owns	 it	 if	 the	 company	 is	 so	 extensively	 controlled	 by	 the	
sovereign	 that	a	principal-agency	 relationship	 is	created	which	would	work	a	 fraud	or	
injustice.35	This	effectively	applies	the	U.S.	alter	ego	test	for	disregard	of	the	corporate	
identity	to	a	state-owned	company.	But	other	tests	might	also	be	applied,	such	as,	for	
example,	 those	used	for	attribution	of	state	responsibility	under	Articles	4,	5	and	8	of	
the	International	Law	Commission’s	Articles	of	State	Responsibility.	These	tests	include	
whether	the	company	is	considered	an	organ	of	the	state	under	its	own	law,	whether	it	
exercises	sovereign	authority	or	whether	it	is	directed	or	controlled	by	the	sovereign.	In	
addition,	in	certain	circumstances	the	abuse	of	rights	doctrine	might	also	be	applied.36	
An	alternative	to	collecting	directly	against	a	sovereign	is	to	collect	on	political	
risk	 insurance	 (PRI)	 policy	 when	 a	 sovereign	 refuses	 to	 honor	 the	 award.	 There	 are	
many	types	of	PRI	coverage	available.	For	example,	Arbitral	Award	Default	Coverage	is	
available	 to	 cover	 a	 sovereign’s	 dishonor	 of	 an	 award	 arising	 from	 the	 breach	 of	 a	
specified	 contract.	 Separate	 PRI	 coverage	 is	 available	 for	 a	 denial	 of	 justice,	 which	
typically	 applies	 when	 the	 wrongful	 action	 of	 a	 government,	 usually	 a	 local	 court	
																																																													
34	The	 two	 Vienna	 Conventions	 may	 be	 useful	 when	 enforcement	 is	 sought	 against	 the	 assets	 of	 an	
embassy	or	consulate.	
35	First	national	City	Bank	v.	Banco	Para	El	Comercio	Exterior	de	Cuba,	462	U.S.	611,	629	(1983).	
36	Karl	 Heinz	 Bockstiegel,	 Arbitration	 and	 State	 Enterprises:	 Survey	 on	 the	 National	 and	 International	
State	of	Law	and	Practice	45-56	(1984).	
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injunction,	prevents	arbitration	from	proceeding	or	renders	the	arbitration	impossible.	
PRI	coverage	for	refusal	of	a	sovereign	to	honor	an	arbitral	award	arising	from	a	treaty-
based	arbitration	has	not	been	generally	 available	 in	 the	past,	 but	 is	 a	product	being	
considered	by	PRI	insurers.	
In	 sum,	 most	 arbitral	 awards	 against	 sovereigns	 are	 honored	 by	 the	 debtor	
government,	in	part	because	of	contractual	and	treaty	obligations	of	the	government.	
Relatively	 few	 successful	 claimants	 have	 been	 forced	 to	 initiate	 enforcement	
proceedings	 in	 court.	 When	 governments	 do	 not	 honor	 their	 obligations,	 their	
investment	climates	may	suffer	a	 loss	of	 reputation,	perhaps	slowing	the	 flow	of	new	
investments	 into	 the	 country.	 Multilateral	 and	 other	 international	 lenders	 may	 also	
hesitate	in	committing	funds	to	a	nation	that	has	not	honored	its	international	financial	
commitments.	 The	 claimant’s	 government	 may	 exercise	 diplomatic	 protection,	
possibly	including	economic	pressure,	to	persuade	the	debtor	state	to	pay	the	award.	If	
a	sovereign	persists	in	dishonoring	an	award	against	it,	enforcement	may	be	obtained	
against	commercial	assets	or	debts	owed	to	it,	or	in	certain	circumstances,	even	against	
the	assets	or	debts	of	a	state-owned	company.	
This	 thesis	aims	to	provide	add	to	 the	 transparency	of	 this	 subject	and	 further	
spur	the	consistent	development	of	this	area	of	law.	
It	will	therefore	try	to	give	an	answer	to	this	problem,	focusing	in	particular	on	
the	 existing	 solutions	 and	 on	 the	 tools	 to	 be	 used	 in	 order	 to	 face	 the	 issue	 of	
enforcement	in	the	network	of	international	investment	law	and	arbitration.		
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Chapter	1 	
Treaty	obligations	to	honour	arbitral	awards:	focus	on	the	New	York	Convention	and	
the	ICSID	Convention	
	
The	World	Bank's	founders	believed	that	the	principal	function	of	the	institution	would	be	to	
encourage	 international	 investment	 by	 private	 investors.	 According	 to	 Ibrahim	 Shihata,	 past	 Vice	
President	and	General	Counsel	of	 the	World	Bank	and	Secretary-General	of	 the	 ICSID,	 the	primary	
objective	of	the	ICSID	is	to	promote	a	climate	of	mutual	confidence	between	investors	and	states	so	
as	 to	 increase	 the	 flow	 of	 resources	 to	 developing	 countries	 under	 reasonable	 conditions.	 It	 is	
therefore	 expected	 that	 like	 the	 World	 Bank,	 the	 ICSID	 must	 be	 regarded	 as	 an	 instrument	 of	
international	policy	for	promoting	investment	and	economic	development.		
The	 key	 purpose	 in	 establishing	 ICSID	 was	 to	 assure	 foreign	 investors	 of	 protection	 under	
international	law	from	unilateral	actions	of	host	countries	that	could	jeopardize	their	investments.	At	
the	 same	 time,	 host	 countries	 of	 foreign	 investments	 are	 assured	 a	 neutral	 dispute	 resolution	
mechanism	that	shields	them	from	the	economic	manipulations	of	developed	countries.	The	 ICSID	
thus	 provides	 a	 level	 playing	 field	 for	 host	 countries	 and	 foreign	 investors	 alike.	 Both	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 and	 the	 ICSID	 Rules	 of	 Arbitration	 create	 this	 balance.	 While	 the	 Convention	 gives	
private	investors	access	to	an	international	forum,	the	Rules	assure	them	that	the	absence	of	a	state	
party	 to	 the	 dispute	 or	 its	 refusal	 to	 participate	 in	 proceedings	 after	 it	 has	 consented	 to	 ICSID	
arbitration	cannot	frustrate	the	arbitral	process.		
Article	25(1)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	provides	for	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ICSID.	According	to	
that	article:	
	
The	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Centre	 shall	 extend	 to	 any	 legal	 dispute	 arising	 directly	 out	 of	 an	
investment,	 between	 a	 Contracting	 State	 (or	 any	 constituent	 subdivision	 or	 agency	 of	 a	 Contracting	
State	designated	to	 the	Centre	by	that	State)	and	a	national	of	another	Contracting	State,	which	the	
parties	 to	 the	 dispute	 consent	 in	 writing	 to	 submit	 to	 the	 Centre.	When	 the	 parties	 have	 given	 their	
consent,	no	party	may	withdraw	its	consent	unilaterally.	
	
Thus,	 for	 the	 ICSID	 to	 be	 vested	with	 jurisdiction,	 a	 case	must	 first	 involve	 a	 legal	 dispute	
arising	 out	 of	 an	 investment.	 Second,	 the	 dispute	 must	 be	 between	 a	 contracting	 state	 or	 its	
authorized	constituent	subdivision	or	agency,	and	a	national	of	another	contracting	state.	Third,	the	
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parties	must	have	consented	in	writing	to	bring	their	dispute	to	the	ICSID,	and	such	consent	may	not	
be	unilaterally	withdrawn.37	
With	 the	 recent	 rapid	 increase	 of	 arbitrations	 commenced	 against	 States	 pursuant	 to	
investment	 treaties,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 examine	 state’s	 treaty	 obligation	 to	 honour	 final	 treaty-based	
awards.	There	are	obligations	to	honour	awards	under	specific	 treaties	such	as	NAFTA,	the	Energy	
Charter	 Treaty	 (ECT)	 and	 some	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 (Bits),	 but	 we	 will	 focus	 only	 on	
obligations	under	the	New	York	Convention	and	the	ICSID	Convention.		
	
1.1.1 	New	York	Convention	and	Enforcement	under	the	New	York	Convention	
Applicable	 rules	 to	 the	 enforcement	 of	 international	 arbitral	 awards	 in	 general	 and	 with	
special	 reference	 as	 to	 enforcement	 against	 states,	 are	 provided	 under	 the	 1958	 New	 York	
Convention	on	the	Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	Foreign	Arbitral	Awards	and	under	the	1965	(NY	
Convention)	Washington	Convention	on	the	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	Between	States	and	
Nationals	of	Other	States	(ICSID	Convention).	
An	obligation	 to	honour	a	 treaty-based	arbitration	award	may	be	 implied	 if	 the	 respondent	
state	 has	 ratified	 the	 New	 York	 Convention.	 Definitely,	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 is	 not	 aimed	
specifically	 at	 treaty-based	 arbitration	 awards,	 as	 it	 generally	 requires	 the	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 not	 recognized	 as	 domestic	 awards	 in	 the	 State	 where	 their	
recognition	ad	enforcement	 is	being	 sought.	Thus,	 the	New	York	Convention	 is	directed	at	 state’s	
obligations	 to	 enforce	 awards	 rendered	 elsewhere,	 rather	 than	 at	 state’s	 obligation	 to	 honour	 an	
award	 rendered	against	 it.	However,	 the	New	York	Convention	does	extend	 to	 investment	 treaty-
based	awards	against	 sovereign	states,	and	 is	expressly	 referenced	 in	NAFTA	Chapter	1138	and	 the	
ECT39,	and	thus	may	be	useful	for	grounding	a	treaty	obligation	to	honour	an	award	rendered	against	
one	of	the	156	state	parties	to	the	New	York	Convention.40	That	said,	the	New	York	Convention	will	
not	apply	to	investment	treaty	awards	rendered	under	the	aegis	of	the	ICSID	Convention,	which	are	
subject	to	a	special	recognition,	enforcement	and	annulment	regime.		
Article	 III	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 provides	 that:	 'Each	 Contracting	 State	 shall	
recognize	arbitral	awards	as	binding	and	enforce	them	in	accordance	with	the	rules	of	procedure	of	
the	 territory	 where	 the	 award	 is	 relied	 upon,	 under	 the	 conditions	 laid	 down	 in	 the	 following	
																																																													
37		Some	concepts	in	Article	25(1)	require	further	clarification.	For	example,	the	term	"investment"	was	not	defined	by	the	
ICSID	Convention.	This	was	not	an	oversight,	but	a	deliberate	attempt	by	the	drafters	of	the	Convention	to	have	a	wider	
and	 more	 flexible	 interpretation	 covering	 major	 international	 business	 transactions	 rather	 than	 just	 trade	 in	 the	
traditional	sense.		
38	NAFTA	Article	1136(7),	Finality	and	Enforcement	of	an	Award,		provides	:	A	claim	that	is	submitted	to	arbitration	under	
this	Section	shall	be	considered	to	arise	out	of	a	commercial	 relationship	or	 transaction	 for	purposes	of	Article	 I	of	 the	
New	York	Convention	and	Article	I	of	the	InterAmerican	Convention.	
39	ECT	Article	26(5),	named	Settlement	of	Disputes	between	an	Investor	and	a	Contracting	Party	provides	an	“agreement	
in	writing”	 for	purposes	of	article	 II	of	 the	United	Nations	Convention	on	 the	Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	Foreign	
Arbitral	Awards,	done	at	New	York,	10	June	1958	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	the	“New	York	Convention”).	
40See	http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html	
22	
	
articles.'41	The	 meaning	 of	 this	 provision	 is	 that	 enforcement	 of	 award	 depends	 on	 the	 laws	 of	
contracting	States	whereas	the	aim	of	investment	arbitration	is	to	take	disputes	out	of	the	national	
court	system	and	give	 investors	 the	prime	power	 to	choose	a	neutral	ground	for	 the	settlement	of	
disputes.	 This	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 problem	 in	 the	 enforcement	 mechanism	 under	 this	 institution	
because	of	the	possibility	that	the	awards	may	be	reviewed	or	refused	to	be	enforced	in	the	courts	of	
member	 states	 due	 to	 judicial,	 political	 and	 economic	 interference	 or	 based	 on	 the	 provisions	 of	
Article	V	which	states	the	grounds	to	refuse	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	award.	
The	New	York	Convention	replaces	between	its	contracting	states	the	Geneva	Convention	
on	 the	 Execution	 of	 Foreign	 Arbitral	 Awards	 of	 1927,	 and	 purports	 to	 overcome	 the	 difficulties	
encountered	by	its	application.	The	Convention	strikes	a	balance	two	competing	interests:	one	is	to	
give	full	effect	to	the	parties’	choice	of	arbitration;	the	other	is	to	allow	a	degree	of	supervision	by	the	
national	court	on	arbitration.	Its	ultimate	contribution	lies	in	the	favour	granted	to	the	parties’	private	
freedom	to	choose	arbitration.	
Among	 others,	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 aims	 at	 eliminating	 the	 need	 for	 judicial	
confirmation	 of	 the	 award	 preliminarily	 to	 the	 enforcement	 procedure	 (so-called	 “double	
exequatur”);	 at	 restricting	 the	grounds	 for	 refusal	of	enforcement	of	awards;	and	at	 shifting	 to	 the	
resisting	 party	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 of	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 award.	With	 this	 respect	 the	 New	 York	
Convention	is	the	principal	standard	for	enforcement,	replicated	in	other	regional	agreements,	in	the	
UNCITRAL	Model	Law	and	in	domestic	laws.	
Articles	 III	 and	 IV	 lay	 down	 the	 general	 obligation	 for	 recognizing	 foreign	 awards42		 as	
binding	 and	 enforcing	 them	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 rules	 of	 procedure,	 at	 the	 same	 conditions	
imposed	 on	 domestic	 awards.	 Article	 IV	 imposes	 to	 the	 party	 seeking	 enforcement	 to	 supply	 the	
court	with	(a)	the	arbitral	award,	and	(b)	the	original	arbitral	agreement;	thereby	allowing	the	party	a	
prima	facie	entitlement	for	enforcement.	
The	 resisting	 party	 can	 oppose	 enforcement	 exclusively	 on	 the	 seven	 grounds	 set	 out	 in	
Article	 V;	 the	 court	 may	 ex	 officio	 raise	 two	 grounds.43	These	 seven	 grounds	 for	 vacating	 the	
enforcement	reveal	the	international	common	core	for	refusal	of	enforcement.44	
																																																													
41	Article	III,	New	York	Convention	for	the	Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	Foreign	Arbitral	Awards.		
42	The	New	York	Convention	applies	to	foreign	arbitral	awards.	In	the	sense	of	Article	I(1),	foreign	awards	are	those	made	
in	the	territory	of	any	other	state,	as	well	as	those	which	are	not	considered	domestic	awards.	If	a	state	has	ratified	the	
New	York	Convention	under	the	reservation	set	out	in	Art.	I(3),	it	will	only	apply	the	Convention	to	arbitral	awards	made	
in	another	contracting	state	(“reciprocity	reservation”);	or	to	arbitral	awards	considered	as	commercial.	
Article	 I(1)	of	 the	New	York	Convention:	 “1.	This	convention	shall	apply	 to	 the	 recognition	and	enforcement	of	arbitral	
awards	made	in	the	territory	of	a	State	other	than	the	State	where	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	such	awards	are	
sought,	and	arising	out	of	differences	between	persons,	whether	physical	or	legal.	It	shall	also	apply	to	arbitral	awards	not	
considered	as	domestic	awards	in	the	State	where	their	recognition	and	enforcement	are	sought.”	
Article	 I(3)	of	 the	Convention:	 “3.	When	signing,	 ratifying	or	acceding	 to	 this	Convention,	or	notifying	extension	under	
Article	X	hereof,	any	State	may	on	the	basis	of	reciprocity	declare	that	it	will	apply	the	Convention	to	the	recognition	and	
enforcement	of	awards	made	only	in	the	territory	of	another	contracting	State.	It	may	also	declare	that	it	will	apply	the	
Convention	 only	 to	 differences	 arising	 out	 of	 legal	 relationships,	whether	 contractual	 or	 not,	which	 are	 considered	 as	
commercial	under	the	national	law	of	the	State	making	such	declaration.”	
43	Article	V	of	the	Convention:	“1.	Recognition	and	enforcement	of	the	award	may	be	refused,	at	the	request	of	the	party	
against	 whom	 it	 is	 invoked,	 only	 if	 that	 party	 furnishes	 to	 the	 competent	 authority	 where	 the	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	is	sought,	proof	that:	
(a)	The	parties	to	the	agreement	referred	to	in	article	II	were,	under	the	law	applicable	to	them,	under	some	incapacity,	or	the	
said	agreement	is	not	valid	under	the	law	to	which	the	parties	have	subjected	it	or,	failing	any	indication	thereon,	under	the	
law	of	the	country	where	the	award	was	made;	or	
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The	first	ground	under	Article	V(2)(a)	concerns	the	invalidity	of	the	arbitration	agreement.	
Grounds	 for	 refusal	 under	 letters	 (b),(c)	 and	 (d)	 concern	 procedural	 defects	 in	 arbitration	 such	 as:	
violation	 of	 due	 process,	 excess	 of	 authority	 by	 arbitrators,	 irregular	 composition	 of	 the	 arbitral	
tribunal,	when	they	amount	to	serious	procedural	 irregularities.	Fifth	ground	 is	 the	setting	aside	of	
the	 award	 under	 the	 law	 the	 country	where	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 legally	 seated,	 or	 under	 the	 laws	
governing	the	arbitral	procedure	–	the	so-called	lex	arbitri	
Further	two	grounds	for	refusal	of	enforcement,	which	may	be	raised	as	well	by	the	court,	
concern	 (a)	 arbitrability	 of	 the	 dispute;	 and	 (b)	 compatibility	 with	 public	 policy;	 both	 are	 grounds	
referring	to	the	law	of	the	court	of	enforcement.	
In	the	system	envisaged	by	the	New	York	Convention,	when	recognition	and	enforcement	
is	 refused	 in	one	country,	 that	refusal	does	not	 impair	 the	 initial	award.	A	court	 in	another	country	
may	 take	 a	 different	 view	 and	 permit	 enforcement;	 this	 may	 take	 place	 simultaneously	 and	 is	
referred	 to	 as	 “multiple	 proceedings”	 in	 the	 same	 dispute.	 There	may	 be	 a	 distinction	 where	 the	
challenge	 to	 the	 enforcement	 is	made	under	 the	 lex	 arbitri,	which	possibly	 nullifies	 the	 award	 and	
renders	 it	 unenforceable	 in	 all	 states,	 according	 to	Article	V(1)(e).	 Refusal	 of	 enforcement	 is	 still	 a	
mere	faculty	of	the	court,	so	the	lack	of	a	duty	to	abide	by	the	annulment	in	the	country	of	origin	of	
the	award	prevents	this	system	to	operate	properly45.	
The	 New	 York	 Convention	 does	 not	 contain	 any	 express	 reference	 to	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	 against	 a	 state,	 even	 if	 it	 is	well	 established	 that	 the	New	York	
Convention	applies	also	to	awards	involving	states.	
Unlike	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 was	 designed	 to	 permit	 the	
enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 between	 private	 parties	 as	 well	 as	 between	 private	 parties	 and	
foreign	States.	Though	nothing	in	the	Convention	explicitly	refers	to	States,	there	is	no	doubt	that	it	
permits	enforcement	as	against	sovereign	States.37	
State	 immunity	 is	not	one	of	 the	explicit	grounds	on	which	a	court	can	 rest	a	decision	 to	
refuse	 to	 enforce	 an	 arbitral	 award	 under	 the	New	York	Convention.	 There	 are,	 how-ever,	 several	
avenues	through	which	immunity	might	enter.	State	jurisdictional	immunity	could	arise	in	defences	
																																																																																																																																																																																																																	
(b)	The	party	against	whom	the	award	is	invoked	was	not	given	proper	notice	of	the	appointment	of	the	arbitrator	or	of	the	
arbitration	proceedings	or	was	otherwise	unable	to	present	his	case;	or	
(c)	The	award	deals	with	a	difference	not	contemplated	by	or	not	falling	within	the	terms	of	the	submission	to	arbitration,	or	it	
contains	decisions	on	matters	beyond	the	scope	of	 the	submission	to	arbitration,	provided	that,	 if	 the	decisions	on	matters	
submitted	to	arbitration	can	be	separated	from	those	not	so	submitted,	that	part	of	the	award	which	contains	decisions	on	
matters	submitted	to	arbitration	may	be	recognized	and	enforced;	or	
(d)	 The	 composition	 of	 the	 arbitral	 authority	 or	 the	 arbitral	 procedure	 was	 not	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 agreement	 of	 the	
parties,	or,	failing	such	agreement,	was	not	in	accordance	with	the	law	of	the	country	where	the	arbitration	took	place;	or	
(e)	The	award	has	not	yet	become	binding,	on	the	parties,	or	has	been	set	aside	or	suspended	by	a	competent	authority	of	the	
country	in	which,	or	under	the	law	of	which,	that	award	was	made.	
2.	Recognition	and	enforcement	of	an	arbitral	award	may	also	be	 refused	 if	 the	competent	authority	 in	 the	country	where	
recognition	and	enforcement	is	sought	finds	that:	
(a)	The	subject	matter	of	the	difference	is	not	capable	of	settlement	by	arbitration	under	the	law	of	that	country;	or	
(b)	The	recognition	or	enforcement	of	the	award	would	be	contrary	to	the	public	policy	of	that	country.”	
44	Can	be	grouped	in	(a)	excess	of	power	by	the	arbitrators;	(b)	validity	of	the	arbitration	agreement;	(c)	annulment	in	the	
country	of	origin.	See:	Cordero	Moss	G.,	International	Commercial	Arbitration,	Oslo	1999,	p.	229.	
45	Paulsson	 J.,	 May	 or	 Must	 Under	 the	 New	 York	 Convention;	 an	 Exercise	 in	 Syntax	 and	 Linguistics,	 14	 International	
Arbitration	227	(1998).	
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based	on	 lack	of	capacity,	arbitrability	of	 the	award,	or	 the	tribunal’s	 treatment	of	matters	beyond	
the	scope	of	submission	to	arbitration.	
State	 immunity	 from	execution	would	 likely	arise	 in	 two	ways.	The	 first	avenue	 is	via	 the	
public	 policy	 exception	 in	 Article	 V(2)(b).46	The	 argument	 in	 favour	 of	 extending	 the	 exception	 to	
encompass	 immunity	 is	 that	 the	basic	 justifications	 for	 recognizing	State	 immunity	 are	 eﬀectively	
public	 policy	 concerns:	 ‘Either	 for	 reasons	 of	 international	 comity	 or	 of	 internal	 constitutional	
structure,	 it	 is	 believed	 that	 the	 courts	 should	 not	 complicate	 potentially	 sensitive	 foreign	 policy	
issues	 by	 “interfering”	 to	 order	 execution	 against	 property	 vested	 in	 a	 foreign	 State’.	 The	 second	
avenue	 is	 via	Article	 III	 of	 the	New	York	Convention,	which	provides	 that	 contracting	parties	 ‘shall	
recognize	arbitral	awards	as	binding	and	enforce	them	in	accordance	with	the	rules	of	procedure	of	
the	territory	where	the	award	 is	relied	on	[	 .	 .	 .	 ]’.	Accordingly,	municipal	 immunity	 laws	have	been	
treated	 as	 preliminary	 matters	 of	 procedure	 which	 claimants	 seeking	 to	 execute	 awards	 must	
overcome.47	
Claimants	have	argued,	with	a	mixed	degree	of	success,	that	the	agreement	of	a	State	to	
arbitrate	 includes	an	 implied	waiver	of	a	claim	of	 immunity	 from	the	enforcement	of	any	 resulting	
award	 if	 that	 award	 is	 governed	 by	 the	 New	 York	 Convention.48	Certainly	 there	 is	 no	 explicit	
reservation	of	waiver	with	respect	to	execution,	such	as	exists	in	the	ICSID	Convention,	which	leaves	
open	 the	 possibility	 of	 an	 implied	 waiver	 argument	 in	 an	 enforcement	 action	 in	 municipal	 court.	
Again,	though,	the	success	of	that	argument	depends	on	municipal	State	immunity	 law.	Moreover,	
varied	responses	are	possible.	One	possibility	is	that	a	respondent	State’s	agreement	to	arbitrate	in	a	
State	that	is	party	to	the	New	York	Convention,	such	that	any	award	is	governed	by	the	Convention,	
is	 an	 implied	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 in	 any	 subsequent	 enforcement	 action,	 regardless	 whether	 the	
respondent	State	is	itself	a	party	to	the	Convention.	A	second	variation	is	that	only	if	the	respondent	
State	 itself	 is	 a	 party	 to	 the	 Convention	 would	 such	 a	 waiver	 be	 implied,	 regardless	 whether	 the	
award	 itself	 was	 rendered	 in	 a	 New	 York	 Convention	 State	 and	was	 thus	 subject	 to	 enforcement	
under	the	Convention.	Some	States	accept	the	implied	waiver	argument,	but	require	that	the	subject	
matter	of	 the	dispute	be	 tied	 to	assets	a	 successful	 claimant	 is	 seeking	 to	attach.	Even	 if	a	State’s	
court	asserts	 jurisdiction	over	the	respondent	State	in	the	enforcement	proceeding,	however,	most	
municipal	 immunity	laws	require	a	separate	examination	of	the	status	of	the	property	sought	to	be	
attached.	 If	 it	 is	 not	 commercial	 property,	 an	 explicit	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 with	 respect	 to	 that	
property	will	be	required	before	attachment	is	permitted.	
	
1.1.2 Collection	Mechanism	under	the	New	York	Convention	
Unlike	 the	 ICSID	Convention,	 the	New	York	Convention	was	 not	 designed	 specifically	 to	
permit	the	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards	rendered	in	disputes	between	private	parties	and	foreign	
																																																													
46	S.J.	Toope,	Mixed	International	Arbitration	(1990)	140–1;	Fox,	above	n.	7,	837.	
47	Fox,	above,	836–7.	
48	Toope,	above	n.	38,	146–8;	A.	Jan	van	den	Berg,	‘Some	Recent	Problems	in	the	Practice	of	Enforcement	under	the	New	
York	 and	 ICSID	 Conventions’,	 2	 ICSID	 Review–Foreign	 Investment	 Law	 Journal	 (1987)	 439,	 450;	 V.O.	 Orlu	 Nmehielle,	
‘Enforcing	 Arbitration	 Awards	 under	 the	 International	 Convention	 for	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Investment	 Disputes	 (ICSID	
Convention)’,	7	Annual	Survey	of	International	and	Comparative	Law	(2001)	21,	35.	
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states.	 Its	 primary	 objective	 was	 to	 facilitate	 the	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 rendered	 in	 disputes	
between	private	parties	in	commercial	arbitration.49
 
 
Article	III	contains	an	obligation	to	recognize	as	binding	arbitral	awards	coming	within	the	
scope	 of	 application	 of	 the	 Convention	 and	 to	 enforce	 them	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 procedures	
applicable	 under	 the	 domestic	 laws.	 As	 a	 result,	 state	 parties	 cannot	 impose	 substantially	 more	
onerous	 conditions	 or	 higher	 fees	 or	 charges	 on	 the	 recognition	 or	 enforcement	 of	 Convention	
awards	than	on	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	domestic	awards.	The	only	specific	requirement	
imposed	by	the	Convention	on	the	party	seeking	recognition	and	enforcement	is	that	it	must	provide	
a	 court	 with	 the	 authenticated	 original	 award	 or	 a	 certified	 copy,	 and	 the	 original	 arbitration	
agreement	 or	 a	 certified	 copy.	 Thus,	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 non-ICSID	 awards	 will	
essentially	be	subject	 to	 the	domestic	 laws.	As	 the	procedures	 for	 recognition	and	enforcement	of	
the	awards	are	governed	by	 the	domestic	 rules	of	practice,	 they	will	 vary	by	 jurisdiction.	The	New	
York	Convention	prescribes	five	grounds	for	refusing	recognition	and	enforcement	in	its	Article	V(1),	
and	 two	additional	 grounds	 in	Article	V(2).	 The	 five	Article	V(1)	 grounds	must	be	 established	by	 a	
party	resisting	enforcement,	which	bears	the	burden	of	proof.	Article	V(1)	lists	the	following	grounds:	
(a)	invalidity	of	the	arbitration	agreement;	(b)	violation	of	due	process;	(c)	excess	by	arbitrator	of	his	
or	 her	 authority;	 (d)	 irregularity	 in	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal,	 or	 in	 the	 arbitral	
procedure;	and	(e)	 lack	of	binding	force,	suspension	or	setting	aside	of	the	award	 in	the	country	of	
origin.	The	two	additional	grounds	 in	Article	V(2)	can	be	examined	by	a	court	on	 its	own	 initiative.	
Pursuant	to	this	provision,	a	court	can	refuse	recognition	and	enforcement	of	the	award	if	its	subject	
matter	is	incapable	of	settlement	by	arbitration	under	the	enforcing	country's	laws	or	if	recognition	
or	enforcement	of	the	award	would	violate	the	enforcing	country's	public	policy.	
 
Moreover,	the	awards	enforced	in	accordance	with	the	New	York	Convention	are	open	to	
review	by	domestic	courts	of	the	state	of	arbitration,	which	can	set	the	award	aside.	The	grounds	for	
setting	 aside	 are	 not	 regulated	 in	 the	 Convention.50	Setting	 aside	 of	 an	 award	 in	 the	 state	 of	
arbitration	has	an	extra-territorial	effect	as	it	precludes	enforcement	in	the	other	contracting	states	
by	 virtue	 of	 Article	 V(1)(e)	 of	 the	 Convention.51	This	 contrasts	 with	 the	 refusal	 of	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	which	has	legal	effects	only	in	the	jurisdiction	where	recognition	and	enforcement	are	
sought.
 
 
																																																													
49	Albert	 Jan	Van	Den	Berg,	The	New	York	Arbitration	Convention	Of	1958:	Towards	A	Uniform	Judicial	 Interpretation	
277-82	(1981).	
50	If	 the	state	of	enforcement	has	 implemented	the	UNCITRAL	Model	Law	on	Commercial	Arbitration,	 the	grounds	 for	
setting	aside	the	award	will	be	identical	to	the	grounds	for	refusal	of	recognition	and	enforcement	under	Article	V	of	the	
New	York	Convention.	See,	Article	34	of	the	UNCITRAL	Model	Law	on	Commercial	Arbitration,	24	I.L.M.	1302	(1985).	
51	Albert	 Jan	van	den	Berg,	Should	 the	Setting	Aside	of	 the	Arbitral	Award	be	Abolished?,	29(2)	 ICSID	REV.-	FOREIGN	
INVESTMENT	L.J.	263,	269	(2014).	
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1.1.3 ICSID	Convention	and	Enforcement	Framework	
Besides	 the	New	York	Convention,	domestic	enforcement	of	 foreign	arbitral	awards	can	be	
based	the	1965	Washington	Convention	on	the	Settlement	of	 Investment	Disputes	Between	States	
and	Nationals	of	Other	States	(ICSID	Convention).52	
Although	 even	 more	 largely	 adhered	 to,	 being	 in	 force	 in	 161	 countries,53	the	 scope	 of	
application	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 is	 limited	 to	 disputes	 arising	 from	 investments	 between	
contracting	 states	 and	 nationals	 of	 other	 contracting	 states	 which	 have	 been	 submitted	 to	 the	
International	 Centre	 for	 the	 Settlement	 of	 International	 Disputes	 (ICSID).	 The	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	
ICSID	is	defined	under	Article	25,54	and	extends	ratione	materiae	to	legal	disputes	arising	directly	out	
of	an	 investment,	provided	the	parties	have	consented	 in	writing	to	 it;	ratione	personae	 to	disputes	
between	private	investors	and	states.	
The	 ICSID	 awards	 are	 binding	 on	 the	 parties	 and	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 appeal	 or	 any	 other	
remedy	 outside	 the	 Convention,	 i.e.	 interpretation,55 	revision,56 	and	 annulment	 by	 an	 ad	 hoc	
committee.57	In	this	sense,	the	ICSID	system	is	self-sufficient;	once	consent	to	ICSID	arbitration	has	
been	given,	the	access	to	national	courts	 is	precluded	and	awards	are	subject	to	an	 internal	 review	
mechanism.	Accordingly,	ICSID	awards	are	not	subject	to	the	New	York	Convention.	
	
																																																													
52	Convention	on	the	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	between	States	and	Nationals	of	Other	States,	Washington	18	
March	1965;	575	UNTS	159.	
53 	As	 from	 the	 List	 of	 Contracting	 States	 and	 Other	 Signatories	 to	 the	 Convention	 (as	 of	 November	 3,	 2003)	
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Pages/Database-of-Member-States.aspx	 >	 (last	 visited	 22	 June	
2016).	
54	Article	25	of	the	ICSID	Convention:	“(1)	The	jurisdiction	of	the	Centre	shall	extend	to	any	legal	dispute	arising	directly	
out	 of	 an	 investment,	 between	 a	 Contracting	 State	 (or	 any	 constituent	 subdivision	 or	 agency	 of	 a	 Contracting	 State	
designated	 to	 the	Centre	by	 that	State)	 and	a	national	 of	 another	Contracting	State,	which	 the	parties	 to	 the	dispute	
consent	in	writing	to	submit	to	the	Centre.	When	the	parties	have	given	their	consent,	no	party	may	withdraw	its	consent	
unilaterally.	
(2)	“National	of	another	Contracting	State”	means:	
(a)	any	natural	person	who	had	the	nationality	of	a	Contracting	State	other	than	the	State	party	to	the	dispute	on	the	date	on	
which	the	parties	consented	to	submit	such	dispute	to	conciliation	or	arbitration	as	well	as	on	the	date	on	which	the	request	
was	registered	pursuant	to	paragraph	(3)	of	Article	28	or	paragraph	(3)	of	Article	36,	but	does	not	include	any	person	who	on	
either	date	also	had	the	nationality	of	the	Contracting	State	party	to	the	dispute;	and	
(b)	any	juridical	person	which	had	the	nationality	of	a	Contracting	State	other	than	the	State	party	to	the	dispute	on	the	date	
on	which	the	parties	consented	to	submit	such	dispute	to	conciliation	or	arbitration	and	any	 juridical	person	which	had	the	
nationality	of	the	Contracting	State	party	to	the	dispute	on	that	date	and	which,	because	of	foreign	control,	the	parties	have	
agreed	should	be	treated	as	a	national	of	another	Contracting	State	for	the	purposes	of	this	Convention.	
(3)	Consent	by	a	constituent	subdivision	or	agency	of	a	Contracting	State	shall	require	the	approval	of	that	State	unless	that	
State	notifies	the	Centre	that	no	such	approval	is	required.	
(4)	 Any	 Contracting	 State	may,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 ratification,	 acceptance	 or	 approval	 of	 this	 Convention	 or	 at	 any	 time	
thereafter,	notify	 the	Centre	of	 the	class	or	classes	of	disputes	which	 it	would	or	would	not	consider	submitting	to	 the	
jurisdiction	of	the	Centre.	The	Secretary-General	shall	forthwith	transmit	such	notification	to	all	Contracting	Convention	
on	the	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	between	States	and	Nationals	of	Other	States.”	
55	Article	50	of	the	ICSID	Convention.	
56	Article	51	of	the	ICSID	Convention.	
57	Article	52	of	the	ICSID	Convention.	
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Enforcement	of	ICSID	awards	against	a	contracting	state	is	quite	simple	and	occurs	according	
to	Article	54.	The	party	seeking	enforcement	needs	to	supply	a	copy	of	the	award	to	the	court.	This	
entitles	 the	 party	 to	 enforcement,	 the	 award	 is	 automatically	 recognised.	 There	 is	 no	 ground	 for	
refusal	of	recognition	and	enforcement,	not	even	a	public	policy	defence.	
	
Article	53(1)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	provides	as	follows:		
	
The	 award	 shall	 be	binding	on	 the	parties	 and	 shall	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 any	 appeal	 or	 to	 any	
other	remedy	except	those	provided	for	in	this	Convention.	Each	party	shall	abide	by	and	comply	with	
the	terms	of	the	award	except	to	the	extent	that	enforcement	shall	have	been	stayed	pursuant	to	the	
relevant	provisions	of	this	Convention.58	
According	to	Professor	Schreuer’s	commentary	on	Article	53(1),	 ‘	non-compliance	by	a	party	
with	an	award	would	be	a	breach	of	a	 legal	obligation’,	and	violation	of	this	obligation	may	lead	to	
state	responsibility.59	This	obligation	may	lead	to	state	responsibility.	As	we	will	see,	this	obligation	is	
independent	of	any	argument	regarding	state	immunity	in	the	context	of	ICSID	Article	55,	and	breach	
of	this	obligation	may	lead	to	diplomatic	protection	and	an	ICJ	action	pursuant	to	 ICSID	Articles	27	
and	64	respectively.		
Christoph	 Schreuer	 theorizes	 that	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 under	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 is	
independent	of	 the	New	York	Convention	and	other	 international	and	domestic	 rules	dealing	with	
the	enforcement	of	foreign	arbitral	awards.	According	to	the	author,	this	is	why	ICSID	is	believed	to	
have	its	own	'self-contained'	enforcement	mechanism	which	means	it	does	not	need	the	assistance	
of	 any	 other	 institution	 to	 ascertain	 the	 binding	 force	 and	 enforcement	 of	 its	 awards,	 hence	 it	 is	
expected	to	have	relative	advantages.60	Another	scholar,	Wang	Dong,	puts	it	more	neatly	when	she	
argued	 that	 the	 Convention	 provides	 for	 an	 elaborate	 process	 designed	 to	 make	 arbitration	
independent	of	domestic	 courts.	She	emphasized	 that	even	 in	 the	 face	of	an	uncooperative	party,	
																																																													
58	Article	 54	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention:	 “(1)	 Each	 Contracting	 State	 shall	 recognize	 an	 award	 rendered	 pursuant	 to	 this	
Convention	as	binding	and	enforce	the	pecuniary	obligations	imposed	by	that	award	within	its	territories	as	 if	 it	were	a	
final	judgment	of	a	court	in	that	State.	A	Contracting	State	with	a	federal	constitution	may	enforce	such	an	award	in	or	
through	 its	 federal	 courts	 and	may	provide	 that	 such	 courts	 shall	 treat	 the	award	as	 if	 it	were	a	 final	 judgment	of	 the	
courts	of	a	constituent	state.	
(2)	A	party	seeking	recognition	or	enforcement	in	the	territories	of	a	Contracting	State	shall	furnish	to	a	competent	court	or	
other	 authority	 which	 such	 State	 shall	 have	 designated	 for	 this	 purpose	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 award	 certified	 by	 the	 Secretary-
General.	 Each	 Contracting	 State	 shall	 notify	 the	 Secretary-General	 of	 the	 designation	 of	 the	 competent	 court	 or	 other	
authority	for	this	purpose	and	of	any	subsequent	change	in	such	designation.	
(3)	Execution	of	the	award	shall	be	governed	by	the	laws	concerning	the	execution	of	judgments	in	force	in	the	State	in	
whose	territories	such	execution	is	sought.”	
59	Schreuer,	 The	 ICSID	 Convention	 -	 A	 Commentary	 by	 Christoph	H.	 Schreuer	 (Cambridge	University	 Press,	 2001)	 pp.	
1077,1081;	see	also	C.	F.	Amerasinghe,	‘The	International	Centre	for	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	and	Development	
through	the	Multinational	Corporation	Venderbilt’.	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	9	(1976)	p.		793	
60Christoph	Schreuer,	Loretta	Malintoppi,August	Reinisch,Anthony	Sinclair,	The	ICSID	Convention	A	Commentary	on	the	
Convention	on	the	Settlement	of		Investment	Dispute	between	States	and	Nationals	of	Other	States(2nd	edn	Cambridge		
University	Press	2010).	
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ICSID	 arbitration	 is	 designed	 to	 proceed	 independently	 without	 the	 support	 of	 domestic	 courts.61	
This	 argument	 is	 correct	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 investor-state	 arbitration	 proceedings	 cannot	 be	
influenced	by	 local	courts.	However,	 it	 is	erroneous	on	the	ground	that	the	obligation	to	recognize	
and	enforce	an	ICSID	award	depends	absolutely	upon	all	States	parties	to	the	ICSID	Convention.	The	
Convention	leaves	the	choice	of	the	appropriate	court	or	authority	charged	with	the	enforcement	of	
ICSID	awards	to	each	State	party	to	the	Convention.	Art.	54(2)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	provide	that	
each	 State	 party	 must	 designate	 a	 court	 or	 authority	 for	 this	 purpose	 and	 notify	 the	 Secretary-
General	of	ICSID.	This	certainly	appears	contrary	to	the	aims	of	international	investment	arbitration	
and	 particularly	 to	 the	 'self-contained'	 nature	 of	 the	 Convention	 because	 award	 creditors	 are	
invariably	 subject	 to	 the	 rules	 of	 enforcement	 in	 domestic	 courts	 including	 rules	 on	 sovereign	
immunity.	
	
1.1.4 	Collection	Mechanism	under	the	ICSID	Convention	
The	 ICSID	 Convention	 governs	 recognition,	 enforcement,	 and	 execution	 of	 awards	 in	 its	
Section	6	of	Chapter	 IV,	 in	Articles	53	-	55.	Article	53(1)	 in	 its	first	sentence	stipulates	the	following	
features	of	ICSID	awards:	binding	force,	finality,	and	autonomous	review	within	the	ICSID	system.62	
Their	 binding	 force	 requires	 the	 parties	 to	 a	 dispute	 to	 comply	 with	 awards.	 Non-compliance	
constitutes	a	violation	of	states’	obligations	under	the	Convention.	The	attribution	of	binding	force	to	
ICSID	awards	 in	 the	 first	 sentence	of	Article	 53(1)	of	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 is	 a	 restatement	of	 the	
pacta	 sunt	 servanda	 principle	 of	 customary	 international	 law.63	The	obligation	 to	 comply	 is	 further	
reinforced	by	the	second	sentence	of	Article	53(1)	which	requires	the	parties	to	a	dispute	to	“abide	
and	comply	with	the	terms	of	the	award”	with	the	exception	of	cases	where	the	enforcement	of	the	
award	has	been	stayed	in	accordance	with	the	Convention.	Finality	refers	to	the	res	judicata	effect	of	
the	 awards.	Once	 an	 award	 has	 been	 issued	 parties	 cannot	 seek	 a	 remedy	 in	 the	 same	dispute	 in	
another	 forum.	Autonomous	 review	 under	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 is	 exhaustive	 and	 self-contained,	
meaning	 that	 the	awards	 cannot	be	 subject	 to	any	external	 review.64	Autonomous	 review	of	 ICSID	
awards	 is	 a	 fundamental	 difference	 from	 awards	 enforced	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 New	 York	
Convention,	which	are	open	to	review	by	national	courts	of	the	state	of	arbitration.	The	intention	of	
the	 drafters	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 was	 to	 depart	 from	 a	 model	 which	 allows	 intervention	 of	
domestic	courts	offered	by	the	New	York	Convention.65
	
	
																																																													
61		Wang	Dong,	''Dispute	Settlement	in	International	Trade,	Investment	and	Intellectual	Property,	binding	force	and	
enforcement'	(2003)	UN	conference	on	trade	and	development	,pg	11	
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add8_en.pdf			accessed		20/7/2014		
62	See	SCHREUER,	 supra	note	 15,	 at	 1097.	 The	 first	 sentence	 of	 Article	 53	 reads:	 “[t]he	 award	 shall	 be	 binding	 on	 the	
parties	and	shall	not	be	subject	to	any	appeal	or	to	any	other	remedy	except	those	provided	for	in	this	Convention”.	
63	Aron	Broches,	Awards	rendered	pursuant	to	the	ICSID	Convention:	Binding	Force,	Finality,	Recognition,	Enforcement,	
Recognition,	2(2)	ICSID	REV.-FOREIGN	INVESTMENT	L.J.	287,	289(1987).	
64	The	only	reviews	available	are	revision	and	annulment	under	Articles	51	and	52	of	the	Convention.	
65	Compañiá	de	Aguas	del	Aconquija	S.A.	and	Vivendi	Universal	S.A.	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/97/3,	Decision	on	
the	Argentine	Republic’s	 Request	 for	 a	 Continued	 Stay	 of	 Enforcement	 of	 the	Award,	 ¶	 35	 (Nov.4	 2008)	 [hereinafter:	
Vivendi,	Stay	of	Enforcement].	See	SCHREUER,	supra	note	15,	at	1118.	
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The	collection	mechanism	under	Article	54	can	be	used	when	a	party's	fails	to	comply	with	
the	 award	 in	 accordance	 with	 Article	 53.66	Article	 54(1)	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 lays	 out	 the	
obligation	 of	 the	 state	 parties	 to	 “recognize	 an	 award	 rendered	 pursuant	 to	 this	 Convention	 as	
binding	 and	 enforce	 the	 pecuniary	 obligations	 imposed	 by	 that	 award	within	 its	 territories	 as	 if	 it	
were	a	final	judgment	of	a	court	in	that	State”.67	Some	scholars	have	suggested	that	the	obligation	
under	Article	54	to	treat	the	awards	“as	if	 it	were	a	final	 judgment	of	a	court”	allows	for	challenges	
available	 to	 final	 judgments	 in	 some	 jurisdictions.68	However,	 Article	 53	 is	 clear	 on	 the	 point	 that	
awards	 “shall	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 any	 appeal	 or	 any	 other	 remedy	 except	 those	 provided	 for	 in	 this	
Convention”.	Opening	the	door	to	domestic	review	would	manifestly	contravene	this	provision.	
Article	54(2)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	prescribes	a	simplified	procedure	for	recognition	and	
enforcement	 of	 awards:	 “[a]	 party	 seeking	 recognition	 or	 enforcement	 in	 the	 territories	 of	 a	
Contracting	State	shall	furnish	to	a	competent	court	or	other	authority	which	such	State	shall	have	
designated	for	this	purpose	a	copy	of	the	award	certified	by	the	Secretary-General”.	Recognition	and	
enforcement	 under	 Article	 54	 of	 the	 Convention	 is	 automatic	 meaning	 that	 the	 role	 of	 domestic	
authorities	 is	 limited	 to	 verification	 of	 the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 award.69	Unlike	 the	 New	 York	
Convention,	 	the	ICSID	Convention	does	not	allow	states	to	refuse	recognition	and	enforcement	on	
any	grounds.	Unlike	recognition	and	enforcement,	however,	the	execution	of	awards	is	governed	by	
laws	 of	 the	 state	 where	 the	 enforcement	 is	 sought,	 in	 accordance	 with	 Article	 54(3)	 of	 the	
Convention.	Article	 55	 provides	 an	 interpretative	 guideline	 stating	 “[n]othing	 in	Article	 54	 shall	 be	
construed	as	derogating	from	the	law	in	force	in	any	Contracting	State	relating	to	immunity	of	that	
State	or	of	any	foreign	State	from	execution”.	
	
The	relationship	between	Articles	53	and	54	of	the	ICSID	Convention	was	questioned	when	
Argentina	argued	that	 its	obligation	to	comply	with	 ICSID	awards	under	Article	53	 is	subject	to	the	
prevailing	 mechanism	 for	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 under	 Article	 54.70 	Between	 1998	 and	 2002	
Argentina	 underwent	 a	 severe	 financial	 crisis.	 In	 order	 to	 stabilize	 the	 domestic	 economy	 the	
Argentinian	government	decided	to	dissolve	the	regulatory	framework	that	was	previously	aimed	at	
attracting	 foreign	 capital.	 This	 decision	was	 followed	 by	 a	 flood	 of	 over	 40	 investment	 arbitration	
claims.71	In	several	proceedings	on	stay	of	enforcement	Argentina	has	argued	that	the	obligation	to	
																																																													
66	Stanimir	A.	Alexandrov,	Enforcement	of	 ICSID	Awards:	Articles	53	and	54	of	the	 ICSID	Convention	 in	 INTERNATIONAL	
INVESTMENT	LAW	IN	21ST	CENTURY,	supra	note	5,	at	328.	
67	Thus,	the	non-monetary	awards	will	be	subject	to	the	simplified	recognition,	but	not	to	enforcement	under	the	ICSID	
Convention.	They	will	be	enforced	in	accordance	with	the	New	York	Convention,	or	subject	to	other	applicable	treaties	or	
laws.	See	MARGARET	L.	MOSES,	THE	PRINCIPLES	AND	PRACTICE	OF	INTERNATIONAL	COMMERCIAL	ARBITRATION	
237	(2	ed.	2012).	
68	Edward	 Baldwin,	Mark	 Kantor	 &	Michael	 Nolan,	 Limits	 to	 Enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 Awards,	 23(1)	 J.	 INT’L	 ARB.	 1,	 9-14	
(2006).	
69	Albert	 Jan	 van	 der	 Berg,	 Some	 Recent	 Problems	 in	 the	 Practice	 of	 Enforcement	 under	 the	 New	 York	 and	 ICSID	
Conventions,	2(2)	ICSID	REV.-FOREIGN	INVESTMENT	L.J.	439,448	(1987).	
70	Siemens	A.G.	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/8,	Argentina's	Response	to	the	Submission	by	the	United	States	of	
America	to	the	ad	hoc	Annulment	Committee	(June	2,	2008);	Enron	Corporation	and	Ponderosa	Assets,	L.P.	v.	Argentina,	
ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/01/3,	 Decision	 on	 the	 Argentine	 Republic’s	 Request	 for	 a	 Continued	 Stay	 of	 Enforcement	 of	 the	
Award	(October	7,	2008);	Compañiá	de	Aguas	del	Aconquija	S.A.	and	Vivendi	Universal	S.A.	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	
ARB/97/3,	 Respondent's	 Letter	 Regarding	 Stay	 of	 Enforcement	 (Nov.	 28,	 2008)	 [hereinafter:	 Vivendi,	 Respondent's	
Letter].	
71	As	of	6	August	2014,	see	World	Bank,	List	of	ICSID	Cases,	available	at	https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.	
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comply	 with	 awards	 under	 Article	 53	 does	 not	 arise	 until	 the	 creditor	 has	 initiated	 enforcement	
proceedings	under	Article	54.72	Argentina	has	claimed	that	it	was	a	result	of	its	obligation	to	treat	an	
ICSID	award	as	if	it	was	a	final	judgment	of	an	Argentinian	court	in	accordance	with	Article	54	of	the	
Convention.	 According	 to	Argentina,	 the	 award	 creditor	 has	 to	 comply	with	 the	 same	 procedures	
that	are	applicable	to	the	enforcement	of	final	judgments	in	local	courts	in	Argentina.	Until	then	the	
obligation	to	pay	the	award	under	Article	53	does	not	arise.	
In	 the	 Enron	 case,	 the	 ICSID	 ad	 hoc	 annulment	 committee	 rejected	 Argentina’s	
interpretation	of	Articles	53	and	54	and	confirmed	that	the	obligations	under	these	provisions	are	to	
be	 seen	 as	 separate	 and	 independent.	 The	 committee	 held	 that	 a	 state's	 obligation	 to	 comply	 is	
unconditional,	meaning	that	it	arises	directly	after	the	award	is	rendered	and	remains	unaffected	by	
any	domestic	procedure	 for	 collection.	The	committee	analysed	 in	detail	 the	 relationship	between	
these	two	obligations	and	provided	reasons	for	which	it	held	Argentina’s	interpretation	weak.	Firstly,	
the	obligations	under	Articles	53	and	54	are	directed	to	different	subjects:	the	obligation	to	comply	
under	Article	53	is	addressed	to	a	party	to	a	dispute,	whereas	the	obligation	to	recognize	and	enforce	
is	binding	on	all	parties	to	the	Convention.73
	
	
Secondly,	 in	 accordance	 with	 Article	 54,	 parties	 are	 obliged	 to	 enforce	 only	 pecuniary	
awards.	 Following	 Argentina’	 reasoning,	 there	 would	 never	 be	 an	 obligation	 to	 comply	 with	 non-
pecuniary	 obligations	 imposed	 by	 an	 ICSID	 award.74 	Moreover,	 it	 was	 found	 that	 Argentina’s	
interpretation	was	not	supported	by	the	subsequent	practice	of	states	in	terms	of	Article	31(3)	(b)	of	
the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	(VCLT).75	In	each	of	the	four	ICSID	cases	that	reached	
the	 enforcement	 stage	 before	 local	 courts,	 the	 enforcement	 was	 sought	 before	 courts	 of	 a	 third	
state,	rather	than	the	courts	of	a	state	against	which	the	award	had	been	rendered.
41	
According	 to	 Argentina’s	 interpretation,	 in	 those	 cases	 the	 obligation	 to	 pay	 the	 award	
could	 never	 arise	 because	 the	 claimants	 did	 not	 trigger	 the	 enforcement	 proceedings	 before	 the	
domestic	 courts	 of	 the	 respondent	 states.	 This	 construction	 of	 Articles	 53	 and	 54	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 was	 confirmed	 by	 the	 Vivendi	 II	 annulment	 committee	 in	 its	 decision	 on	 the	 stay	 of	
enforcement.76
	
As	 noted	 by	 some	 commentators,	 the	 interpretation	 proposed	 by	 Argentina	 would	
undermine	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 the	 enforcement	 regime	 under	 the	 ICSID	 Convention.77	
Argentina’s	interpretation	of	Articles	53	and	54	would	imply	a	supervisory	role	for	domestic	courts	in	
the	enforcement	of	awards.
44
	As	noted	by	the	Committee	in	Vivendi,	this	would	open	the	possibility	
of	local	authorities	reviewing	awards	and	deciding	whether	or	not	they	should	be	enforced	based	on	
domestic	 law.
45
	This	 is	contrary	to	the	 intention	of	the	drafters	of	the	Convention	whose	objective	
was	 to	 depart	 from	 the	 model	 offered	 by	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 and	 to	 eliminate	 state	
intervention	in	the	field	of	 investment	disputes	by	creating	a	self-contained	review	mechanism	and	
																																																													
72	Siemens,	supra	note,	para	5;	Enron,	supra	note,	para	57.	
73	Para	62.	
74	Para	66.	
75	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties,	May	23,	1969,	1155	U.N.T.S.	331.	
76	Vivendi,	Stay	of	Enforcement,	supra	note	25,	paras		31-36.	
77	See	Alexandrov,	supra	note	,	at	323.	
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its	 enforcement	 procedure.78	Further,	 intervention	 by	 a	 judicial	 authority	 in	 the	 host	 state	 would	
render	the	award	simply	“a	piece	of	paper	deprived	from	any	legal	value	and	dependent	on	the	will	of	
state	organs”.79	Such	an	interpretation	would	defeat	the	object	and	purpose	of	Article	53	in	violation	
of	the	rules	of	interpretation	under	the	VCLT.80	
 
1.1.5 	Pros	and	Cons	of	ICSID	vis-à-vis	the	NY	Convention	
	
The	ICSID	Convention	represents	a	self-contained	regime	and	does	not	permit	any	external	
review,	 including	at	the	recognition	and	enforcement	stage.	By	contrast,	Article	5	of	the	New	York	
Convention	contains	grounds	on	which	enforcement	may	be	refused	by	domestic	courts.	The	Sempra	
v	Argentina	stay	decision	explains	that:	
	There	 is	 a	 fundamental	difference	between	enforcement	of	 awards	under	 the	New	York	
Convention	and	the	ICSID	Convention,	in	that	Article	5	of	the	New	York	Convention	envisages	certain	
grounds	 on	which	 the	 award	may	 be	 subject	 to	 judicial	 review	 at	 a	 national	 level	 and	which	may	
entitle	a	State	to	refuse	enforcement.	
	
The	State	where	enforcement	is	sought	cannot	refuse	execution	on	grounds	such	as	ordre	
public	or	on	any	other	ground.	Consequently,	the	only	reasons	for	a	State	to	refuse	execution	are	if	
the	assets	subject	to	execution	are	immune	under	the	law	of	that	State	or	if	enforcement	has	been	
stayed	pursuant	 to	Article	52(5)	of	 the	 ICSID	Convention.	As	was	stated	 in	 the	Vivendi	v	Argentina	
stay	decision:	
	
Any	possible	intervention	by	a	judicial	authority	in	the	host	State	is	unacceptable	under	the	
ICSID	Convention,	 as	 it	would	 render	 the	 awards	 simply	 a	 piece	 of	 paper	 deprived	 from	 any	 legal	
value	and	dependent	on	the	will	of	State	organs.		
Hazel	Fox	defines	State	 immunity	as	 ‘a	plea	relating	to	the	adjudicative	and	enforcement	
jurisdiction	 of	 national	 courts	 which	 bars	 municipal	 courts	 of	 one	 State	 from	 adjudicating	 the	
disputes	 of	 another’.81		 It	 must,	 therefore,	 be	 clarified	 that	 immunity	 from	 enforcement	 (which	 is	
available	to	the	respondent	State)	is	only	a	procedural	limitation	but	it	is	not	a	ground	for	review.		As	
a	matter	of	procedure,	 it	does	not	challenge	on	 the	substantive	 right	 to	 recover	 the	amount	owed	
under	the	award	but	serves	as	a	 limitation	to	proceed	on	State	assets	where	no	relevant	exception	
would	permit	enforcement.	The	State	where	enforcement	is	sought	cannot	review	compliance	with	
international	law	either.	
Anyway	some	authors,	like		Baldwin,	Kantor	and	Nolan	warn	that	given	the	equalization	of	
ICSID	 awards	 to	 national	 judgments,	 the	 condemned	 States	 may	 still	 seek	 relief	 from	 a	 final	
judgment	under	national	laws	which	provide	exceptional	remedies	to	final	judgments.	This	question	
has	not,	however,	been	thus	far	scrutinized	on	the	international	level	(eg	in	the	practice	of	States	or	
before	an	 ICSID	tribunal)	and	thus	needs	further	clarification	 in	the	future	especially	with	a	view	to	
what	the	Vivendi	v	Argentina	stay	decision	mentions:	
																																																													
78	Vivendi,	Respondent's	Letter,	supra	note	31	para	5.	
79	Vivendi,	Stay	of	Enforcement,	supra	note	25,	¶36.	
80	Id.	
81	Hazel	Fox,	The	Law	of	State	Immunity	(OUP	2008)	1	
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Articles	54	and	55	were	adopted	for	that	precise	purpose	and	were	worded	in	a	manner	that	
excludes	 any	 possible	 court	 intervention	 in	 all	 States	 that	 adhered	 to	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	
particularly	 the	 judicial	 organs	 of	 the	 State	which	was	 party	 to	 the	 dispute	 adjudicated	 under	 the	
ICSID	rules.	
	
States	 such	 as	 Brazil	 and	 India	 are	 not	 among	 the	 150	 contracting	 States	 to	 the	 ICSID	
Convention,	 and	 Bolivia	 has	 denounced	 the	 Convention.	 Additionally,	 the	 enforcement	 regime	
established	by	the	ICSID	Convention	does	not	apply	to	awards	rendered	under	the	Additional	Facility	
Rules;	 therefore,	 such	 awards	will	 be	 enforceable	 under	 the	New	York	Convention.	It	may	 thus	 be	
questioned	whether	an	investor	who	has	obtained	an	award	in	his	favour	may	rely	on	the	New	York	
Convention	to	enforce	it	within	the	territory	of	such	States.	There	is	no	clear	answer	to	this	question.	
Schreuer	notes	that:	
	
Since	enforcement	under	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 is	 easier	 to	obtain	 than	under	 the	New	York	
Convention,	the	question	of	the	applicability	of	the	New	York	Convention	to	ICSID	awards	is	not	likely	to	
arise.	But	this	issue	may	become	relevant	in	exceptional	circumstances	like	the	enforcement	of	an	ICSID	
award	in	a	State	that	is	a	party	to	the	New	York	Convention	but	not	to	the	ICSID	Convention.	
	
Given	 that	 the	 regime	 established	 under	 the	New	 York	 Convention	 requires	 recourse	 to	
local	courts,	it	follows	that	enforcement	under	the	ICSID	Convention	is,	in	principle,	much	faster.	As	
explained	in	the	Vivendi	v	Argentina	stay	decision:	
	
To	 eliminate	 State	 intervention	 in	 the	 field	 of	 investment	 disputes,	 and	 as	 a	 necessary	
consequence	of	creating	an	international	mechanism	to	adjudicate	such	investment	disputes	under	
the	aegis	of	ICSID,	all	sort	of	recourse	to	domestic	courts	(in	cases	other	than	those	provided	by	the	
Convention	 itself)	 was	 to	 be	 avoided	 in	 all	 States	 who	 are	 Members	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	
including	the	host	State,	in	respect	of	the	recognition	or	enforcement	of	a	finally	binding	ICSID	award	
rendered	against	a	given	State.	
	
The	 second	 paragraph	 of	 Article	 54	 merely	 organizes	 the	 logistics	 of	 seeking	 the	
recognition	and	enforcement,	through	the	identification	of	a	given	judicial	or	other	authority	whose	
function	is	merely	administrative,	in	the	sense	of	undertaking	the	operation	of	receiving	the	copy	of	
the	award	‘certified	by	the	ICSID	Secretary-General’	as	required	under	Article	49,	paragraph	1	of	the	
ICSID	 Convention.	 This	 is	 the	 substitute	 for	 obtaining	 an	 ‘exequatur’	 in	 international	 commercial	
arbitrations.	
	
On	 the	 negative	 side,	 it	 should	 be	 mentioned	 that	 implied	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 from	
execution	has	been	accepted	under	 the	New	York	Convention,	but	would	not	seem	possible	under	
the	 ICSID	 Convention	 because	 of	 Article	 55,82		 although	 Schreuer	 supports	 the	 availability	 of	 the	
implied	waiver	argument	even	under	the	ICSID	Convention	enforcement	regime.83		
																																																													
82	Spaccaquerche	Barbosa,	‘The	Enforcement	of	International	Investment	Arbitral	Awards:	Is	There	a	Better	Way?’	(2009)	
6	Transnatl	Dispute	Management	1.	
83	Bjorklund		216.	See	also	Schreuer	et	al,	at		1128.	
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The	 ICSID	 Convention	 has	 not	 left	 room	 for	 its	 awards	 to	 be	 controlled	 by	 national	
authorities.	 It	 has	 withdrawn	 from	 national	 courts	 and	 national	 laws	 the	 competence	 to	 anyhow	
revise	the	award,	 including	the	set	aside	motions.	The	self-contained	rules	of	the	ICSID	Convention	
avoid	the	possibility	of	any	Contracting	State’s	authority	set	aside,	annul,	reform,	or	change,	in	any	
way,	 the	decision	 rendered	by	an	 ICSID	Tribunal.	One	can	say	 that	 this	 feature	makes	 it	 the	 ICSID	
award	 truly	 international,	 for	 it	 is	detached	 from	any	national	 law	whatsoever.	 Ironically,	however,	
the	competent	ad	hoc	Annulment	Committees	chosen	to	settle	annulment	requests	under	the	scope	
of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 seemed	 to	 grant	 a	 similar	 role	 to	 a	 Court	 of	 Appeals,	 but	 with	 a	 more	
significant	 action	 for	 revising	 the	 awards.	 The	 ICSID	 practice	 shows	 that	 those	 Annulment	
Committees	 have	 been	 responsible	 for	 the	 review	 of	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 ICSID	 awards,	 rendering	
decisions	 nullifying	 the	 original	 award47	 and	 obliging	 the	 parties	 to	 wait	 for	 a	 new	 award.	 This	
practice	results	on	the	questioning	of	the	real	effectiveness	of	the	ICSID	procedure,	as	the	annulment	
procedures	 may	 endanger	 the	 better	 features	 mentioned	 hereinabove	 and	 delay	 the	 supposedly	
faster	enforcement	procedure.	
	
The	 reality	of	 the	non-ICSID	awards	which	are	submitted	 to	 the	NYC	 is	 slightly	different.	
The	Article	V(1)(e)	gives	the	possibility	to	the	national	courts	to	neither	recognize	nor	enforce	arbitral	
awards	that	“have	been	set	aside	or	suspended	by	a	competent	authority	of	the	country	in	which	or	
under	the	law	of	which,	that	award	was	made”.	Therefore,	the	competent	authority	of	the	place	of	
arbitration	is	fully	authorized	to	revise	the	awards	rendered	under	its	law	or	in	its	territory.	In	fact,	set	
aside	motions	 are	 a	 common	 practice	 in	 ordinary	 international	 arbitration	 in	 order	 to	 avoid,	 or	 at	
least	postpone	the	compliance	with	the	award.	Hence,	although	the	NYC	does	not	provide	 for	any	
rule	to	be	followed	by	the	competent	authority	of	the	place	of	arbitration,	in	international	arbitration	
it	 is	 expected	 that	 “the	 courts	 of	 the	 seat	 of	 arbitration	 oversee	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 the	
procedural	aspects	of	the	arbitration	and,	at	the	end	of	the	process,	confirm	or	set	aside	the	award”	
48.	
	
As	a	result,	the	NYC	allows	the	interference	of	the	national	courts	of	the	seat	of	arbitration,	
even	 though	 set	 aside	or	 annulment	grounds	are	not	 the	 subject	of	 this	 convention.	 It	 is	 true	 that	
international	 investment	 awards	 may	 be	 considered	 as	 detached	 from	 a	 specific	 national	 law	 or	
jurisdiction,	 avoiding	 the	 lex	 loci	 arbitri.	 Nonetheless,	 in	 jurisdictions	 where	 the	 award	 can	 still	 be	
attached	from	the	seat	of	arbitration	and	there	is	not	a	“more-favourable	right	provision”,	the	NYC	
can	do	nothing	but	make	the	competent	authority	of	the	place	of	enforcement	respect	the	set	aside	
decision	 rendered	 elsewhere.	 Luckily	 in	 this	 situation	 the	 UNCITRAL	Model	 Law	 on	 International	
Commercial	Arbitration	can	play	an	essential	role.	
	
	
1.1.6 Consequences	of	Enforcement	and	Non-Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards		
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In	2008,	in	an	empirical	survey	conducted	by	the	School	of	International	Arbitration	of	the	
Queen	 Mary	 of	 London84	the	 results	 about	 compliance	 and	 enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 are	
persuasive.	
Awards	are	normally	voluntarily	complied	with	and	only	 in	a	very	small	number	of	cases,	
enforcement	proceedings	will	be	 instigated	 to	ensure	enforcement:	 ‘84%	of	 respondents	 indicated	
that	 the	 opposing	 party	 had	 honoured	 the	 award	 in	 full	 in	more	 than	 76%	 of	 the	 cases.	 Only	 3%	
reported	that	an	award	debtor	had	failed	to	comply	with	the	award.	During	the	interviews,	corporate	
counsel	often	mentioned	that	more	than	90%,	typically	99%	of	the	awards	had	been	honoured	by	the	
non‐prevailing	party.’85	
	
The	same	survey	showed	also	that	only	in	11%	of	cases	participants	needed	to	proceed	to	
courts	or	other	enforcement	agencies	to	enforce	an	award.	Even	 in	such	cases,	 the	majority	of	 the	
corporations	reported	that	they	had	not	encountered	major	
difficulties	in	doing	so.	only	a	very	small	proportion	of	the	corporations	faced	problems	when	trying	
to	recognize	and	enforce	foreign	arbitral	awards.	Out	of	the	11%,	only	19%	of	the	corporations	had	
encountered	difficulties	when	seeking	to	recognize	and	enforce	foreign	arbitral	awards.	This	number	
appears	 to	 be,	 and	 actually	 is,	 quite	 small	 and	 encouraging	 as	 far	 as	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 is	
concerned.	
	
As	part	of	the	same	survey	in-house	lawyers	reported	that	the	 ‘difficulties	 in	enforcing	an	
award	often	arose	because	of	the	circumstances	of	the	award-debtor	rather	than	deficiencies	in	the	
arbitral	or	court	proceedings.’	The	survey	indicates	that	70%	of	the	problems	related	to	the	absence	
of	assets	or	the	 inability	to	 identify	the	debtor’s	assets.	Against	this	background	 it	 is	not	surprising	
that	 asset-tracking	 or	 asset-tracing	 has	 become	 a	 profession	 nowadays.	 However,	 it	 is	 very	
encouraging	 that	 ‘only	 6%	 of	 the	 respondents	 encountered	 difficulties	 because	 the	 country	 of	
enforcement	was	not	a	signatory	to	the	New	York	Convention.	The	small	percentage	in	this	last	case	
is	translated	in	the	large	number	of	countries	parties	to	the	New	York	Convention	1958.	17%	of	the	
corporate	 counsel	 indicated	 the	 hostility	 of	 the	 place	 of	 enforcement,	 which	 is	 understood	 as	
comprising,	 among	 others,	 an	 unstable	 and	 bureaucratic	 political	 and	 legal	 system	 with	 all	
consequences	deriving	from	this,	intimidation	and	threats	or	corruption.’	
According	to	the	abovementioned	empirical	survey,	44%	of	the	participating	corporations	
responded	 that	 they	 usually	 recovered	 100%	 of	 the	 arbitral	 award	 when	 using	 recognition,	
enforcement	and	execution	proceedings,	while	40%	recovered	over	76%	of	the	amount	awarded.	In	
other	words,	at	 least	84%	of	 the	participants	 reported	that	 they	have	recovered	76	to	100%	of	 the	
award	 sum.	 Corporate	 counsel	 also	 indicated	 in	 the	 interviews	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 assets	 of	 the	 non-
prevailing	party	 is	 the	main	 reason	 for	 the	 failure	 to	 recover	 the	 full	amount	of	an	award.	The	 fact	
that	parties	prevailing	in	arbitration	are	prepared	to	settle	and	satisfy	their	claim	for	a	sum	less	than	
that	100%	awarded	by	the	arbitral	tribunal	should	not	be	read	as	a	defect	of	the	arbitration	system	or	
an	indication	of	a	diminished	value	of	the	award.	Quite	to	the	contrary,	one	should	not	overlook	the	
fact	 that	 most	 awards	 are	 complied	 with	 or	 are	 providing	 the	 basis	 for	 enforcement	 for	 a	 very	
substantial	percentage.	It	is	well	possible	that	lawyers	or	damages	experts	may	inflate	claims	in	the	
																																																													
84	See	http://www.arbitrationonline.org/research/Corpattitempirical/2008.html.	
85	Mistelis	 and	 Baltag,	 “Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards	 and	 Settlement	 in	 International	 Arbitration:	
Corporate	Attitudes	and	Practices”,	19(3-4)	American	Review	of	Int’l	Arbitration	319-375	(2008),	at	343.	
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request	 for	 arbitration	 while	 instructing	 parties	 are	 happy	 with	 a	 sum	much	 lower	 than	 originally	
claimed	for.	
	
It	 is	 also	worth	mentioning	 that	 the	 award	 debt	was	 typically	 collected	 in	 a	 rather	 short	
period	of	time	(i.e.	often	less	than	six	months	or	more	commonly	less	than	one	year),	but	with	some	
cases	(about	5%)	going	for	more	than	two	years.		
	
As	 alternative	 to	 voluntary	 compliance	 or	 enforcement	 via	 the	 national	 courts,	 other	
options	 have	 been	 developed	 such	 as	 post-award	 settlement;	 such	 alternatives	 to	 traditional	
enforcement	seem	to	expand.86		Similarly,	 it	has	been	reported87	that	one	award	(CMS	v	Argentina)	
was	assigned	to	a	fund,	Blue	Ridge,	which	exercised	significant	diplomatic	pressure	in	order	to	ensure	
enforcement.	 It	was	 stated	 that	CMS	 received	 from	Blue	Ridge	a	 sum	 they	 felt	 fully	 compensated	
them	but	 lower	 than	 the	 sum	awarded	 as	 the	 result	 of	 the	 arbitration	 proceedings.	 Similarly,	 in	 a	
recent	decision	of	the	Thai	Supreme	Court,	judgment	no	9691/2554,	it	was	confirmed	that	awards	are	
transferable	 and	may	 be	 enforced	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 transferee	 and	 ultimate	 recipient	 of	 the	
transferred	award.	
In	 this	sense	we	share	 the	conclusion	of	Professor	Mistelis	 to	draw	that	 the	“value”	of	an	
arbitral	award	lies	not	only	on	the	fact	that	the	legal	framework	for	the	recognition	and	enforcement	
of	 foreign	 arbitral	 awards	 is	 supportive	 of	 enforcement	 internationally	 (courtesy	 of	 the	New	 York	
Convention),	but	also	on	the	fact	that	the	awards	maintain	economic	value	 irrespective	of	whether	
the	award	is	enforced	or	not.	Awards	may	be	used	as	a	basis	for	renegotiation	of	contracts	or	for	the	
exercise	of	pressure	to	achieve	legitimate	commercial	objectives.	For	example,	press	releases	may	be	
issued	and/or	published	on	the	financial	or	daily	political	press,	awards	may	be	assigned	to	collecting	
agencies,	 funds	or	banks,	or	an	award	may	be	used	after	 it	has	been	 rendered	 to	safeguard	 future	
business	relationships.	This	may	appear	too	rosy	a	picture	but	the	fact	remains	that	awards,	whether	
enforced	or	not,	do	embody	real	economic	and/or	commercial	value.	
																																																													
86	See,	 e.g.,	 Loukas	 Mistelis,	 “The	 Settlement-Enforcement	 Dynamic	 in	 International	 Arbitration,	 19(3-	 4)	 American	
Review	of	International	Arbitration	377-389	(2008),	at	379	et	seq.	and	most	pertinently	at	383-387.	
87	Viñuales,	J.	E.	and	D.	Bentolila,	‘The	use	of	alternative	(non-judicial)	means	to	enforce	investment	awards’,	in:	Boisson	
de	Chazournes,	L.,	M.	Kohen	and	J.	E.	Viñuales	(eds.),	Diplomatic	and	Judicial	Means	of	Dispute	Settlement:	Assessing	their	
Interactions	(The	Hague:	Brill,	forthcoming	in	2012),	also	in	SSRN:	SSRN-id2125051,	at	p	13.	
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Chapter	2	
The	ICSID	Enforcement	Procedure	
	
One	 area	 of	 the	 dispute	 resolution	mechanism	under	 the	 ICSID	Convention	
that	 attracts	 academic	 comment	 is	 the	 enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 arbitral	 awards	 under	
article	54	of	the	Convention.	The	question	is	often	raised	whether	the	provisions	of	the	
Convention	promote	effective	enforcement	of	ICSID	arbitral	awards.	This	is	due	to	the	
place	 accorded	 domestic	 law	 in	 resolving	 questions	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 in	 the	
enforcement	of	arbitral	awards	and	other	issues	that	seem	to	impinge	on	the	effective	
enforcement	of	 ICSID	 awards.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 the	problem,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
conduct	a	comparative	analysis	on	the	award	and	enforcement	procedure	of	the	ICSID	
Convention	awards	and	clarify	the	concepts	of	recognition,	enforcement	and	execution.		
	
The	World	 Bank	 principally	 aims	 to	 promote	 sustainable	 economic	 growth	
and	 to	eradicate	poverty	 in	each	part	of	 the	world.88	Therefore,	 the	Bank	 constituted	
Convention	on	the	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	between	States	and	Nationals	of	
Other	States	(The	Washington	Convention)	and	then	the	Washington	Convention	ICSID	
in	 1965	 to	 provide	 “a	 favourable	 investment	 climate” 89 .	 The	 main	 intention	 of	
establishment	 of	 ICSID	 system	 was	 to	 “promote	 much-needed	 international	
investment	 by	 offering	 a	 neutral	 dispute	 resolution	 forum	 both	 to	 investors	 that	 are	
(rightly	 or	 wrongly)	 wary	 of	 nationalistic	 decisions	 by	 local	 courts	 and	 to	 host-states	
that	are	(rightly	or	wrongly)	wary	of	self-	interested	actions	by	foreign	investors”90.	The	
ICSID	Convention	has	brought	unique	enforcement	rules	 for	 investor-state	arbitration	
to	 transfer	 these	 purposes	 into	 practice.	 The	 underlying	 cause	 of	 this	 system	 is	 that	
success	 of	 an	 arbitral	 process	 is	 based	 on	 whether	 the	 award	 can	 be	 enforced	 and	
executed.91
	
																																																													
88	Joseph	M.	 Cardosi.	 "Precluding	 the	 Treasure	 Hunt:	 How	 the	World	 Bank	 Group	 Can	 Help	 Investors	
Circumnavigate	 Sovereign	 Immunity	Obstacles	 to	 ICSID	 Award	 Execution."Pepperdine	 Law	 Review	 41,	
no.	1	(2013).	Accessed	March	3,	2015.	http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/3/.	
89	Yusuf	 Çalışkan.	 "Dispute	 Settlement	 in	 Internatinal	 Investment	 Law."	 In	 Implementing	 International	
Economic	Law	Through	Dispute	Settlement	Mechanism,	edited	by	Yusuf	Aksar.	Martinus	Nijhoff	Publisher,	
2011,	p.	130.	
90	Lucy	 Reed,	 Jan	 Paulsson,	 and	 Nigel	 Blackaby.	 "Recognition,	 Enforcement	 and	 Execution	 of	 ICSID	
Awards."	In	Guide	to	ICSID	Arbitration.	Kluwer	Law	International,	2004,	p.	4-5.	
91	Mohamed	Fahmi	Ghazwi.	"Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	 International	Arbitration	Awards:	A	Case	
Study	of	Malaysia	and	Saudi	Arabia."	International	Journal	of	Accounting	and	Financial	Reporting	4,	no.	2	
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In	few	words,	just	to	give	a	brief	overview	of	what	we	will	see	in	deep	further,	
according	 to	 the	 ICSID	Convention,	 ICSID	awards	 are	 recognised	 automatically	 by	 all	
signatory	 states	 and	 enforced	 by	 local	 laws	 including	 sovereign	 immunity	 laws.	 This	
brings	forth	the	question	how	ICSID	awards	can	be	effective	and	executory	 in	spite	of	
sovereign	immunity	laws.	
The	enforcement	of	the	arbitral	award,	when	it	 is	not	voluntary,	 is	the	stage	
of	 the	 dispute	 where	 the	 parties	 have	 to	 resort	 to	 authority	 of	 the	 national	 courts.	
Effective	enforceability	before	national	courts	is	sometimes	considered	as	the	weakest	
ring	chain	of	 ICSID	arbitration,	 the	ultimate	 feature	 that	makes	arbitration	a	doubtful	
alternative	to	litigation.	
The	 procedure	 for	 arbitration	 under	 ICSID	 has	 earned	 its	 various	
commendations	from	the	observers	of	International	investment	arbitrations	because	it	
is	 believed	 to	 have	 established	 a	mechanism	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	 disputes	 between	
foreign	 investors	 and	 host	 States	 through	 ‘international	 methods	 of	 settlement	
designed	to	take	special	account	of	the	characteristics’	of	such	disputes	which	include	
recognition,	 execution	 and	 enforcement	 of	 the	 awards	 irrespective	 of	 the	 reserved	
sovereign	powers	of	States.92	One	of	such	observer	 is	Sir	Elihu	Lauterpacht	who	in	his	
Foreword	 to	 Professor	 Christoph	 Schreuer's	Commentary	to	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	
stated	that	the	most	important	features	of	the	Convention	represented	‘significant	new	
developments’	in	international	law	and	the	practice	of	States.	According	to	him:	
For	 the	 first	 time	 a	 system	 was	 instituted	 under	 which	 non-State	 entities,	
corporations	 or	 individuals,	 could	 sue	 States	 directly;	 in	 which	 State	 immunity	 was	
much	 restricted;	 under	 which	 international	 law	 could	 be	 applied	 directly	 to	 the	
relationship	 between	 the	 investor	 and	 the	 host	 State;	 in	 which	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
local	 remedies	 rule	was	excluded;	and	 in	which	the	tribunal's	award	would	be	directly	
enforceable	within	the	territories	of	the	States	parties.93	
Therefore	signatories	to	the	ICSID	Convention	must	ensure	the	enforcement	
of	the	award	and	particularly	of	its	pecuniary	obligations	as	if	it	were	a	definitive	award	
of	 a	 national	 tribunal.	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 in	 order	 to	 properly	 have	 an	 in-depth	
analysis	 of	 the	 procedure	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	 award	 and	 its	 problems	 under	 this	
heading,	 it	 is	 important	to	take	a	 look	at	the	argument	on	the	 interpretation	given	to	
the	procedure	of	enforcement	under	the	sections	which	comprises	of	Articles	53,	54	and	
55	 as	 well	 as	 analyse	 the	 cases	 where	 the	 tribunal	 accepted	 or	 declined	 the	 various	
arguments	on	the	interpretation	or	interrelationship	of	the	Articles.	
	
2.2 Recognition	and	Enforcement	Rules	of	the	ICSID	Convention	
 
																																																																																																																																																																																					
(2014).	 Accessed	 March	 3,	 2015.	
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92	Stanimi	 	 Alexandrov	 ''Enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 Awards:	 Articles	 53	 and	 54	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention''in	
Christina	Binder(eds)	International	Investment	Law	for	the	21st	Century	Essays	in	Honour	of	Christopher	
Schreuer,	(Oxford	University	Press	2009)pg322-337	
93Ibid	n6p	ix	
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Recognition	of	an	award	is	the	formal	imprimatur	that	the	awards	are	binding	
and	 final	 decision	 on	 the	 issues	 disputed	 by	 the	 parties.94	In	 this	 respect,	 the	 award	
acquires	 res	 judicata	 effect	 through	 recognition.	 It	 means	 that	 the	 disputed	 issues	
cannot	be	subjected	to	any	court	or	arbitration	proceedings.	Pursuant	to	Article	53	of	
the	ICSID	Convention,	the	ICSID	awards	are	binding	and	final	and	cannot	be	subjected	
to	any	remedy	except	those	provided	by	the	Convention.	Thus,	 the	 ICSID	Convention	
brings	 automatic	 recognition	and	gives	 res	 judicata	 effect	 ipso	 facto.	At	 this	 juncture,	
the	 ICSID	mechanism	discerned	 from	other	 international	 arbitral	mechanism	with	 its	
unique	procedure.	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 enforcement	 refers	 to	 declaring	 in	 an	 order	 that	 an	
arbitration	awards	is	in	fact	enforceable.95	However,	in	the	context	of	ICSID	arbitration,	
recognition	and	enforcement	generally	 refers	 to	same	process,	which	 is	 leading	up	to	
execution	 of	 an	 award.	 Article	 54	 says,	 “Each	 Contracting	 State	 shall	 recognize	 an	
award	 rendered	 pursuant	 to	 this	 Convention	 as	 binding	 and	 enforce	 the	 pecuniary	
obligations	imposed	by	that	award	within	its	territories	as	if	it	were	a	final	judgment	of	
a	court	in	that	State”.	This	article	shows	the	greatest	strength	of	the	ICSID	Convention	
that	 is	 even	 more	 favourable	 to	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 than	 the	 New	 York	
Convention	 because	 the	 article	 nullifies	 the	 necessity	 of	 local	 court’s	 decision	 for	
enforcement.	Also,	the	Convention	does	not	allow	any	refusal	grounds	for	recognition	
and	enforcement	by	clarifying	that	awards	would	be	considered	as	a	final	judgment.	
	
Pursuant	 to	 Article	 54,	 all	 states	 parties	 to	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 shall	
recognize	and	enforce	an	 ICSID	award	as	 if	 it	were	a	 final	 judgment	of	a	court	 in	that	
state.96	Highly	 unusual	 enforcement	 obligation	 is	 designed	 to	 ensure	 payment	 if	 the	
other	 party	has	 failed	 to	 comply	with	 an	 award.97	In	 the	 case	of	 non-compliance,	 the	
prevailing	party	can	apply	to	courts	of	a	Contracting	State	where	the	 losing	party	has	
attachable	assets	because	awards	should	be	recognized	and	enforced	by	all	Contracting	
States.	 Also,	 the	 party	 seeking	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 an	 award	 has	 the	
possibility	to	select	most	favourable	forum	for	this	purpose.98	
	
Another	 matter	 about	 Article	 54	 is	 that	 there	 was	 a	 nuance	 between	
pecuniary	and	non-pecuniary	obligations.	The	Article	54	clearly	put	down	the	fact	that	
only	monetary	obligations	can	be	subjected	to	automatic	recognition	and	enforcement	
by	 all	 Contracting	States.	 The	Convention	does	 not	 provide	 this	mechanism	 for	 non-
pecuniary	 obligations	 such	 as	 “restitution	 or	 an	 obligation	 to	 desist	 from	 a	 certain	
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action”99.	Indeed,	it	does	not	create	a	great	difference	because	“ICSID	tribunals	have	in	
all	 known	 cases	 only	 imposed	 pecuniary	 obligations”100.	 Therefore,	 ICSID	 keep	 the	
enforcement	mechanism	effective	by	means	of	implementing	monetary	obligations.	
	
Yet,	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 excludes	 external	 intervention	 of	 local	 courts	 or	
other	 authorities.	Notwithstanding,	 the	 Convention	 establishes	 that	 execution	 of	 the	
award	shall	be	governed	by	local	laws.	It	conjures	up	whether	the	law	of	the	country	can	
prevent	 to	abide	by	an	award.	Due	to	the	 fact	 that	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 intended	to	
provide	 more	 enforceable	 system,	 it	 eliminates	 the	 problem	 with	 strict	 compliance	
rules.	Therefore,	obstacles	to	the	enforcement	of	an	ICSID	award	under	the	law	where	
execution	is	sought	in	no	way	affect	the	obligation	of	the	party	to	the	ICSID	Arbitration	
to	abide	by	and	 comply	with	 the	award	 in	 accordance	with	Article	 53(1).	 In	 the	 same	
vein,	 it	 is	 a	 violation	 to	avoid	 from	compliance	with	an	award	because	of	 state’s	 law.	
Also,	the	Convention	brings	certain	remedies	against	such	non-compliance	cases	as	 it	
will	be	seen	below.	
In	addition	to	Article	54(3),	Article	55	should	be	examined	closely	because	it	is	
a	 specification	 of	 Article	 54(3).	 It	 states	 that	 sovereign	 immunity	 laws	 cannot	 be	
derogated	 from	the	 law	of	 the	state	where	execution	 is	 sought.	 In	other	words,	 state	
immunity	will	 apply	 to	 the	 execution	of	 an	 ICSID	 award	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 it	would	
apply	 to	 the	execution	of	 a	 judgment	of	 a	domestic	 court.	 For	 this	 reason,	 sovereign	
immunity	must	be	examined	closely	to	reveal	its	effect	on	enforcement	and	execution	
process.	
	
	
2.2.1 Articles	53	and	54	of	ICSID	Convention	
	
Article	53(1)	states:	
	
The	award	shall	be	binding	on	the	parties	and	shall	not	be	subject	to	any	appeal	
or	to	any	other	remedy	except	those	provided	for	in	this	Convention.	Each	party	shall	abide	
by	and	comply	with	 the	 terms	of	 the	award	except	 to	 the	extent	 that	enforcement	shall	
have	been	stayed	pursuant	to	the	relevant	provisions	of	this	Convention.	
	
Article	54	titled	Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	the	Award	provides:	
	
(1)	Each	Contracting	State	shall	 recognize	an	award	 rendered	pursuant	 to	 this	
Convention	 as	 binding	 and	 enforce	 the	 pecuniary	 obligations	 imposed	 by	 that	 award	
within	 its	 territories	as	 if	 it	were	a	 final	 judgment	of	a	court	 in	that	State.	A	Contracting	
State	 with	 a	 federal	 constitution	 may	 enforce	 such	 an	 award	 in	 or	 through	 its	 federal	
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courts	and	may	provide	that	such	courts	shall	treat	the	award	as	if	it	were	a	final	judgment	
of	the	courts	of	a	constituent	State.	
(2)A	party	seeking	recognition	or	enforcement	in	the	territories	of	a	Contracting	
State	 shall	 furnish	 to	 a	 competent	 court	 or	 other	 authority	which	 such	State	 shall	 have	
designated	for	this	purpose	a	copy	of	the	award	certified	by	the	Secretary-General.	Each	
Contracting	State	shall	notify	the	Secretary-General	of	the	designation	of	the	competent	
court	 or	 other	 authority	 for	 this	 purpose	 and	 of	 any	 subsequent	 change	 in	 such	
designation.	
(3)	 Execution	 of	 the	 award	 shall	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 laws	 concerning	 the	
execution	of	judgments	in	force	in	the	State	in	whose	territories	such	execution	is	sought.	
	
The	enforcement	of	the	arbitration	awards	starts	with	its	'recognition'	by	the	
domestic	courts	of	member	States	and	this	 is	 followed	by	 its	execution	which	usually	
consists	in	the	forcible	realization	of	the	respondent	assets.101	It	has	been	observed	that	
recognition,	 enforcement	 and	 execution	 appear	 in	 a	 sequential	 order	 under	 article	
54:'recognition'	appears	in	Article	54(1)	'recognition	and	enforcement'	appears	in	54	(2)	
and	 'execution'	 appears	 in	 54(3)	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 in	 order	 not	 to	
encounter	 problems	 in	 the	 course	 of	 enforcement,	 the	 procedure	 for	 enforcement	
under	the	ICSID	Convention	should	follow	this	sequence.	In	other	words	it	is	important	
that	 recognition	 of	 the	 award	 should	 kick	 start	 the	 process	 while	 enforcement	 or	
execution	will	 follow.	Martin	Hunter	 explained	 this	procedure	 further	when	he	 stated	
that	 ‘Recognition	 is	 a	 necessary	 and	 formal	 procedure	 whereby	 an	 award	 will	 be	
confirmed	 as	 authentic.	 It	 is	 a	 preliminary	 step	 to	 enforcement/execution.	 Once	
recognition	has	been	obtained,	enforcement	or	execution	proceedings	come	into	play.	
Prior	to	this	stage,	creditors	possess	only	an	executory	title,	meaning	that	the	award	is	
ready	 to	 be	 executed.	 There	 are	 two	 possible	 consequences	 of	 the	 recognition	 of	 an	
award.	 Firstly,	 it	 confirms	 that	 the	 award	 is	 binding	 or	 res	 judicata.	 Secondly,	 it	 is	
usually	seen	as	a	preliminary	step	leading	to	enforcement.	In	essence,	in	order	to	obtain	
the	pecuniary	obligations	contained	in	the	award,	creditors	have	to	obtain	recognition	
from	the	competent	court’.102	
Article	 54(2)	 offers	 certain	 procedural	 directions	 for	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	of	award.	First,	Contracting	States	shall	designate	the	competent	court	or	
authority	for	the	purpose	of	recognition	and	enforcement.	A	party	seeking	recognition	
and	enforcement	shall	submit	a	copy	of	an	award	(certified	by	the	Secretary-General)	
to	such	court	or	authority.103	However,	the	problem	with	the	enforcement	of	an	ICSID	
award	usually	starts	with	the	unwillingness	of	the	designated	authority	to	recognise	an	
award.		
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As	Uchkunova	and	Temnikov	observed,	recognition	of	awards	is	distinct	from	
and	precedes	execution.		
Recognition	is	the	verification	of	the	authenticity	of	the	ICSID	award	in	order	
to	accord	it	with	res	judicata	force.	It	precedes	enforcement.	
Notably,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 second	 stage—that	 of	 enforcement—is	 concerned,	
there	seems	to	be	disagreement	among	scholars	as	to	whether	the	terms	enforcement	
and	execution	are	the	same	for	the	purposes	of	Article	54	of	the	ICSID.		
Schreuer	 is	 of	 the	 view	 that	 the	 interpretation	 that	 best	 reconciles	 the	
divergence	 between	 the	 three	 equally	 authentic	 English,	 French	 and	 Spanish	 texts	
would	 appear	 to	 be	 that	 the	 words	 ‘enforcement’	 and	 ‘execution’	 are	 identical	 in	
meaning.	 Broches,	 however,	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 the	 two,	 adding	 that	
‘enforceability	[is]	governed	and	decreed	by	the	Convention	and	its	implementation	by	
execution	[is]	governed	by	domestic	law’.104	
The	Kardassopoulos	&	Fuchs	v	Georgia	stay	decision	seems	to	support	such	
distinction.	There	the	ad	hoc	Committee	stated:	
	
‘The	 simplified	 and	 automatic	 enforcement	 system	 of	 Article	 54(1)	 of	 the	
ICSID	Convention	should	not	be	conflated	with	the	measures	of	execution	that	follow	
the	order	granted	by	the	court	or	authority	designated	in	accordance	with	Article	54(2)	
for	enforcement	of	the	award	and	which	are	referred	to	 in	Article	54(3)	providing	that	
‘[e]xecution	 of	 the	 award	 shall	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 laws	 concerning	 the	 execution	 of	
judgments	in	force	in	the	State	in	whose	territories	such	execution	is	sought’.	
	
Instead,	recognition	 is	the	process	by	which	the	award	 is	attributed	with	res	
judicata	 effect	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 State	 where	 enforcement	 is	 sought,	 thereby	
serving	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 subsequent	 execution.	 The	 party	 seeking	 leave	 for	
enforcement	 need	 only	 file	 with	 the	 competent	 local	 court	 (or	 another	 competent	
authority)	a	copy	of	the	award	certified	by	the	Secretary-General	of	the	ICSID.	
	
While	Article	54(3)	subjects	execution	to	the	modalities	of	the	law	of	the	State	
of	 the	 enforcement	 forum,	 recognition,	 by	 contrast,	 is	 not	 subjected	 to	 local	 law	but	
only	to	the	requirements	of	the	Convention.	Therefore,	domestic	legislation	should	not	
impose	additional	requirements	such	as	the	summoning	of	the	respondent	State	at	the	
stage	of	 recognition,	under	pain	of	violating	Article	54.	This	 is	 supported	by	Schreuer	
who	 has	 opined	 that	 ICSID	 awards	 ‘must	 not	 be	 made	 subject	 to	 conditions	 for	
recognition	not	provided	for	by	the	Convention’.	
For	 example,	 the	 order	 of	 exequatur	 issued	 by	 the	 Tribunal	 de	 grande	
instance	de	Paris	in	favour	of	the	investor	in	Benvenuti		contained	a	limitation	requiring	
the	prior	authorization	of	the	Court	with	regard	to	execution:	
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‘no	measures	 of	 execution,	 or	 even	 a	 conservatory	measure	 shall	 be	 taken	
pursuant	to	the	said	award,	on	any	assets	located	in	France,	without	prior	authorization	
of	this	Court’.	
	
The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 found	 that	 the	 judge	 had	 exceeded	 his	 powers	 as	
recognition	and	enforcement	are	two	separate	stages.	At	the	stage	of	enforcement	the	
court	will	inquire	whether	the	assets	concerned	are	immune	or	not.	But	there	cannot	be	
such	a	requirement	or	limitation	at	the	stage	of	recognition.	
The	Court	of	Appeal	stated	[Benvenuti	]:	
	
But	 considering	 that	 the	 order	 granting	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 to	 an	
arbitral	award	does	not	constitute	a	measure	of	execution	but	only	a	decision	preceding	
possible	 measures	 of	 execution	 the	 lower	 Judge	 could	 not,	 therefore,	 without	
exceeding	his	authority,	deal	with	the	second	step,	that	of	execution,	to	which	relates	
the	question	of	the	immunity	from	execution	of	foreign	states.	
	
	Once	 an	 award	 has	 been	 successfully	 recognised	 it	 becomes	 necessary	 to	
take	steps	to	'enforce'	or	'execute'	the	award.	The	contextual	meaning	of	the	two	words	
as	used	in	the	Article	has	been	subject	of	academic	debate	and	in	his	contribution	to	the	
debate;	 Edward	 Baldwin	 opined	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 resolved	 by	 ordinary	 rules	 of	
interpretation	 thus	 it	was	 necessary	 to	 resort	 to	 the	 1969	Vienna	 Convention	 on	 the	
Law	 of	 Treaties	 (Vienna	 Convention)	 for	 a	 clear	 interpretation.105	This	 made	 him	 to	
conclude	 that	 the	words	are	essentially	 identical	 in	meaning	and	this	 is	why	 the	 term	
'enforcement'	and	'execution'	are	used	interchangeably	in	the	Convention.106		However	
the	problems	of	award	in	IIAs	go	beyond	the	mere	theoretical	definition	of	these	terms.	
It	 focuses	 more	 on	 the	 obstacles	 faced	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 give	 practical	 approach	 to	
achieve	the	intent	and	purpose	of	the	terms.	At	this	point	it	will	be	necessary	to	take	a	
look	at	the	situations	where	enforcement	/execution	were	faced	with	various	problems.	
	
2.2.2 Enforcement	proceedings	in	national	courts	–	four	cases	
	
Rapidly	 summarizing	 the	 provisions,	 we	 have	 said	 that	 Article	 54.1	 of	 the	
ICSID	 Convention	 requires	 each	 Contracting	 State	 to	 recognize	 an	 award	 rendered	
pursuant	 to	 the	 Convention	 as	 binding	 and	 to	 enforce	 the	 pecuniary	 obligations	
imposed	by	the	award	as	if	it	were	a	final	judgment	of	the	State’s	courts.	Under	54.2	of	
the	Convention,	recognition	and	enforcement	of	the	award	may	be	obtained	from	the	
competent	court	of	a	Contracting	State	on	simple	presentation	of	a	copy	of	the	award	
certified	by	the	Secretary-General	of	the	Centre.		
The	regime	of	the	Convention	does	not,	however,	extend	to	the	execution	of	
the	 award.	 Such	 execution	 is,	 in	 accordance	 with	 Article	 54.3	 of	 the	 Convention,	
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governed	 by	 the	 law	 on	 the	 execution	 of	 judgements	 in	 force	 in	 the	 country	 where	
execution	is	sought.	Article	55	of	the	Convention	additionally	makes	it	clear	that	Article	
54	does	not	derogate	from	the	 law	of	 the	enforcement	 forum	on	sovereign	 immunity	
from	execution	of	an	award.			
These	provisions	of	the	Convention	have	been	tested	in	four	cases.	
	
In	the	first	case,	Benvenuti	&	Bonfant,	an	Italian	company,	obtained	from	the	
Tribunal	 	 de	 Grande	 Istance	 of	 Paris	 an	 order	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	 a	 Convention	
award	against	the	Republic	of	Congo’s	company.107	
The	court	granted	 the	 recognition	after	ascertaining	 that	 the	award	did	not	
conflict	 with	 French	 'law	 and	 order',	 but	 under	 the	 condition	 that	 'no	 measure	 of	
execution,	or	even	conservatory	measure,	can	be	taken	pursuant	to	that	award	on	any	
assets	 located	 in	 France,	 without	 (the	 court's)	 prior	 authorization. 108 	Benvenuti	
appealed109	the	decision	to	the	Paris	Court	de	Cassation,	which	struck	out	the	qualifying	
language	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 contradicted	 the	 ICSID	 Convention's	 simplified	
enforcement	procedure,	but	did	not	address	the	public	policy	examination	made	by	the	
lower	Court.110	Following	the	recognition,	the	claimant	attempted	execution,	obtaining	
the	attachment	of	funds	held	by	a	French	bank	on	behalf	of	the	Banque	Commerciale	
Congolaise	 (BCC)	 a	 State-controlled	 bank.	 The	 attempt	 failed,	 as	 the	 Court	 de	
Cassation	held	 that	 the	claimant	was	a	creditor	of	 the	State	of	Congo,	but	not	 to	 the	
BCC	who,	albeit	dependent	on	the	State,	could	not	be	regarded	as	an	emanation	of	the	
State	of	Congo.111	
One	fundamental	principle	reintegrated	in	this	case	is	that	the	recognition	of	
an	 award	 does	 not	 guarantee	 its	 enforcement	 especially	 in	 view	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Convention	concedes	total	discretion	to	Contracting	States,	under	their	national	 laws,	
to	determine	whether	the	award	can	be	executed	against	particular	assets.	This	gives	
room	 to	 different	 legal	 systems	 to	 invent	 policies	 with	 which	 they	 can	 deny	
enforcement	or	execution.	For	instance,	in	the	instant	case	even	though	it	may	be	right	
for	the	Court	de	Cassation	to	have	denied	enforcement	on	the	ground	of	immunity	but	
however	 since	 it	 did	 not	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 public	 policy	 as	 a	 ground	 for	 refusing	
enforcement	it	is	assumed	that	it	was	comfortable	with	the	introduction	of	public	policy	
into	 the	 enforcement	 procedure	 under	 the	 ICSID.	 It	 is	 submitted	 that	 the	 role	 of	
enforcement	or	recognition	delegated	to	courts	of	contracting	States	is	a	peculiar	one	
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therefore	they	should	not	derogate	from	their	rules	of	engagement	by	initiating	policies	
not	anticipated	by	the	Convention.	
	
Interestingly	 execution	 of	 award	 in	 SOABI	 v	 Senegal	112	which	 is	 another	
French	case	also	suffered	almost	the	same	setback	like	the	one	above,	in	this	case,	the	
Tribunal	Grande	 Instance	of	Paris	granted	SOABI	an	order	 for	 the	enforcement	of	 its	
ICSID	 award	 against	 Senegal.	 The	 Paris	 Court	 of	 Appeal113	reversed	 the	 order	 and	
blocked	execution	of	the	award	because	it	was	not	satisfied	that	SOABI	would	enforce	
the	 award	 only	 against	 assets	 specifically	 allocated	 by	 Senegal	 for	 economic	 and	
commercial	 activities.	 The	 Court	 of	 Cassation	 reversed	 the	 decision,	 on	 the	 grounds	
that	the	lower	court's	enforcement	order	in	itself	did	not	amount	to	an	act	of	execution	
entitling	 Senegal	 to	 claim	 Sovereign	 immunity.	 The	 court	 held	 that	 the	 immunity	 of	
execution	should	not	be	considered	until	after	the	award	is	recognized	and	funds	have	
been	attached.114	The	major	point	that	will	be	emphasized	here	is	that	since	States	are	
always	quick	to	resist	the	attachment	of	their	assets	to	offset	an	award	and	they	often	
hide	under	the	guise	of	immunity	to	do	this,	they	should	be	made	to	give	the	court	list	
of	asserts	as	collateral	when	they	want	to	apply	for	a	stay	of	execution.	
It	 must	 be	 highlighted	 that	 the	 Paris	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 confounded	 the	 two	
phases	 that	 the	Court	of	Appeal	has	so	clearly	distinguished	eight	years	earlier	 in	 the	
Benvenuti	&	Bonfant	case.	The	French	Court	of	Cassation	corrected	this,	 in	a	decision	
on	june	1991	that	quased	the	decision	of	the	Paris	Court	of	Appeal.115	In	its	decision,	the	
Court	of	Cassation	pointed	out,	in	terms	reminiscent	of	those	used	by	the	Paris	Court	of	
Appeal	 in	 the	 Benvenuti	 &	 Bonfant	 case,	 that	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 provided	 a	
‘simplified’	regime	for	the	enforcement	of	awards	and	that	enforcement	did	not	in	itself	
represent	 an	 act	 of	 execution	 in	 respect	 of	which	 immunity	 from	 execution	 could	 be	
considered.	
	
In	 exercising	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 court	 described	 above,	 the	 scenario	 that	
hindered	the	enforcement	of	award	in	above		LETCO	v	Liberia116	raises	the	question	of	
what	the	court	will	do	when	assets	of	States	are	used	for	both	commercial	and	public	
purpose.	 This	 case	 was	 brought	 before	 the	 Federal	 District	 court	 of	 the	 Southern	
District	of	the	New	York.	The	district	court	granted	an	enforcement	order,	but	declined	
to	 permit	 execution	 of	 the	 order	 against	 fees	 and	 taxes	 payable	 to	 Liberia	 on	 the	
grounds	of	sovereign	immunity.	A	later	effort	in	the	District	of	Columbia	to	execute	the	
order	against	certain	bank	accounts	also	failed	for	reasons	of	diplomatic	and	sovereign	
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116LETCO	v	Liberia,	Award(	1986),2	ICSID	Reports	349	
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immunity,	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 the	 accounts	 contained	 funds	 used	 both	 for	 public	
purposes	 and	 for	 commercial	 activities	 incidental	 to	 embassy	 operations. 117 	It	 is	
submitted	 that	 if	 there	 is	 doubt	 about	 the	 use	 of	 any	 particular	 assets	 the	 award	
creditor	 should	 seek	 to	 enforce	 the	 award	 in	 other	 asserts	 that	 do	 not	 have	 such	
encumbrance	this	is	to	prevent	the	States	from	invoking	the	doctrine	of	immunity.	
The	 fourth	 and	 final	 case	 concerned	 an	 ICSID	 Convention	 award	 upholding	
claims	brought	against	the	Republic	of	Kazakhstan	by	AIG	Capital	Partners,	a	Delaware	
company,	and	a	joint	venture	enterprise	controlled	by	the	Delaware	company.	An	order	
of	the	High	Court	in	London	permitted	the	successful	claimants	to	register	the	award	as	
a	judgement	of	the	Court	in	accordance	with	the	UK’S	implementing	legislation	for	the	
ICSID	Convention.	The	Claimants	then	obtained	interim	third	party	debt	and	charging	
orders	 against	 cash	 and	 securities	 held	 by	 banks	 in	 London	 for	 the	National	 Bank	 of	
Kazakhstan,	the	country	central	bank.	In	October	2005,	the	High	Court	discharged	the	
interim	orders.	In	doing	so,	it	noted	that	the	obligation	of	a	contracting	State	to	enforce	
an	 ICSID	Convention	award	was	made	 subject	by	Article	 55	of	 the	Convention	 to	 the	
State’s	 law	 relating	 to	 sovereign	 immunity.	 The	 Court	 held	 in	 this	 respect	 that	 the	
assets	in	question	were	property	of	a	central	bank	deemed,	by	the	1978	State	Immunity	
Act	of	the	UK,	as	non-commercial	and	hence	immune	from	execution	under	the	Act.	As	
for	the	interim	third	party	debt	order,	the	Court	held	that	such	an	order	could	only	be	
made	 in	 respect	 of	 a	 debt	 owed	 to	 the	 judgment	 debtor,	which	 in	 this	 case	was	 the	
Republic	of	Kazakhstan,	not	its	central	bank.	
	
These	 experiences	 suggest	 that	 securing	 sovereign	 compliance	 to	
international	 arbitral	 awards	 remains	 a	 challenging	 task,	 and	 that	 grounds	 to	 refuse	
enforcement	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 itself,	 in	 international	 law,	 and	
domestic	 rules,118	even	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 despite	 having	 gone	 a	 long	 way	 in	
limiting	 domestic	 review	 of	 arbitral	 awards,	 and	 providing	 for	 an	 international	 self-
contained	procedure	investment	disputes,	suffers	from	an	Achilles	heel	at	the	decisive	
moment	 of	 enforcing	 the	 award	 against	 a	 non-cooperative	 government	 . 119 It	 is	
submitted	that	since	ICSID	is	a	creation	of	World	Bank	every	member	of	the	Convention	
should	be	mandated	to	have	a	trust	fund	with	the	Bank,	which	they	will	forfeit	to	offset	
any	award	they	deliberately	refuse	to	comply	with.	This	will	enhance	the	enforcement	
of	 award	on	 two	grounds;	 first	 States	may	not	want	 to	 lose	 their	 trust	 fund	with	 the	
Bank	because	what	may	be	used	to	offset	an	award	will	eventually	be	more	than	what	
they	 would	 have	 been	 able	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 award	 creditor.	 Secondly	 States	
makes	all	effort	to	keep	a	good	reputation	before	the	bank	because	they	often	resort	to	
it	 to	 borrow	money	 hence	 they	will	 at	 all	 cost	 avoid	 the	 stigma	 they	will	 get	 if	 they	
refuse	the	enforcement	of	award	from	ICSID	Convention.		
	
																																																													
117Ibid	n78	pg	18	
118	Ibid	n16Article	55	
119Ibid	n78	pg	18	
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2.2.3 Enforcement/Execution	of	Award	against	the	'non-State'	party	
Most	 of	 the	 problems	 discussed	 so	 far	 mostly	 entail	 the	 recognition,	
enforcement/execution	 against	 contracting	 States.	 Whereas	 the	 problem	 of	
enforcement	 of	 award	 is	 not	 particular	 to	 States	 alone	 it	 also	 extends	 to	 'non-State'	
party	 to	 investment	 arbitration	 dispute.	 Even	 though	 the	 problem	 starts	with	 States	
who	may	not	want	to	initiate	the	enforcement	process	it	is	exacerbated	when	investors	
also	take	their	turn	to	refuse	recognition	and	enforcement	of	award.	Regrettably,	there	
is	 constraint	 of	 academic	 literature	 in	 this	 regard	 because	 of	 the	 high	 rate	 at	 which	
investors	generally	comply	with	the	enforcement	of	award	against	them.	This	position	
seems	 to	 create	 a	 disparity	 in	 the	 attitude	 to	 enforce	 an	 award	 on	 the	 premise	 that	
State	parties	to	 investment	arbitration	do	not	record	the	same	 level	of	compliance	to	
enforcement	procedures.120	Notwithstanding,	opinions	are	divided	on	what	will	happen	
when	investors	also	wish	not	to	comply	with	enforcement.	While	some	scholars	believe	
that	 there	 are	 no	 clear	 cut	 measures	 to	 adopt	 under	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 in	 such	
situation,	 others	 like	 Stanimi	 has	 postulated	 a	 standard	 model	 to	 adopt	 in	 such	
situation	based	on	the	interpretation	of	Art.54	of	ICSID	Convention.	According	to	him:	
Article	 54	 gives	 States	 the	means	 to	 compel	 compliance	 and	 enforce	 an	 award	 in	 its	
favour	against	an	individual	(investor)	because	host	States	(like	investors)	can	also	seek	
enforcement	 of	 the	 award	 in	 other	 contracting	 States	 under	 the	 provision	 of	 this	
Article.121	On	his	part,	Broches	observed	that,	Article	54	‘was	inserted	primarily	with	the	
needs	of	host	States	in	mind’.122According	to	him:	
If	a	host	State	obtains	an	award	against	an	investor	in	arbitration	proceedings	
before	the	Centre,	and	the	investor	does	not	comply	with	the	award,	the	host	State	can	
seek	 forced	execution	 in	 the	 territories	of	any	Contracting	State	without	 running	 into	
the	 obstacles	 which	 frequently	 stand	 in	 the	 way	 of	 enforcement	 of	 foreign	 arbitral	
awards.	123	
It	 is	 submitted	 that	 in	other	not	 to	allow	 the	binding	 force	of	 awards	under	
Article	 53	 of	 the	 Convention	 to	 create	 a	 symmetrical	 obligation	 between	 States	 and	
investors,	Article	54	was	created	to	respond	to	this	concern	of	parties	who	do	not	obey	
their	 obligation	 to	 accept	 an	 award	 under	 Art.53.	 Both	 investors	 and	 State	 parties	
should	always	accept	liabilities	arising	from	awards	by	performing	their	role	under	Art.	
53	 this	 is	 because	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 Convention	 and	 perhaps	 the	 investment	
protection	from	BITs	is	to	secure	immediate	payment	in	the	event	that	any	party	is	 in	
breach	of	their	international	obligations.124	
	
																																																													
120	Vincent	Orlu	Nmehielle	 '	 Enforcing	 Arbitration	 Awards	 Under	 the	 International	 Convention	 for	 The	
Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes	(ICSID	Convention)(2001)	7	Ann.	Surv.	Int'l	&Comp.	L.	21	2001	pg	31	
121	Ibid	n64pg		
122 	Aron	 Broches	 'The	 Convention	 on	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Investment	 Dispute	 between	 States	 and	
Nationals	of	Other	States'(1972)	136	Hague	Recueil	pg	331-349	
123AJ	Van	Den	Berg,	 'Some	Recent	Problems	 in	 the	Practice	 of	 Enforcement	Under	 the	New	York	 and	
ICSID	Conventions',	(1987)	2	ICSID	Review-Foreign	Investment	Law	Journal,	439-441.	
124Ibid	n77	p.	309.	
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2.2.4 The	Duty	To	‘Abide	And	Comply’	
	
In	analysing	the	subject	of	the	enforcement	of	awards	rendered	pursuant	to	
the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 it	 is	 important	 also	 to	 recall	 the	 provisions	 of	 its	 article	 53(1).	
Mention	was	made	earlier	of	the	provision	of	the	first	sentence	of	article	53(1)	regarding	
the	 binding	 force	 and	 finality	 of	 such	 an	 award.	 The	 second	 sentence	 requires	 each	
party	to	‘abide	by	and	comply	with	the	terms	of	the	award’.	For	the	Contracting	State	
party	 to	 the	 dispute,	 a	 failure	 to	 abide	 by	 and	 comply	with	 the	 award	 is	 therefore	 a	
violation	 not	 only	 of	 its	 undertaking	 to	 arbitrate,	 but	 also	 of	 an	 international	 treaty	
obligation.	
	Article	27(1)	of	the	Convention	provides	that	a	Contacting	State	may	not	give	
diplomatic	protection,	or	bring	an	international	claim,	in	respect	of	a	dispute	that	one	of	
its	 nationals	 and	 another	 Contracting	 State	 have	 consented	 to	 submit,	 or	 have	
submitted,	 to	 arbitration	 under	 the	Convention.	Article	 27(1)	 of	 the	Convention	 	 also	
provides	that	the	first	Contracting	State	may	nevertheless	give	diplomatic	protection	or	
bring	an	international	claim	if	the	second	State	fails	to	honor	its	obligation	under	Article	
53	to	abide	by	and	comply	with	the	award.	In	such	circumstances,	the	first	State	could	
under	Article	64	of	the	Convention	institute	proceedings	against	the	second	before	the	
International	Court	of	Justice.	Article	64	of	the	Convention	provides	for	the	referral	to	
the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 ‘any	 dispute	 arising	 between	 Contracting	 States	
concerning	 the	 interpretation	 or	 application	 of	 this	 Convention’.	 To	 date,	 no	 such	
reference	has	been	made	to	the	Court	under	Article	64	of	the	Convention.		
Indeed,	 for	 the	 drafters	 of	 the	 Convention,	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	 the	
enforcement	provisions	of	Article	54	was	to	facilitate	the	enforcement	of	an	award	by	a	
State	 as	 a	 successful	 claimant	 against	 an	 investor	 lacking	 assets	 in	 the	 host	 State.125	
This	was	seen	as	redressing	the	imbalance	in	the	relative	positions	of	the	State	party	to	
the	dispute,	which	would	be	bound	directly	 under	 the	Convention	 to	 comply	with	 an	
award,	 and	 the	 investor.	 As	 Aron	 Broches,	 the	 principal	 drafter	 of	 the	 Convention,	
explained:		
As	 regards	 enforcements	 against	 governments,	 as	 distinguished	 from	
that	against	private	parties,	what	has	become	Article	53	of	 the	Convention	 is	 the	
primary	provision	and…while	Article	54	is	important,	concern	with	the	possibilities	
offered	 by	 that	 provision	 should	 not	 be	 permitted	 to	 obscure	 or	 weaken	 the	
importance	 of	 Article	 53.	 The	 obligation	 of	 governments	 to	 abide	 by	 awards	
remains	unaffected	by	the	limitations	on	their	forcible	execution.126	
	
	
																																																													
125	See	ICSID,	2	Documents	Concerning	the	origin	and	formulation	of	the	Convention	892	(1970).	
126	A.	Broches,	Awards	Rendered	Pursuant	to	te	ICSID	Convention;	Binding	Force,	Finality	,Recognition,	
Enforcement,	Execution,	2	ICSID	REV.	FILJ	287,	302	(1987).	
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2.2.5 Voluntary	Compliance	And	World	Bank	Influence	
	
Supporting	 perhaps	 Louis	 Henkin’s	 aphorism	 about	 the	 observance	 by	
governments	 of	 their	 international	 law	 obligations,	 the	 record	 of	 compliance	 with	
awards	rendered	pursuant	to	the	ICSID	Convention	has	generally	been	good.	
As	 of	 the	 date	 of	 writing	 (June	 2016)	 the	 ICSID	 website	 listed	 almost	 four	
hundred	 concluded	 arbitration	 proceedings	 instituted	 against	 States	 under	 the	
Convention,	while	registered	cases	are	almost	six	hundred.	The	scenario	 in	various:	 in	
some	 of	 these,	 the	 parties	 had	 reached	 an	 amicable	 settlement	 of	 their	 dispute	 or	
decided	otherwise	to	discontinue	the	proceeding	before	the	rendition	of	the	award.	In	
others,	the	settlement	agreement	reached	by	the	parties	has	been	incorporated	in	the	
award.	 Sometimes	 the	 awards	 have	 been	 annulled	 in	 whole	 or	 in	 part	 pursuant	 to	
Article	52	of	 the	Convention.	 In	other	 instances,	 the	outcomes	vary.	 In	 some	of	 them	
there	 were	 upholding	 claims	 and	 ordering	 the	 respondent	 governments	 to	 pay	
compensation	 to	 the	 claimant	 investors,	 in	 others	 awards	 had	 been	 rendered	
dismissing	all	claims	on	the	merits	or	on	jurisdictional	grounds.		
Information	 regarding	 payment	 of	 the	 awards	 is	 somewhat	 sketchy,	
settlements	 often	 being	 confidential.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 successful	 claimants,	 if	 not	
paid	promptly,	seldom	hesitate	to	make	that	fact	known.		
From	the	 information	that	can	be	garnered,	 it	appears	that	 in	almost	all	 the	
cases	 of	 awards	 upholding	 claims,	 the	 respondents	 ultimately	 discharged	 their	
payment	 obligations,	 either	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 awards	 or	 in	
accordance	with	post-award	settlement	of	the	parties.	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	cases	
of	eventual	voluntary	compliance	with	the	award	include	at	least	three	of	the	four	cases	
described	 in	 the	previous	paragraph	 in	which	 there	were	enforcement	proceedings	 in	
national	courts.	Often	brought	up	in	connection	with	the	enforcement	of	ICSID	arbitral	
awards	 is	 the	 	 possible	 role	 therein	 of	 the	 World	 Bank.	 Its	 executive	 Directors	
formulated	 the	 Convention	 and	 ICSID	 is	 a	 member	 of	 the	 World	 Bank	 Group	 of	
International	 organizations	 (	 made	 of	 the	 International	 Bank	 of	 Reconstruction	 and	
Development,	 The	 International	 Finance	 Corporation,	 the	 International	Development	
Association,	ICSID	and	the	Multilateral	Investment	Guarantee	Agency.		
It	 is	 sometimes	 suggested	 that	 the	 leverage	 of	 the	 Bank	 with	 a	 borrowing	
member	country	might	be	applied	to	secure	payment	of	an	award.	An	operation	policy	
of	the	Bank	indicates	that	it	may	refrain	from	making	new	loans	to	a	member	country	in	
certain	 extreme	 cases	 involving	 expropriation	 or	 external	 debt	 disputes.	 These	 are	
cases	 involving	 expropriation	 disputes	 that	 are	 substantially	 harming	 the	 country’s	
international	credit	standing	and	that	the	country	 is	not	making	reasonable	efforts	 to	
settle	 or	 external	 debt	 disputes	 that	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	 country’s	
creditworthiness	or	on	 its	ability	or	on	 its	ability	to	 implement	Bank-financed	projects	
or	service	Bank	loans.	As	indicated	above,	however,	such	situations	have	not	arisen	in	
connection	with	performance	of	an	ICSID	arbitral	award.	A	role	that	has	been	played	by	
the	 ICSID	Secretariat,	 and	occasionally	 also	by	 the	World	Bank	 ,	when	 informed	of	 a	
delay	 in	paying	an	award,	has	been	to	 remind	the	award	debtor	of	 the	 importance	of	
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prompt	payment,	 if	only	 to	avoid	the	accumulation	of	 further	 interest	on	the	amount	
outstanding.	In	addition,	there	has	been	an	instance	of	the	ICSID		Secretariat	agreeing,	
at	 the	 request	 of	 the	 parties	 concerned,	 to	 host	 post-award	 settlement	 discussions.		
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Chapter	3 	
Issues	Arising	in	ICSID	Enforcement	Procedure	
3.1 Article	55	and	the	Obstacle	Posed	by	the	Doctrine	of	State	Immunity	to	the	
Enforcement	
As	 already	mentioned	 above,	 Article	 55	 is	 a	 specification	 of	 Article	 54(3).	 It	
states	 that	 sovereign	 immunity	 laws	 cannot	 be	 derogated	 from	 the	 law	 of	 the	 state	
where	execution	is	sought.	In	other	words,	state	immunity	will	apply	to	the	execution	of	
an	ICSID	award	in	the	same	way	as	it	would	apply	to	the	execution	of	a	judgment	of	a	
domestic	 court.	 For	 this	 reason,	 sovereign	 immunity	 affects	 the	 enforcement	 and	
execution	process.	
Indeed,	one	of	 the	main	problems	arisen	 in	 ICSID	arbitration	 is	 the	obstacle	
posed	 by	 the	 doctrine	 of	 State	 immunity	 to	 the	 enforcement4	 of	 arbitration	 awards	
rendered	 against	 sovereign	 States.	 As	 noted	 by	 Bjorklund	 the	 words	 recognition,	
enforcement,	 and	 execution	 are	 often	 used	 imprecisely.	 Recognition	 involves	 the	
process	 often	 called	 exequatur:	 confirmation	 by	 a	 municipal	 court	 that	 the	 award	 is	
authentic	 and	 thus	 has	 legal	 consequences,	 such	 as	 res	 judicata	 status.	 Execution	
usually	refers	to	the	mechanics	of	attaching	assets	to	satisfy	an	award.	‘Enforcement’	is	
sometimes	 coupled	 with	 recognition,	 is	 sometimes	 coupled	 with	 execution,	 and	 is	
sometimes	used	as	an	umbrella	phrase	to	encompass	both	recognition	and	execution.	
Professor	Schreuer	uses	enforcement	as	synonymous	with	execution,	unless	otherwise	
specified.127		
	
It	 has	 long	 been	 accepted	 that	 a	 waiver	 of	 State	 immunity	 from	 the	
jurisdiction	 of	 an	 international	 tribunal	 does	 not	 encompass	 any	 automatic	waiver	 of	
immunity	from	the	execution	of	a	resulting	award.128	The	distinction	between	waivers	
of	 immunity	 with	 respect	 to	 litigation	 or	 arbitration	 and	 waivers	 of	 immunity	 with	
respect	to	execution	means	that	victorious	investors	may	have	diﬃculty	collecting	the	
monies	owed	them	from	States	that	do	not	wish	to	pay	voluntarily.129	
The	 rationale	 for	maintaining	 immunity	 from	execution	 is	 that	certain	State	
assets,	such	as	central	bank	reserves	and	military	and	diplomatic	property,	are	integral	
																																																													
127	In	the	United	States	there	is	strictly	no	such	thing	as	execution	of	an	award.	A	claimant	moves	to	have	
an	award	confirmed	under	the	ICSID,	New	York,	or	Panama	Conventions.	22	USC	s	1650a;	9	USC	ss	201	et	
seq;	9	USC	ss	301	et	seq.	The	confirming	court	enters	a	judgment	on	the	award,	and	that	court	judgment	
can	then	be	executed	against	the	assets	of	the	defendant.	
128	H.	Fox,	8e	Law	of	State	Immunity	(2nd	edn,	2008)	599,	601–4	
129	See	 eg	 G.R.	 Delaume,	 ‘ICSID	 Arbitration	 and	 the	 Courts’,	 77	American	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	
(1983)	784.	
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to	 the	 business	 of	 government	 and	 should	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 seizure. 130 	Yet	 in	
concession	contracts	and	in	investment	treaties	States	have	acquiesced	in	the	creation	
of	 international	 arbitral	 tribunals	 before	 which	 foreign	 investors	 can	 seek	 relief.	
Decoupling	 the	waiver	of	 immunity	 from	 jurisdiction	 from	a	waiver	of	 immunity	 from	
execution	 seems	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 making	 a	 forum	 available	 to	 the	
foreign	investor.	As	Professor	Schreuer	noted	in	his	1988	study	of	State	immunity,	long	
before	 the	 recent	 surge	 in	 the	 number	 of	 investors	 resorting	 to	 investor-State	
arbitration,	 ‘The	 assumption	 of	 jurisdiction	 by	 domestic	 courts	 over	 foreign	 States	
without	any	prospect	of	having	the	resulting	decisions	made	eﬀective	would	not	only	
be	rather	half-hearted	but	would	also	largely	nullify	the	progress	made	in	the	protection	
of	the	private	claimant’.131	
Immunity	 from	 execution	means	 that	 respondents	 who	 lose	 investor-State	
cases	still	retain	the	ability	not	to	pay	awards	rendered	against	them,	although	by	doing	
so	 they	 are	 in	 violation	 of	 their	 international	 obligations.	 Professor	 Sompong	
Sucharitkul,	the	Special	Rapporteur	for	the	International	Law	Commission’s	project	on	
the	 codification	 of	 the	 law	 of	 State	 immunity,	 has	 described	 State	 immunity	 from	
execution	 as	 ‘the	 last	 fortress,	 the	 last	 bastion	 of	 State	 immunity’. 132 	Successful	
investors	 in	 investor-State	 arbitrations	 are	 increasingly	 finding	 themselves	 loosing	
arrows	at	that	fortress.	This	impediment	to	an	investor’s	recovery	of	assets	is	becoming	
more	 evident	 as	 recalcitrant	States	 refuse	 to	pay	 the	 awards	 rendered	 against	 them.	
Recent	examples	of	those	States	include	Russia	and	Argentina,	though	there	have	been	
other	isolated	instances	over	the	years.	
The	more	than	2,500	bilateral	 investment	treaties	 (BITs)	now	extant	are	not	
identical.	Many	permit	investors	to	choose	either	to	submit	a	dispute	to	ICSID	under	the	
auspices	of	the	ICSID	Convention	or	to	convene	proceedings	under	other	arbitral	rules.	
Under	 the	 former	 election,	 enforcement	 of	 the	 award	 is	 governed	 by	 the	 ICSID	
Convention;	under	the	latter,	no	matter	which	rules	govern	the	arbitration,	awards	will	
nearly	 always	 be	 subject	 to	 enforcement	 under	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 on	 the	
Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards.133	
The	 enforcement	 provisions	 in	 both	 of	 these	 Conventions	 are	 usually	
heralded	as	a	powerful	tool	in	the	hands	of	investors,	who,	if	they	win,	will	have	in	hand	
arbitral	 awards	 readily	 recognized	 around	 the	 world.	 The	 ICSID	 Convention	 requires	
that	State	parties	to	the	Convention	recognize	and	enforce	ICSID	awards	as	if	they	were	
final	 awards	 of	 their	 own	 courts	 (Article	 54).	 Yet	 it	 also	makes	 clear	 that	 waivers	 of	
																																																													
130	H.	 Fox,	 ‘State	 Immunity	 and	 the	 New	 York	 Convention’,	 in	 E.	 Gaillard	 and	 D.	 di	 Pietro	 (eds),	
Enforcement	 of	 Arbitration	 Agreements	 and	 International	 Arbitral	 Awards:	 8e	 New	 York	 Convention	 in	
Practice	(2008)	829,	858.	
131	Schreuer,	above	,	125.	
132	S.	Sucharitkul,	Commentary	to	ILC	Draft	Articles,	Article	18,	para	1,	C/AN.4/L/452/Add	3.	
133	Convention	on	the	Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	(1958),	21	UST	2517;	330	UNTS	3	
[hereinafter	 New	 York	 Convention].	 The	 Inter-American	 Convention	 on	 International	 Commercial	
Arbitration	 (the	 Panama	 Convention)	 is	 an	 OAS	 Convention	 with	 17	 State	 parties.	 14	 ILM	 (1975)	 336;	
<http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/iacac/iacac2e.asp>.	 In	 the	 United	 States	 it	 takes	 precedence	
over	 the	New	York	Convention,	when	 it	 is	 applicable,	 unless	 the	parties	 agree	otherwise.	 9	USC	 s	 305	
(2008).	Its	provisions,	however,	largely	mirror	those	of	the	New	York	Convention.	
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immunity	 from	 jurisdiction	 do	 not	 encompass	 waivers	 of	 immunity	 from	 execution;	
actual	execution	of	awards	is	subject	to	the	laws,	including	those	on	State	immunity,	of	
the	State	in	which	execution	is	sought	(Articles	54.3,	55).	New	York	Convention	awards	
are	enforceable	in	156	countries	and	are	often	more	readily	enforceable	than	municipal	
court	judgments	from	other	States.	Yet	they,	too,	are	subject	to	the	immunity	laws	of	
the	place	of	enforcement.	Because	those	immunity	 laws	vary	greatly,	enforceability	 is	
much	 less	 certain	 than	might	 be	 inferred	 from	 a	 cursory	 review	 of	 the	 enforcement	
provisions.	
The	 insertion	 of	 municipal	 law	 into	 the	 execution	 process	 inevitably	
introduces	a	note	of	unpredictability,	though	it	would	be	going	too	far	to	say	there	is	no	
prospect	of	a	decision	resulting	from	an	investment	arbitration	award	being	executable	
in	 local	 courts.	 State	 practice	 over	 the	 last	 several	 decades	 has	 shifted	 perceptibly,	
though	not	uniformly,	towards	a	restrictive	theory	of	 immunity	with	respect	to	assets	
subject	 to	 execution,	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 inroads	 made	 by	 the	 restrictive	 theory	 of	
immunity	 in	 the	 jurisdictional	 context.134	Jus,	 a	 successful	 investor	 can	 very	 likely	
execute	his	arbitral	award	against	commercial	assets	of	a	State,	assuming	he	is	able	to	
locate	 those	assets	and	surmount	any	 immunity	defence	 raised	by	 the	State	 that	 the	
assets	 are	 properly	 classified	 as	 used	 for	 government	 rather	 than	 for	 commercial	
purposes.	 This	 half-a-loaf	 approach,	 however,	 is	 unlikely	 to	 satisfy	 many	 foreign	
investors,	 and	 they	may	 hesitate	 to	 bring	 claims	 if	 recovery	 should	 prove	 to	 be	 too	
diﬃcult.	As	Professor	Schreuer	has	noted:	
[A]llowing	plaintiﬀs	 to	proceed	against	 foreign	States	 and	 then	 to	withhold	
from	them	the	fruits	of	successful	litigation	through	immunity	from	execution	may	put	
them	 into	 the	 doubly	 frustrating	 position	 of	 having	 been	 lured	 into	 expensive	 and	
seemingly	successful	lawsuits	only	to	be	left	with	an	unenforceable	judgment	plus	legal	
costs.135	
	
Article	55	creates	 in	this	way	a	melting	pot	of	State	Immunity	and	domestic	 laws	that	
can	 seriously	 undermine	 proper	 enforcement.	 It	 ideed	 qualifies	 the	 obligation	 to	
enforce	and	execute	the	award	by	expressly	reserving	the	integrity	and	applicability	of	
‘the	 law	 in	 force	 in	 any	 Contracting	 State’	 relating	 to	 the	 immunity	 of	 States	 from	
execution.	
	
As	noted	by	 the	MTD	v	Chile	Decision	on	 stay,	 ‘immunity	 from	execution	 is	 reserved	
(Article	 55),	 but	 this	 simply	 leaves	 the	 issue	 of	 immunity	 to	 be	 dealt	 with	 under	 the	
applicable	 law:	 ‘Immunity	 from	 execution	 of	 the	 host	 State	 in	 its	 own	 courts	 would	
depend	entirely	on	its	domestic	law’.	
	
																																																													
134	A.F.M.	Maniruzzaman,	‘State	Enterprise	Arbitration	and	Sovereign	Immunity	Issues:	A	Look	at	Recent	
Trends’,	 60(3)	 Dispute	 Resolution	 Journal	 (August–October	 1985)	 1,	 4;	 J.	 Crawford,	 ‘Execution	 of	
Judgments	and	Foreign	Sovereign	Immunity’,	75	American	Journal	of	International	Law	(1981)	820,	854–5.	
135	Schreuer,	above,	125.	
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Noticeably,	 Article	 55	 refers	 to	 ‘a	 foreign	 state’.	 It	 may	 thus	 be	 arguable	 that	 the	
respondent	 State	would	 not	 enjoy	 immunity	when	 enforcement	 is	 sought	 in	 its	 own	
courts.	 However,	 this	 supposition	 has	 not	 been	 tested	 in	 practice,	 and	 in	 any	 event	
Article	54(3)	 refers	 to	 ‘the	 laws	concerning	the	execution	of	 judgments	 in	 force	 in	 the	
State	 in	 whose	 territories	 such	 execution	 is	 sought’,	 thus	 including	 the	 law	 of	 the	
respondent	State	in	the	event	that	enforcement	is	sought	within	its	territory.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	States	enjoy	 immunity	 in	 the	courts	of	other	States	based	on	the	
principle	of	sovereign	equality.	Thus,	under	customary	law	(and	where	applicable	treaty	
law),	States	are	obliged	to	respect	the	immunity	of	other	States.	
	
The	 State	 where	 enforcement	 is	 sought	 will	 not	 lift	 another	 State’s	 enforcement	
immunity	 absent	 any	 applicable	 exception	 to	 immunity	 such	 as	 ‘that	 the	 property	 in	
question	 must	 be	 in	 use	 for	 an	 activity	 not	 pursuing	 government	 non-commercial	
purposes,	 or	 that	 the	 State	which	 owns	 the	 property	 has	 expressly	 consented	 to	 the	
taking	 of	 a	 measure	 of	 constraint,	 or	 that	 that	 State	 has	 allocated	 the	 property	 in	
question	for	the	satisfaction	of	a	judicial	claim.’	
	
The	question	of	forcible	execution	is	left	expressly	subject	to	the	law	of	the	State	of	the	
execution	 forum,	 including	 in	particular	 the	 immunity	 from	execution	which	a	 foreign	
State	 might	 enjoy	 under	 that	 law.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 under	 Article	 53	 of	 the	
Convention	the	Respondent	State	is	under	a	continuing	obligation	to	comply	with	the	
award	 (subject	 only	 to	 stay	 of	 enforcement).	 Thus,	 the	 Convention	 imposes	 an	
obligation	 on	 the	 unsuccessful	 Respondent	 to	 abide	 by	 and	 comply	 with	 an	 award.	
Consequently,	a	Respondent	State	which	raises	the	immunity	plea	breaches	the	ICSID	
convention	 because	 it	 is	 under	 the	 obligation	 to	 comply.	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 Broches	
‘[t]he	 obligation	 of	 governments	 [under	 Article	 53]	 to	 abide	 by	 awards	 remains	
unaffected	by	the	limitations	on	their	forcible	execution.’	
	
Similarly	and	importantly,	the	MINE	v	Guinea	stay	decision	records	that:	
	
It	should	be	clearly	understood	[..]	that	State	immunity	may	well	afford	a	legal	defense	
to	forcible	execution,	but	it	provides	neither	argument	nor	excuse	for	failing	to	comply	
with	an	award.	In	fact,	the	issue	of	State	immunity	from	forcible	execution	of	an	award	
will	typically	arise	if	the	State	party	refuses	to	comply	with	its	treaty	obligations.	Non-
compliance	 by	 a	 State	 constitutes	 a	 violation	 by	 that	 State	 of	 its	 international	
obligation	and	will	attract	 its	own	sanctions.	The	Committee	refers	 in	 this	connection	
among	other	 things	 to	Article	27	and	64	of	 the	Convention,	and	to	 the	consequences	
which	such	a	violation	would	have	for	such	a	State’s	reputation	with	private	and	public	
sources	of	international	finance.	
	
During	 the	 negotiations	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 the	main	 result	which	 the	 drafters	
sought	 to	 achieve	 was	 removing	 any	 doubt	 as	 to	 the	 binding	 character	 of	 the	
agreement	to	arbitrate.	Once	this	result	was	achieved	in	the	Convention,	it	was	thought	
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that	States	would	not	fail	to	comply	with	the	award.	In	this	sense,	the	ICSID	convention	
has	maintained	 the	 traditional	 distinction	 between	 immunity	 from	 enforcement	 and	
jurisdictional	immunity.	
Enforcement	 immunity,	however,	may	cause	serious	prejudice	to	successful	 investors.	
They	 may	 only	 direct	 execution	 to	 property	 subject	 to	 one	 of	 the	 exceptions	 noted	
above	such	as	property	serving	commercial	purposes	and	in	observance	of	all	local	law	
modalities.	
Moreover,	 the	 burden	 of	 establishing	 that	 the	 property	 at	 hand	 is	 not	 serving	 non-
commercial	 government	 purposes	 is	 on	 the	 party	 seeking	 enforcement	 based	on	 the	
principle	 that	 the	party	 relying	on	an	exception	bears	 the	onus	of	proving	 it.	This	 is	a	
great	burden	given	that	such	 information	 is	controlled	by	the	debtor	State	and	might	
not	 be	 susceptible	 to	 discovery.	 Under	 most	 national	 legislations,	 the	 head	 of	 a	
diplomatic	 mission	 may	 issue	 a	 certificate	 as	 to	 whether	 certain	 State	 property	 is	
immune	 or	 not.	 Such	 evidence	 is	 conclusive.	 Blane	 rightly	 recalls	 that	 the	 law	 of	
diplomatic	immunity	precludes	cross-examination	of	the	head	of	a	diplomatic	mission,		
and	 suggests	 that	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 should	 be	 shifted	 in	 order	 better	 to	 protect	
investors.	
	
The	continuing	availability	of	the	State	immunity	plea	has	been	criticized	by	scholars122	
as	 being	 contrary	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 effectiveness	 of	 awards.	 Schreuer	 has	 termed	
Article	55	‘the	Achilles’	heel	of	the	Convention’.136	
	
Be	 that	 as	 it	 may,	 it	 must	 be	 emphasized	 that	 during	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention,	it	was	assumed	that	States	would	comply	voluntarily	due	to	the	threat	of	
negative	publicity	and	loss	of	future	investment,	as	investors	would	be	unwilling	to	deal	
with	unreliable	host	States.	
	
In	actual	fact,	Article	54	was	inserted	to	guarantee	enforcement	against	noncompliant	
investors	as	they	are	not	parties	to	the	Convention	per	se	and	‘no		
direct	 sanction’	 was	 otherwise	 available	 to	 States,	 especially	 with	 a	 view	 to	 the	
additional	 guarantee	 which	 investors	 are	 entitled	 to	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 27	 of	 the	
Convention,	namely,	that	if	the	respondent	State	refuses	to	comply	voluntarily,	there	is	
a	possibility	of	diplomatic	protection	by	the	investor’s	home	State.	
	
Compliance	 has	 prevailed	 since	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 entered	 into	 force.	Within	 the	
scope	of	the	present	article,	only	nine	cases	of	enforcement	against	States	have	been	
identified.	 Of	 course,	 given	 that	 not	 all	 decisions	 of	 local	 courts	 or	 investor–State	
settlements	 are	 publicly	 available,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 absolute	 certainty	 as	 to	 State	
compliance.	
	
																																																													
136	Schreuer	et	al,		1154.	
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The	 instances	 in	 which	 investors	 have	 availed	 themselves	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	
enforcement	mechanism	are:	
	
—		Benvenuti	&	Bonfant	v	The	Congo;	
—		SOABI	v	Senegal;	
—		LETCO	v	Liberia;	
—		AIG	Partners	v	Kazakhstan;	
—		Siag	v	The	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt;	
—		Sempra	v	Argentina;	
—		Enron	v	Argentina;	
—	Blue	Ridge	 Investments,	 LLC	 as	 purchaser	 and	 assignee	 of	 the	Award	 rendered	 in	
favour	of	CMS	in	the	case	CMS	v	Argentina;	
—		Ares	International	Srl	and	Metalgeo	Srl	v	Georgia.	
	
Domestic	 courts	 have	 been	 criticized	 for	 the	 way	 they	 have	 handled	 some	 of	 these	
cases.	 For	 example,	 in	 SOABI	 v	 Senegal,	 the	 French	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 ‘erroneously	
treated	the	recognition	and	execution	stages	as	interchangeable.	It	reasoned	that	since	
SOABI	 had	 not	 proven	 the	 commercial	 nature	 of	 the	 Senegalese	 assets	 subject	 to	
execution,	recognition	of	the	award	would	violate	Senegal’s	immunity	from	execution.’	
The	 Cour	 de	 Cassation	 then	 corrected	 the	 error	 finding	 that	 ‘[t]here	 is	 no	 sovereign	
immunity	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 recognition	 of	 an	 award’,	 since	 ‘[i]mmunity	 from	
execution	under	Article	55	only	arises	when	actual	measures	of	execution	are	taken’.	
	
Broches	 has	 also	 noted	 that	 the	 French	 Tribunal	 de	 Grande	 instance	 was	 wrong	 in	
examining	 the	 conformity	 of	 the	 ICSID	 award	 with	 French	 law	 and	 ordre	 public	 in	
Benvenuti	&	Bonfant	v	The	Congo.	
	
The	Order	in	the	already	cited	case	of	Siag	v	The	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt	states	in	one	
part	 that	 ‘[a]	 judgment	 so	 filed	 has	 the	 same	 effect	 and	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 same	
procedures,	 defenses	 and	 proceedings	 for	 reopening,	 vacating,	 or	 staying	 as	 a	
judgment	 of	 the	 supreme	 court	 of	 [New	York]	 and	may	 be	 satisfied	 in	 like	manner.’	
Such	language	seems	to	imply	that	the	option	of	review	by	a	domestic	court	is	open	to	
the	award	debtor.	This,	most	 likely,	 is	the	reason	why	Siag	chose	a	different	forum	to	
enforce	the	award.	
	
Similar	language,	subject	to	much	criticism,	was	also	contained	in	the	Order	in	LETCO	v	
Liberia	 a	 few	 years	 earlier,	 implying	 that	 domestic	 courts	 have	 not	 learned	 a	 lesson	
from	past	mistakes.	Additionally,	in	the	LETCO	Order,	the	judge	mistakenly	issued	the	
Award	with	the	same	force	as	a	final	judgment	of	the	court	to	which	he	belongs,	rather	
than	of	a	court	of	‘general	jurisdiction	of	one	of	the	several	states’	as	required	by	Article	
54(1),	second	sentence,	in	the	case	of	federal	States.	
	
This	thesis	cannot	present	a	comprehensive	overview	of	all	State	laws	and	practices	in	
the	field	of	sovereign	immunity.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	almost	all	national	systems	have	
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moved	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 restrictive	 immunity	 and	 permit	 enforcement	 against	 State	
property	covered	by	the	commercial	exception.	Reinisch	has	reported	that	only	Russian	
courts	 accord	 absolute	 enforcement	 immunity,	 the	 only	 exception	 being	 an	 explicit	
waiver.	 In	contrast,	 ‘Turkish	courts	generally	refuse	to	grant	 immunity	from	execution	
to	foreign	states’.	
	
	
	
3.2 		Sovereign	Immunity	as	the	Achielle’s	Heel	
	
Sovereign	 Immunity	 is,	 in	essence,	 the	principle	 that	 the	sovereign	 (i.e.)	 the	
government)	cannot	be	sued	without	its	consent.	Although	rooted	in	English	common	
law,	the	doctrine	also	derives	from	the	practical	consequence	that	the	sovereign	makes	
the	laws,	and	so	can	restrict	any	legal	right	against	it	under	the	very	laws	that	it	makes.	
In	federal	states,	like	the	United	States,	the	concept	extends	to	political	subdivision	and	
involves	 the	 immunity	 of	 both	 the	 federal	 courts	 and	 the	 courts	 of	 its	 constituent	
subdivisions.	However,	 in	 this	 chapter,	we	will	 focus	on	 ‘foreign’	 sovereign	 immunity-
i.e.,	 the	 immunity	 of	 sovereign	nation-states	 in	 the	 courts	 of	 other	 sovereign	nation-
states.	 This	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 common	 law	 doctrine	 to	 the	 international	 plane,	
which	emerged	largely	as	a	result	of	international	comity.		
Structurally,	 we	 will	 analyze	 firstly	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 doctrine	 from	 its	
‘absolutist’	origins	to	the	significantly	more	 ‘restrictive’	version	in	place	 in	most	states	
today.	 This	 evolution	 has	 made	 it	 substantially	 easier	 for	 a	 creditor	 holding	 an	
arbitration	 award	 against	 a	 sovereign	 to	 be	 able	 to	 maintain	 jurisdiction	 over	 that	
sovereign	 in	a	sovereign	court.	 Importantly,	however,	we	will	 try	 to	demonstrate	that	
creditors	 should	 be	 aware	 of	 the	 significant	 distinction	 between	 immunity	 from	
jurisdiction	 and	 immunity	 from	 execution.	 The	 latter	 protects	 many,	 perhaps	 even	
most,	sovereign	assets	from	being	attached	to	collect	an	arbitration	award,	even	when	
the	relevant	foreign	court	has	otherwise	obtained	jurisdiction	over	the	sovereign	state.	
This	portion	of	the	thesis,	therefore	includes	an	overview	of	these	concepts	as	applied	
in	the	most	recent	sovereign	immunity	precedents	in	several	major	jurisdiction	in	which	
enforcement	of	ICSID	arbitration	is	likely	to	be	sought,	including	the	United	States,	the	
United	Kingdom,	France	and	Germany.	
	
3.2.1 The	Legal	Issue	with	Sovereign	Immunity		
	
So	what	 is	 the	 legal	 issue	 behind	 the	 enforcement	 of	 an	 award	 between	 a	
state	and	a	private	party,	when	the	state	is	unwilling	to	honour	the	award?	The	question	
invokes	the	rules,	which	were	analysed	in	the	previous	chapters.	
	
The	 New	 York	 Convention	 does	 not	 contain	 any	 express	 reference	 to	
recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	 against	 a	 state,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 well	
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established	 that	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 applies	 also	 to	 awards	 involving	 states.	
Neither	 does	 it	 address	 the	 subject	 of	 sovereign	 immunity,	 although	 it	 has	 been	
suggested	that	considerations	of	 immunity	may	fall	within	the	public	policy	exception	
under	 Article	 V(b)(2)	 of	 the	 Convention.137	It	 should	 be	 said	 that	 no	 judicial	 authority	
could	be	cited	so	far	supporting	this	proposition.138	Such	proposition	may	derive	from,	
and	it	may	lead	to,	confusion.	It	is	the	New	York	Convention	to	frame	immunity	rules,	
because	it	contains	in	itself	a	waiver	to	all	exception	not	expressly	mentioned,	and	not	
vice	versa	immunity	rules	to	impact	upon	the	Convention.	All	the	same	as	an	agreement	
to	arbitrate	operates,	or	should	operate,	as	a	waiver	of	immunity	both	with	respect	to	
enforcement	of	the	agreement	and	the	resulting	award.	
	
Under	 the	 ICSID	Convention,	where	 ratione	 personae	 arbitration	 necessarily	
involves	a	state,	there	are	specific	provisions	to	this	effect.	The	Execution	of	an	 ICSID	
award	shall	be	governed	by	the	laws	concerning	the	execution	of	judgements	in	force	in	
the	State	 in	whose	territories	such	execution	 is	sought.	Though	Article	55	states	that:	
“Nothing	 in	 Article	 54	 shall	 be	 construed	 as	 derogating	 from	 the	 law	 in	 force	 in	 any	
Contracting	 State	 relating	 to	 immunity	 of	 that	 State	 or	 of	 any	 foreign	 State	 from	
execution.”	The	Convention	makes	it	clear	that	the	issue	of	execution	remains	subject	to	
the	immunity	rules	prevailing	in	each	contracting	state.	It	is	therefore	possible	that	an	
ICSID	award,	like	other	award,	may	be	susceptible	of	execution	in	certain	countries	and	
not	in	others.	
	
3.2.2 Sources	 of	 the	 State	 Immunity	 and	 Evolution	 From	Absolute	
Immunity	To	Restrictive	Immunity		
	
State	immunity	has	either	sources	in	international	law	that	in	local	laws.	One	of	
the	main	sources	of	state	immunity	right	under	international	law	is	the	UN	Convention	
on	Jurisdictional	 Immunities	of	States	and	Their	Property.	This	convention	was	signed	
in	 2004,	 to	 allow	 signatory	 states	 to	 use	 this	 defence	 against	 foreign	 courts.	 It	 gave	
immunity	to	states	in	matters	such	as	diplomatic	properties	and	military	assets,	but	at	
the	 same	 time	 excluded	 matter	 such	 as	 commercial	 transactions.139	Similarly,	 with	
regards	 to	 arbitration,	 states	may	 not	 use	 state	 immunity	 defence	 according	 to	 this	
convention	 against	 arbitration	 proceedings	 provided	 that	 the	 state	 has	 given	 its	
																																																													
137	Delaume	 G.R.,	 Enforcement	 of	 State	 Contract	 Awards:	 Jurisdictional	 Pitfalls	 and	 Remedies,	 8	 ICSID	
Review	–	Foreign	Investment	Law	Journal	29	(1993),	p.	49.	
138	See	Stewart	D.P.,	National	Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	under	Treaties	and	Conventions,	in:	Lillich	R.	
and	 Brower	 C.	 (eds.).	 International	 Arbitration	 in	 the	 21st	 Century:	 Towards	 “judicialization”	 and	
Uniformity?,	Twelfth	Sokol	Colloquium,	Irvington	New	York	1993,	at	p.	196	and	footnote	117.	Reference	
is	 made	 to:	 generally	 Delaume,	 Contractual	 Waivers	 of	 Sovereign	 Immunity:	 Some	 Practical	
Considerations,	 5	 ICSID	 Review	 –	 FILJ	 232	 (1990);	M.B.L.	 Contractors,	 Inc.	 v.	 Republic	of	 Trinidad	 and	
Tobago,	 725	 F.	 Supp.	 52	 (D.D.C.	 1989)	 (foreign	 government’s	 agreement	 to	 arbitrate	 with	 non-U.S.	
entities	 outside	 of	 the	 United	 States	 under	 its	 own	 governing	 law	 held	 waiver	 of	 jurisdiction,	 subject	
matter	and	personnel,	to	U.S.	enforcement	action	of	resulting	award).	
139	Article	10	of	the	UN	Convention	on	Jurisdictional	Immunities	of	States	and	Their	Property.	
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consent	 in	 writing.140	Nowadays,	 most	 BIT’s	 contain	 arbitration	 clauses	 that	 refer	
disputes	to	ad	hoc	or	institutional	arbitration	through	which	states	waive	implicitly	their	
jurisdictional	immunity.	
Local	 laws	 play	 a	 role	 too.	 With	 the	 evolving	 role	 of	 states	 in	 different	
international	 activities	 including	 trade,	 many	 states	 such	 as	 the	 US	 and	 several	
European	 states	 have	 adopted	 a	 restrictive	 approach	 to	 state	 immunity	 and	
incorporated	 that	 into	 their	 local	 laws.	 One	 of	 the	motives	 for	 such	 change	was	 the	
pressure	 imposed	 by	 business	 owners	 through	 attacking	 the	 unfair	 status	 quo	 when	
conflict	arises	with	foreign	states.	In	1978,	the	UK	passed	its	State	Immunity	Act	which	
eliminated	the	right	for	immunity	against	acts	that	have	been	committed	by	a	state	in	
its	private	 capacity.141	Also,	 agreeing	 in	writing	 to	 submit	 to	arbitration	will	 not	 allow	
the	 state	 to	 use	 such	 defence	 at	 a	 later	 stage.	 Similarly,	 the	 Foreign	 Sovereign	
Immunities	Act,	FSIA	hereunder,	was	passed	in	1976	in	the	US.	This	Act	excluded	from	
state	immunity	the	commercial	disputes	and	obliges	states	to	comply	with	arbitration	
agreements	 as	 long	 as	 the	 arbitration	 process	 in	 conducted	 in	 the	 US.142		 However,	
there	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 acts	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 definition	 of	
commercial	 property	 that	 can	 be	 enforced	 upon	 as	 the	 UK	 act	 has	 a	 narrower	
definition.143	
Following	the	Treaty	of	Westphalia	 in	1648	the	nation-state	emerged,	along	
with	its	corresponding	theory	of	political	sovereignty.	In	England,	the	notion	that	‘The	
King	can	do	no	wrong’	became	deep-rooted,	so	much	that	Blackstone	described	it	as	‘a	
necessary	and	fundamental	principle	of	the	English	constitution’.144	
Within	the	system	of	nation-states,	it	was	widely	accepted	that	this	immunity	
of	 each	 sovereign	 state	 was	 a	 necessary	 corollary	 to	 respect	 for	 the	 state’s	 overall	
sovereignty.145	It	therefore	became	a	matter	of	international	comity	that,	based	on	the	
respect	 for	 the	 sovereignty	 of	 fellow	 nation-states,	 the	 domestic	 courts	 of	 one	
sovereign	state	would	refuse	to	entertain	jurisdiction	over	cases	lodged	against	another	
sovereign	state	 in	 the	absence	of	 the	 latter’s	consent.	Thus	was	 the	 initially	domestic	
doctrine	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 internationalized,	 giving	 birth	 to	 ‘foreign’	 sovereign	
immunity.		
The	international	law	of	foreign	immunity	has	evolved	considerably	over	the	
past	 century.	 Prior	 to	 1900,	 sovereign	 immunity	 could	 best	 be	 characterized	 in	
‘absolute’	 terms-sovereign	 immunity	 extended	 to	 the	 state	 and	 all	 of	 its	 avatars,	
including	state-owned	commercial	operations	and	entities.146	
																																																													
140	Article	17	of	the	UN	Convention	on	Jurisdictional	Immunities	of	States	and	Their	Property.	
141	Article	3	of	the	UK	State	Immunity	Act	of	1978.	
142	FSIA	28	USC	sec.	1605	(A)6a	
143	Krishnan,	 A.,	 Obstacles	 to	 the	 Enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 against	 states-	 an	 international	
perspective,	 Critical	 Twenties,	 (2011)	 http://www.criticaltwenties.in/lawthejudiciary/obstacles-to-the-
enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-against-states-an-international-perspective	(Last	visited	on	January	2nd,	
2013).	
144	William	Blackstone,	Commentaries	on	the	laws	of	England	(1769).	
145	David	 P.	 Vandenberg,	 In	 the	Wake	 of	 Austria	 v.	 Altmann:	 The	 Current	 Status	 of	 Foreign	 Sovereign	
Immunity	in	the	United	States	Courts,	77	U.	Colo.	L.	Rev.	739.741	(2006).	
146	J	M	Sweeny,	The	international	law	of	foreign	immunity	20-22,	(1963).	
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The	 first	 judicial	 expression	 of	 absolute	 sovereign	 immunity	 in	 the	 united	
States	 is	 found	 in	 the	1812	U.S.	Supreme	Court	decision	 in	The	Schooner	Exchange	v.	
M’Faddon.147	In	that	case,	a	French	naval	ship	that	entered	Philadelphia	under	the	stress	
of	wheatear	 conditions	was	 claimed	 by	M’Faddon	 and	 his	 partner	 as	 their	 own	 ship,	
which	 they	 claimed	 the	 French	Navy	had	 forcefully	 seized	 from	 them	while	 at	 sea	 in	
1810.	 M’Faddon	 and	 his	 partner	 libeled	 the	 ship	 in	 federal	 district	 court,	 which	
dismissed	 the	 libel,	 only	 to	 be	 overturned	 by	 the	 circuit	 court.	 The	 U.S.	 Attorney,	
appearing	against	M’Faddon,	appealed	to	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court,	which	in	a	decision	
by	 chief	 justice	 Marshall,	 began	 with	 the	 assertion	 that	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 each	
sovereign	is	necessarily	exclusive	and	absolute	within	its	own	territory:	
The	 jurisdiction	of	 the	nation	within	 its	own	territory	 is	necessarily	exclusive	
and	 absolute.	 All	 exceptions,	 therefore,	 to	 the	 full	 and	 complete	 power	 of	 a	 nation	
within	 its	own	 territories,	must	be	 traced	up	 to	 the	 consent	of	 the	nation	 itself…One	
sovereign	being	in	no	respect	amenable	to	another:	and	being	bound	by	obligations	of	
the	highest	character	not	to	degrade	the	dignity	of	his	nation,	by	placing	himself	or	its	
sovereign	rights	within	the	jurisdiction	of	another,	can	be	supposed	to	enter	a	foreign	
territory	 only	 under	 an	 express	 license,	 or	 in	 the	 confidence	 that	 the	 immunities	
belonging	 to	 his	 independent	 sovereign	 station,	 though	 not	 expressly	 stipulated,	 are	
reserved	by	implication,	and	will	be	extended	to	him.		
This	 perfect	 equality	 and	 absolute	 independence	 of	 sovereigns,	 and	 this	
common	 interest	 impelling	 them	 to	mutual	 intercourse…have	given	 rise	 to	 a	 class	 of	
cases	 in	which	 every	 sovereign	 is	 understood	 to	waive	 the	 exercise	 of	 a	 part	 of	 that	
complete	exclusive	territorial	jurisdiction,	which	has	been	stated	to	be	the	attribute	of	
every	nation.148	
Accordingly,	 the	 Court	 held	 that	 France,	 the	 purported	 sovereign	 owner	 of	
the	vessel,	was	protected	by	an	implied	grant	of	immunity	from	the	jurisdiction	of	U.S.	
courts.	
Importantly,	however,	Chief	Justice	Marshall	also	opined	in	dicta	that	certain	
exceptions	to	sovereign	 immunity	should	exist.	Because	his	decision	derived	from	the	
principle	 that	 each	 state	 had	 ‘full	 and	 absolute	 territorial	 jurisdiction’,	 Chief	 Justice	
Marshall	 left	 open	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	 territorial	 sovereign	 could	 condition	 or	
completely	 withdraw	 such	 immunity.	 In	 addition,	 observed	 that	 ‘there	 is	 a	 manifest	
distinction	between	the	private	property	of	the	person	who	happens	to	be	a	prince,	and	
that	military	force	which	supports	the	sovereign	power,	ad	mantains	the	dignity	and	the	
independence	of	a	nation’.149		
In	other	words,	when	a	sovereign	acts	as	a	private	party,	it	may	be	considered	
to	 have	waived	 its	 immunity	 as	 a	 sovereign	 and	 to	 have	 subjected	 itself	 to	 the	 laws	
governing	private	parties.	Despite	the	dicta,	which	prefigured	the	‘restrictive’	theory	of	
sovereign	 immunity	 that	 would	 emerge	 later,	 The	 Shooner	 Exchange	 has	 been	
																																																													
147	See	http://courses.kvasaheim.com/ps376/briefs/tnkrumholzbrief2.pdf	.		
148	135-137.	
149	Id	at	145.	
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repeatedly	 cited	 as	 an	 important	 precedent	 for	 the	 general	 principle	 of	 ‘absolute’	
sovereign	immunity.	
The	 courts	 of	 numerous	 other	 jurisdiction	 subsequently	 announced	 support	
for	the	absolute	theory.	For	example,	in	1849,	the	Supreme	Court	of	France	in	the	case	
Spanish	Government	v.	Lambage	et	Puyol	described	the	sovereign	immunity	doctrine	as	
follows:		
The	 reciprocal	 independence	 of	 states	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 universally	
respected	 principles	 of	 international	 law,	 and	 it	 follows	 as	 a	 result	 therefrom	 that	 a	
government	cannot	be	subjected	to	the	jurisdiction	of	one	another	against	its	will,	and	
that	the	right	of	jurisdiction	of	one	government	over	litigation	arising	from	its	own	acts	
is	 a	 right	 inherent	 to	 its	 sovereignty	 that	 another	 government	 cannot	 seize	 without	
impairing	their	mutual	relations.	
Similarly,	 the	British	courts	expressed	the	concept	of	sovereign	 immunity	 in	
equally	 broad	 ad	 absolute	 terms.	 In	 1880,	 the	British	 courts	 stated	 in	The	Parliament	
Belge	that:		
As	a	consequence	of	the	absolute	independence	of	every	sovereign	authority,	
and	 of	 the	 international	 comity	 which	 induces	 every	 sovereign	 state	 to	 respect	 the	
independence	and	dignity	of	every	other	sovereign	state,	each	and	every	one	declines	
to	exercise	by	means	of	its	courts	any	of	its	territorial	jurisdiction	over	the	person	of	any	
sovereign.	
Acceptance	of	the	‘absolute’	doctrine	of	sovereign	immunity	began	to	decline	
at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 eventually	 becoming	 an	 anachronism.	 This	was	
largely	 due	 to	 the	 changing	 role	 of	 the	 nation-state.	 As	 governments	 increasingly	
participated	 in	 commercial	 activities	 through	private	entities,	 the	number	of	disputes	
arising	 in	 connection	 with	 such	 transactions	 likewise	 increased.	 State	 claims	 of	
immunity	in	this	context	created	an	unfair	result	because	aggrieved	private	parties	were	
often	 denied	 a	 legal	 remedy	 for	 reasons	 wholly	 unrelated	 to	 the	 substance	 of	 their	
claims.	To	resolve	such	inequalities,	judiciaries	began	to	distinguish	between	public	acts	
(acta	 jure	 imperii)	 and	 private	 acts	 (acta	 jure	 gestionis),	 excluding	 the	 latter	 from	
immunity.150	
Belgium	 was	 the	 first	 civil	 law	 country	 to	 adapt	 its	 evolving	 domestic	
immunity	 concepts	 to	 litigation	 against	 foreign	 sovereign.151	In	 the	 1903	 decision	 of	
Societe’	 Anonyme	 des	 Chemins	 de	 Fer	 Liegois	 Luxembourgeois	 v.	 The	 Netherlands,	 the	
Supreme	Court	of	Belgium	described	the	distinction	between	public	and	private	acts	as	
follows:	
																																																													
150	In		general	on	the	immunity	of	States	from	jurisdiction	and	the	distinction	between	,		acta		jure		imperii		
and	 acta	 jure	 gestionis,	 	 see	 	 S.	 S	 UCHATITKUL,	 Immunities	 of	 Foreign	 States	 before	 National	
Authorities,	in	Recueil	des	cours,		n.		1/1976,		pp.		87		e		ss.		;		I.	PINGEL-LENUZZA,	Les	immunités	des	Etas	
en	 droit	 international,	 Bruxelles,	 1997;	 M.COSNARD,	 La	 soumission	 des	 Etas	 aux	 tribunaux	 internes,	
Paris,	1996.	
Cfr.	 also	 N.	 RONZITTI	 -G.VENTURINI,	 Le	 	 immunità	 	 giurisdizionali	 	 degli	 	 stati	 	 e	 	 degli	 	 altri	 	 enti		
internazionali,	Padova,		2008.	
151	Joseph	W	Dellapenna,	Suing	foreign	Governments	and	their	Corporations	5	(2nd	ed.	2003).	
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Sovereignty	 is	 involved	 only	 when	 political	 acts	 are	 accomplished	 by	 the	
state;	However,	the	state	 is	not	bound	to	confine	 itself	to	a	political	role,	and	can,	for	
the	 needs	 of	 the	 collectivity,	 buy,	 own,	 contract,	 become	 creditor	 or	 debtor,	 and	
engage	 in	 commerce…In	 the	 discharge	 of	 these	 functions,	 the	 state	 is	 not	 acting	 as	
public	 power,	 but	 does	what	 private	 persons	 do,	 and	 as	 such,	 is	 acting	 in	 a	 civil	 and	
private	 capacity.	 When	 after	 bargaining	 on	 a	 footing	 of	 equality	 with	 a	 person	 or	
incurring	a	responsibility	in	no	way	connected	with	the	political	order,	the	state	is	drawn	
to	 litigation,	 the	 litigation	 concerns	 a	 civil	 right,	 within	 the	 sole	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	
courts…and	the	foreign	state	as	civil	person	is	like	any	other	foreign	person	amendable	
to	the	Belgian	courts.152	
In	 this	manner,	 the	 absolute	 theory	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 began	 evolving	
into	a	new	restrictive	theory	distinguishing	between	acts	of	a	public	and	private	nature.	
In	the	United	States,	the	weakness	of	the	absolute	theory	was	exposed	in	the	
1926	case	Berizzi	Brothers	v.	Steamship	Pesaro.153	
In	 that	 case,	 the	 district	 court,	 in	 a	 preliminary	 ruling	 and	 upon	
recommendation	of	the	U.S	State	Department,	declined	Italy’s	request	for	immunity	in	
an	admiralty	case	in	which	the	Italian	ship,	in	its	usual	course	of	commercial	activities,	
failed	to	deliver	cargo	to	New	York.	The	State	Department	had	recommended	that	the	
courts	deny	immunity	on	the	basis	that	vessels	conducting	commerce	were	not	entitled	
to	the	same	deference	as	warships.154	In	a	later	proceeding,	the	district	court	reversed	
its	 earlier	 decision	 and	 dismissed	 the	 case	 for	 lack	 of	 jurisdiction.	 In	 upholding	 the	
dismissal,	the	Supreme	Court	concluded	that	even	merchant	ships	of	foreign	sovereigns	
were	entitled	to	immunity.	The	Court	noted,	however,	that	‘[i]n	the	lower	federal	courts	
there	has	been	some	diversity	of	opinion	on	the	question	[of	 immunity	in	instances	of	
commercial	activity]’.155	
In	 subsequent	 decisions,	 the	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 shifted	 away	 from	 the	
absolute	theory	of	deferring	to	the	executive	branch.	For	example,	in	the	1938	decision	
of	Compania	Espanola	de	Navegacion	Maritima,	SA	v.	The	Navemar,	the	Courtdeclared	
that	sovereign	immunity	was	no	longer	absolute.	Rather,	it	was	a	prerogative	extended	
by	 the	 executive	 branch	 and	 the	 judiciary	 would	 defer	 to	 decisions	 of	 the	 executive	
regarding	 whether	 a	 foreign	 sovereign	 should	 be	 entitled	 to	 immunity	 in	 any	 given	
case.	Similarly,	in	the	1945	case	of	Republic	of	Mexico	v.	Hoffman,	the	Court	reiterated	
that	the	judiciary	would	acquiesce	to	decisions	of	the	executive	concerning	questions	of	
foreign	 sovereign	 immunity.	 These	 cases,	 among	 others,	 marked	 the	 beginning	 of	
judicial	 deference	 to	 the	 U.S.	 State	 Department	 to	 define	 the	 scope	 of	 such	
immunity.156		
																																																													
152	Para	294,301	(1903)	cited	in	Sweeny	ut	supra.	
153	Keith	Sealing,	State	Sponsors	of	Terrorism,	Are	Entitled	 to	Due	Process	Too:	The	amended	Foreign	
Sovereign	Immunity	Act	is	Unconstitutional,	15	AM.	U.INT’L	L.	REV.	395,	427	(2000).	
154	The	Pesaro,	277	F.	473	(S.D.N.Y.	1921).	
155	271	U.S	562,576	(1926).	
156	M.	Scott	Bucci,	Breaking	Through	The	Immunity	Wall?	Implications	of	the	Terrorism	Exceptions	to	the	
Foreign	Sovereign	Immunities	Act,	3	J.	INT’L	LEGAL	STUD.	293-298	(1997).	
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As	 the	 court	 shifted	 away	 from	 the	 absolute	 theory	 by	 deferring	 to	 the	
executive	branch,	a	1952	 letter	written	to	the	acting	U.S.	Attorney	General	by	Jack	B.	
Tate,	 the	Acting	Legal	Adviser	 to	the	U.S.	Secretary	of	State,	affirmed	that	 the	State	
Department	 would	 thereafter	 apply	 a	 restrictive	 form	 of	 sovereign	 immunity,	 which	
would	be	recognized	‘with	regard	to	sovereign	or	public	acts	(jure	imperii)	of	a	state,	but	
not	 with	 respect	 to	 private	 acts	 (jure	 gestionis)’.157	The	 Tate	 letter	 explained	 that	
granting	 absolute	 immunity	 to	 foreign	 sovereign	was	 no	 longer	 appropriate	 because	
foreign	sovereigns	were	so	often	engaged	in	private	commerce,	and	parties	transacting	
business	 with	 those	 sovereigns	 deserved	 a	 dispute-resolution	 venue.	 The	
abovementioned	letter	further	noted	that	it	had	become	the	prevailing	practice	around	
the	 globe	 for	 countries	 to	 employ	 the	 restrictive	 theory	 of	 immunity,	 pointing	 to	
Belgium	,	Italy,	Egypt,	Switzerland,	France,	Greece,	Romania,	Peru’,	Austria,	Denmark,	
Sweden	Argentina,	the	Netherlands	and	Germany,	concluding	:	 ‘It	 is	thus	evident	that	
with	the	possible	exception	of	the	United	Kingdom	little	support	has	been	found	except	
on	 the	part	of	 the	Soviet	Union	and	 its	 satellites	 for	 continued	 full	 acceptance	of	 the	
absolute	theory	of	sovereign	immunity	and	there	are	evidences	that	British	authorities	
are	aware	of	its	deficiencies	and	ready	for	a	change.’	For	these	reasons,	the	Tate	letter	
concluded	 that	 ‘it	 will	 hereafter	 be	 the	 Department’s	 policy	 to	 follow	 the	 restrictive	
theory	of	sovereign	immunity	in	the	consideration	of	requests	of	foreign	governments	
for	a	grant	of	sovereign	immunity’.158	
This	 conclusion	 was	 consistent	 with	 the	 evolving	 contemporaneous	
jurisprudence	 from	 other	 jurisdictions.	 For	 example,	 in	 1950,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	
Austria	concluded	in	Dralle	v.	Republic	of	Czechoslovakia:	‘This	survey	shows	that	today,	
it	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 said	 that	 jurisprudence…generally	 recognizes	 the	 principle	 of	
exemption	of	foreign	states	insofar	as	it	concerns	claims	of	a	private	character,	because	
the	majority	of	courts	of	different	civilized	countries	deny	the	immunity’.159	
One	 year	 later	 after	 the	 letter	 was	 issued,	 Professor	 Lalive	 surveyed	
jurisprudence	 in	his	course	at	the	Hague	Academy	of	 international	 law	on	L’immunite’	
de	Jurisdiction	des	Etats	et	des	Orgaznisations	 Internationales	 :	 ‘The	theory	of	absolute	
immunity	is	today	nearly	universally	condemned…;	it	is	only	followed	with	difficulty	and	
not	without	hesitation	by	the	courts	of	a	few	countries’.	
Similarly,	a	1963	Policy	Research	Study	on	the	International	law	of	Sovereign	
Immunity	conducted	by	Joseph	Sweeny	on	behalf	of	the	U.S.	State	Department	noted	
that	 international	 jurisprudence,	 scholarly	 writings	 and	 international	 agreements	 all	
provide	 evidence	 of	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 absolute	 theory	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 in	
favour	of	the	restrictive	theory.	As	Sweeny	concluded,	‘the	sources	of	international	law	
taken	as	a	whole	show	a	pronounced	shift	to	the	restrictive	concept…the	general	rule	of	
immunity	from	jurisdiction	now	is	that	a	foreign	state	is	entitled	to	immunity	only	with	
respect	to	its	public	acts’.	160	
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It	 is	this	restrictive	theory	of	sovereign	immunity	that	forms	the	basis	of	the	
various	modern	domestic	sovereign	immunity	regimes.	
	
3.2.3 Structuralist	v.	Functionalist	Approach	
Another	 way	 to	 look	 at	 the	 Immunity	 Issue	 is,	 as	 Professor	 Maniruzzman	
pointed	 out,	 to	 notice	 that	 there	 are	 two	 main	 approaches	 to	 sovereign	 immunity:	
absolute	sovereign	immunity	and	restrictive	sovereign	immunity.	It	is	not	correct	to	say	
that	the	former	has	been	completely	eradicated,	as	Professor	Brownlie	noted	that	quite	
a	few	States,	such	as	Brazil,	Bulgaria,	China,	Ecuador,	Hungary	Japan,	Poland,	Portugal,	
Sudàn,	 Syria,	 Thailand	 and	 Tobago,	 Czechoslovakia	 and	 Venezuela	 still	 accept	 the	
principle	of	absolute	 immunity.	Nevertheless,	 restrictive	 immunity	has	gained	ground	
globally	 over	 the	 last	 few	decades.	 The	 approach	 associated	with	 absolute	 sovereign	
immunity	is	called	‘structuralist’	(ratione	personae),	while	the	approach	associated	with	
restrictive	 immunity	 is	 called	 ‘functionalist’	 (rationae	 materiae).	 The	 former	 is	
concerned	 with	 the	 status	 of	 the	 party	 claiming	 sovereignity,	 while	 the	 latter	 is	
concerned	 with	 the	 subject	 matter	 (e.g.	 conduct)	 forming	 the	 bass	 for	 the	 claim	 of	
sovereign	immunity.	
The	 structuralist	 or	 status-oriented	 approach	 still	 finds	 favour	 in	 some	
jurisdiction	(	i.e.,	those	adhering	to	absolute	sovereign	immunity),	but	the	recent	trend	
seems	 to	be	 towards	 the	 functionalist	 approach,	which	has	 little	or	no	 regard	 for	 the	
status	 of	 the	 State	 enterprise.	 The	 functionalist	 approach	 embodies	 the	 restrictive	
doctrine	of	sovereign	immunity.	According	to	the	structuralist	approach,	the	creation	of	
a	separate	entity	gives	rise	to	a	presumption	that	the	entity	is	effectively	separate	from	
the	State.	Thus,	the	fact	that	a	State	entity	has	a	distinct	legal	personality	would	defeat	
any	 claim	 to	 immunity.	 Communist	 and	 Socialist	 follow	 this	 principle.	 State	
corporations	in	these	countries	have	rarely	made	claims	to	sovereign	immunity	because	
their	 character	 as	 separate	 legal	 entities	 was	 believed	 to	 exclude	 ‘danger	 that	 the	
foreign	trade	corporations	would	claim	for	themselves	the	immunities	which	belong	to	
the	State	and	its	property’.161	Thus	to	determine	whether	a	State	enterprise	is	entitled	
to	immunity	from	jurisdiction,	the	courts	is	structuralist	States	investigate	such	factors	
as	:	1)	whether	the	enterprise	is	a	public	entity	or	a	company	formed	under	private	law;	
2)	 the	enterprise’s	 capacity	 to	 sue	or	be	 sued;	 the	extent	of	government	control	over	
the	 enterprise;	 and	 the	 enterprise’s	 ability	 to	 incorporate	 and	 hold	 property.	 A	 strict	
structuralist	 approach	will	 lead	 to	 absolute	 immunity	 if	 the	 entity	 is	 established	 as	 a	
public	entity	that	is	inseparable	from	the	State.	Then,	everything	the	entity	does	will	be	
entitled	to	immunity.	Under	the	functionalist	approach,	when	a	State	enterprise	has	a	
distinct	 legal	 personality,	 detached	 from	 the	 State	 itself,	 and	 it	 performs	 acts	 of	 a	
private	 or	 commercial	 nature,	 it	 cannot	 claim	 sovereign	 immunity.	 To	 functionalists,	
the	status	of	the	State	enterprise	is	irrelevant,	only	the	nature	of	its	acts	really	matters	
for	purposes	of	jurisdictional	immunity.	
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Some	 national	 courts	 have	 taken	 a	 mixed	 approach	 in	 which	 stucturalist	
considerations	were	 initially	 taken	 into	account,	but	 the	nature	of	 the	act	usually	was	
decisive	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 deciding	 the	 immunity	 issue.	 This	 suggests	 that	 mixed	
approaches	would	likely	tilt	in	favour	of	the	functionalist	approach.	
Under	 a	 functionalist	 approach	 to	 sovereign	 immunity,	 a	 State	 or	 a	 State	
enterprise	 can	 claim	 sovereign	 immunity	 only	 for	 acta	 jure	 imperii	 (	 government	 or	
sovereign	 acts)	 but	 not	 for	 acta	 jure	 gestionis.	 Because	 court	 decisions	 in	 different	
countries	 are	 inconsistent,	 it	 is	 not	 always	 easy,	 especially	 in	marginal	 or	 borderline	
cases,	 to	 distinguish	 between	 them.	 Professor	 Ian	 Brownlie	 stated,	 ‘[O]n	 any	 view	 a	
satisfactory	mode	of	application	of	 the	principle	of	 restrictive	 immunity	has	yet	 to	be	
developed’.	For	example,	courts	in	Europe	and	the	United	States	apparently	are	divided	
on	whether	 the	exploration	and	exploitation	of	natural	gas	or	other	natural	 resources	
are	 sovereign	or	 commercial	 acts.	 Faced	with	 conflicting	positions	on	how	 to	 resolve	
the	matter,	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	Jurisdictional	 Immunities	of	States	and	
Their	 Property	 (2004)	 took	 a	 combined	 nature/purpose	 approach	 and	 offered	 the	
following	guidelines:	
In	 determining	 whether	 a	 contract	 or	 transaction	 is	 a	 “commercial	 transaction”	 under	
paragraph	 1	 (c),	 reference	 should	 be	 made	 primarily	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 contract	 or	
transaction,	but	its	purpose	should	also	be	taken	into	account	if	the	parties	to	the	contract	
or	transaction	have	so	agreed,	or	if,	in	the	practice	of	the	State	of	the	forum,	that	purpose	
is	relevant	to	determining	the	non-commercial	character	of	the	contract	or	transaction.162	
	
Thus,	 the	 distinction	 between	 actus	 jure	 imperii	 and	 actus	 jure	 gestionis	 is	
seen	to	resolve	around	the	 ‘nature’	and	‘purpose	or	motive’	of	the	act	concerned.	The	
nature	test	has	been	increasingly	endorsed	in	both	case	law	and	recent	legislation.	The	
test	 seems	 to	 turn	on	wheter	 the	act	 is	 taken	pursuant	 to	a	public	 law	or	private	 law	
contract.	 If	 the	 contract	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 a	 public	 law	 one,	 immunity	 will	 be	
granted.	
There	 is	 yet	 another	 test,	 that	 is	 whether	 the	 act	 ‘is	 one	 that	 may	 be	
performed	by	anyone	,	or	only	by	a	sovereign’.	In	other	words,	the	question	is	‘whether	
the	act	could	be	also	performed	by	private	persons’.	This	test,	which	may	be	circuitos,	
seems	to	derive	from	the	combined	nature/purpose	tests.	
Still,	there	are	situations	in	which	nature	and	purpose	tests	are	not	helpful.	A	
recent	ILC	report	noted	as	follows:		
	
Many	of	the	cases	examined	took	the	approach	that	the	purpose	of	the	activity	
is	not	relevant	to	determining	the	character	of	a	contract	or	transaction	and	that	it	is	the	
nature	of	 the	activity	 itself	which	 is	 the	decisive	 factor.	Nevertheless,	 some	 cases	under	
different	national	legal	orders	have	emphasized	that	it	is	not	always	possible	to	determine	
wheter	a	State	was	entitled	to	sovereign	immunity	by	assessing	the	nature	of	the	relevant	
act.	This	is	because,	it	is	said,	the	nature	of	the	act	may	not	easily	be	separated	from	the	
purpose	of	the	act.	 In	such	circumstances,	 it	has	sometimes	been	held	to	be	necessary	to	
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examine	 the	motive	 of	 the	 act.	 Sometimes,	 even	where	motive	 and	 purpose	 are	 judged	
irrelevant	 to	 determining	 the	 commercial	 character	 of	 an	 activity,	 reference	 has	 been	
made	to	the	context	in	which	the	activity	took	place.163	
		
This	shows	the	complexity	of	the	issue	of	sovereign	In	certain	circumstances.	
Where	the	nature	and	the	purpose	test	are	not	helpful,	other	tests	may	be	used	to	reach	
a	 satisfactory	 result.	 In	 this	 sense,	 courts	 needs	 to	 be	 innovative	 and	 sensitive	 to	 all	
relevant	elements	at	issue.	
	
As	 Fox	 observed:	 ‘the	 extent	 to	 which	 immunity	 should	 be	 enjoyed	 by	
agencies,	connected	to	 the	State	but	not	so	closely	as	 to	constitute	central	organs	of	
government,	remains	a	perennial	problem	in	the	law	of	State	Immunity’.164	
	
	
3.2.4 The	 Distinction	 Between	 Immunity	 From	 Jurisdiction	 And	
Immunity	From	Execution	
	
The	 restrictive	 theory	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 does	 not	 necessarily	 imply	 that	
award	creditors	will	have	an	easier	 time	collecting	on	awards	against	 sovereigns	 in	 the	
courts	 of	 a	 foreign	 state.	 In	 this	 respect,	 a	 clear	 distinction	 must	 be	 made	 between	
immunity	from	jurisdiction	and	immunity	from	execution.	The	former	refers	to	whether	a	
domestic	court	can	even	exercise	jurisdiction	over	the	foreign	sovereign	in	the	first	place	
(sometimes	called,	in	the	arbitration	context,	‘recognition	of	an	award).	The	latter	refers	
to	whether	and	to	what	extent	such	a	court,	having	obtained	jurisdiction	and	recognized	
an	award,	can	then	attach	and	execute	on	specific	property	of	the	sovereign	for	purposes	
of	enforcing	a	judgment	or	award	against	the	sovereign.		
This	 distinction	 is	 exactly	 recognized	 in	 Article	 54	 and	 55	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention.	Article	54	sets	forth	that	each	Contracting	State	shall	recognize	and	enforce	
within	 its	 territories	 the	 pecuniary	 obligations	 of	 ICSID	 awards	 (which	 often	 will	
constitute,	under	the	 law	of	the	enforcing	state,	a	waiver	of	 immunity	from	jurisdiction	
by	 any	 Contracting	 State	 that	 has	 an	 ICSID	 award	 rendered	 against	 it).	 Article	 55,	
however,	 goes	 expressly	 to	 state	 that	 ‘Nothing	 in	 Article	 54	 shall	 be	 construed	 as	
derogating	 from	 the	 law	 in	 force	 in	 any	Contracting	State	 relating	 to	 immunity	 of	 the	
State	or	of	any	foreign	State	from	execution’.	In	other	words,	a	foreign	state	retains	the	
right	to	pleas	that	certain	sovereign	assets	remain	immune	from	execution	under	the	law	
of	 the	 enforcing	 state,	 even	 if	 the	 state	 has	waived	 its	 immunity	 as	 to	 jurisdiction	 for	
purposes	of	having	the	award	recognized	in	the	enforcing	state.		
Indeed,	 ILC	 Special	 Rapporteur	 Suchartikil	 described	 immunity	 from	
enforcement	as	‘the	last	bastion	of	State	immunity’.165	
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Starting	with	sovereign	immunity	from	jurisdiction,	it	means	a	plea	against	the	
jurisdiction	of	 the	 court.166	To	be	more	precise,	 it	 is	 a	 protection	given	 to	 a	 state	 from	
being	sued	in	the	courts	of	other	states.167	It	arises	from	the	notion	of	sovereign	equality	
of	 states	 that	 a	 sovereign	 state	 cannot	 be	 compelled	 to	 submit	 jurisdiction	 of	 and	 be	
judged	by	another	state.168	
Wavier	of	immunity	right	has	been	a	controversial	topic.	Surely,	if	the	state	had	
waived	its	right	of	sovereign	immunity,	that	would	be	in	the	best	interest	of	the	investor.	
However,	 even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 express	waiver,	 the	 courts,	 in	 the	US,	 interpreted	 it	 in	 a	
significantly	narrow	way	in	favour	of	the	state.	
For	 the	 express	 waiver	 to	 be	 valid	 it	 valid	 it	 “must	 give	 a	 clear,	 complete,	
unambiguous	 and	 unmistakable	 manifestation	 of	 the	 sovereign’s	 intent	 to	 waive	
immunity”.		In	the	early	case	of	Duff	Development	v	Government	of	Kelantan,	the	House	
of	Lords	ruled	that	an	arbitration	clause	embedded	in	a	mining	contract	did	not	establish	
the	court	jurisdiction.	The	arbitration	clause	was	pursuant	to	the	Arbitration	Act	of	1889,	
however,	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 decided	 that	 it	 did	 not	 give	 any	 right	 for	 the	 court	 to	
interfere	with	regards	to	enforcement	and	the	clause	was	inter	partes.		Since	there	is	no	
explicit	 jurisdictional	waiver	by	 the	state	 to	allow	the	courts	 to	 intervene,	 the	plea	was	
accepted.	 	 With	 regards	 to	 implied	 wavier,	 the	 US	 courts	 have	 decided	 to	 widen	 the	
exceptions	 against	 using	 the	 immunity	 shield	 in	 relation	 to	 arbitration.	 After	 the	
ratification	 of	 the	 NYC,	 the	 courts	 have	 limited	 the	 use	 of	 immunity	 against	 arbitral	
proceedings	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 the	 convention	 to	 serve	 its	 intended	 purposes.	 The	 US	
courts	 will	 allow	 states	 to	 use	 immunity	 defence,	 unless	 stated	 in	 the	 FSIA,	 as	 an	
exception.	 One	 	 exception	 is	 when	 the	 parties	 agree	 for	 the	 arbitration	 process	 to	 be	
conducted	in	the	US.	Also,	states	may	not	use	this	defence	if	the	arbitration	agreement	
or	 award	 is	 governed	 by	 a	 treaty	 that	 is	 in	 force	 in	 the	 US.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 neither	 the	
arbitration	 agreements	 nor	 the	 process	 of	 enforcement	 will	 face	 difficulty	 before	 US	
courts	 if	one	of	 these	conditions	were	met	with	 regarding	arbitration	under	NYC.	With	
regards	 to	 ICSID,	 this	 also	 applies	 theoretically,	 but	 it	 should	 be	 mentioned	 that	 the	
wording	of	the	ICSID	Convention	is	independent	and	self-contained.	In	other	words,	the	
convention	does	not	allow	court	 interference	 in	any	 form.	Also,	according	to	 the	 ICSID	
Convention,	 the	 seat	 for	 arbitration	 is	 the	 US	 	 unless	 otherwise	 agreed	 between	 the	
parties.	Therefore,	it	 is	not	advisable	to	change	the	seat	as	this	may	risk	this	protection	
under	FSIA	 if	 there	 is	a	 special	 interest	 to	 sue	 in	 the	US,	or	 to	 insure	 that	 the	 seat	has	
similar	 protection	 if	 the	parties	 agreed	on	a	different	 state	 to	be	 the	 seat.	However,	 a	
state	 of	 confusion	 and	 uncertainty	was	 caused	 by	 the	US	Supreme	Court	 in	 the	 ICSID	
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case	 of	MINE	 v	 Republic	 of	 Guinea.	 	 	 As	mentioned	 above,	 ICSID	 seat	 is	 the	 US,	 and	
according	to	the	FSIA,	a	state	is	considered	to	have	waived	its	jurisdictional	immunity	if	
agreed	to	arbitrate	in	the	US.	However,	the	Supreme	Court	reversed	a	lower	court	ruling	
and	 asserted	 that	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 which	 refer	 disputes	 to	 ICSID	 does	 not	
constitute	 an	 implicit	 waiver	 of	 jurisdiction	 to	 US	 courts	 under	 the	 FSIA.	 The	 court’s	
reasoning	was	that	the	parties	have	not	contemplated	the	role	of	the	US	courts	explicitly	
in	the	arbitration	process.	This	would	cause	uncertainty	to	investors	who	are	seeking	to	
initiate	 ICSID	 arbitration	 in	 the	US,	 as	 this	 ruling,	would	 give	 grounding	 for	 a	 state	 to	
claim	 state	 immunity	 against	 jurisdiction	 under	 the	 FSIA.	 	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	
Supreme	Court	gave	attention	to	the	parties’	intention	as	to	their	expectation	of	the	US	
court	 role	 in	the	arbitration	when	 it	should	not	have	done	so	as	 ICSID	proceedings	and	
award	 require	 no	 intervention	 from	 courts.	 Also,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 view	 has	 been	
criticized	as	it	ignored	the	parties’	reasonable	expectation	when	agreeing	to	arbitrate	in	
the	US,	as	the	seat,	according	to	ICSID	rules.	Although	in	ICSID	arbitration	the	court	role	
is	 only	 formal,	 	 but	 parties	 naturally	 and	 logically	 recognise	 that	 role	 because	 it	 is	 the	
competent	court	of	the	seat.	Moreover,	the	Court	of	Appeal	has	violated	the	exclusivity	
rule	of	ICSID	to	which	the	US	is	bound	to.	In	other	case,	the	court	had	a	different	view.	In	
Liberia	Eastern	Timber	Corp	v	Liberia,	 	Liberia	 jurisdictional	 immunity	plea	was	refused	
by	 the	court.	The	court	 stated	 that	 since	member	 states	have	agreed	 to	enforce	 ICSID	
awards,	 then	 Liberia	 has	 contemplated	 the	 role	 of	 courts	 of	 all	 contracting	 states	
including	 the	 US	 to	 enforce	 against	 Liberian	 assets.	 Furthermore,	 a	 state	 cannot	 plea	
jurisdictional	immunity	to	an	ICSID	tribunal,	but	it	could	at	the	time	of	enforcement	to	be	
provided	to	the	proper	court.			
	
Instead,	sovereign	immunity	from	execution	aims	to	protect	state’s	assets	from	
execution.	 However,	 this	 doctrine	 has	 undergone	 significant	 changes	 in	 recent	 times	
when	sovereign	taking	part	in	commercial	activities.169	Courts	soon	moved	to	recognise	
that	once	sovereigns	had	entered	the	market-place,	they	must	be	treated	like	the	other	
merchants.	 To	 that	 end,	 courts	 began	 to	make	 distinction	 between	 disputes	 involving	
purely	governmental	conduct	for	which	they	granted	immunity	and	disputes	arising	from	
commercial	transactions	for	which	they	did	not	grant	immunity.	
The	 ICSID	Convention	 is	only	 interested	 in	 immunity	 from	execution	because	
Article	 25	 explicitly	 states	 that	 Contracting	 States	 cannot	 alleged	 sovereign	 immunity	
from	 jurisdiction	 if	 they	 submit	 the	dispute	 consent	 in	writing.	Then,	Article	 55	 can	be	
implemented	 on	 only	 sovereign	 immunity	 from	 execution.	 Thus,	 sovereign	 immunity	
plea	 cannot	 have	 effect	 on	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 an	 ICSID	 award.	 In	 other	
words,	 successful	 reliance	 on	 state	 immunity	 may	 still	 amount	 to	 a	 violation	 of	 the	
Convention.	 By	 this	 way,	 the	 Convention	 makes	 possible	 that	 awards	 can	 still	 be	
applicable	without	 any	 damage	 to	 state’s	 immunity	 law.	 The	 ICSID	mechanism	 brings	
two	different	remedies	to	accomplish	this	purpose.	
																																																													
169	Muthucumaraswamy	 Sornarajah.	 "The	 Award	 and	 Its	 Enforcement."	 In	 The	 Settlement	 of	 Foreign	
Investment	Disputes.	Kluwer	Law	International,	2000,	p.	290.	
	
68	
	
Naturally,	the	purpose	of	arbitral	process	is	to	reach	an	award	that	would	end	
the	dispute.	The	successful	party	 then	seeks	 to	enforce	the	award	to	be	able	 to	collect	
what	 he	 was	 awarded.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 that	 easy	 when	 the	 defeated	 party	 is	 a	
sovereign	state.	According	to	established	international	law,	states	cannot	be	compelled	
by	 foreign	 courts	 judgments.	 Under	 the	New	York	 Convention,	 it	 is	 easy	 for	 states	 to	
avoid	enforcement	as	the	grounds	for	refusal	are	several	such	as	violating	public	policy.		
On	the	other	hand,	 ICSID’s	main	objective	was	to	provide	a	 reliable	method	of	settling	
disputes.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 offer	 the	 guarantee	 of	 enforcing	 awards	 especially	 when	
awards	are	rendered	against	host	states.	Awards	issued	by	ICSID	tribunals	are	final	and	
are	not	subjected	to	any	appeals	or	annulment	except	on	matters	of	procedural	errors.	
Also,	 the	 awards	 are	 considered	as	 if	 issued	 from	highest	 judicial	 authority	 in	 the	 land	
and	therefore	they	are	final.		However,	there	have	been	cases	in	which	awards	have	been	
issued	against	state	owned	companies	and	states	pleaded	immunity	to	avoid	execution.	
The	ICSID	Convention	states	clearly	that	 it	does	not	override	or	undermine	states’	 laws	
which	are	related	to	sovereign	immunity.	 	This	means	that	if	the	enforcement	of	award	
violates	 a	 local	 immunity	 law,	 this	 excuse	 the	 state	 from	 executing	 on	 its	 land.	 To	
illustrate	the	court’s	 interpretation	to	waivers,	 in	 the	case	of	Noga	v.	 the	Soviet	Union,		
currently	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	 a	 loan	 agreement	 was	 signed	 which	 included	 an	
arbitration	 clause.	 The	 agreement	 also	 included	 terms	 such	 as	 waiver	 of	 “all	 right	 to	
immunity	 relative	 to	execution	of	 the	arbitral	 award”.	Also,	 the	government	agreed	 to	
not	 rely	 on	 “any	 immunity	 from	 suit,	 from	 enforcement,	 from	 seizure”,	 and	 upon	
enforcement,	Paris	Court	of	Appeal	 reversed	an	earlier	 ruling	and	refused	enforcement	
on	 diplomatic	 funds	 and	 assets.	 This	 ruling	 has	 caused	 controversy	 as	 observers	 have	
agreed	 that	 the	waiver	wordings	were	 clear,	 explicit	 and	were	 general.	 Also,	 all	 states	
have	the	power	to	waive	their	immunity	against	enforcement,	and	the	wavier	clearly	was	
general	and	included	all	types	of	assets	not	only	commercial	ones.		In	many	cases	states	
have	 attempted	 to	 evade	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 under	 the	 state	 immunity	 rights	
through	re-categorising	the	assets.	In	the	ICSID	case	of	LETCO	v	Republic	of	Liberia,	the	
claimant	was	successful	to	freeze	Liberian	assets	to	recover	the	award	value.	However,	a	
motion	presented	by	the	respondent	was	accepted	to	overturn	the	freeze	order	as	these	
accounts	 were	 protected	 under	 the	 FSIA.	 The	 court	 had	 also	 rejected	 a	 request	 to	
execute	on	Liberia’s	Central	Bank	account	as	this	would	lead	to	a	violation	of	the	Vienna	
Convention	on	Diplomatic	Relations.	The	court	concluded	that	it	does	not	have	the	right	
to	freeze	and	execute	on	the	bank	accounts	as	they	enjoy	diplomatic	immunity	even	if	a	
portion	of	it	is	used	in	commercial	activities.		This,	as	a	result,	may	encourage	states	with	
high	risk	of	being	sued	to	re-arrange	their	books	and	finances	 in	a	way	to	 include	all	of	
them	under	diplomatic	immunity.	This	can	be	achieved	by	not	establishing	accounts	for	
the	sole	purpose	of	commercial	activities	separately.	Although	practically	it	would	seem	
difficult,	but	theoretically,	a	state	may	evade	execution	of	an	ICSID	award	if	 it	does	not	
have	 commercial	 assets	 in	 an	 ICSID	 signatory	 state.	 Because,	 non	 ICSID	 state	 is	 not	
obliged	by	 ICSID	 rules	and	no	 state,	whether	 ICSID	 state	or	not,	 could	enforce	against	
diplomatic	assets	of	a	state	for	a	commercial	disputes	under	international	law.	The	main	
reason	 behind	 this	 is	 that	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 are	 governed	 by	
different	 rules.	 Also,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 seen	 much	 better	 further	 in	 this	 dissertation,	 it	 is	
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important	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 under	
ICSID.	Recognition	involves	a	formal	procedure	to	confirm	the	award	and	grant	it	the	seal	
of	 approval.	On	 the	other	 hand,	 enforcement	 involves	 actions	 such	 as	 asset	 seizure	or	
confiscation	of	property.	The	recognition	stage	of	the	arbitral	process	is	the	ultimate	step	
under	 ICSID	 Convention.	 However,	 with	 regards	 to	 execution,	 different	 rules	 apply.	
According	to	the	ICSID	Convention,	the	execution	of	ICSID	award	is	governed	by	the	law	
of	the	state	in	which	the	award	is	sought	to	be	enforced.		This	will	relocate	the	attention	
from	 ICSID	 convention	 to	 local	 laws	 on	 how	 they	 define	 the	 extent	 of	 immunity	 with	
regards	to	enforcement.	Also,	as	mentioned	before,	the	UK	and	US	state	immunity	laws	
differs	 in	 the	 scope	 of	 commercial	 properties	 definition	 on	 which	 an	 award	 could	 be	
enforced.	As	 a	 result,	 an	 investor	may	 fail	 to	 enforce	 ICSID	 award	 issued	 in	 his	 favour	
because	 under	 the	 immunity	 law	 of	 that	 state,	 the	 defeated	 state	 has	 managed	 to	
rearrange	 its	 assets	 to	be	protected	under	 the	 immunity	 law.	After	 all,	when	defeated	
states	 do	 not	 want	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 awards,	 the	 successful	 party	may	 always	 seek	
enforcement	 in	 another	 signatory	 state	 in	 which	 the	 defeated	 state	 has	 assets.	 	 For	
example,	 in	 ad	 hoc	 arbitration,	 the	 parties	 are	 constantly	 advised	 to	 choose	 a	 NYC	
signatory	state	to	be	the	seat	for	enforcement	purposes.	Similarly,	the	successful	party	
may	seek	enforcement	in	a	state	other	than	the	respondent	in	which	the	respondent	has	
assets.	 However,	 to	 avoid	 uncertainty,	 current	 practices	 illustrate	 the	 importance	 of	
inclusion	of	express	waiver	of	immunity	in	international	petroleum	agreements	as	a	key	
issue.	Failure	to	reach	an	agreement	on	such	waiver	would	cause	the	negotiation	to	reach	
an	impasse	in	many	cases.	
	
Immunity	definitely	stands	 in	 the	way	of	enforcement.	The	 ICSID	Convention	
expressly	retains	the	defence	of	state	immunity	from	execution	in	Articles	54(3)	and	55.	
Immunity	 as	 used	 in	 this	 context	 simply	 means	 that	 certain	 assets	 of	 States	 are	
exempted	 from	 investment	 arbitration	 and	 the	 enforcement	 of	 investment	 arbitral	
award.	The	 justification	 lies	 in	 the	assumption	that	 those	assets	which	are	 reserved	 for	
public,	military	 or	 diplomatic	 use	 should	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 seizure	 or	 use	 to	 offset	 the	
demands	 of	 an	 award.	 Thus,	 while	many	 commentators	mistakenly	 assume	 that	 final	
awards	issued	under	lCSID	are	'self-enforceable',	the	reality	is	that	the	Convention	gives	
States	the	right	to	restrict	enforcement	of	awards	under	the	doctrine	of	immunity.	This	
seems	to	be	the	motivation	for	the	overwhelming	acceptance	of	the	Convention	and	it	is	
doubtful	if	so	many	States	would	have	ratified	the	Convention	without	Articles	54(3)	and	
55.	When	the	principle	of	 immunity	 is	applied,	 legal	action	can	only	be	brought	against	
the	 State	where	 its	 consent	 has	 been	 obtained.	 Claims	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 remain	
available	to	States	even	before	the	court	of	other	states	where	enforcement	is	sought.		
	
Some	commentators	argue	that	 immunity	from	jurisdiction	should	be	treated	
separately	 from	 immunity	 from	execution.	Nevertheless,	 the	decision	of	 the	tribunal	 in	
Westland	Helicopters	Ltd	v	Arab	Organization	for	Industrialization	seems	to	affirm	that	
the	waiver	of	immunity	applies	to	both	jurisdiction	and	execution.	This	is	because	once	a	
tribunal	has	established	it	has	jurisdiction	over	a	sovereign	State	in	a	certain	case	and	has	
consequently	 rendered	 an	 award	 against	 it,	 the	 property	 of	 that	 State	 should	 become	
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susceptible	 to	 attachment	because	execution	 is	 simply	 the	act	of	 enforcing	 the	 law	by	
harmonizing	the	factual	situation	or	the	subject	matter	of	the	dispute	with	the	award	of	
the	tribunal.		
The	question	that	may	be	asked	under	this	heading	 is	whether	this	applies	to	
instances	 where	 some	 States	 do	 not	 appear	 in	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 throughout	 the	
proceedings	 and	 yet	 award	 is	 rendered	 in	 default	 against	 them?	 This	 generates	 the	
agitation	 as	 to	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 have	 submitted	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 so	 as	 to	
consequently	be	affected	by	the	award.	It	is	submitted	that	it	does	apply	because	States	
do	not	need	to	be	physically	present	for	the	tribunal	to	assume	jurisdiction.	In	conclusion,	
it	would	be	senseless	 for	a	party	 to	 investment	arbitration	over	whom	the	 tribunal	has	
jurisdiction	 not	 to	 be	 liable	 to	measures	 of	 enforcement.	 This	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 reality	
associated	 with	 the	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 hence	 most	 nations	 distinguish	 between	
immunity	from	jurisdiction	and	immunity	from	execution.170	
As	seen	above,	interestingly,	the	past	decades	have	seen	a	shift	in	the	doctrine	
of	 sovereign	 immunity	 from	 absolute	 to	 restrictive	 immunity 171 ,	 contemporary	
enforcement	procedures	seems	to	show	distinction	from	the	nature	of	assets	which	are	
to	 be	 the	 object	 of	 enforcement	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 execution	 is	 permitted	 against	
commercial	property	but	not	against	property	serving	official	or	governmental	purposes.	
But	 the	 exact	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	 property	 is	 not	 always	 clear.172	For	
instance	 in	 AIG	 Capital	 Partners	 Inc	 and	 Another	 v	 Republic	 of	 Kazakhstan	 (National	
Bank	 of	 Kazakhstan),173	it	 was	 held	 that	 the	 property	 of	 a	 State's	 Central	 Bank	 or	
monetary	authority	was	subject	to	State	immunity	under	S.14	of	the	State	Immunity	Act	
1978	and	could	not	be	used	to	satisfy	an	 ICSID	award,	even	 if	 such	property	was	being	
held	 by	 third	 parties	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	Central	 Bank	 or	monetary	 authority.	However	 it	
must	 be	 noted	 that	 a	 State	 that	 successfully	 relies	 on	 the	 laws	 concerning	 State	
immunity	from	execution	will	still	be	in	violation	of	its	obligation	under	the	Convention.	
The	consequence	may	be	a	revival	of	the	right	of	diplomatic	protection	under	Art.	27(1)	
as	noted	above.174	
In	view	of	the	far-reaching	protection	of	State-owned	property	from	execution,	
there	seems	to	be	a	big	problem	to	the	enforcement	of	award	hence	an	investor	should	
have	 a	 strong	 interest	 in	 securing	 a	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 from	 execution.	 A	 waiver	 of	
immunity	 from	 execution	 is	 possible,	 in	 principle,	 but	 may	 be	 subject	 to	 specific	
conditions	 or	 limitations	 under	 the	 law	 of	 the	 country	where	 execution	 is	 sought.	 The	
possibility	to	waive	immunity	is	not	necessarily	unlimited.175	Certain	waivers	may	have	to	
be	explicit	while	others	may	be	given	implicitly.	Certain	forms	of	waiver	of	immunity	may	
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be	invalid	even	if	agreed	upon	by	the	parties	but	award	creditors	must	strive	to	achieve	
their	validity.	
On	 this	 premise,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 in	 BITs	 should	 be	
construed	as	a	prior	waiver	of	immunity	such	as	in	the	1970	Diminco	Agreement	between	
the	 Government	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	 and	 Sierra	 Leone	 Selection	 Trust	 Ltd	 which	 provide	
that:		
The	State	and	Dominco	hereby	expressly	waive	the	right	to	avail	themselves	of	
any	 privilege	 or	 immunity	 of	 jurisdiction	 in	 respect	 of	 any	 arbitration	 pursuant	 to	 this	
Agreement	 of	 the	 execution	 or	 enforcement	 of	 any	 award	 or	 judgment	 as	 a	 result	
therefore.176	
Also,	Peter	Wolfgang	suggest	the	below	sample:	
The	 (name	 of	 contracting	 State)	 hereby	 irrevocably	 waives	 any	 claim	 to	
immunity	 in	 regard	 to	 any	 proceedings	 to	 enforce	 any	 arbitral	 award	 rendered	 by	 a	
Tribunal	constituted	pursuant	to	this	Agreement,	including,	without	limitation,	immunity	
from	jurisdiction	of	any	court	and	immunity	of	any	of	its	property	from	execution.177	
The	 final	 submission	 on	 this	 is	 that	 arbitration	 clause	 indicates	 that	
enforcement	 should	 as	 of	 right	 be	 available	 to	 successful	 parties	 because	 the	 foreign	
state	which	decides	to	engage	in	international	commercial	business	has	by	its	own	acts	
made	itself	equal	to	private	persons	who	should	neither	have	immunity	from	jurisdiction	
nor	execution,	 therefore	measures	of	execution	can	be	taken	against	property	which	 is	
used	 in	 activities	 that	 equate	 the	 position	 of	 the	 State	 with	 that	 of	 a	 private	
person.178They	however	must	identify	the	asset	they	wish	to	use	for	commercial	purpose	
and	outline	property	that	can	be	attached	to	offset	the	demands	of	an	award	execution.	
In	 2008	 for	 example,	 an	 empirical	 survey	 conducted	 by	 the	 School	 of	 International	
Arbitration 179 	regarding	 compliance	 and	 enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 found	
compelling	results	that	indicates	that	asset-tracking	or	asset-tracing	is	now	a	recognized	
profession.	In	view	of	this,	such	professionals	can	help	identify	the	asset	of	the	State	used	
for	commercial	purpose	such	as	bank	accounts,	 investments	 in	other	countries,	or	seek	
concession	and	waiver	of	tax	etc.	to	offset	and	award.	
	
3.2.5 The	Role	of	the	Courts	of	member	States	in	Enforcement	
Historically,	 the	 relationship	 between	 investment	 arbitration	 and	 national	
courts	 in	 terms	 of	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 has	 been	 complex	 and	 subject	 to	 several	
debates.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 parties	 normally	 select	 IIAs	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	 their	
																																																													
176	George	Dalaume,	'	ICSID	Arbitration	and	the	Courts(1983)	Vol.	77	AMJI,	No	4	
177Wolfgang	 Peters,	 Arbitration	 and	 Renegotiation	 of	 International	 Investment	 Agreements(2nd	 edn	
Kluwer	Law	International	1995)	
178	Ibid	n17	p.	744		
179 	See	 ‘2008	 International	 Arbitration	 Study-Corporate	 Attitudes	 and	 Practices:	 Recognition	 and	
Enforcement	of	Foreign	Awards’	(School	of	International	Arbitration,	Queen	Mary	University	of	London	
and	 Price	 water	 house	 Coopers	 LLP)	
<http://www.arbitrationonline.org/research/Corpattitempirical/2008.html>	 	 Accessed	 10th	 September,	
2014.	
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disputes	 precisely	 to	 reduce	 or	 eliminate	 the	 role	 of	 national	 courts	 .This	 is	 largely	
because	of	the	mistrust	that	each	side	feels	towards	the	municipal	laws	and	their	judges	
as	 well	 as	 to	 avoid	 giving	 either	 of	 them	 a	 home	 court	 advantage	 in	 the	 dispute	
resolution	 process.	 This	 kind	 of	 feeling	 was	 anticipated	 by	 the	 drafters	 of	 ICSID	
Convention,	who	wish	to	‘maintain	a	careful	balance	between	the	interests	of	investors	
and	those	of	host	States’.180	In	this	regard,	Aaron	Broches	rightly	observed	that	in	other	
to	protect	the	balance	of	rights	between	investors	and	States,	the	drafters	established	
‘a	 complete,	 exclusive	 and	 closed	 jurisdictional	 system,	 insulated	 from	 national	 law’,	
with	 respect	 to	 the	arbitration	proceedings,	 awards,	 and	 review	of	 awards.181	Despite	
this	 however,	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 awards,	 ‘required	 interaction	 of	
international	 and	 domestic	 law’,	 this	 resulted	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 ‘a	 mixed	 juridical	
structure’.182	Numerous	 points	 of	 contact	 between	 the	 two	 structures	 remain	 since	
national	courts	hold	the	power	of	recognition	and	enforcement	as	well	as	establishing	
the	court	or	authority	designated	for	the	purpose	of	enforcement.183	
It	 suffices	 to	 say	 that	 the	 fate	 of	 an	 award	 at	 this	 point	 seems	 to	 rest	 on	 a	
given	legal	system	of	the	State	where	enforcement	 is	sort.	For	obvious	reasons	this	 is	
the	stage	at	which	 investors	or	award	creditors	may	experience	difficulty	 in	obtaining	
payment	 if	Contracting	States	are	 reluctant	 to	enforce	or	execute	 the	award	or	 there	
are	 rules	 that	 provide	 for	 immunity	 in	 a	 state	 where	 enforcement	 is	 sort.184	It	 is	
important	to	point	out	that	the	consequence	of	this	 is	that	an	over-zealous	court	 is	 in	
clear	danger	of	 tampering	with	 the	 intent	and	content	of	an	award	either	by	denying	
the	 enforcement	 of	 it	 as	 a	 whole	 or	 in	 part.	 This	 also	 exposes	 these	 courts	 to	 the	
possibility	of	reviewing	an	award.185	
In	 view	 all	 these,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day,	 national	 courts	 are	 an	 essential	
component	of	successful	international	arbitration	this	is	because	arbitrators,	as	private	
person,	lack	the	coercive	police	power	of	the	state,	which	is	reserved	to	government.	At	
various	stages	in	the	arbitration	process,	effective	adjudication	may	therefore	become	
difficult	to	achieve	without	implementation	of	the	threat	of	implementation	by	national	
court.	It	is	submitted	that,	in	as	much	as	their	execution	role	is	acknowledge,	excessive	
interference	by	state	court	can	deprive	arbitration	of	its	usefulness,	slows	the	process,	
																																																													
180Leah	Harhay,The	Argentine	Annulment:	The	Uneasy	Application	of	ICSID	Article	52	in	Parallel	Claims	
in		Karl	Sauvant	(eds)	Yearbook	on	International	Investment	Law	&	Policy	2011-2012		(Oxford			University	
Press	2013)pg	440-450	
181 Aaron	 Broches,	 Award	 Rendered	 Pursuant	 to	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 Binding	 Force,	 Finality,	
Recognition,	 Enforcement	 and	 Execution',	 (1987)	 ICSID	 Review	 Foreign	 Investment	 Law	 Journal(1987)	
297-288	
182	Ibid	n48	pg	354	
183	Ibid	n14	Article	54	(2)	
184David	 	 Caron,"	 The	Nature	 of	 the	 Iran-	United	 States	Claims	Tribunal	 and	 the	 Evolving	 Structure	 of	
International	Dispute	Resolution",	(1990)84	AM.	J.	INT.	L.	194,	118	
185Muth	 Sornarajah,	 The	 International	 law	 on	 Foreign	 Investment	 (3rd	 edn	 Cambridge	University	 Press	
2010)	P.	429-452	
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makes	it	more	expensive,	and	can	tilt	the	playing	field	if	a	party	turns	to	its	own	national	
courts	for	intervention	in	an	arbitrable	dispute.186	
This	has	resulted	 in	the	most	extreme	form	of	national	court	 intervention	 in	
IIAs	 such	 as	 the	 issuance	 of	 restrictive	 injunctions.	 This	 position	 is	 informed	 by	 a	
practical	 example	 from	 the	 case	 of	 Jakarta	 court	 in	 Himpurna	 Califinia	 Energy	 Ltd	
(Bermuda)	 v	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia.187	In	 this	 case,	 the	 contract	 provided	 for	 ad	 hoc	
arbitration	with	the	seat	 in	Jakarta	under	the	UNCITRAL	Rules	but	with	Indonesia	 law	
application	 to	both	substance	and	procedure.	Shortly	after	 the	case	began,	 Indonesia	
sought	 and	 obtained	 an	 injunction	 against	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 to	 stop	 them	 from	
rendering	 an	 award	 against	 an	 Indonesian	 state-owned	 corporation,	 ordered	 the	
arbitrators	to	cease	all	arbitration-related	activities	and	failure	to	comply	would	result	
in	a	 fine	of	US$1	million	per	day.188	After	 the	 first	arbitral	 tribunal	 rendered	an	award	
against	 the	 Indonesian	 state-owned	 electricity	 corporation,	 an	 Indonesian	 court	
granted	 two	 injunctions:	 one	ordering	 the	 suspension	of	 the	enforcement	of	 the	 first	
award,	 and	 the	 second	 preventing	 the	 second	 arbitration	 from	 taking	 place.	
Consequently	the	adjudicatory	powers	of	the	tribunal	were	undermined.		
For	 obvious	 reasons	 this	 is	 unacceptable	 especially	 in	 view	 of	 the	 role	
UNCITRAL	 and	 ICSID	 expects	 the	 courts	 of	 member	 states	 to	 play	 in	 arbitration	
particularly	 as	 regards	 enforcement	of	 award.189	Injunctions	 should	not	be	 allowed	 to	
prevent	the	smooth	operation	of	 investment	arbitration	process	or	enforcement	of	 its	
award.	Parties	who	lose	their	case	in	investment	arbitration	should	learn	to	accept	the	
outcome	 of	 the	 process.	 In	 B	 L	 Harbert	 International	 v	 Hercules	 Steel190	the	 court	
criticized	parties	 that	are	quick	 to	 seek	other	 remedies	when	 they	are	 'poor	 losers'	 in	
investment	 arbitration.	 The	 court	 stated	 that;	 'If	 we	 permit	 parties	 who	 lose	 in	
arbitration	to	freely	re-litigate	their	cases	in	court,	arbitration	will	do	nothing	to	reduce	
congestion	in	the	judicial	system;	dispute	resolution	will	be	slower	instead	of	faster;	and	
reaching	a	 final	decision	will	 cost	more	 instead	of	 less'191	The	court	 further	 suggested	
that	 sanctions	 are	 'an	 idea	 worth	 considering'	 where	 a	 party	 '	 decides	 to	 obey	 this	
caution	and	drag	the	dispute	through	the	court	system	without	objectively	reasonable	
belief	 that	 it	 will	 prevail.192In	 conclusion	 national	 courts	 should	 be	 constrained	 to	
providing	'reasonable	support'	in	the	recognition/enforcement	and	execution	of	award.	
Their	powers	should	be	 limited	 if	 the	problems	of	enforcement	are	 to	be	curtailed.	 In	
view	 of	 this,	 investor	 should	 provide	 for	 execution	 clause	 in	 their	 BITs	with	member	
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States	 to	 guide	 against	 any	 move	 by	 the	 States	 to	 frustrate	 enforcement	 of	 award	
through	the	mechanism	of	national	courts.	
	
3.2.6 Conclusion	
The	ICSID	convention	has	provided	a	legal	framework	that	is	powerful	for	the	
purpose	of	settling	disputes.	Although	the	powerfulness	of	ICSID	comes	at	a	high	price	
paid	by	member	states,	the	upside	to	such	convention	 is	 legal	certainty.	 Investors	are	
wishing	 to	be	on	an	equal	 footing	with	 the	host	 state	when	dispute	arises	which	 to	a	
significant	 level	 ICSID	 provides.	 However,	 under	 international	 law,	 states	 enjoy	
immunities	 that	cannot	be	violated	unless	 there	 is	a	clear	consent.	State	members	of	
the	 ICSID	 Convention	 have	 waived	 jurisdictional	 immunity	 to	 ICSID	 but	 no	 the	
immunity	against	enforcement.	Therefore,	with	regards	to	enforcement,	although	non-
compliance	 is	 not	 common,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 the	 investor	 to	 know	where	 the	 host	
state’s	 assets	 are	 located,	 and	 whether	 these	 assets	 are	 protected	 under	 the	 local	
immunity	laws.	If	that	is	the	case,	the	investor	may	not	be	granted	access	to	execute	on	
these	assets.	However,	there	are	other	options	that	the	investor	might	peruse.	Seeking	
enforcement	in	another	state	in	which	the	host	state	has	assets.	Also,	without	prejudice	
to	 ICSID,	 home	 state	 may	 be	 involved	 in	 imposing	 political	 or	 commercial	 pressure	
against	 the	 host	 state	 in	 case	 of	 non-compliance	 as	 happened	 with	 the	 US	 against	
Argentina	 in	 a	 form	 that	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 diplomatic	 protection.	 Another	
solution,	 that	 has	 a	 preventative	 nature,	 is	 to	 include	 a	 clear	 and	 express	 waiver	 of	
enforcement	 immunity	 from	 the	 host	 state	 as	 ICSID,	 as	 mentioned	 earlier,	 cannot	
guarantee	 such	 right	 to	 the	 investor.	 However,	 states	 are	 reluctant	 to	 grant	 such	 a	
compromise	to	investors	or	private	companies,	but	usually	such	compromises	occur	in	a	
reciprocal	 basis	 with	 the	 home	 state.	 An	 effective	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 may	 be	
solved	 through	 the	 current	 efforts	 to	 harmonise	 immunity	 laws.	 The	 definition	 of	
commercial	 activities,	 arbitration	 requirement	 and	 scope	 of	 immunity	 can	 all	 be	
enforced	under	one	legal	umbrella	as	the	case	of	the	UN	convention	on	state	immunity.	
However,	 the	 convention	 has	 significantly	 low	 number	 of	 signatories	 and	 it	 has	 not	
been	enforced	yet,	therefore,	unless	this	change,	this	area	of	law	will	remain	to	certain	
extent	 controversial	 and	 uncertain.	 Another	 option	 is	 to	 include	 in	 the	 agreement	 a	
clear	express	waiver	of	both,	jurisdictional	and	enforcement,	immunities	as	the	case	in	
the	AIPN	dispute	resolution	model	of	2004,	where	AIPN	stands	for	the	Association	of	
International	 Petroleum	 Negotiators	 is	 an	 independent	 not-for-profit	 professional	
membership	 association	 that	 supports	 international	 energy	 negotiators	 around	 the	
world.
	
But,	according	 to	 the	wording	of	 this	 clause,	and	depending	on	 the	country	of	
enforcement,	the	local	court	would	still	have	space	to	interpret	it	in	accordance	to	the	
local	law.	
To	 conclude,	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 provides	 the	 most	 effective	 dispute	
settlement	 for	 issues	 regarding	 investment	 even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 sovereign	 immunity.	
This	system	of	remedies	is	exhaustive	and	self-contained.	ICSID	awards	are	binding	on	
the	parties	and	they	have	a	legal	obligation	to	comply.	Thus,	the	awards	are	recognized	
automatically	and	they	have	res	judicata	effect.	Thereof,	awards	cannot	be	subjected	to	
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domestic	 courts’	 decisions.	 It	 represents	 a	 significant	 improvement	 over	 the	
enforceability	of	awards	under	the	New	York	Convention.	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 execution	 process	must	 take	 into	 account	 the	 local	
laws	and	this	can	 lead	to	face	with	sovereign	 immunity	 law.	The	Convention	provides	
obligatory	enforcement	and	other	remedies	in	Article	27	and	64	to	overcome	sovereign	
immunity	laws.	By	this	way,	the	ICSID	system	carries	built-in	incentives	for	compliance	
as	well	as	easily	identifiable	risks	accompanying	non-compliance.	Thereby,	while	some	
scholars	point	out	the	that	much	could	be	done,	other	part	of	the	doctrine	sustains	that	
the	system	supplies	perfect	compliance	with	the	awards	and	accomplishes	the	purpose	
that	providing	comfortable	investment	environment	by	assuring	effective	remedies	for	
both	investors	and	states.	
	
	
3.3 Attachment	and	Execution	on	Commercial	Assets	
	
Because	most	 nations	 afford	 some	 form	of	 immunity	 from	attachment	 and	
execution	to	the	assets		of	foreign	sovereigns	located	in	their	jurisdictions,	enforcing	an	
arbitral	award	against	a	sovereign	who	refuses	to	pay	can	pose	significant	challenges,	
even	when	that	award	has	been	recognized	as	a	judgment.	In	most	nations,	the	concept	
of	 sovereign	 immunity	 generally	 protects	most	 sovereign	 assets	 from	 execution	 and	
attachment.	An	exception	to	general	principles	of	sovereign	immunity,	however,	often	
exists	 with	 regard	 to	 sovereign	 assets	 that	 are	 used	 (or	 intended	 to	 be	 used)	 for	
commercial	 activity	 or	 for	 commercial	 purposes.	 Thus,	 although	 a	 party	 seeking	 to	
enforce	an	arbitral	award	against	a	recalcitrant	sovereign		may	lack		the	execution	and	
other	options	usually	available	to	the	victor	in	arbitration	against	a	non-	governmental	
party,	 under	 the	 "commercial	 activity"	 exception	 to	 sovereign	 immunity,	 the	 party	
seeking	 enforcement	 may	 be	 able	 to	 reach	 the	 sovereign's	 commercial	 assets	 in	
satisfaction	of	the	award.	
	
Thus	 we	 have	 to	 peruse	 the	 ‘commercial	 activity’	 exception	 to	 sovereign	
immunity,	 which	 is	 codified	 in	 the	 statutes	 of	 some	 nations	 and	 recognized	 by	
reference	 to	 general	 principles	 of	 customary	 international	 law	 in	 others.	 Because	 the	
United	 States	 and	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 have	 sovereign	 immunity	 statutes	 explicitly		
recognizing	 the	 ‘commercial	 activity’	 exception	 and	well-developed	 	 case	 law	 setting	
forth	 the	 criteria	 for	 reaching	 sovereign	 assets	 under	 that	 exception,	 much	 of	 the	
following	discussion	will	focus	on	those	countries.	Execution	against	sovereign	assets	in	
general	 is	a	 relatively	 recent	development,	and	most	states	have	followed	the	 lead	of	
the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom	in	applying	a	sovereign	immunity	doctrine	
that	permits	execution	in	aid	of	arbitral	awards	against	commercial	assets.	
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3.4 Award	and	Enforcement:	the	Sedelmayer	saga	
The	 case	 called	 the	 Sedelmayer	 saga 193 ,	 illustrates	 well	 the	 potential	
problems	 regarding	 state	 immunity	 pleas	 in	 the	 execution	of	 investment	 awards	 and	
serves	as	a	good	example	of	the	hardship	involved	in	tracing	attachable	State	assets.194	
Sedelmeyer	 was	 the	 sole	 owner	 of	 a	 company	 dedicated	 to	 training	 of	 police	 and	
security	 personnel	 which	 entered	 into	 a	 joint	 venture	 with	 the	 Leningrad	 police	
department	 in	 1991.	 Following	 expropriation	 of	 his	 capital	 contribution	 in	 the	 joint	
venture,	 Sedelmayer	 initiated	 arbitration	 under	 the	 Germany	 –	 Russia	 bilateral	
investment	treaty	(BIT)	at	the	Stockholm	Chamber	of	Commerce.	In	1998	the	tribunal	
rendered	an	award	in	his	favour	ordering	Russia	to	pay	$	2.35	million,	plus	interest.195	It	
took	Mr.	Sedelmayer	12	years	and	over	30	domestic	execution	cases	to	collect	a	part	of	
the	 award	 compensation.	 During	 that	 time	 Russia	 successfully	 evaded	 paying	 the	
awarded	 compensation	 by	 raising	 its	 state	 immunity	 from	 execution	 before	 national	
courts.196	
	
The	case	called	the	Sedelmayer	saga,	 illustrates	well	 the	potential	problems	
regarding	state	immunity	pleas	in	the	execution	of	investment	awards	and	serves	as	a	
good	example	of	the	hardship	involved	in	tracing	attachable	State	assets.	The	claimant	
in	 this	 dispute	 was	 one	 Franz	 Sedelmayer,	 a	 German	 citizen	 who	 owned	 a	 US	
corporation	 called	 the	Sedelmayer	Group	of	Companies	 International	 Inc.	 (SGC).	 The	
case	 arose	 following	 Sedelmayer’s	 relocation	 to	 St	 Petersburg,	 Russia.	 There	
Sedelmayer	through	his	company	negotiated	a	25-year	lease	on	a	villa	previously	used	
as	a	retreat	by	Soviet	ministers.	In	August	1991,	SGC	and	the	Leningrad	police	entered	
into	 a	 joint	 venture	 called	 Kammenjj	 Ostrov	 (KO).	 After	 significant	 renovations,	
Sedelmayer	 opened	 the	 villa	 as	 a	 conference	 centre	 and	 training	 facility	 for	 security	
personnel.	 The	 joint	 stock	 company	 was,	 among	 other	 things,	 to	 produce	 police	
equipment	 and	 to	 provide	 for	 transportation	 and	 protection	 services	 for	 foreign	 and	
Russian	citizens.	Difficulties	arose	soon	thereafter	with	a	Russian	court	proceeding	that	
determined	that	the	joint	venture’s	registration	was	null	and	void	In	December	1994,	a	
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presidential	decree	directed	that	the	assets	of	the	joint	venture	were	to	be	transferred	
to	 a	 ‘Procurement	 Department’.	 	 In	 1996	 authorities	 barred	 Sedelmayer	 from	 the	
facility	as	well.	
As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 Russian	 governmental	 action,	 Sedelmayer	 filed	 a	 claim	
under	 the	 1989	 German–Soviet	 BIT	 with	 the	 Arbitration	 Institute	 of	 the	 Stockholm	
Chamber	of	Commerce.	Sedelmayer	alleged	expropriation.	The	tribunal	ruled	that	the	
Russian	 Federation	 had	 expropriated	 the	 property	 and	 ordered	 a	 payment	 to	
Sedelmayer	 in	 the	 amount	 of	US$2,350,000,	 plus	 interest,	 in	 the	 July	 1998	 award.	 In	
turn,	 Sedelmayer	 had	 the	 1998	 award	 declared	 enforceable	 under	 the	 New	 York	
Convention	by	the	German	Superior	Court	of	Justice	(Kammergericht)	in	Berlin.	
Though	Mr	Sedelmayer’s	case	and	award	were	not	untypical	of	other	claims	
by	 Western	 businessmen	 who	 	 had	 lost	 investments	 in	 Russia,	 his	 persistence	 in	
attempting	to	satisfy	the	award	of	the	international	tribunal	was	not.	
	As	 Mr	 Sedelmayer	 has	 described	 the	 Russian	 government	 efforts	 to	 block	
payment:	 ‘They	 tried	 every	 trick	 to	 thwart	 me,	 but	 a	 building	 can’t	 run	 away’.	 	 Mr	
Sedelmayer’s	 first	 step	 to	 execute	 the	 award	 was	 to	 attempt	 to	 impound	 Lufthansa	
Airlines’	payments	to	Russia	for	overflights	of	Russian	airspace.	To	accomplish	this,	Mr	
Sedelmayer	brought	an	action	 to	execute	against	 these	assets	 in	 the	municipal	 court	
(Amtsgericht	 Köln)	 of	 Cologne.	 The	 partial	 award	 granted	 was	 some	 €511,000.197	In	
turn,	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 and	 the	 third-party	 debtor	 blocked	 appeals	 against	 the	
order	and	the	municipal	court	overruled	its	earlier	decision,	annulling	the	order	on	the	
basis	of	public	purpose.	Although	it	had	overruled	its	earlier	order,	the	municipal	court	
permitted	Sedelmayer	to	appeal	to	the	Federal	Court	of	Justice	on	grounds	of	law.		The	
case	 was	 then	 heard	 by	 Germany’s	 highest	 court.	 The	 Federal	 Court	 of	 Justice	
determined	 that	 the	 German	 courts	 had	 no	 international	 jurisdiction	 in	 execution	
proceedings	 against	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 concerning	 these	 overflight	 rights.	
Overflight	 rights,	 including	 both	 the	 transit	 and	 entry	 fees,	 were	 deemed	 to	 be	 of	 a	
public	 character	 and	 not	 private	 law	 contract-type	 	 claims	 and	 were,	 therefore,	 not	
subject	 to	 internal	 execution.	 The	 German	 court	 stated	 that	 the	 determination	 of	
whether	 such	 assets	 as	 these	 fees	 were	 of	 a	 public	 character	 had	 to	 be	 determined	
according	to	German	law.	The	fees,	according	to	the	court,	arose	out	of	the	territorial	
sovereignty	of	a	foreign	state	and	were	a	benefit	for	a	public	function	carried	out	by	the	
Russian	Federation	and	were,	therefore,	public	in	nature.	An	additional	factor	was	that	
the	 assets	 were	 located	 in	 Russia	 and	 not	 Germany.	 The	 court	 concluded	 that	 the	
																																																													
197	Mr	Sedelmayer	was	very	unhappy	with	 the	behaviour	of	 the	 local	German	bailiG	s.	 In	one	 instance—
Sedelmayer	 suggests	 that	 he	 initiated	 over	 30	 diG	 erent	 executions	 against	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 in	
Germany—Sedelmayer	 sought	 to	 execute	 against	 assets—in	 this	 instance,	 computers,	 cameras,	 and	
security	 equipment	 being	 displayed	 at	 the	 Russian	 government	 stand—at	 an	 industrial	 trade	 fair	 in	
Hannover	in	April	2005.	What	followed	was	a	series	of	eG	orts	to	get	a	bailiG	to	act	and	refusals	by	several	
to	do	so.	 !	ough	Mr	Sedelmayer	brought	actions	and	complaints	 in	several	courts	 in	Hanver	and	Lower	
Saxony,	he	X	nally	launched	an	action	against	the	Republic	of	Germany	in	the	European	Court	of	Human	
Rights	for	failure	of	Germany’s	judiciary	to	equally	apply	the	law.	See	FJ	Sedelmayer,	‘Sedelmayer	vs.	
Germany,	European	Court	of	Human	Rights’	2(5)	TDM	(2005).	
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Russian	Federation	was	not	subject	to	German	jurisdiction	and	that	sovereign	immunity	
applied.		
Significantly,	the	court	in	its	decision	held	that	the	arbitration	clause	implied	
no	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 for	 execution	 proceedings.	 The	 German	 court	 asserted	 that	
immunity	 in	 proceedings	 on	 the	merits	 has	 to	 be	 treated	 in	 a	 different	manner	 from	
immunity	in	execution	proceedings.	The	BIT	only	regulates	proceedings	on	the	merits.	
For	the	Federal	Court,	the	agreement	pursuant	to	Article	10	of	the	German–	Soviet	BIT	
that	 the	award	was	 to	be	 recognized	and	enforced	 in	 accordance	with	 the	New	York	
Convention	did	not	raise	a	waiver	of	immunity	in	execution	proceedings	such	as	those	
before	the	German	courts.	The	BIT	is	designed	to	encourage	investment	activities	and	
raises	the	prospect	that	an	award	will	require	execution	against	a	state	party.	However,	
an	 execution	 against	 assets	 that	 are	 identified	 as	 being	 for	 public	 purpose	 is	 not	
necessary	to	achieve	the	purposes	of	the	BIT.	
Notwithstanding	 the	 refusal	 of	 German	 courts	 to	 order	 execution	 against	
these	 landing	 rights,	Mr	Sedelmayer	has	 remained	undeterred	and	 continues	 to	 seek	
execution	of	his	award.	As	a	postscript,	Mr	Sedelmayer	has	traced	Russian	real	estate	
assets	in	Germany.	In	Cologne,	Mr	Sedelmayer	came	across	a	former	KGB	com-	pound	
near	 the	 downtown	 of	 the	 city.	 At	 first	 Sedelmayer	 was	 unable	 to	 act	 since	 the	
registered	owner	on	title	was	the	defunct	Soviet	Union.	Sedelmayer	continued	to	check	
the	 ownership	 every	 few	 months	 and	 was	 rewarded	 in	 late	 2002	 with	 a	 change	 in	
ownership	 to	 the	Russian	Federation.	At	 that	point,	Mr	Sedelmayer	 	 filed	against	 the	
real	 property.	 While	 allegedly	 there	 have	 been	 threats	 against	 Sedelmayer	 and	 his	
family,	Sedelmayer	has	begun	to	collect	against	the	rent	payments	amounting	to	some	
$29,000.00	per	month198		while	he	awaits	sale	and	disposition	of	the	revenues	from	the	
eventual	sale	of	the	property.199		
	
The	 dispute	was	 brought	 also	 before	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	
(“ECtHR”).	Mr.	Sedelmayer	claimed	that	the	conduct	of	the	German	authorities	 in	the	
execution	 proceedings	 violated	 his	 rights	 under	 Article	 1	 of	 the	 Protocol	 No.	 1	
(protection	 of	 property),	 as	well	 as	Articles	 6	 (right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial)	 and	 13	 (right	 to	 an	
effective	 remedy)	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 (“ECHR”).	 As	 seen	
																																																													
198	In	an	email	to	the	OGEMID	discussion	group	dated	3	December	2006,	Mr	Sedelmayer	advised:	 ‘Dear	
OGEMID	members,	This	is	to	inform	you	that	in	the	case	Franz	J.	Sedelmayer	vs.	The	Russian	Federation,	
the	Frankfurt	City	Court	(Amtsgericht	Frankfurt	am	Main)	has	issued	an	order	to	seize	the	business	bank	
accounts	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 held	 with	 the	 Dresdner	 Bank	 AG,	 the	 VTB	 Bank	 Deutschland	 AG	
(formerly	called	the	Ost-West	Handelsbank	AG)	and	the	Deutsche	Bank	AG.	The	registration	number	of	
the	court	order	is	82	M	20481/06.	A	couple	of	days	ago	the	Dresdner	Bank	AG	and	the	Deutsche	Bank	AG	
have	acknowledged	the	existence	of	bank	accounts	and	declared	their	willingness	to	cooperate	with	the	
creditor	 .	 .	 .	 Cordially,	 Franz	 J.	 Sedelmayer.’	 See:	 OGEMID	 Archive,	 December	 2006,	 ‘Sedelmayer	 vs.	
Russian	 Federation:	 More	 Russian	 Federation	 Bank	 Accounts	 Seized—MinFin	 and	 Russian	 House	 in	
Berlin’.	
199	See	 E	 Baldwin,	M	 Kantor,	 and	M	Nolan	 ‘Limits	 to	 Enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 Awards’	 23	 J	 of	 Int	 Arb	 1	
(2006).	 The	 authors	 canvass	 the	 numerous	means	which	 disappointed	 state	 respondents	may	 employ	
that	may	not	have	been	contemplated	by	the	drafers	of	the	ICSID	Convention	to	avoid	enforcement	of	an	
arbitral	award.	
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above,	 the	 execution	 was	 refused	 by	 the	 German	 authorities	 because	 the	 claims	 in	
question	were	protected	by	 the	principle	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 from	execution.	 The	
court	 qualified	 a	 claim	 to	 compensation	 under	 an	 award	 as	 a	 possession	 in	 terms	 of	
Article	 1	 of	 the	 Protocol	 No.	 1.	 However,	 the	 ECtHR	 first	 observed	 that	 sovereign	
immunity	was	as	a	principle	of	customary	 international	 law	in	accordance	with	Article	
31(3)(c)	of	the	VCLT,	and	further	that	the	principle	of	immunity	of	State	property	from	
execution	is	subject	to	“certain	strictly	delimited	exceptions”	and	“[a]	State	cannot	be	
required	to	override	against	 its	will	the	rule	of	State	immunity”.	 In	the	court’s	view,	 in	
this	case	“the	German	courts	struck	a	fair	balance	between	the	demands	of	the	general	
interest	 of	 the	 community	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 individual’s	
fundamental	 rights”.	 Sedelmayer’s	 claims	 were	 found	 manifestly	 ill	 founded	 and	
therefore	declared	inadmissible.	
	
This	case	strongly	suggests	that	there	continue	to	be	difficulties	in	achieving	
complete	 claimant	 satisfaction	 in	 the	 enforcement	 and	 execution	 of	 investment	
arbitration	awards.	All	of	the	cases	discussed	above,	and	the	Ultimately,	as	experience	
with	 the	 enforcement	 and	 execution	 of	 awards	 grows,	 it	 may	 be	 necessary	 to	 re-
examine	 the	 application	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 by	 domestic	 courts	 and	 ask	 the	
question	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 current	 system	 set	 in	 place,	 whether	 under	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 or	 other	 arbitral	 settings,	 is	 satisfactory	 as	 an	 effective	 system	 of	
international	justice	for	investors	and	their	investments.	
	
3.4.1 Defining	The	Property	As		"Commercial"	
	
The	 exception	 of	 commercial	 assets	 refers	 to	 the	 traditional	 distinction	
between	 two	 capacities	 in	 which	 the	 state	 acts:	 sovereign	 acts	 of	 a	 state	 (acta	 iure	
imperii)	 and	 acts	 of	 a	 state	 in	 its	 private	 capacity	 (acta	 iure	 gestionis).	 Following	 this	
division,	 state	 property	 can	 be	 classified	 as	 property	 serving	 either	 sovereign	 or	
commercial	purposes.	
	
Because	 of	 the	 "commercial	 activity"	 exception,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 property	
becomes	the	central	question	in	most	published	cases	involving	enforcement	of	arbitral	
awards	 against	 sovereigns:	 when	 is	 property	 sufficiently	 "commercial"	 subject	 to	
execution?	
In	most	jurisdictions,	the	question	of	whether	property	subject	to	execution	is	
being	 used	 for	 commercial	 activity	 is	 a	 separate	 determination	 from	 whether	
commercial	activity	gave	rise	to	the	claim	in	the	first	place.	Thus,	although	a	State	may	
be	engaged	 in	 commercial	activity	 that	 led	 the	parties	 to	arbitration,	 the	commercial	
activity	underlying	the	claim	does	not	mean	that	all	the	sovereign's	property	is	subject	
to	attachment	and	execution.	 In	order	 to	execute,	 the	winning	party	must	prove	 that	
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the	 property	 itself	 meets	 the	 requirement	 of	 "commercial	 activity''	 or	 "commercial	
purpose"	under	 the	applicable	 law.	This	can	create	challenges	 for	winning	parties,	 for	
while	 showing	 that	 a	 sovereign	was	 engaged	 in	 commercial	 activity	 can	be	 relatively	
easy,	showing	how	property	owned	by	the	sovereign	is	being	used,	or	is	intended	to	be	
used,	can	be	somewhat	more	difficult.	
The	commercial	assets	exception	is	generally	accepted	in	treaty	and	domestic	
law.	Article	19(c)	of	the	UNCSI	allows	execution	against	property	“in	use	or	intended	for	
use	by	the	State	for	other	than	government	non-commercial	purposes”	which	“is	in	the	
territory	of	the	State	of	the	
The	commercial	assets	exception	is	generally	accepted	in	treaty	and	domestic	
law.	Article	19(c)	of	the	UNCSI	allows	execution	against	property	“in	use	or	intended	for	
use	by	the	State	for	other	than	government	non-commercial	purposes”	which	“is	in	the	
territory	 of	 the	 State	 of	 the	 forum”.	 Article	 26	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	State	
Immunity		allows	execution	of	a	 judgement	 in	proceedings	 relating	 to	an	 industrial	or	
commercial	 activity	 against	 property	 of	 the	 state	 against	 which	 judgment	 has	 been	
given,	used	exclusively	in	connection	with	such	an	activity	in	the	state	of	forum.	Section	
13(4)	of	the	State	Immunity	Act	allows	execution	against	property	which	is	“for	the	time	
being	 in	 use	 or	 intended	 for	 use	 for	 commercial	 purposes”.	 The	 Foreign	 Sovereign	
Immunities	 Act	(FSIA)	permits	 execution	 of	 arbitration	 awards	 against	 foreign	 state	
property	“used	for	a	commercial	activity”	in	the	territory	of	the	United	States.	
The	 examples	 show	 that	 the	 current	 law	 on	 state	 immunity	 favours	 the	
“purpose	 test”,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 “nature	 test”	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
assets.	 The	 “purpose	 test”	 will	 require	 determination	 of	 two	 elements:	 whether	 the	
relevant	activity	is	commercial	and	whether	the	assets	in	question	are	used	or	intended	
to	be	used	for	such	an	activity.	
With	regard	to	the	first	element,	in	1977	the	German	Constitutional	Court	has	
observed	 that	 whether	 a	 state	 activity	 is	 sovereign	 or	 non-sovereign	will	 in	 principle	
have	 to	 be	 determined	 according	 to	 the	 national	 law	 applicable	 in	 each	 case,	 since	
customary	 international	 law	 contains	 no	 criteria	 for	 establishing	 that	 distinction.200	
However,	 some	 context	 how	 to	 interpret	 the	 term	 “government	 non-commercial	
purposes”	 under	 Article	 19(c)	 of	 the	 UNCSI	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 definition	 of	 a	
“commercial	 transaction”	 in	 Article	 2(1)(c)	 of	 the	 Convention	 as	 “(i)	 any	 commercial	
contract	or	transaction	for	the	sale	of	goods	or	supply	of	services;	(ii)	any	contract	for	a	
loan	or	other	transaction	of	a	financial	nature,	including	any	obligation	of	guarantee	or	
																																																													
200	Philippine	Embassy	Bank	Account	Case,	Judgment	of	Dec.	13,	1977,	Constitutional	Court,	65	I.L.R.	146,	
155	(Germ)	(English	translation).	
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of	 indemnity	 in	 respect	 of	 any	 such	 loan	 or	 transaction;	 (iii)	 any	 other	 contract	 or	
transaction	of	a	commercial,	industrial,	trading	or	professional	nature,	but	not	including	
a	 contract	 of	 employment	 of	 persons”.201	Similar	 definitions	 have	 been	 adopted	 in	
domestic	state	immunity	legislation.		
As	 clarified	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 FSIA,	 “commercial	 activity”	 has	 been	
formulated	 as	 a	 state	 activity	which	 is	 analogous	 to	 an	 activity	 conducted	by	 private	
persons.202	The	commercial	character	of	an	act	will	be	determined	by	its	“nature”	rather	
than	its	“purpose”.	This	means	that	the	question	is	not	whether	the	foreign	government	
is	acting	with	a	profit	motive	or	with	the	aim	of	fulfilling	uniquely	sovereign	objectives,	
but	whether	the	particular	actions	that	the	foreign	state	performs	are	a	type	of	“actions	
by	which	a	private	party	engages	in	trade	and	traffic	or	commerce”.	
The	second	issue	regarding	the	“commercial	purpose”	test	is	whether	it	is	the	
past,	 present,	 or	 future	 use	 of	 the	 property	 that	 is	 relevant	 for	 determination	 of	 the	
purpose	 of	 the	 property.	 Using	 the	 phrase	 “used	 for	 commercial	 activity”,	 the	 FSIA	
formulates	 the	 test	 as	 a	 past	 use,	 the	 SIA	 refers	 to	 the	 present	 or	 past	 use.	 The	
International	Law	Commission	Commentary	 indicates	that	the	property	must	be	used	
or	 intended	 to	 be	 used	 for	 commercial	 purposes	 “at	 the	 time	 the	 proceeding	 for	
attachment	or	execution	is	instituted”.		Similarly,	the	German	Constitutional	Court	held	
that	 it	 is	 the	 “actual	 use”	 that	 is	 decisive.	 French	 courts	 take	 into	 consideration	
“simultaneously	the	origin	and	use	of	the	property”.	Determining	the	purpose	of	assets	
appears	to	be	a	challenging	task.	Without	any	specific	earmarking,	the	use	of	funds	will	
be	a	matter	within	the	discretion	of	states.	
There	are	several	categories	of	commercial	property	 that	a	sovereign	might	
have	available	 for	execution	 in	aid	of	 an	arbitral	 award.	First,	a	winning	arbitral	party	
can	attach	obviously	 commercial	property.	Although	executing	against	 such	property	
should	be	relatively	straightforward,	identifying	sovereign-owned	commercial	property	
can	be	difficult.	Second,	 "mixed	use"	 property-in	particular,	 embassy	bank	 accounts	 -
may	 be	 available	 to	 satisfy	 judgments.	 Although	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 generally	
protects	 an	 embassy's	 property,	 bank	 accounts	 held	 in	 an	 embassy's	 name	 used	 for	
both	 diplomatic	 and	 commercial	 activities	 have	 been	 subject	 to	 attachment	 and	
execution	proceedings	(with	varying	results)	in	several	jurisdictions.	Third,	central	bank	
assets	maintained	in	foreign	jurisdictions	present	a	particular	difficulty	 in	this	context,	
																																																													
	
202	As	held	in	by	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	in	Weltover	v.	Argentina,	foreign	sovereign's	actions	are	
“commercial”	within	 the	meaning	of	 the	 FSIA	when	 it	 acts	 “not	 as	 a	 regulator	 of	 a	market,	 but	 in	 the	
manner	of	a	private	player	within	it”	see	Argentina	et	al.	v.	Weltover	Inc.	et	al.,	504	U.S.	607,	614	(1992).	
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because	while	they	are	obviously	used	for	commercial	activity,	they	are	also	regarded	
as	 critical	 to	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 international	 economy,	 and	 thus	 often	 held	 to	 be	
beyond	the	reach	of	judgment	creditors.	
3.4.2 The	Problem	of	Assets	of	Separate	Entities	
	
States	often	conduct	their	private	law	activities	through	agencies	or	separate	
juridical	 entities	 owned	 or	 otherwise	 controlled	 by	 a	 state.	 Property	 owned	 by	 these	
entities	 is	 likely	 to	be	 targeted	by	 investors	 as	 there	will	 be	 strong	evidence	 that	 the	
property	 belonging	 to	 an	 entity	 engaged	 in	 commercial	 purposes	 will	 be	 used	 for	
commercial	purposes.225	However,	such	entities’	distinct	legal	personality	will	often	be	
an	obstacle	in	the	execution	of	an	award	against	a	state’s	property.	If	such	entities	were	
to	be	treated	as	separate	from	the	foreign	state,	there	would	be	a	strong	incentive	for	
the	 sovereigns	 to	 direct	 commercial	 revenues	 to	 separate	 entity’s	 organizational	
structure	 to	 avoid	 execution.	 Nonetheless,	 domestic	 legal	 systems	 have	 developed	
methods	to	“pierce	the	corporate	veil”	of	entities	controlled	by	a	state	to	prevent	such	
abuses	
The	FSIA	incorporates	state	agencies	and	instrumentalities	into	the	definition	
of	 a	 “foreign	 state”	 in	 Section	 1603(a).	 In	 this	 way	 it	 extends	 the	 presumption	 of	
immunity	 to	 state	 agencies	 and	 instrumentalities.	 FSIA	 defines	 an	 “agency	 or	
instrumentality	of	a	 foreign	state”	as	 “any	entity	 (1)	which	 is	a	 separate	 legal	person,	
corporate	 or	 otherwise,	 and	 (2)	 which	 is	 an	 organ	 of	 a	 foreign	 state	 or	 political	
subdivision	thereof,	or	a	majority	of	whose	shares	or	other	ownership	interest	is	owned	
by	a	foreign	state	or	political	subdivision	thereof,	and	(3)	which	is	neither	a	citizen	of	a	
State	of	the	United	States	[…]	nor	created	under	the	laws	of	any	third	country”.	
The	SIA	takes	a	position	different	from	that	of	the	FSIA	and	does	not	accord	a	
presumption	 of	 immunity	 to	 separate	 entities.	 SIA	 Section	 14(1)	 stipulates	 that	 state	
immunities	do	not	extend	to	“any	entity	[…]	which	is	distinct	from	the	executive	organs	
of	 the	government	of	 the	State	and	capable	of	 suing	or	being	 sued”.231	Section	14(2)	
provides	that	a	separate	entity	can	invoke	immunity	from	jurisdiction	before	the	courts	
of	 the	United	Kingdom	only	 if	 the	proceedings	 relate	 to	 an	act	by	 that	 entity	 “in	 the	
exercise	of	sovereign	authority”	and	if	its	parent	state	in	the	same	circumstances	would	
be	 entitled	 to	 immunity.	 Thus,	 the	 assets	 of	 separate	 entities	 will	 not	 be	 entitled	 to	
immunity,	 unless	 the	 entities	 are	 engaged	 in	 sovereign	 activities	 and	 the	 assets	 are	
used	 for	 this	 activity.	 The	 UNCSI	 adopts	 a	 functionalist	 approach	 similar	 to	 that	
employed	in	the	SIA.	The	presumption	of	immunity	of	the	property	of	an	entity	will	be	
dependent	on	the	determination	that	the	entity	performs	sovereign	activities	and	that	
the	 property	 is	 used	 or	 intended	 to	 be	 used	 for	 such	 activities.	 The	 property	 will	 be	
protected	only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	 used	 for	 the	 sovereign	 activities.	 The	 separate	
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entity	bears	the	burden	of	proving	that	the	entity	is	engaged	in	sovereign	activities.	As	
further	 clarified	 in	 the	 Annex	 to	 the	 Convention,	 “Article	 19	 does	 not	 prejudge	 the	
question	of	“piercing	the	corporate	veil”,	questions	relating	to	a	situation	where	a	State	
entity	has	deliberately	misrepresented	its	financial	position	or	subsequently	reduced	its	
assets	to	avoid	satisfying	a	claim,	or	other	related	issues”.	
3.4.3 The	Problem	of	Mixed	Commercial/Sovereign	Use	
	
As	 noted	 above,	 in	 the	 Sedelmayer	 case,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 in	 Frankfurt	
allowed	the	attachment	of	a	bank	account	held	in	the	name	of	the	Russian	embassy	in	
aid	 of	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award.	 The	 clear	 rule	 in	Germany	 since	 1977	 has	
been	that	embassy	accounts	are	exempt	from	attachment	and	execution.	Although	the	
Court	of	Appeals	recognized	this	rule,	the	 lower	court	had	specifically	asked	Russia	to	
elaborate	 on	 whether	 the	 funds	 in	 the	 account	 were	 earmarked	 for	 sovereign,	 as	
opposed	 to	 commercial,	 activities.	 The	 Russian	 government'	 s	 response,	 a	 cursory	
statement	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 account	 is	 sovereign	 in	 nature,	 did	 not	 satisfy	 the	
German	courts.	Thus,	the	attachment	of	the	embassy	bank	account	was	upheld.	
Despite	 	 the	 	 Sedelmayer	 	 decision,	 embassy	 	 accounts	 	 are	 	 generally	
considered	 immune	 from	 execution	 under	 the	 Vienna	 Convention,	 which	 immunizes	
embassies	 and	 their	 property.	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 cases,	 however,	 dealing	 with	
"mixed	 use"	 embassy	 accounts	 -that	 is,	 accounts	 used	 for	 both	 diplomatic	 and	
commercial	 activities-that	 have	 led	 to	 varying	 conclusions	 on	 whether	 mixed-use	
property	should	be	subject	to	attachment.	In	Liberian	Eastern	Timber	Corp.	v.	Republic	
of	Liberia1	for	example,	a	mixed	use	account	was	found	immune	from	attachment.	The	
claimant,	LETCO-who	had	been	awarded	over	US$9	million	in	arbitration	-had	its	ICSID	
award	 reduced	 	 to	 judgment	 	 in	 the	 Southern	 District	 of	 New	 York.	 LETCO	 then	
attempted	to	execute	against	 tax	collection	 revenues	 in	 the	Southern	District	of	New	
York,	 but	 was	 rebuffed	 based	 on	 the	 court's	 finding	 that	 the	 collection	 of	 taxes	 is	 a	
sovereign	activity.	
LETCO,	again		like		the		claimant		in	Sedelmayer,		then		attempted		to	execute	
against	bank	accounts	held	 in	 the	name	of	 the	Liberian	emba:ssy..64	 In	 its	execution	
order	 (which,	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 can	 be	 issued	 directly	 by	 a	 judgment	 creditor),	
LETCO	 specifically	 requested	 execution	 only	 against	 "any	 credits	 other	 than	 wages,	
salary,	commissions	or	pensions	of	the	defendant,	The	Government	of	the	Republic	of	
Liberia,	 The	Republic	 of	 Liberia,	 or	 The	Embassy	of	 the	Republic	 of	 Liberia	 or	 any	of	
their	 agencies,	 that	 are	 used	 for	 commercial	 activities,"	 thereby	 exempting	 from	 the	
execution	any	funds	protected	by	the	Vienna	Convention.65	The	Court,	acknowledging	
that	the	Liberian	embassy	accounts	were	mixed	use	accounts	and	included	funds	used	
for	both	diplomatic	and	commercial	activities,	nonetheless	rejected	the	execution,	but	
seemed	to	leave	open	the	possibility	that	an	account	might	be	subject	to	attachment	if	
a	creditor	can	show	that	the	account	is	used	for	enough	commercial	activity:	
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[F]ollowing	 the	 	 narrow	 definition	 	 of	 "commercial	 activity,"	 funds	 used	 for	
commercial		activities	which		are	"incidental"		or	"auxiliary,"	not	denoting	the	essential	
character	of	the	use	of	the	funds	in	question,	would		not	cause	the	entire	bank		account	
to	 lose	 its	 mantle	 of	 sovereign	 immunity.	 .	 .	 .	 	 Indeed,	 a	 diplomatic	 mission	 would		
undergo		a	severe	hardship	if	a	civil	 judgment	creditor	 	were	permitted	to	freeze	bank		
accounts		used		for		the	purposes	of	a	diplomatic	mission	for	an	indefinite	period	of	time	
until		exhaustive		discovery	had	taken		place		to		determine		the	precise	portion		of		the	
bank	account	used	for	commercial	activities.	Such	a		scenario	would	practically	gut	one	
of	the	purposes		behind	immunity:	to	afford	deference		to	the	governmental	affairs	of	
foreign	states.	
Another	U.S.	 federal	 court,	however,	 arrived	at	 the	 	opposite	 conclusion	on	
the	 exact	 same	 question	 of	 mixed-use	 bank	 accounts.	 	 In	 Birch	 Shipping	 Corp.	 v.	
Embassy	of	the	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	the	plaintiff	had	attempted	to	enforce	an	
arbitral	 award	 rendered	 against	 Tanzania	 by	 serving	 a	 writ	 of	 garnishment	 on	 a	
Washington,	D.C.	bank	at	which	 the	Tanzanian	embassy	maintained	a	bank	account.	
The	bank	account	in	question	was	used	to	pay	the	Tanzanian	embassy	staff	as	wen	as	
for	 "incidental	 purchases	 and	 services	 necessary	 and	 incident	 to	 the	operation	of	 the	
Embassy."	 In	 denying	Tanzania's	motion	 to	 quash	 the	writ	 of	 garnishment,	 the	 court	
first	held	that	such		''incidental		purchases	and	services"	were	commercial	activity	under	
the	FSIA,	thereby	rendering	the	bank	account	a	mixed-use	asset.	The	court	then	found	
that	mixed-use	bank	accounts	are	subject	 to	execution	 in	order	 to	enforce	an	arbitral	
award,	because	"a	reading	of	the	Act	which	exempted	mixed	accounts	would	create	a	
loophole,	for	any	property	could	be	made		immune	by	using	it,	at	one	time	or	another,	
for	some	minor	public	purpose."	
Jurisdictions	outside	of	the	United	States	addressing	the	mixed-use	problem,	
like	 the	 two	 U.S.	 courts	 discussed	 above,	 have	 arrived	 at	 divergent	 conclusions,	
although	most	grant	immunity	to	mixed-use	accounts.	
	
	
3.4.4 The	 exception	 of	 the	 exception:	 Central	 banks	 funds,	 military	
property,	and	property	used	by	diplomatic	missions	
	
Regardless	 of	 its	 commercial	 or	 public	 character,	 certain	 categories	 of	
property	will	always	be	considered	as	serving	a	sovereign	purpose,	and	thus	immune	to	
execution.203	The	 most	 significant	 exceptions	 concern	 the	 assets	 of	 central	 banks,	
military	property,	and	property	used	by	diplomatic	missions.204	
																																																													
203	UNCSI,	 Article	 21(1).	 See	 Cedrik	 Ryngaert,	 Embassy	 Bank	 Accounts	 and	 State	 Immunity	 from	
Execution:	 Doing	 Justice	 to	 the	 Financial	 Interests	 of	 Creditors,	 26(1)	 LEIDEN	 J.	 INT'L	 L	 .73,	 78	 (2013)	
(holding	 against	 the	 view	 that	 the	 catalogue	 under	 Article	 21	 of	 the	 UNCSI	 represents	 customary	
international	law).	
204	Article	 21	 of	 the	UNCSI	 lists	 five	 categories	 of	 property:	 “(a)	 property,	 including	 any	 bank	 account,	
which	 is	used	or	 intended	 for	use	 in	 the	performance	of	 the	 functions	of	 the	diplomatic	mission	of	 the	
State	 or	 its	 consular	 posts,	 special	missions,	missions	 to	 international	 organizations	 or	 delegations	 to	
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Property	 of	 central	 banks	 is	 a	 fairly	 certain	 source	of	 assets	which	makes	 it	
particularly	attractive	for	attachment	by	award	creditors.	However,	due	to	the	peculiar	
character	of	these	assets	and	their	critical	role	in	the	functioning	of	a	state,	they	enjoy	
special	protection	under	the	regime	of	sovereign	 immunity.	The	UNCSI	as	well	as	the	
domestic	FSIA	and	SIA	include	non-rebuttable	presumptions	of	immunity	of	the	assets	
	
After	 its	 first	 two	 failed	 attempts	 at	 execution,	 the	 claimant	 in	 the	 LETCO	
arbitration	 discussed	 above	 attempted	 to	 enforce	 its	 arbitral	 award	 against	 assets	 of	
the	 Liberian	 central	 bank.	 Under	 U.S.	 law,	 central	 bank	 assets	 are	 afforded	 special	
protection.	 Despite	 the	 obvious	 commercial	 nature	 of	 central	 banking	 activities,	
including	 investment	 and	 foreign	 exchange	 transactions	 (which,	 under	 the	 usual	
definition,	any	private	person	could	undertake),	 the	FSIA	carves	out	special	 immunity	
for	 central	 bank	 reserves.	 The	 rationale	 behind	 this	 special	 protection	 is	 that	 central	
banking	 activity	 is	 critical	 to	 international	 relations	 and	 thus	 deserving	 of	 special	
protection.	 	 LETCO's	 attempt	 to	execute	against	Liberia's	 central	 banking	assets	was	
rejected	on	 this	basis.	 Thus,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	LETCO's	 arbitral	 award	against	
Liberia	was	 easily	 reduced	 to	 judgment	 in	 the	United	 States,	 LETCO	 failed	 in	 	 three		
attempts	to	execute	against	Liberian	assets	in	aid	of	that	judgment.	
The	issue	of	central	bank	asset	immunity	in	the	context	of	enforcement	of	an	
arbitral	 award	 similarly	 arose	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 in	 AIG	 Capital	 Partners	 Inc.	 v.	
Republic	of	Kazakhstan.	 	The	United	Kingdom,	 like	 the	United	States,	confers	special	
immunity	over	central	bank	assets.	There	is	one	critical	difference,	however,	in	how	the	
sovereign	 immunity	 statutes	 of	 the	 two	 countries	 classify	 central	 bank	 assets.	Under	
the	 FSIA,	 central	 bank	 assets	 are	 considered	 commercial	 assets,	 but	 are	 nonetheless	
explicitly	 exempted	 from	 the	 execution	 provisions	 that	would	 otherwise	 apply	 to	 the	
commercial	 assets.	 In	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 however,	 the	 State	 Immunity	 Act	
specifically	states	that	central	bank	assets	are	not	commercial	assets.	
In	AJG	v.	Kazakhstan,	the	claimant	was	attempting	to	enforce	an	ICSID	award	
against	 funds	 held	 by	 English	 agents	 on	 behalf	 of	 Kazakhstan's	 central	 bank	 for	 the	
purpose	of	funding	Kazakhstan'	s	"National	Fund."	AIG	argued	not	only	that	the	funds	
were,	in	effect,	actually	held	for	the	benefit	of	Kazakhstan	and	therefore	not	subject	to	
the	 central	 bank	 exception,	 but	 also	 that	 the	 sovereign	 immunity	 requirements	
protecting	 central	 banks	 (and	 non-commercial	 property	 in	 general)	 should	 be	 read	
narrowly	and	in	conjunction	with	Articles	1	and	6	of	the	European	Convention	of	Human	
Rights,	 which	 protected	 AIG's	 right	 of	 access	 to	 the	 enforcement	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																																					
organs	of	international	organizations	or	to	international	conferences;	(b)	property	of	a	military	character	
or	used	or	 intended	for	use	in	the	performance	of	military	functions;	(c)	property	of	the	central	bank	or	
other	monetary	authority	of	the	State;	(d)	property	forming	part	of	the	cultural	heritage	of	the	State	or	
part	 of	 its	 archives	 and	 not	 placed	 or	 intended	 to	 be	 placed	 on	 sale;	 (e)	 property	 forming	 part	 of	 an	
exhibition	of	objects	of	scientific,	cultural	or	historical	interest	and	not	placed	or	intended	to	be	placed	on	
sale”.	 Only	 three	 first	 categories	 will	 be	 addressed	 in	 the	 present	 Article.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	
catalogue	in	Article	21(1)	is	not	exhaustive	as	demonstrated	by	the	use	of	the	term	“in	particular”	in	the	
chapeau	of	the	provision.	UNSCI,	Article	21(1).	
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court	 and	 AIG's	 general	 right	 to	 property,	 respectively.	 AIG	 further	 argued	 that	 the	
funds,	 being	 properly	 considered	 an	 asset	 of	 Kazakhstan,	 were	 "for	 the	 time	 being"	
used	for	commercial	purposes,	i.e.	investment	in	the	United	Kingdom.	The	English	High	
Court	disagreed	on	all	points,	as	it	found	first	that	the	assets	in	question	fell	under	the	
exception	 for	 central	 bank	 assets,	 and	 second	 that	 since	 the	 funds	 in	 question	 were	
intended	 to	 be	 used	 for	 Kazakhstan's	National	 Fund,	 their	 present	 investment	 in	 the	
United	Kingdom	did	not	constitute	commercial	activity.	
Like	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom,	the	statute	governing	state	
immunity	in	Canada	protects	central	bank	assets	from	attachment	and	execution.	The	
Singapore	statute	contains	no	reference	to	central	banks	or	their	property.	Australia's	
statute	explicitly	states	that	the	exceptions	to	 immunity	from	execution	apply	equally	
to	States	and	their	central	banks.	
	
	
3.4.5 Conclusion	
In	sum,	most	 judicial	systems	accord	a	substantial	degree	of	 immunity	 from	
attachment	and	execution	to	sovereign	assets.	These	same	judicial	systems,	however,	
are	also	increasingly	willing	to	permit	the	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards	against		assets	
that	 are	 	 purely	 	 commercial	 	 in	 	 nature.	 This	 “commercial	 activity"	 exception	 to	
sovereign	 immunity	 can	 appropriately	 be	 viewed	 as	 balancing	 the	 need	 for	
governmental	and	diplomatic	functions	not		to		be		interrupted	by		private	commercial	
disputes	with	notions	of	fundamental	fairness	to	litigants.	Stated	another	way,	when	a	
sovereign	engages	in	the	same	type	of	commercial	behaviour	as	a	private	actor,	it	is	fair	
to	 permit	 enforcement	 of	 a	 duly	 adjudicated	 arbitral	 award	 against	 the	 sovereign's	
commercial	assets	in	·the	same		manner	that	enforcement	would	be	permitted	against	
the	 assets	 of	 a	 private	 actor.	 	 To	 promote-certainty,	 courts	 and	 other	 judicial	 bodies	
faced	with	 future	 cases	 involving	 the	 	 commercial	 activity"	 exception	 should	 develop	
and	define	with	more	precision	the	specific	sovereign	asset	classes	that	are	considered	
"commercial,"	and	thus	subject	to	attachment.	Litigants	would	also	be	aided	if	judicial		
systems	were	to	announce	clear	and	specific	criteria	governing	the	circumstances	under	
which		so-called	"mixed	purpose"	sovereign	assets	could	be	subject	to	enforcement.	
	
	
	
3.5 Limitations	to	Enforcement	of	Awards	
	
We	have	analysed	 the	current	problems	 investors	 can	 face	after	winning	an	
ICSID	 case.	 We	 have	 showed	 how	 the	 immunity	 problem	 is	 clearly,	 as	 Professor	
Shereuer	put	it,	the	Achilles’	heel	of	the	whole	ICSID	system,	which	claims	to	be	a	self-
contained	 system	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 shows	 its	 contradiction	 in	 entrusting	 to	 the	
domestic	laws	the	enforcement	stage.		
As	was	stated	in	the	Vivendi	v	Argentina	stay	of	enforcement	decision:	
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[O]ne	of	the	fundamental	 issues	which	the	drafters	of	the	 ICSID	Convention	
were	keen	to	achieve	was	a	total	divorce	from	the	recognition	and	enforcement	system	
which	prevailed	under	domestic	laws	or	under	the	1958	New	York	Convention.205	
	
While	recognition	and	enforcement	take	place	before	the	courts	of	the	States	
parties	 to	 the	 Convention,	 the	 successful	 investor	will	 have	 recourse	 to	 enforcement	
following	the	respondent	State’s	refusal	to	comply	voluntarily	with	the	award.206	
The	award	creditor	is	free	to	choose	the	place	of	enforcement207	(he	may	even	
apply	 before	 the	 courts	 of	 the	 respondent	 State	 itself	 or	 can	 initiate	 executory	
measures	 in	 more	 than	 one	 State)	 depending	 on	 his	 ability	 to	 locate	 non-immune	
assets	of	the	debtor	State.208	
This	task	is	not	an	easy	one.	We	have	referred	in	this	regard	to	the	so-called	
Sedelmayer	saga,	which—although	not	an	ICSID	case—serves	as	a	good	example	of	the	
hardship	involved	in	tracing	attachable	State	assets.	It	took	Mr	Sedelmayer	12	years	to	
enforce	the	award	he	obtained	in	his	favour	against	Russia.209	
	
	
	
3.5.1 Annulment:	 the	 first	 problem	 that	 thwarts	 the	 enforcement	 of	 an	
arbitral	award	and	other	issues	
	
Under	the	ICSID	framework,	the	lack	of	domestic	review	of	the	award's	merits	
is	 compensated	 by	 establishing	 annulment	 proceedings	 before	 ICSID	 which	 aims	 to	
prevent	 the	enforcement	of	 awards	affected	by	 serious	 flaws.	 	Annulment	 is	 the	 first	
problem	that	thwarts	the	enforcement	of	an	arbitral	award	in	the	sense	that	it	hinders	
execution	by	 rendering	 the	award	a	nullity.	The	annulment	procedure	can	be	used	 to	
set	aside	jurisdictional	or	merits	awards	rendered	in	all	types	of	disputes	submitted	to	
the	 ICSID	Convention,	whether	 jurisdiction	 is	bestowed	by	 treaty	or	by	 contract.	The	
reasons	which	authorize	an	ad	hoc	committee	to	annul	an	ICSID	award	are	the	five	set	
forth	in	Article	52(1)	of	the	Convention.	They	include:	
(1)	The	Tribunal	was	not	properly	constituted		
(2)	The	Tribunal	“manifestly	exceeded	its		powers,”		
																																																													
205	Compan˜ı´a	de	Aguas	del	Aconquija	SA	and	Vivendi	Universal	SA	v	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No	
ARB/97/3	(Second	Annulment	Proceeding),	Decision	on	the	Argentine	Republic’s	Request	for	a	Continued	
Stay	of	Enforcement	of	the	Award	(4	November	2008)	para	35.	
206	Stanimir	A	Alexandrov,	‘Enforcement	of	ICSID	Awards:	Articles	53	and	54	of	the	ICSID	Convention’	in	
Christina	 Binder	 et	 al	 (eds),	 International	 Investment	 Law	 for	 the	 21st	 Century:	 Essays	 in	 Honour	 of	
Christoph	Schreuer	(OUP	2009)	324.	
207		Christoph	Schreuer	et	al,	The	ICSID	Convention:	A	Commentary	(CUP	2009)	1124	
208	See	 Joseph	 Profaizer,	 ‘Emerging	 Issues	 in	 the	 Enforcement	 of	 Foreign	 Arbitral	 Awards’	 (2011)	 2	
Transnatl	Dispute	Management	168.	
209	Andrea	 Bjorklund,	 ‘Sovereign	 Immunity	 as	 a	 Barrier	 to	 the	 Enforcement	 of	 Investor–State	 Arbitral	
Awards:	The	Re-politicization	of	International	Investment	Disputes’	(2010)	21	Am	Rev	Intl	Arb	211.	
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(3)	One	of	the	arbitrators	was	corrupt,		
(4)	There	was	“a	serious	departure	from	a		fundamental	rule	of	procedure,	and		
(5)	The	award	has	failed	to	state	the	reasons	on	which	it	is		based			
	
Hence	there	is	a	debate	on	whether	or	not	annulment	is	relevant	to	the	ICSID	
arbitration	system.	Jeswald	Salacuse,	sustains	that	the	annulment	system	represents	a	
great	achievement	because	 the	Convention	would	have	become	a	 'tame	paper	 tiger',	
threatening	but	ineffectual,	unable	to	offer	a	minimum	amount	of	certainty	to	foreign	
investors,	 if	 the	 court	 where	 enforcement	 is	 sought	 	 is	 entrusted	 with	 the	 last	 say.			
Christopher	 Smith	 argues	 that	 this	 judicialization	 of	 arbitration	 under	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	is	responsible	for	several	 inconsistent	decisions	and	this	 issue	quashes	the	
effect	of	awards.	According	to	him,	this	position	 is	a	threat	to	the	 legitimacy	of	 ICSID	
award	 when	 enforcement	 is	 sought	 immediately	 after	 the	 award	 is	 rendered,	 and	
therefore	 he	 concluded	 with	 a	 call	 for	 a	 reform	 or	 replacement	 of	 the	 annulment	
system.	 	 It	 is	 suggested	 that,	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 wrong	 reasoning	 of	 some	
annulment	 committees	 and	 tribunals,	 a	 reform	 of	 the	 ICSID	 annulment	 system	 is	
necessary	especially	in	view	of	the	fact	that	ICSID	do	not	have	any	other	form	of	appeal	
mechanism.	
The	anticipated	reform	has	been	subject	of	serious	academic	debate,	scholars	
suggest	an	appeal	 system	to	 replace	or	 co-exist	with	annulment.	Those	who	want	an	
appellate	tribunal	argue	 it	will	help	 in	harmonizing	the	different	trends	 in	 interpreting	
the	 rules	 of	 foreign	 investment	 law	 and	 the	 divergent	 views	 of	 various	 investment	
tribunals.	Michael	Reisman	argue	 that	 it	 should	be	 replaced	because	of	 the	 time	and	
cost	incurred	when	an	annulled	dispute	is	resubmitted.		He	based	his	argument	on	the	
cases	of	AMCO	v	Indonesia	-	which	lasted	almost	a	decade	because	it	went	through	two	
annulment	decisions	and	Klockner	v	Cameron		which	did	not	end	until	seven	years	after	
the	 registration	 of	 the	 original	 proceedings.	 	 Susan	 Frank	 cited	 the	 examples	 of	 two	
tribunals	giving	somewhat	different	ruling	on	similar	questions	of	law	as	in	the	cases	of	
SGS	 v	 Pakistan	 	 and	 SGS	 v	 Philistines	 	 and	 wrote	 that	 the	 inconsistent	 decisions	
occasion	by	annulment	 system	 is	enough	 reason	 to	 justify	 its	 review	because	 it	 takes	
away	public	confidence	in	the	adjudicatory	process.			
While	 those	 who	 want	 the	 reform	 to	 co-exist	 argue	 that	 this	 approach	 is	
valuable	because	 implementing	the	new	appellate	mechanism	 in	 this	manner	will	not	
only	present	the	parties	with	the	advantage	of	choice,	but	also	the	appellate	body	will	
enable	all	parties	to	have	the	advantage	of	increased	certainty	that	precedent	provides.	
Therefore,	parties	 that	prefer	 the	 finality	 that	 the	annulment	process	provides	will	be	
able	 to	 maintain	 the	 status	 quo	 by	 settling	 their	 disputes	 at	 the	 ICSID	 rather	 than	
seeking	out	an	alternative	forum.	Parties	valuing	the	accuracy	of	the	legal	reasoning	of	
awards,	however,	will	be	permitted	to	appeal	awards	on	legal	grounds	through	the	new	
ICSID	appellate	mechanism.	
This	 school	 of	 thought	 believes	 that	 since	 the	 annulment	 mechanism	 will	
remain	 the	 default	 review	 procedure	 to	 affirm	 the	 parties’	 original	 expectations,	 a	
credible	system	of	appeal	which	 limits	 its	review	to	 legal	 issues	should	co-	exist.	Also,	
the	 appellate	 body	will	 hear	 appeals	 only	where	 all	 the	 factual	 issues	 and	 inferences	
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have	already	been	determined,	this	is	because	if	every	issue	of	fact	becomes	subject	to	
appeal,	then	awards	by	the	original	tribunal	run	the	risk	of	becoming	meaningless	and	
superfluous.	Smith	added	that:	issues	that	are	currently	subject	to	annulment	should	be	
issues	 that	can	be	 later	appealed	 to	an	appellate	 tribunal.	 	According	 to	him,	 the	 five	
grounds	 for	 annulment	 should	 be	 separate	 from	grounds	 for	 appeal	 to	 the	 appellate	
tribunals	apart	from	questions	of	 law.	 	 In	view	of	this,	the	 ICSID	secretariat	 initiated	a	
discussion	 in	 2004	 into	 the	 possible	 creation	 of	 an	 appeal	 mechanism	 against	 the	
decisions	 of	 ICSID	 tribunals	 by	 issuing	 a	 discussion	 paper	 on	 22	October	 2004	 and	 a	
working	paper	on	12	May	2005	containing	a	summary	of	the	comments	received	on	the	
discussion	paper.		But	this	process	has	suffered	some	set	back	because	of	the	herculean	
task	of	amending	the	ICSID	Convention	thus	it	remains	only	a	desire	at	present.	
	
Another	 issue	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 clarified	 is	 which	 awards	 are	 subject	 to	
enforcement	under	the	ICSID	Convention.	As	pointed	out	by	Christoph	Schreuer	‘[o]nly	
final	awards	under	 the	Convention	 [.	 .	 .]	are	subject	 to	 recognition	and	enforcement.’	
An	award	rejecting	jurisdiction	may	also	be	subject	to	recognition	and	enforcement	as	
regards	 costs.	 This	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the	 Libananco	 v	 Turkey	 stay	 decision	 where	 the	
Committee	 found	 that,	 in	 principle,	 there	 is	 no	 distinction	 in	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	
between	awards	on	jurisdiction	and	awards	on	the	merits	for	purposes	of	enforcement.	
The	key	question	is	whether	a	part	of	the	dispositif	warrants	execution.	
Under	 Article	 53(2)	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 ‘award’	 includes	 any	 decision	
interpreting,	 revising	 or	 annulling	 the	 award	 pursuant	 to	 Articles	 50,	 51	 or	 52	 of	 the	
Convention.	 Schreuer	 adds	 that	 ‘award’	 will	 necessarily	 include	 also	 ‘any	 decision	
supplementing	or	rectifying	the	award	pursuant	to	Article	49(2)’.	
	
It	follows	that	an	annulment	committee’s	decision	on	whether	to	make	a	stay	
of	enforcement	conditional	on	 the	posting	of	 security	by	 the	 respondent	State	under	
Article	 52	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 will	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 enforcement	 if	 the	 State	
refuses	to	comply	with	the	requirement	to	provide	security.	
	
Under	Article	54	of	 the	Convention,	an	 ICSID	award	 is	 to	be	given	the	same	
effect	as	a	final	judgment	of	the	courts	of	the	State	where	the	award	is	being	enforced.	
Awards	 rendered	 under	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 are	 ‘directly	 enforceable,	 upon	
registration	and	without	further	jurisdictional	control’.210		The	regime	established	under	
the	 ICSID	 Convention	 is	 characterized	 as	 delocalized,	 i.e.	 outside	 the	 control	 or	
interference	 of	 domestic	 courts.	 This	 is	 the	 main	 difference	 between	 enforcement	
under	the	ICSID	Convention	and	under	the	New	York	Convention.	
 
																																																													
210	MTD	Equity	Sdn	Bhd	&	MTD	Chile	SA	v	Republic	of	Chile,	 ICSID	Case	No	ARB/01/7,	Decision	on	the	
Respondent’s	Request	 for	a	Continued	Stay	of	Execution	 (1	June	2005)	para	31;	CMS	Gas	Transmission	
Company	v	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No		RB/01/08,	Decision	on	the	Argentine	Republic’s	Request	
for	a	Continued	Stay	of	Enforcement	of	the	Award	(1	September	2006)	para	40.	
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One	more	 issue	concerns	 the	 relevant	part	of	Art.	54.	 	While	 the	obligation	of	
recognition	 extends	 to	 the	 entire	 award,	 the	 obligation	 to	 enforce	 concerns	 only	
pecuniary	obligations.	Thus,	States	parties	to	the	ICSID	Convention	are	not	required	to	
enforce	any	other	obligations	 imposed	by	the	award	such	as	restitution,	an	obligation	
to	cease	the	wrongful	act	or	other	forms	of	specific	performance	(e.g.	the	award	might	
require	the	host	State	to	grant	a	visa	or	to	restore	a	licence).	Schreuer	explains	that	this	
was	due	to	the	fact	that	such	forms	of	relief	may	be	unknown	to	the	 law	of	the	State	
where	enforcement	 is	 sought.	Moreover,	 if	 the	State	where	enforcement	 is	 sought	 is	
not	 the	 respondent	 State,	 the	 former	 State	 simply	 does	 not	 have	 the	 means	 under	
international	law	to	compel	another	State	to	perform	(or	abstain	from)	certain	acts.	
In	 the	 same	way,	 the	 ad	hoc	Committee	 in	Sempra	 v	Argentina	 recognized	
that:	
[T]he	 enforcement	 mechanism,	 which	 a	 contracting	 party	 to	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 undertakes	 to	 provide,	 concerns	 only	 the	 enforcement	 of	 ‘pecuniary	
obligations	 imposed	 by	 that	 award’.	 This	 restriction	 is	 necessary	 because	 an	 ICSID	
award	may	well	be	of	a	declaratory	character	or	impose	obligations	on	a	party	to	do	or	
refrain	from	doing	certain	acts,	something	which	would	not	lend	itself	to	enforcement,	
in	particular	in	a	third	State	jurisdiction.	
	
In	 this	 regard,	 Schreuer	 has	 suggested	 that	 ‘[t]ribunals	 imposing	 [..]	 non-
pecuniary	 obligations	 should	 keep	 the	 impossibility	 of	 enforcing	 them	 in	mind.	 Such	
awards	 should	 provide	 for	 a	 pecuniary	 alternative’,	 that	 is,	 the	 payment	 of	 a	 sum	 of	
money	 in	case	the	respondent	State	 fails	 to	 fulfil	voluntarily	 the	obligation	of	specific	
performance.	
	
	
3.5.2 The	Act	of	State	Doctrine	
	
The	Act	of	State	doctrine	 is	another	obstacle	 to	 the	enforcement	of	arbitral	
award	 because	 it	 probes	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 awards	 in	 courts	 where	 enforcement	 is	
sought.	 Simply	 put,	 the	 doctrine	 states	 that	 no	 domestic	 court	 of	 a	 State	 should	
pronounce	 upon	 the	 legality	 of	 a	 legislative	 or	 executive	 act	 performed	 by	 a	 foreign	
Government	 intended	 to	 take	 effect	 within	 the	 territory	 of	 that	 foreign	 State.	 This	
doctrine,	according	to	some	practitioners,	derives	 its	 justification	from	the	decision	of	
the	court	in	First	National	Bank	v	Banco	Nacional	de	Cuba211	where	it	was	held	that	the	
conduct	of	foreign	policy	is	not	the	matter	for	the	courts	but	of	the	executive	and	the	
courts	should	not	assume	this	 role	by	speaking	about	 the	 legality	of	 the	conduct	of	a	
foreign	Government.	This	defense	usually	occurs	when	enforcement	is	sort	in	courts	of	
member	States	other	than	courts	of	the	State	who	is	an	award	debtor.	
Sornarajah	 is	 a	 major	 advocate	 of	 this	 doctrine	 and	 in	 his	 view:	 ''in	 the	
situation	 of	 enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 in	 foreign	 investment	 disputes,	 the	 issue	
																																																													
211	First	National	Bank	v	Banco	Nacional	de	Cuba(1972)402US	759,at	769	
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that	 arises	 is	 whether	 the	 award	 settling	 a	 dispute,	 which	 always	 arises	 from	 a	
governmental	 interference,	 is	capable	of	enforcement	as	 it	 involves	a	pronouncement	
on	the	validity	of	the	governmental	act''.212	He	added	that	courts	which	surmount	the	
impediment	presented	by	the	sovereign	immunity	plea	use	the	act	of	State	doctrine	as	
the	 way	 out	 of	 the	 difficult	 task	 of	 enforcing	 an	 award	 made	 against	 a	 foreign	
sovereign.	 Thus	 in	 Liamco	 v	 Libya,213	where	 enforcement	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	 was	
sought	 under	 the	 New	 York	 Convention,	 the	 court	 rejected	 the	 sovereign	 immunity	
plea	but	held	that	the	act	of	State	doctrine	precluded	enforcement.		
Anyway	it	has	been	pointed	out	that	since	the	plea	of	the	doctrine	does	not	
prevent	a	tribunal	from	assuming	jurisdiction	it	should	therefore	not	prevent	execution.	
This	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 initial	 pronouncement	 on	 the	 validity	 of	
governmental	act	should	have	been	made	at	the	arbitral	tribunal	which	would	have	felt	
constrained	by	such	doctrines	and	consequently	refuse	to	assume	jurisdiction	over	the	
arbitration.	If	the	doctrine	did	not	prevent	the	tribunal	from	assuming	jurisdiction,	it	is	
quiet	illogical	for	courts	of	enforcement	to	deem	it	necessary	to	reopen	the	whole	issue	
for	 examination	 irrespective	 of	 the	 time	 and	 effort	 that	 may	 have	 been	 spent	
deliberating	on	this	doctrine	at	the	tribunal.	It	is	safe	to	conclude	even	though	arbitral	
tribunals	may	consider	the	applicability	of	the	doctrine	as	a	defence	to	their	jurisdiction,	
once	a	tribunal	gives	an	affirmative	decision	on	its	jurisdiction,	the	doctrine	should	not	
affect	the	enforcement	of	award.		
	
	
3.5.3 Local	 law	 and	 Limitations	 in	 Provisional	 Measures	 for	 the	
Enforcement	of	Investment	Awards	
	
	
As	mentioned	above,	the	ICSID	Convention	has	thus	preserved	the	traditional	
distinction	 between	 immunity	 from	 jurisdiction	 and	 immunity	 from	 enforcement,	
indeed	article	54(3)	states	that	execution	shall	be	governed	by	local	law.214	
This	 is	 already	 implicit	 in	 the	 equalization	 of	 ICSID	 awards	 to	 local	 final	
judgments	 and	 this	 is	 aimed	 to	 respect	 the	 variety	 of	 legal	 techniques	 followed	 in	
individual	States.	This	means	that	actual	enforcement	will	require	intimate	knowledge	
of	the	peculiarities	of	local	laws,	and	consequently,	the	results	obtained	may	also	vary	
																																																													
212Ibid	n26	pg.	366.	
213Liamco	v	Libya	(1980)	20	ILM1	
214		Similarly,	the	MINE	v	Guinea	stay	decision	records	that:[W]hile	the	Convention	imposes	an	obligation	
on	parties	 to	 abide	by	 and	 comply	with	 an	 award	 and	on	Contracting	States	 to	 enforce	 the	pecuniary	
obligations	imposed	by	an	ICSID	award,	the	question	of	forcible	execution	is	left	expressly	subject	to	the	
law	 of	 the	 State	 of	 the	 execution	 forum,	 including	 in	 particular	 the	 immunity	 from	 execution	which	 a	
foreign	 State	 might	 enjoy	 under	 that	 law.	 Maritime	 International	 Nominees	 Establishment	 (MINE)	 v	
Republic	 of	 Guinea,	 ICSID	 Case	No	ARB/84/4,	 Interim	Order	No	 1	 on	Guinea’s	 Application	 for	 Stay	 of	
Enforcement	of	the	Award,	para	24	(12	August	1988)	[attached	to	Decision	on	the	Application	by	Guinea	
for	Partial	Annulment	of	the	Arbitral	Award	dated	6	January	1988	(14	December	1989)	as	Annex	II,	(1990)	
4	ICSID	Rep	129].	
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from	one	jurisdiction	to	the	other.	Summoning	the	respondent	State	may	be	necessary	
at	the	stage	of	enforcement.	
	
It	should	be	noted	that	a	 list	of	pieces	of	State	 legislation	 implementing	the	
Convention	 is	 available	 on	 the	 ICSID	 website.	 National	 legislation	 concerning	 State	
immunity	is	not	registered	there,	however.	For	the	sake	of	completeness,	 it	should	be	
noted	 that	only	nine	States	have	enacted	 legislation	 concerning	 sovereign	 immunity,	
namely	 the	 United	 States215,	 Great	 Britain216,	 Canada217,	 South	 Africa,218	Malaysia,219	
Pakistan,220	Argentina,221	Australia222	and	Singapore.223	
	
A	generalized	standard	mode	of	enforcement	among	member	States	of	 the	
ICSID	 and	New	York	 Convention	 is	 not	 readily	 available;	 hence	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	
Conventions	 with	 its	 attendant	 shortcomings	 remain	 the	 guiding	 principle	 for	 the	
enforcement	of	investment	arbitral	awards.	A	major	weakness	in	the	provisions	of	the	
Conventions	 as	 already	 stated	 is	 their	 inability	 to	 effect	 enforcement	 which	 makes	
them	rely	on	 the	 laws	on	enforcement	of	award	of	member	states.	For	example,	Art.	
53(1)	of	ICSID	Convention	gives	'each	party'	the	obligation	to	'abide	by	and	comply	with	
the	terms	of	the	award'.	This	is	often	times	addressed	to	the	respondent	party	which	in	
most	cases	is	the	host	State.	The	problems	with	enforcement	of	award	arise	from	this	
point	especially	if	the	content	of	an	award	contradict	the	policies	of	the	State	hence	the	
argument	generated	 in	this	regard	 is	that	the	Articles	should	have	made	provision	for	
necessary	sanctions	for	parties	that	will	not	abide	by	or	comply	with	the	terms	of	the	
award.	The	semblance	of	solution	in	the	case	of	default	is	that	award	creditors	seek	the	
enforcement	of	the	award	in	more	than	one	State	at	the	same	time	bearing	in	mind	the	
fact	that	the	extent	to	which	an	award	will	be	acceptable	and	enforced	depends	on	the	
discretion	of	each	State.	As	a	 result	of	 this,	 the	award	creditor	may	have	 recourse	 to	
favorable	 jurisdiction	to	seek	the	enforcement	of	award.	This	has	 its	own	implications	
ranging	from	jurisdiction	shopping,	forum	shopping,	diplomatic	rancor	between	States	
																																																													
215	United	 States	 Foreign	 Sovereign	 Immunities	 Act	 (1976)	 Pub	 L	 94-583,	 90	 Stat	 2891,	 28	USC	 §1330,	
1332(a),	1391(f)	and	1601–1611.	
216 	State	 Immunity	 Act	 1978	 (1978)	 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/33>	 accessed	 15	
November	2017.	
217	State	Immunity	Act	1982	(1982)	RSC,	1985,	c	S-18.	
218	Foreign	States	Immunities	Amendment	Act	5	of	1988	(1988).	
219	Immunities	and	Privileges	Act	No	16	of	1984	(1984).	
220	State	Immunity	Ordinance	VI	(1981).	
221	Ley	 de	 Inmunidad	 Jurisdiccional	 de	 los	 Estados	 Extranjeros	 ante	 los	 Tribunales	 Argentinos,	 Ley	No	
24488	(1995).	
222	Foreign	State	Immunities	Act	No	196	of	1985	(1985).	
223	State	Immunity	Act	Revised	Edition	1985	(1985).	
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and	 endless	 litigation	 arising	 out	 of	 attempt	 to	 enforce	 one	 award	 in	 different	
jurisdiction	at	the	same	time.224	
Moreover,	Article	54(3)	of	ICSID	Convention	provides	that	the	execution	of	an	
award	shall	be	governed	by	the	laws	concerning	the	execution	of	judgment	in	force	in	
the	State	in	whose	territories	such	execution	is	sought.	The	overriding	concern	here	as	
suggested	by	Loukas	 	Mistelis	 is	 that	 the	efficiency	of	 the	enforcement	mechanism	 is	
often	 tangled	with	 judicial	 efficiency,	 as	well	 as	 judicial	 attitudes	 towards	 the	arbitral	
process. 225 		 The	 argument	 among	 scholars	 is	 that	 this	 provision	 prorogates	 the	
jurisdiction	of	courts	of	member	States	as	supreme	against	 the	 intent	and	purpose	of	
investment	arbitration	and	most	BITs	provision.	The	point	that	must	be	emphasized	is	
that	there	is	a	debate	on	how	the	courts	of	member	states	are	likely	to	use	such	powers	
delegated	to	them	to	secure	the	efficacy	of	an	award.	In	other	words,	in	the	exercise	of	
this	power	to	enforce	an	award	the	courts	are	burdened	with	a	lot	of	judicial,	social,	and	
economic	variables	which	may	influence	or	change	the	content,	intent	and	purpose	of	
the	award.	The	options	usually	available	to	the	courts	are	either	to	adhere	strictly	to	the	
anticipations	 of	 ICSID	 or	 entertain	 the	 concerns	 of	 the	 award	 debtor	 which	 in	 most	
cases	are	State	agents.226	
Opinions	 are	 divided	 on	 the	 position	 of	 the	 court	 in	 this	 regard	 but	 most	
likely,	there	are	many	reasons	why	courts	will	intervene	on	policy	grounds	or	refuse	to	
intervene	 in	 circumstances	 where	 a	 sovereign	 does	 not	 wish	 to	 abide	 by	 an	 arbitral	
award.	 It	may	 intervene	to	help	enforce	the	award	so	as	to	uphold	the	sanctity	of	the	
judicial	 system	of	 the	 State	 and	make	 it	 very	 attractive	 to	 both	 investors	 and	 award	
creditors.	 It	 may	 refuse	 to	 intervene	 due	 to	 jurisdictional	 and	 other	 problems	 or	 to	
'protect'	 the	 investment	within	 its	 jurisdiction.227	However	 the	 situation	 is	 different	 if	
the	enforcement	of	award	is	sought	in	the	court	of	the	State	who	is	the	award	debtor,	
the	court	most	times	intervene	to	frustrate	the	enforcement	of	award	because	it	wants	
to	protect	the	assets	of	the	State.	There	seems	to	be	no	straight	forward	provision	on	
how	 the	 court	 will	 resolve	 such	 conflict	 of	 interest	 that	 hinders	 the	 enforcement	 of	
award.		
However,	to	avoid	such	conflict	and	take	the	dilemma	away	from	the	courts,	
it	 is	 argued	 that	 several	 states	 reserve	 a	 role	 for	 the	 executive	 in	 the	 procedure	 to	
execute	 an	 award	 against	 a	 foreign	 state.228	Art.	 54(2)	 provides	 that	 'a	 party	 seeking	
recognition	or	 enforcement	 in	 the	 territories	of	 a	Contracting	State	 shall	 furnish	 to	 a	
competent	 court	 or	 other	 authority	 which	 such	 State	 shall	 have	 designated	 for	 this	
purpose	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 award	 certified	 by	 the	 Secretary-General.	 This	 provision	 is	
interpreted	to	mean	that	the	executive	can	be	the	alternative	'authority'	designated	for	
																																																													
224	Maxi	 Scherer,	 ''Effects	 of	 Foreign	 Judgments	 Relating	 to	 International	 Arbitral	 Awards:	 Is	 the	
'Judgment	Route’	''The	Wrong	Road?'',	(2013)	Journal	of	International	Dispute	Settlement',	Vol.	4,	No.	3,	
pp.	587–628.	
225Ibid	n15	p.	19.	
226	Ibid	n8p.	346.	
227	Ibid	p.	357.	
228Lewis	 	Mistelis	 and	 Krollis,	 Comparative	 International	 Commercial	 Arbitration.	 The	Hague,	 London,	
New	York,	(Kluwer	Law	International,	2003),	p.	744.	
94	
	
the	purpose	of	enforcement	to	help	the	court	to	take	such	decisions.	It	must	be	noted	
that	the	relationship	between	the	court	and	executive	in	this	process	is	also	not	without	
problems.	According	to	George	Foster	this	relationship	becomes	practical	in	the	seizure	
and	attachment	of	respondent's	assets	including	when	the	assets	pursued	are	those	of	
other	sovereign.	The	challenge	with	this	practice	is	that	the	executive	may	be	unwilling	
to	effect	such	powers	against	it	own	assets	when	it	is	the	award	debtor.		
Against	this	backdrop	the	argument	by	Foster	 is	 that	 in	such	a	situation	the	
precedent	 to	 be	 followed	 is	 that	 of	 Brazil	 who	 provides	 specific	 rules	 that	 allow	 the	
courts	upon	the	claimant's	request,	to	register	the	debt	into	the	government's	budget,	
hence	 securing	payment	 in	 the	 following	budget.229	This	argument	may	be	correct	 to	
the	 extent	 that	 some	 multinational	 corporations	 can	 have	 overwhelming	 'undue	
influence'	that	can	induce	some	weak	States	to	compel	the	enforcement	of	the	award.	
However,	the	reasoning	is	flawed	in	view	of	the	fact	that	some	powerful	States	will	see	
this	reasoning	as	challenge	to	their	sovereignty	and	will	not	abide	by	it.				
	
3.5.4 Shortcomings	related	to	Article	54	
Another	shortcoming	can	be	found	in	the	provision	of	Art	54(1).	An	analysis	of	
this	provision	 shows	 that	an	 ICSID	award	 is	 'res	 judicata'	 .This	means	 that	 it	 is	a	 final	
decision	hence	it	cannot	be	reviewed	in	the	court	where	enforcement	is	sort.	It	must	be	
noted	 that	 this	applies	only	 to	 ICSID	awards.	UNCITRAL	awards	even	 though	binding	
are	not	final	because	enforcement	under	UNCITRAL	follows	the	New	York	Convention	
(under	 which	 an	 award	 can	 be	 reviewed	 and	 refused	 enforcement	 in	 courts	 where	
enforcement	is	sort	under	any	of	the	grounds	for	refusing	enforcement).	This	seems	to	
fuel	the	argument	that	the	New	York	Convention	 is	not	applicable	to	the	 ICSID.230	On	
the	contrary	it	is	important	to	note	that,	the	last	part	of	Art.54(2)	of	ICSID	Convention	
above	 has	 a	 peculiar	 problem	 because	 it	 emphasis	 the	 fact	 that	 only	 'pecuniary	
obligations'	 of	 award	 are	 to	 be	 enforced	 by	 contracting	 States.	 This	 is	 reasonably	
understandable	 in	 view	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 States	 cannot	 enforce	 award	 that	 carries	
obligations	 like	 injunctive	 reliefs	 because	 of	 territorial	 and	 jurisdictional	 inhibitions.	
However,	 bearing	 in	 mind	 the	 fact	 that	 awards	 may	 have	 obligations	 other	 than	
pecuniary	measures,	 the	 questions	 that	 should	 be	 asked	 here	 is	 how	 does	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 intend	 to	 enforce	 such	 awards?	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
point	out	that	the	 ICSID	provision	has	a	weakness	 in	 its	provision.	 It	 is	submitted	that	
the	New	York	Convention	is	applicable	in	this	regard	as	well	as	in	relevant	exceptional	
circumstances	like	the	enforcement	of	an	ICSID	award	in	a	State	that	is	not	a	party	to	
the	ICSID	Convention	but	is	a	party	to	the	New	York	Convention.	
A	major	setback	on	the	provisions	of	Art.54	is	Article	55	of	ICSID	Convention	
which	provides	that;	'nothing	in	Article	54	shall	be	construed	as	derogating	from	the	law	
in	force	in	any	Contracting	States	relating	to	the	immunity	of	that	State	or	any	foreign	
																																																													
229George	 Foster,	 'Collecting	 from	 Sovereigns:	 The	 Current	 Legal	 Framework	 for	 Enforcing	 Arbitral	
Awards	 and	 Courts	 Judgements	 Against	 State	 and	 their	 Instrumentalities,	 and	 Some	 Proposals	 for	 its	
Reform'	(2008)	25:3	Arizona	Journal	International	&	Comparative	Law,	p.	670.	
230Ibid	n6	p.1118	
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State	 from	execution'	 .231Some	scholars	believe	that	Art.	55	of	 ICSID	Convention	take	
away	with	another	hand	what	Art.	54	gave	with	one	hand.232	This	is	because	sovereign	
immunity	is	invariably	the	single	most	important	legal	hurdle	to	the	actual	execution	of	
a	treaty	award	both	within	and	outside	the	ICSID	System.233	
	
3.5.5 Shortcomings	related	to	Article	27	
Another	notable	limitation	in	the	ICSID	provision	in	relation	to	enforcement	is	
the	 interpretation	given	 to	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 first	 and	 last	part	of	Art.	 27.	
The	Article	provides	thus:	
No	 Contracting	 State	 shall	 give	 diplomatic	 protection,	 or	 bring	 an	
international	 claim,	 in	 	 respect	 of	 a	 dispute	 which	 one	 of	 its	 nationals	 and	 another	
Contracting	State	shall	have	consented	to	submit	or	shall	have	submitted	to	arbitration	
under	this	Convention,	unless	such	other	Contracting	State	shall	have	failed	to	abide	by	
and	comply	with	the	award	rendered	in	such	dispute.	
The	 first	 part	 of	 this	 provision	 can	 be	 interpreted	 to	mean	 that	 diplomatic	
protection	 is	 prohibited	 by	 the	 Convention.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 historical	
evolution	 of	 IIAs	 reveals	 diplomatic	 protection	 as	 one	 of	 the	 remedies	 for	 breach	 on	
investor's	rights.	The	investors	home	States	before	the	advent	of	treaty	protection	and	
investment	 tribunals	 often	 intervene	 in	 the	 case	 of	 expropriation	 to	 help	 investors	
recover	 their	 investment.	 The	development	of	 IIAs	 surpassed	 this	 practice	 hence	 this	
may	explain	why	the	above	provision	seems	not	to	encourage	it.	However,	the	problem	
with	this	provision	is	the	interpretation	it	has	received	among	some	practitioners.	While	
some	 argue	 that	 the	 later	 part	 of	 the	 provision	 is	 interpreted	 to	 mean	 it	 is	 only	 an	
exception	to	the	main	provision	in	which	case	it	is	a	necessary	remedy	when	States	fail	
to	abide	by	and	comply	with	the	award	rendered.234	
Others	believe	 that	 in	practice	 it	 is	 a	major	procedure	 to	enforce	an	award.	
This	 opinion	 is	 explained	 by	 Schreuer	who	 suggests	 that	 it	 can	 be	 used	 concurrently	
with	 other	 enforcement	 mechanism.	 He	 argues	 that	 both	 remedies	 are	 available,	 in	
principle,	to	investors	to	secure	compliance	with	awards.	According	to	him	'there	is	no	
indication	 of	 any	 relationship	 of	 priority	 or	 mutual	 exclusivity	 between	 the	 two	
remedies.	Enforcement	and	diplomatic	protection	may	be	used	simultaneously	but	as	
soon	 as	 one	 of	 these	 remedies	 succeeds,	 the	 other	 must	 be	 discontinued'.235	It	 is	
submitted	that	this	reasoning	is	not	totally	correct	in	view	of	the	provision	of	Art	26	of	
ICSID	 Convention	 which	 states	 that	 consent	 of	 parties	 to	 arbitration	 under	 the	
Convention	 shall,	 unless	 otherwise	 stated,	 be	 deemed	 consent	 to	 such	 arbitration	 to	
																																																													
231Ibid	n6	p.1121.	
232	Christopher	Smith,	 ''The	Appeal	 of	 ICSID	Awards:	How	 the	AMINZ	Appellate	Mechanism	 can	guide	
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the	 exclusion	of	 any	other	 remedy.	Therefore	 the	 remedy	of	 diplomatic	 protection	 is	
excluded	unless	on	the	ground	where	enforcement	is	refused.		
The	 very	 important	 point	 to	 note	 from	 Schreuer's	 argument	 is	 that	 even	
though	the	old	rule	of	traditional	diplomatic	protection	has	been	largely	dispensed	with	
in	 IIAs	 it	keeps	haunting	us	 in	other	 legal	disguises.236.	Rudolf	Dolzer	also	opined	that	
diplomatic	 protection	 is	 an	 alternative	 and	 supplement	 to	 judicial	 enforcement	 of	
awards	 under	 Article	 54	 because	 the	 right	 of	 diplomatic	 protection	will	 revive	 in	 the	
event	 of	 non-compliance.237	This	 is	 correct	 in	 view	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 allows	 award	
creditor	 to	 prevail	 upon	 its	 home	 State	 to	 intervene	 and	 take	 steps	 against	 the	
defaulting	 host	 State	 upon	 their	 failure	 ‘to	 abide	 by	 and	 comply	 with’	 an	 award.	 In	
practice,	the	shortcoming	with	the	provision	is	obvious	in	that	it	relies	absolutely	on	the	
State	of	nationality	of	the	aggrieved	investor	to	secure	compliance	with	an	award.		
The	implication	of	this	therefore	 is	that	the	efficacy	of	this	method	depends	
largely	on	so	many	variable	factors	which	include	the	relationship	between	the	investor	
and	 its	host	State,	 the	 social	 economic	 relationship	between	 the	 investor's	State	and	
any	other	State	where	enforcement	is	sought	or	general	political	will	of	the	State	to	get	
involve	in	private	arrangements.		If	these	factors	are	not	totally	in	favor	of	the	investor	
the	 award	 may	 still	 not	 be	 enforced.	 It	 is	 safe	 to	 conclude	 that	 it	 is	 not	 a	 'ready	
alternative'	to	the	enforcement	of	award	because	it	is	not	totally	reliable.		
	
	
	
3.5.6 Another	Limit	:	Stay	of		Enforcement		
	
The	 Sempra	 v.	 Argentina	 Committee	 rightly	 pointed	 out	 that	 ‘[a]n	 ICSID	
award	is	immediately	payable	by	the	award	debtor,	irrespective	of	whether	annulment	
is	sought	or	not.’	Only	where	stay	of	enforcement	has	been	granted	under	Article	52(5)	
would	the	award	debtor	be	temporarily	released	from	the	obligation	to	pay.	Having	in	
mind	Article	and	Article	54,	under	the	terms	of	the	ICSID	Convention,	therefore,	stay	of	
enforcement	is	the	only	exception	to	the	obligation	to	comply	promptly	with	an	award.	
The	MINE	v	Guinea	stay	decision	adds	that:	
Article	53(1)	provides	that	the	award	 is	binding	on	the	parties	and	that	each	
party	‘shall	abide	by	and	comply	with	the	terms	of	the	award	except	to	the	extent	the	
enforcement	 shall	 have	 been	 stayed	 pursuant	 to	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 of	 this	
Convention’.	 Article	 52(4)	 is	 one	 of	 those	 relevant	 provisions.	 Thus,	 if	 an	 ad	 hoc	
Committee	grants	a	stay	of	enforcement,	the	obligation	of	the	party	against	whom	the	
award	was	rendered	to	abide	by	and	comply	with	the	terms	of	 the	award	 is	pro	tanto	
suspended.	
																																																													
236Christopher	Schreuer	 ''Calvol's	grand	children:	 the	 return	of	 local	 remedies	 in	 investment	arbitration'	
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In	 view	 of	 the	 above,	 except	 where	 stay	 is	 granted,	 the	 obligation	 under	
Article	54	is	absolute.	A	decision	on	stay	has	suspensory	effect	over	the	award.	As	noted	
by	 the	 CDC	 v	 Seychelles	 Committee,	 ‘under	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 the	 stay	
automatically	 is	effective	for	municipal	enforcement	purposes’.	Schreuer	points	out	 in	
this	regard	that	the	‘competent	court	or	authority	to	which	a	copy	of	the	award	certified	
by	 the	 Secretary-General	 is	 furnished	 will	 have	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 the	 award	 is	 not	
subject	to	any	intervening	stay	of	enforcement’.	
It	 should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 Article	 52(2)	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 provides	
that	parties	seeking	annulment	shall	commence	proceedings	within	120	days	from	the	
date	 of	 the	 award.	 This	means	 that,	 during	 this	 period	 (pending	 stay),	 the	 victorious	
investor	may	 initiate	enforcement	proceedings.	By	contrast,	the	North	American	Free	
Trade	Agreement	prohibits	 a	party	 from	enforcing	an	 ICSID	award	until	 expiration	of	
this	period.	
Stay	 of	 enforcement	 may	 also	 be	 granted	 in	 cases	 of	 interpretation	 and	
revision.	 It	 follows	 that	 the	mere	 initiation	 of	 a	 procedure	 of	 interpretation,	 revision,	
supplementation,	 rectification	 or	 annulment,	without	 obtaining	 stay	 of	 enforcement,	
does	not	create	an	obstacle	to	enforcement.238	
	
3.5.7 Argentina’s	Position	and	the	Rosatti	Doctrine		
The	 obligations	 under	 Articles	 53	 and	 54	 are	 separate	 and	 independent.	As	
stated	by	the	ad	hoc	Committee	in	Kardassopoulos	&	Fuchs	v	Georgia:	
	
Once	an	award	is	made,	completion	of	any	further	process	is	unnecessary	for	
the	acquisition	of	a	binding	character.	Should	the	award	debtor	not	carry	out	voluntarily	
the	award,	the	award	creditor	is	only	invited	by	Article	54(2)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	to	
furnish	 to	 a	 competent	 court	 or	 other	 authority	 of	 a	Contracting	State	 a	 copy	of	 the	
award	 certified	 by	 the	 Secretary-General	 of	 ICSID.	 The	 party	 seeking	 recognition	 or	
enforcement	of	an	ICSID	award	has	no	condition	to	prove	other	than	the	authenticity	of	
the	 award,	 as	 Article	 54(1)	 of	 the	 Convention	 obliges	 the	 Contracting	 States	 to	
recognize	an	ICSID	award	as	binding	and	to	enforce	the	pecuniary	obligations	imposed	
by	 that	 award	 as	 if	 it	 were	 a	 final	 judgment	 of	 a	 court	 in	 that	 State.	 Article	 53(1)	
reinforces	this	obligation	to	recognize	and	enforce	by	specifying	that	an	ICSID	award	is	
not	 subject	 to	 appeal	 or	 any	 other	 remedy	 except	 as	 otherwise	 provided	 in	 the	
Convention	as	regards	interpretation,	revision	or	annulment	of	the	award.	
Stanimir	 A	 Alexandrov	 has	 commented	 on	 Argentina’s	 insistence	 that	 the	
obligation	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 award	 under	 Article	 53	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 successful	
investor’s	 recourse	 to	 the	 enforcement	mechanism	 of	 Article	 54.	 He	 points	 out	 that	
‘Article	54	cannot	be	interpreted	to	weaken	or	diminish	the	obligation	under	Article	53’.	
Argentina’s	position	has	been	fully	described	in	the	Enron	v	Argentina	stay	decision:	
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Argentina	on	the	other	hand	takes	the	position	that	Articles	53	and	54	of	the	
ICSID	 Convention	 complement	 each	 other	 and	 have	 to	 be	 read	 in	 conjunction.	
According	 to	 Argentina,	 Article	 53	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 establishes	 the	 final	 and	
binding	 nature	 of	 ICSID	 Awards	 while	 Article	 54	 establishes	 the	 way	 in	 which	 ICSID	
Awards	 have	 to	 be	 complied	 with.	 Argentina	 submits	 that	 Article	 53	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 ‘does	 not	 establish	 an	 obligation	 of	 voluntary	 payment	 by	 the	 State.’	
Rather,	it	is	said	that	under	Article	54,	Argentina	is	required	to	treat	an	ICSID	award	as	if	
it	were	a	final	judgment	of	a	court	in	Argentina.	This	means	that	to	receive	payment,	an	
award	creditor	has	to	comply	with	the	same	formalities	applicable	to	final	judgments	of	
local	courts.	
Argentina	 also	 tried	 to	 avoid	 enforcement	 by	 contending	 (under	 what	 has	
become	 known	 as	 the	 ‘Rosatti	 Doctrine’)	 that,	 since	 only	 investors	 of	 foreign	 States	
have	access	to	 ICSID	arbitration,	this	 ‘bestows	an	 illegal	privilege	on	foreign	 investors	
and	 discriminates	 against	 local	 Argentinean	 investors’. 239 	Therefore,	 Argentina	
maintained	that	ICSID	awards	would	be	‘subject	to	local	court	review’.	
Such	 arguments	 are,	 as	 many	 authors	 suggest,	 untenable.	 To	 accept	
Argentina’s	position	would	mean	that	enforcement	must	be	first	and	foremost	sought	
in	the	debtor	State,	which	is	contrary	to	the	ordinary	meaning	to	be	given	to	Article	54.	
Next	to	this,	Articles	53	and	54	address	different	subjects.	What	is	more,	under	such	a	
reading,	there	would	never	be	an	obligation	to	comply	with	non-pecuniary	obligations	
in	an	award.	Not	the	least,	such	an	interpretation	would	provide	a	leeway	for	States	to	
avoid	(or	at	least	to	defer	ad	infinitum)	enforcement.	In	the	decision	on	continued	stay	
of	enforcement	the	Enron	Committee	stressed	that:	
	
[I]t	 would	 inherently	 undermine	 confidence	 in	 the	 ICSID	 system	 if	 a	 State	
against	which	an	award	has	been	given	could	make	its	own	compliance	with	the	award	
subject	 to	 the	 award	 creditor	 availing	 itself	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 under	 that	 State’s	
national	law	for	enforcement	of	final	judgments	of	courts.	
	
Argentina’s	 interpretation	 renders	 Article	 53	 meaningless	 and	 has	 been	
discarded.	 The	main	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 ICSID	 dispute	 settlement	mechanism	
was	intended	to	be	an	international	method	of	dispute	settlement.	Hence,	it	would	run	
counter	to	this	intention	for	compliance	with	a	final	award	to	be	subject,	ultimately,	to	
the	provisions	and	mechanisms	of	national	law.	
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3.5.8 The	linkage	requirement	
	
Further,	the	so-called	‘linkage	requirement’,	according	to	which	there	must	be	
a	 specific	 link	 between	 the	 underlying	 claim	 and	 the	 property	 that	 is	 subject	 to	
execution,	has	met	with	much	criticism.	
	
As	noted	by	Reinisch:	
	
One	 nexus	 requirement—which	 is	 clearly	 expressed	 in	 the	 US	 [Foreign	
Sovereign	Immunities	Act	of	1976]—demands	a	connection	between	the	property	and	
the	 underlying	 claim.	 Similarly,	 the	 [International	 Law	Association]	Draft	 Convention	
requires	that	‘[t]he	property	is	in	use	for	the	purposes	of	commercial	activity	or	was	in	
use	for	the	commercial	activity	upon	which	the	claim	is	based’.	The	generally	restrictive	
approach	of	the	[European	Convention	on	State	Immunity]	is	also	reflected	in	its	Article	
26	 which	 permits	 enforcement	 measures	 only	 against	 property	 ‘used	 exclusively	 in	
connection	with	[an	industrial	or	commercial]	activity’.	
	
The	nexus	requirement	would	constitute	a	serious	limitation	on	execution	as	
it	 is	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 a	 Respondent	 State	 will	 keep	 commercial	 assets	 in	 another	
State	that	can	be	said	to	have	a	direct	connection	to	an	 investment	 in	the	territory	of	
the	Respondent	State.	
	
Article	19(c)	of	the	United	Nations	Convention	on	Jurisdictional	Immunities	of	
States	 and	 Their	 Property	 (not	 yet	 in	 force)	 attempts	 to	 overcome	 this	 hurdle	 by	
permitting	 execution	 in	 respect	 of	 ‘property	 that	 has	 a	 connection	 with	 the	 entity	
against	 which	 the	 proceeding	 was	 directed’	 as	 is	 stated	 in	 Article	 19(c)	 of	 the	 UN	
Convention	 itself.	 This	 provision,	 however,	 does	 not	 currently	 reflect	 customary	
international	 law	 and	 was	 rather	 an	 attempt	 at	 ‘harmonization	 of	 practice	 in	 this	
area’.151	State	practice	on	this	question	is	still	unsettled.	Schreuer	has	thus	pointed	out	
that	the	ICSID	Convention	will	evolve	hand	in	hand	with	the	evolution	of	the	practice	of	
States	in	the	field	of	immunity.	
	
There	 are	 certain	 types	 of	 property,	 such	 as	 property	 used	 for	 military	
purposes,	 property	 of	 the	 State’s	 central	 bank	 etc,	 which	 cannot	 be	 attached	 in	
enforcement	without	explicit	waiver	on	the	part	of	the	State	concerned.	The	rationale	
for	maintaining	 immunity	 from	 execution	 against	 such	 property	 is	 that	 certain	 State	
assets,	such	as	central	bank	reserves	or	military	and	diplomatic	property,	are	integral	to	
the	functioning	of	a	State	and	should	not	be	subject	to	seizure	without	explicit	waiver	
on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 State.240 	Diplomatic	 property	 is	 additionally	 protected	 under	
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customary	 international	 law	 and	 under	 the	 1961	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	 Diplomatic	
Relations.	
	
	
3.5.9 Defenses	To	Enforcement	Found	Within	The	ICSID	Convention	
	
The	growth	of	 ICSID’s	caseload	will	give	 rise	 to	many	new	opportunities	 for	
disappointed	parties	 to	explore	possible	defences	 to	enforcement	of	 an	 ICSID	award.	
The	traditionally	light	ICSID	docket	has	undergone	a	dramatic	change	in	recent	years	as	
a	 result	 of	 the	 explosion	 in	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 containing	 consents	 by	 the	
signatory	states	to	ICSID	arbitration.	Disputing	parties	can	be	expected	to	look	closely	
at	 the	 language	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 regarding	 enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 awards	 in	
national	courts.	Significantly,	defences	to	enforcement	of	 ICSID	awards	may	arise	out	
of	the	“final	judgment”	language	of	Article	54(1)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	itself.	
	
Article	 54(1),	 as	 noted	 above,	 requires	 enforcement	 of	 the	 monetary	
obligations	of	an	 ICSID	award	 “as	 if	 it	were	a	 final	 judgment	of	a	 court”	 in	 the	 forum	
where	 enforcement	 is	 sought.	 Although	 the	 phrase	 “final	 judgment”	 suggests	 true	
finality,	in	fact	many	jurisdictions	permit	final	judgments	to	be	challenged	in	a	number	
of	 circumstances.	 The	 practice	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 France,	 Colombia	 and	 Chile	 is	
illustrative.	
In	the	United	States,	Rule	60(b)	of	the	Federal	Rules	of	Civil	Procedure	(FRCP)	
sets	 out	 the	 bases	 upon	 which	 a	 U.S.	 federal	 court	 may	 refuse	 to	 enforce	 a	 final	
judgment:	
On	motion	and	upon	such	terms	as	are	just,	the	court	may	relieve	a	party	or	a	
party’s	 legal	 representative	 from	 a	 final	 judgment,	 order,	 or	 proceeding	 for	 the	
following	 reasons:	 (1)	mistake,	 inadvertence,	 surprise,	or	excusable	neglect;	 (2)	newly	
discovered	evidence	which	by	due	diligence	could	not	have	been	discovered	in	time	to	
move	 for	 a	 new	 trial	 …	 ;	 (3)	 fraud	 (whether	 heretofore	 denominated	 as	 intrinsic	 or	
extrinsic),	 misrepresentation,	 or	 other	 misconduct	 of	 an	 adverse	 party;	 (4)	 the	
judgment	is	void;	(5)	the	judgment	has	been	satisfied,	released,	or	discharged,	or	a	prior	
judgment	upon	which	it	has	been	based	has	been	reversed	or	otherwise	vacated,	or	it	is	
no	longer	equitable	that	the	judgment	should	have	prospective	application;	or	(6)	any	
other	reason	justifying	relief	from	the	operation	of	the	judgment.	
	
Thus,	Rule	60(b)	offers	U.S.	federal	courts	a	number	of	grounds	for	refusing	to	
enforce	a	 final	 judgment.	Out	of	 the	 thousands	of	 cases	 in	U.S.	 courts	asserting	Rule	
60(b)	as	a	basis	for	overturning	a	final	judgment,	however,	only	a	very	small	proportion	
have	 been	 successful.	 Still,	 a	 careful	 attorney	 may	 pick	 and	 choose	 among	 the	
successes	for	cases	that	offer	parallels	to	common	arguments	for	challenging	awards	in	
investment	treaty	arbitrations.	In	Tsakonites	v	Transpacific	Carriers	Corp.,	for	example,	
the	court	vacated	a	judgment	dismissing	plaintiff’s	claim	for	failure	to	state	a	cause	of	
action	because	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	had	subsequently	ruled	in	another	proceeding	
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that	 a	 similar	 claim	 could	 be	 brought.	 And	 in	 Pioneer	 Investment	 Services	 Co.	 v	
Brunswick	 Associates	 Ltd.	 Partnership,	 the	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 held	 that,	 in	
circumstances	 constituting	 “excusable	 neglect,”	 a	 creditor	would	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 a	
final	 judgment	disallowing	 its	claim	 in	bankruptcy	proceedings	even	though	the	claim	
was	submitted	late.28	Analogous	fact	pat-terns	may	arise	in	investor-state	arbitration.	
In	 addition,	 allegations	 of	 unequal	 knowledge	 and	 bargaining	 power,	 often	
raised	in	investment	treaty	arbitration,	have	played	a	role	in	Rule	60(b)	cases.	In	United	
States	v	Williams,	for	example,	the	court	voided	an	order	for	the	sale	of	a	farm	by	a	tax	
authority	to	recover	back	taxes.	In	reaching	that	conclusion,	the	court	held	that,	while	
“persons	with	more	experience,	education,	and	general	knowledge	would	have	 taken	
effective	 steps	 to	 preserve	 and	 protect	 their	 interest	 in	 the	 land,”	 in	 the	 particular	
circumstances	of	 the	case	the	 failure	of	 the	petitioner	 to	 raise	certain	defenses	 in	 the	
earlier	 tax	 litigation	 was	 “excusable	 neglect”	 under	 Rule	 60(b)(1)	 of	 the	 FRCP	 even	
though	the	petitioner	had	been	represented	by	counsel	in	that	litigation.	
 
3.5.10 Defenses	To	Enforcement	Found	Outside	The	ICSID	Convention	
 
Apart	from	the	defenses	to	enforcement	of	an	ICSID	award	arising	out	of	the	
“final	 judgment”	 language	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 itself,	 disappointed	 Contracting	
States	may	also	use	methods	outside	the	ICSID	Convention	to	resist	the	enforcement	of	
awards.	 These	 methods	 might	 include	 using	 the	 national	 courts	 to	 invalidate	 ICSID	
awards	 for	 reasons	 arguably	 not	 allowed	 under	 the	 ICSID	 Convention.	 Disappointed	
Contracting	 States	 may	 also	 employ	 international	 law	 in	 their	 efforts	 to	 avoid	 their	
treaty	obligations	under	the	ICSID	Convention.	
 
For	 what	 concerns	 the	 invalidation	 of	 the	 Award	 by	 the	 Home	 State,	
disappointed	 parties	 may	 seek	 invalidation	 of	 an	 ICSID	 award	 in	 the	 courts	 of	 their	
home	state.	Although,	to	the	authors’	knowledge,	no	party	to	ICSID	proceeding	has	yet	
sought	 to	 invalidate	 an	 ICSID	 award	 in	 its	 home	 state,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 home	 state	
courts	may	be	 sympathetic	 to	 losing	parties	 in	an	 ICSID	proceeding	 regardless	of	 the	
terms	of	the	ICSID	Convention.	Although	the	annulment	of	an	ICSID	award	in	the	home	
state	may	not	 render	 that	award	unenforceable	 in	other	states,	 such	a	decision	could	
affect	the	practical	opportunities	for	a	prevailing	party	to	enforce	the	award.	
Article	53(1)	of	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 states	 that	 ICSID	awards	 “shall	not	be	
subject	 to	 any	 appeal.”	 But,	 in	 other	 contexts,	 courts	 have	 not	 always	 upheld	
agreements	to	limit	appeals	of	arbitration	awards.	In	the	recent	Argentine	case	of	Jose	
Cartellone	Construcciones	Civiles,	S.A.	v	Hidroelectrica	Norpatagonica	S.A.,	for	example,	
the	losing	party	sought	to	modify	an	arbitration	award	rendered	under	procedures	that	
disallowed	an	appeal	of	 the	award.	The	Argentine	High	Court,	 the	National	Supreme	
Court	of	Justice,	nevertheless	accepted	the	respondent’s	argument	that	the	arbitration	
award	should	be	modified	in	the	interests	of	ordre	public.	
The	claimant	had	successfully	obtained	an	award	against	the	respondent	for	
damages	plus	 interest.	When	 the	claimant	 sought	 to	enforce	 the	award	 in	Argentina,	
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the	 respondent	 challenged	 various	 aspects	 of	 the	 award,	 including	 the	 dates	 upon	
which	 interest	was	 calculated.	 In	 response,	 the	 claimant	 argued	 that	 the	 parties	 had	
agreed	 the	 award	was	 not	 subject	 to	 appeal.	 Although	 the	 lower	 court	 accepted	 the	
claimant’s	argument,	the	National	Supreme	Court	of	Justice	reversed	the	lower	court.	
The	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Justice	 found	 that	 certain	 portions	 of	 the	 award	 relating	 to	
interest	 accrual	 contravened	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 arbitration	 agreement.	 The	 Supreme	
Court	therefore	modified	the	award	to	reduce	the	interest	amount.	
More	significant	than	the	result,	the	Supreme	Court	held	that	agreements	to	
restrict	 review	 of	 arbitration	 awards	 in	 the	 courts	 do	 not	 prevent	 the	 court	 from	
determining	whether	such	awards	contradict	ordre	public.	The	Supreme	Court	reasoned	
that	 parties	 cannot	 restrict	 appellate	 review	 by	 agreement,	 because	 the	 public’s	
interests	override	the	parties’	intentions.	In	this	case,	the	Supreme	Court	found	that	the	
award	 did	 not	 comport	 with	 what	 it	 regarded	 as	 the	 realities	 of	 the	 situation	 and	
therefore	 produced	 a	 disproportionate	 and	 irrational	 result	 in	 contravention	 of	 ordre	
public.	
	
Although	the	Argentine	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	the	Jose	Cartellone	case	
to	 examine	 the	 award	 in	 light	 of	 the	 ordre	 public	 did	 not	 occur	 pursuant	 to	 Treaty	
arbitration,	recent	actions	by	the	Argentine	government	indicate	that	Argentina	might	
use	 this	and	other	 reasoning	 to	 seek	 the	 invalidation	of	awards	 rendered	pursuant	 to	
ICSID	arbitration.	In	an	ICSID	hearing	related	to	CMS	Gas	Transmission	Co.	v	Argentine	
Republic,	Argentina	argued	that	national	public	services	such	as	gas	transportation	and	
distribution	 must	 take	 into	 account	 particular	 needs	 of	 social	 importance.	 In	 such	
circumstances,	Argentina	argued,	necessity	and	emergency	allowed	the	government	to	
change	public	policy	with-out	violating	its	Treaty	obligations.	
The	 CMS	 tribunal	 rejected	 Argentina’s	 arguments	 regarding	 necessity	 and	
national	 emergency	 as	 a	 defense	 to	 Treaty	 violations	 and	 awarded	 CMS	 U.S.$	 133	
million.	Before	and	after	the	tribunal’s	award	to	CMS,	Argentinean	officials	have	made	
statements	that	ICSID	awards	should	be	subject	to	domestic	court	review	based	on	the	
arguments	 stated	 above,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 possible	 bases.	 For	 example,	 Argentina’s	
former	Attorney	General,	Horacio	Rosatti,	made	public	arguments	 that	 ICSID	did	not	
have	 jurisdiction	 over	 Argentina	 if	 the	 Argentine	 Supreme	 Court	 found	 an	 award	
incompatible	 with	 the	 Argentine	 Constitution.	 Notwithstanding	 this	 and	 other	
statements	 regarding	 the	 review	 of	 ICSID	 awards,	 Argentina,	 proceeding	 under	 the	
ICSID	rules,	has	brought	an	annulment	challenge	to	the	CMS	award	rather	than	use	its	
domestic	 courts	 to	 resist	 enforcement	 of	 the	 award.	 Argentinean	 officials	 have	 also	
been	meeting	with	 foreign	 government	 officials	 and	 some	 ICSID	 complainants	 in	 an	
attempt	 to	 amicably	 resolve	 the	 outstanding	 ICSID	 cases.	 Although	 Argentina,	 of	
course,	 may	 ultimately	 decide	 to	 use	 the	 domestic	 courts	 to	 resist	 enforcement	 of	
ICSID	awards,	there	does	not	appear	to	be	such	a	review	in	the	immediate	future.	
	
Recent	 actions	 show	 that	 a	 trend	 for	 states	 to	 resist	 the	 enforcement	 of	
arbitral	 awards	 may	 be	 gaining	 force.	 After	 losing	 an	 UNCITRAL	 arbitration	 to	
Occidental	Petroleum	based	on	violations	of	a	bilateral	investment	treaty,	the	Republic	
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of	 Ecuador	 sought	 to	 avoid	 enforcement	 of	 the	 award.	 Initially,	 Ecuador	 brought	 a	
jurisdictional	challenge	 to	 the	award	 in	 the	English	courts,	as	London	was	 the	seat	of	
the	arbitration.	The	court	held	that	English	courts	could	entertain	the	challenge	to	the	
jurisdiction	of	the	tribunal	even	though	the	right	of	arbitration	was	derived	from	public	
international	 law.71	 Although	 the	 result	 may	 have	 been	 different	 had	 the	Occidental	
Petroleum	 arbitration	 been	 conducted	 pursuant	 to	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 this	 case	
shows	that	disappointed	states	cannot	always	be	relied	upon	to	pay	awards	arising	out	
of	investment	treaty	arbitration	without	a	fight.	Incidentally,	Ecuador	has	continued	the	
fight	by	bringing	an	action	against	Occidental	Petroleum	in	local	Ecuadorian	courts	for	
contract	 violations	 based	 on	 actions	 taken	 by	 Occidental	 related	 to	 a	 production	
sharing	contract.	
The	Karaha	Bodas	arbitration	presents	another	example.	In	April	1998,	Karaha	
Bodas	 Corp.	 (KBC)	 instituted	 arbitration	 proceedings	 against	 Perusahaan	
Pertambangan	 Minyak	 Dan	 Gas	 Bumi	 Negara	 (“Pertamina”),	 an	 Indonesian	 state-
owned	company,	pursuant	 to	an	agreement	 containing	an	arbitration	provision.	That	
agreement	 provided	 for	 UNCI-TRAL	 ad	 hoc	 arbitration	 and	 limited	 the	 rights	 of	 the	
parties	to	challenge	any	resulting	award.74	Despite	this	limitation,	Pertamina	sought	to	
vacate	the	award	in	Switzerland	and	Indonesia.75	The	Swiss	court	rejected	Pertamina’s	
action	 on	 procedural	 grounds.76	 The	 Indonesian	 district	 court,	 however,	 annulled	 the	
award,	 finding	 in	 part	 that	 the	 award	 was	 contrary	 to	 Indonesian	 law	 and	 that	
Indonesian	 courts	 had	 authority	 to	 determine	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 award.	 Recently,	
though,	 the	 Indonesian	 Supreme	Court	 overturned	 that	 lower	 court	 decision,	 finding	
that	the	district	court	had	no	“authority	to	examine	and	adjudicate”	the	award	to	KBC.	
	
3.5.11 The	 International	 Law	 of	 Treaties	 for	 refusing	 to	 enforce	 an	 ICSID	
award	
According	 to	 Edward	 Baldwin,	 Mark	 Kantor	 and	 Michael	 Nolan,	 the	
international	 law	of	 treaties	may	also	create	grounds	 for	 refusing	to	enforce	an	 ICSID	
award.	Professor	Schreuer,	as	noted	above,	has	 remarked	that	 the	“finality	of	 [ICSID]	
awards	 would	 also	 exclude	 any	 examination	 of	 their	 compliance	 with	 international	
public	 policy	 or	 international	 law	 in	 general.”	Here	 too,	 commentators	may	have	 too	
quickly	dismissed	the	prospect	that	national	courts	will	not	 review	an	 ICSID	award	on	
the	basis	of	 international	public	policy,	as	 illustrated	by	the	reference	to	 international	
ordre	public	 found	 in	SOABI	v	Senegal.	Moreover,	 international	 law	respecting	Treaty	
obligations	applies	to	both	the	interpretation	of	obligations	of	Contracting	States	under	
the	ICSID	Convention	and	to	the	circumstances	in	which	those	obligations	may	be	sus-
pended.	 Therefore,	 the	 international	 law	 of	 treaties	may	 also	 come	 into	 play.	 Let	 us	
turn	first	to	the	interpretation	of	a	Contracting	State’s	obligation	under	Article	54(1)	to	
recognize	and	enforce	an	ICSID	award.	
The	core	instrument	for	interpreting	treaties	is	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	
Law	 of	 Treaties,	 to	 which	 virtually	 all	 countries	 are	 adherents.	 Article	 31(3)(c)	 of	 the	
Vienna	Convention	tells	us	that	treaties	should	be	interpreted	in	light	of	“any	relevant	
rules	of	international	law	applicable	in	the	relations	between	the	parties.”	Sympathetic	
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domestic	 courts	 might	 employ,	 among	 other	 arguments,	 the	 international	 law	
doctrines	of	“abuse	of	right,”	“denial	of	 justice,”	“unfair	and	inequitable	treatment”	or	
“good	 faith”	 as	 bases	 to	 interpret	 the	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 obligations	
established	by	ICSID	Article	54(1).	
The	doctrine	of	“abuse	of	right”	arguably	obligates	parties	to	exercise	a	right	
reasonably	and	in	good	faith.	An	abuse	of	right	may	arise,	for	example,	where	a	party	
“adopts	 a	 position	 contrary	 to	 one	 it	 has	 previously	 taken	 [and]	 the	 other	 party	 has	
relied	on	 the	 initial	position	 to	 its	detriment.”	This	 international	precept	 is	 codified	 in	
the	domestic	law	of	many	countries	as	well.	Article	2	of	the	Swiss	Civil	Code	states	that	
“[e]very	person	shall	exercise	his	rights	and	perform	his	obligations	in	accordance	with	
the	rules	of	good	faith.	A	manifest	abuse	of	right	is	not	protected	by	law.”	Article	281	of	
the	Greek	Civil	Code	states	that	“[t]here	is	an	abuse	of	a	right	under	this	article,	 if	the	
party	exercising	 that	 right	goes	well	beyond	 the	 limits	of	accepted	principles	of	good	
faith	 and	morality.	 The	 exercise	 of	 a	 right	 becomes	 ‘abusive,’	 if	 a	 reasonable	 person	
would	say	its	exercise	exceeded	its	financial	or	social	objective.”	Although	admittedly	in	
a	different	context,	the	concept	of	“abuse	of	right”	was	employed	by	the	arbitrators	in	
recent	 ad	 hoc	 investor-state	 arbitrations	 involving	 geothermal	 power	 projects	 in	
Indonesia	to	limit	the	damages	awarded	against	the	Indonesian	side.241	
	
“Fair	 and	 equitable	 treatment”	 and	 “denial	 of	 justice”	may	 provide	 another	
set	of	bases	 for	a	court	 to	narrowly	construe	 its	enforcement	obligations	under	 ICSID	
Article	54(1).	The	revised	2004	Model	U.S.	Bilateral	Investment	Treaty	states	in	Article	
5.2(a)	that	the	customary	international	law	obligation	of	“fair	and	equitable	treatment”	
includes	the	obligation	of	a	state	“not	to	deny	justice	in	criminal,	civil,	or	administrative	
adjudicatory	proceedings	in	accordance	with	the	principle	of	due	process	embodied	in	
the	principal	 legal	 systems	of	 the	world.”	According	 to	 the	 ICSID	“Additional	Facility”	
tribunal	 in	 Robert	 Azinian	 and	 others	 v	 United	 Mexican	 States,	 a	 finding	 of	 denial	 of	
justice	may	be	based	upon:	 (i)	a	court	decision	clearly	 incompatible	with	 international	
law;	 (ii)	 lack	of	procedural	and	substantive	due	process,	 including	 the	 relevant	court’s	
refusal	 to	 entertain	 a	 suit,	 creation	 of	 undue	 delay,	 administration	 of	 justice	 in	 a	
seriously	 inadequate	way,	or	adoption	of	a	 “clear	and	malicious	misapplication	of	 the	
law”;	 or	 (iii)	 in	 some	 circumstances,	 a	 judicial	 decision	 contrary	 to	 municipal	 law.	
Arguably,	 proceedings	 held	 before	 an	 ICSID	 tribunal	 may	 fall	 below	 international	
standards	 of	 justice	 if	 there	 are	 instances	 of	 corruption,	 threats,	 unwarranted	 delay,	
flagrant	 abuse	 of	 judicial	 procedure,	 or	 a	 judgment	 so	 manifestly	 unjust	 that	 no	
competent	 and	 honest	 court	 could	 have	 issued	 it.	 While	 “denial	 of	 justice”	 has	
developed	as	a	customary	 international	 law	standard	applicable	 to	states,	not	private	
parties,	there	is	no	assurance	that	a	court	 in	an	enforcing	jurisdiction	would	reject	the	
application	 of	 that	 standard	 to	 investor-state	 arbitration	 proceedings	 conducted	
pursuant	to	an	international	treaty	and	administered	by	an	international	organization.	
																																																													
241 	See	 Himpurna	 California	 Energy	 Ltd.	 (Bermuda)	 v	 PT	 (Persero)	 Perusuhaan	 Listruik	 Negara	
(Indonesia),	Final	Award,	 14	Mealey’s	 Int.	Arb.	Rep.	A-1	 (1999)	and	Patuha	Power	Ltd.	 (Bermuda)	v	PT	
(Persero)	Perusahaan	Listruik	Negara	(Indonesia),	Final	Award,	14	Mealey’s	Int.	Arb.	Rep.	B-1	(1999)	
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Similarly,	 based	 on	 early	 international	 decisions	 such	 as	 the	 1926	 decision	 in	Neer	 v	
United	Mexican	States,	the	minimum	standard	of	“fair	and	equitable	treatment”	under	
customary	international	law	has	traditionally	been	understood	to	prohibit	acts	by	states	
amounting	to	“bad	faith,	wilful	neglect,	clear	 instances	of	unreasonableness	or	 lack	of	
due	diligence.”	For	instance,	the	international	standard	of	fair	and	equitable	treatment	
may	be	invoked	where	“national	law	does	not	provide	…	for	adequate	guarantees	of	fair	
treatment	 in	 accordance	 with	 generally	 shared	 values	 of	 substantial	 and	 procedural	
fairness	and	justice	in	respect	of	the	enjoyment	of	property	and	the	normal	conduct	of	
business	operations.”	An	ICSID	tribunal	is	not,	of	course,	an	organ	of	a	particular	state.	
Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 certainly	possible	 that	counsel	 for	a	disappointed	 respondent	 state	
may	 seek	 to	 extend	 the	 principle	 of	 fair	 and	 equitable	 treatment	 to	 public	 sector	
activities	such	as	 investor-state	arbitration	under	the	auspices	of	an	arm	of	the	World	
Bank	Group,	 ICSID.	Accordingly,	 a	 respondent	 state	might	 argue	 in	 the	 enforcement	
forum	that	 the	obligation	 to	enforce	 the	 ICSID	award	under	Article	54(1)	 is	 subject	 to	
interpretation	taking	account	of	unfair	or	inequitable	treatment	by	the	tribunal.	
	
Customary	 international	 law	 principles	 of	 “good	 faith”	 might	 affect	 the	
claimant’s	 rights	 in	 local	 enforcement	 proceedings	 as	 well.	 In	 a	 dispute	 between	 a	
foreign	investor	and	a	host	state,	the	host	state	may	assert	that	the	foreign	investor	has	
made	 material	 misrepresentations	 or	 engaged	 in	 corrupt	 practices	 or	 similar	
misconduct.	Such	allegations	may	be	renewed	when	the	ICSID	award	is	being	enforced	
to	support	an	argument	that	the	enforcement	obligations	of	an	ICSID	Contracting	Party	
are	to	be	interpreted	in	light	of	international	law	principles	of	good	faith.	If	lack	of	good	
faith	 by	 the	 foreign	 investor	 in	 the	 underlying	 transaction	 is	 proven,	 those	 principles	
might	buttress	an	argument	that	a	Contracting	State	need	not	enforce	an	ICSID	award	
in	its	national	courts.	
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Chapter	4 	
Possible	solutions	to	the	ICSID	Achilles’	heel	
	
Few	 authors	 have	 attempted	 to	 offer	 and	 propose	 solutions	 to	 the	 ICSID	
Achilles’	 heel	 even	 if	 non-compliance	by	States	with	 ICSID	awards	 is	 the	exception,	 and	
voluntary	compliance	remains	the	rule.	242	Hereinafter	we	have	tried	to	give	an	overview	of	
all	the	possible	solutions	that	could	be	adopted	to	heal	the	Achilles’	heel.	
	
4.1 Waiver	of	immunity	and	provision	of	a	list	of	attachable	assets	
	
Waiver	remains	one	of	the	most	reliable	ways	of	avoiding	the	immunity	bar.	As	
part	 of	 the	 docrtine	 has	 noted,	 it	 is	 the	 ‘only	 one	 hope’.243	However,	 waiver	 will	 be	
applicable	only	where	 there	 is	 a	direct	 investment	agreement	between	 the	 investor	and	
the	host	State,	and	it	will	depend	on	the	negotiating	strength	of	the	former.	
There	 are	 instances	 in	 which	 a	 waiver	 is	 contained	 in	 a	 bilateral	 investment	
treaty	 (BIT);	however,	 these	 instances	are	 rare	as	 they	 require	 reciprocity,	meaning	 that	
the	home	State	must	waive	its	immunity	as	well.	Therefore,	States	are	unwilling	to	include	
such	clauses	in	BITs.	
It	should	also	be	noted	that,	under	domestic	law,	a	waiver	of	immunity	in	respect	
of	 diplomatic	 or	 military	 property	 may	 not	 be	 possible.	 For	 example,	 the	 US	 Court	 of	
Appeals,	Ninth	Circuit,	in	Af-Cap,	Inc	v	Chevron	Overseas	(Congo)	Ltd,	held	that	a	waiver	
whereby	a	State	waives	its	immunity	with	respect	to	all	of	its	property	held	in	the	United	
States,	is	invalid.	The	Court	required	the	creditor	to	prove	that	the	property	is	commercial.	
Schreuer	 cautions	 that	 ‘the	 reference	 of	 Article	 55	 of	 ICSID	 to	 the	 law	 of	 the	
respective	country	means	that	any	limitation	in	that	law	to	the	validity	of	a	waiver	would	
have	to	be	 respected	 .	 .	 .	 [Thus],	a	waiver	 that	goes	beyond	that	provision	 [may	not]	be	
effective.’	
The	 Commentary	 to	 the	 ILC’s	 Draft	 Articles	 on	 Immunity	 of	 States	 (which	
represent	 the	 preparatory	 work	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 on	 Jurisdictional	
Immunities	of	States	and	Their	Property),	however,	 is	explicit	 in	that	a	State	may	validly	
waive	its	immunity	even	with	regard	to	specially	protected	property.	Moreover,	in	view	of	
the	fact	that	most	States	already	permit	enforcement	on	commercial	property,	it	would	be	
																																																													
242	Among	 them	we	 can	 for	 sure	 find	 	 Uchkunova	 and	 Temnikov	 who	 offered	 a	 clear	 picture	 of	 possible	
remedies	available.	
243	See	 for	 this	 part	 Uchkunova	 and	 Temnikov.	 Few	 authors	 have	 tried	 to	 propose	 solutions	 to	 the	
enforcement	issue.	
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illogical	 additionally	 to	 require	 a	 waiver	 with	 regard	 to	 property	 which	 does	 not	 enjoy	
immunity	anyway.	
Schreuer,	however,	makes	the	 important	observation	that	under	 the	European	
Convention	on	State	Immunity,	because	of	its	far-reaching	protection	even	of	commercial	
property,	a	waiver	that	covers	such	property	would	make	sense.	
A	 weak	 point	 of	 this	 solution	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	
unavailability	of	assets	or	their	(possible)	subsequent	conversion	from	commercial	to	non-
commercial.	
Another	possible	solution	is	found	in	Mitchell	v	Congo	where	Mr	Mitchell	agreed	
to	 indicate	 his	 address	 in	 South	 Africa	 and	 the	 United	 States	 and	 to	 provide	 the	
Respondent	 State	 with	 a	 list	 of	 assets	 that	 could	 be	 attached	 should	 the	 Democratic	
Republic	of	Congo	 (DRC)	be	 successful	 in	 the	annulment	proceedings,	on	condition	 that	
the	DRC	 proceeds	 alike.	 This	 could	well	 serve	 as	 an	 example	 for	 subsequent	 cases,	 but	
would	depend	on	the	good	will	of	the	host	State.	
	
	
4.1.1 	Making	Stay	of	Enforcement	Conditional	on	the	Posting	of	a	Financial	
Guarantee:	 ‘Comfort	 Letters’	 as	 Implied	Waiver—Attachment	 of	 Escrowed	 Funds	
by	Third	Creditors	
	
A	stay	of	enforcement	may	be	requested	in	accordance	with	Article	52(2)	of	the	
ICSID	Convention	pending	a	decision	on	annulment.	Neither	the	granting	of	a	stay,	nor	the	
imposition	 of	 conditions	 such	 as	 posting	 a	 financial	 guarantee,	 however,	 represents	 an	
automatic	 entitlement	 of	 the	 award	 creditor.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ad	 hoc	
committee	may	grant	the	request	for	a	stay	only	if	the	circumstances	so	require.	
The	posting	of	 a	 guarantee	 aims	at	 preventing	 the	 risk	of	 non-enforcement	 in	
the	future.	The	guarantee	may	be	defined	as	a	form	of	‘conditional	payment	in	advance’	in	
that	 it	converts	the	undertaking	of	compliance	under	Article	53	of	the	Convention	 into	a	
financial	guarantee	and	avoids	any	issue	of	sovereign	immunity	from	execution,	which	is	
expressly	reserved	by	Article	55	of	the	Convention.	In	the	event	that	the	annulment	fails,	
the	successful	investor	may	enforce	on	the	security	imposed.	
Absent	such	a	security,	enforcement	proceedings	would	at	all	times	depend	on	
the	successful	investor’s	ability	to	overcome	the	defence	of	sovereign	immunity.	
Likewise,	the	Mitchell	v	Congo	Committee	stated	that:	
	
[B]y	 virtue	 of	 the	 Convention	 a	 State	 has	 the	 obligation	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
award,	while	annulment	of	an	ICSID	award	is	‘unusual’.	It	thus	seems	reasonable	to	order	
the	posting	of	a	guarantee	when	a	State	requests	the	stay	of	enforcement	of	the	award,	
except	if	this	entails	significant	costs	for	said	State,	or	the	freezing	of	the	amount	due	with	
serious	consequences	on	this	State’s	budget.	
	
Thus,	while	the	presumption	of	the	good	faith	of	States	remains	valid,	one	may	
wonder	 whether	 in	 future	 stay-of-enforcement	 proceedings	 it	 would	 not	 be	 preferable	
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that	the	Committees	demand	security	as	a	matter	of	course,	subject	only	to	the	exception	
that	the	State	is	able	to	prove	that	it	will	suffer	severe	economic	hardship	as	a	result.	
A	weak	point	of	this	solution	is	that,	in	the	event	that	the	State	refuses	to	honour	
the	condition	 thus	 imposed,	 there	 is	no	way	 for	 the	award	creditor	 to	enforce	 it	 since	 it	
does	not	qualify	as	a	final	award,	as	above	noted.	The	only	sanction	would	be	termination	
of	the	stay.	
	
In	 a	 number	 of	 cases,	 annulment	Committees	 have	 imposed	 as	 a	 condition	 of	
stay	that	the	Respondent	State	provides	a	‘comfort	letter’.		
Thus,	 in	 CMS	 v	Argentine	Argentina	 provided	 such	 a	 letter	 stating	 that	 in	 the	
event	that	annulment	is	not	granted,	it	would	‘recognize	the	award	.	.	.	as	binding	and	.	.	.	
enforce	 the	pecuniary	obligations	 imposed	by	 that	award	within	 its	 territories’.	This	 can	
well	 raise	 the	question	as	 to	whether	such	a	 ‘comfort	 letter’	could	be	read	as	an	 implied	
waiver	 of	 enforcement	 immunity.	 This	 proposition	 has	 not	 been	 tested	 in	 practice,	
however.	
	
Another	 solution	 may	 be	 found	 the	 attachment	 of	 escrowed	 funds	 by	 third	
creditors.	 This	 solution	 can	 be	 found	 in	 cases	 such	 as	 the	 Second	 Enron	 stay	 Decision	
where	the	Committee	stated:	
	
[O]ther	claimants,	including	those	with	unsatisfied	ICSID	awards	for	payment	of	
monetary	amounts,	could	actively	seek	to	execute	against	the	funds	that	would	be	held	by	
the	escrow	agent	or	Ponderosa	in	the	event	that	the	Award	is	annulled.	
	
	
4.1.2 Awarding	Post-award	Interest	at	a	Higher	Rate	
	
ICSID	tribunals	have	consistently	awarded	interest	on	compensation	or	damages	
in	 investment	disputes.	 Interest	 compensates	 the	Claimant	 for	 the	 time-value	of	money	
since	the	compensation	has	been	due	to	him	at	a	certain	date	preceding	the	date	of	the	
award	(most	often	the	date	of	the	violation).	
The	Tribunal	in	Vivendi	made	it	clear	that	‘[t]he	object	of	an	award	of	interest	is	
to	compensate	the	damage	resulting	from	the	fact	that,	during	the	period	of	non-payment	
by	 the	 debtor,	 the	 creditor	 is	 deprived	 of	 the	 use	 and	 disposition	 of	 that	 sum	 he	 was	
supposed	to	receive’.	
Post-award	 interest,	 specifically,	 is	 intended	 to	 compensate	 for	 any	 additional	
loss	 incurred	from	the	date	of	the	award	to	the	date	of	final	payment	and	to	protect	the	
value	 of	 the	 award	 against	 inflation.	 Thus,	 post-award	 interest	 has	 a	 bearing	 on	 the	
efficacy	 of	 the	 award	 in	 that	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 discourage	 the	 respondent	 from	delaying	
enforcement.	
Therefore,	 post-award	 interest	must	 be	 awarded	 at	 a	 sufficiently	 high	 rate	 in	
order	to	achieve	this	result.	Otherwise,	if	the	rate	of	interest	is	less	than	the	rate	at	which	
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the	State	 is	able	to	gain	on	the	withheld	award	amount	 it	will	not	be	encouraged	to	pay	
promptly.	
As	 observed	 by	 Penelope	 Nevill,	 tribunals	 ‘do	 not	 always	 make	 a	 distinction	
between	the	award	of	pre-award	interest	and	post-award	interest’,	i.e.	they	award	them	at	
the	 same	 rate.	 This	 question	 seems	 unnoticed,	 but	 awarding	 post-award	 interest	 at	 a	
higher	 rate	may	serve	as	a	good	 incentive	 for	 the	 respondent	State	 to	comply	promptly	
with	 the	award.	Ensuring	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	award	after	all	 is	 the	main	 function	of	
post-award	interest.	
One	very	interesting	point,	in	this	regard,	is	that	in	Enron	v	Argentina,	Argentina	
opposed	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	 Award	 and	 demanded	 stay	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Claimant	 had	 allegedly	 sought	 to	 amend	 the	 Award	 in	 a	 national	 court	 (in	 the	 United	
States)	by	claiming	post-award	interest,	despite	the	fact	that	post-award	interest	had	not	
been	awarded	in	the	Award	itself.	The	Claimant	countered	that,	consistent	with	Article	54	
of	 the	 ICSID	Convention,	an	 ICSID	award	 is	enforced	 in	 the	United	States	as	 if	 it	were	a	
final	judgment,	and	that	when	an	ICSID	award	is	converted	into	a	United	States	judgment,	
it	accrues	post-judgment	 interest	 like	any	other	United	States	 judgment	The	Committee	
noted	 that	 it	 has	 not	 been	 referred	 to	 any	 authority	 suggesting	 that	 there	 is	 anything	
inconsistent	 with	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 or	 with	 the	 Award	 in	 this	 case,	 for	 a	 party	
enforcing	an	award	under	Article	54	of	 the	Convention	 to	avail	 itself	of	provisions	under	
the	relevant	national	law	for	post-judgment	interest,	even	if	the	award	debtor	would	not	
be	liable	to	pay	interest	if	it	complied	with	an	award	under	Article	53	without	enforcement	
proceedings	 under	 Article	 54.	 This	 should	 also	 serve	 as	 an	 incentive	 for	 the	 State	 to	
comply	voluntarily	and	speedily	with	the	award.	
	
	
	
4.1.3 	Possible	Sanctions	by	the	World	Bank	
	
Commentators	have	pointed	out	that	the	Secretary	General	of	ICSID	can	remind	
non-paying	States	 of	 ‘their	 international	 obligation	 to	 respect	 the	 result	 of	 a	 process	 to	
which	 they	 have	 given	 their	 consent’.	 Additionally,	 under	 its	 Operational	 Policy	 7.40	
concerning	 Disputes	 over	 Defaults	 on	 External	 Debt,	 Expropriation,	 and	 Breach	 of	
Contract,	the	World	Bank	can	refuse	new	loans	in	the	event	that	the	Bank	‘receives	notice	
that	 a	member	 country	 is	 unwilling	 to	 take	 steps	 to	 resolve	 a	 dispute	 over	 its	 failure	 to	
service	external	debt’.244	
	
This	is	not	a	remedy	open	to	the	investor,	technically	speaking,	since	it	is	outside	
its	control.	
																																																													
244	World	Bank	Operation	Policy	Statement	 7.40—Disputes	over	Defaults	on	External	Debt,	Expropriation,	
and	 Breach	 of	 Contract	 (‘OP	 7.40’)	 (March	 2012)	
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK
:20064628	 menuPK:64701763	 pagePK:64709096	 piPK:64709108	 theSitePK:502184,00.html>	 accessed	 15	
November	2017.	
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4.1.4 Assignment	(	Blue	Ridge	case)	
	
CMS	assigned	its	Award	against	Argentina	to	Blue	Ridge	Investments,	LLC.	Yas	
Banifatemi	 has	 observed	 that	 this	 is	 yet	 another	 possible	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	
immunity.	
	
Argentina,	 however,	 objected	 to	 the	 assignment	 arguing	 that	 ‘CMS	 has—	
improperly—transferred	its	rights	to	the	award,	which	requires	prior	analysis	of	the	legality	
under	 international	 law’.	 Schreuer	 also	 speaks	 of	 the	 ‘requirement	 that	 only	 one	 of	 the	
original	parties	may	initiate	a	proceeding	for	the	recognition	and	enforcement’,	and	states	
that	this	can	present	problems	even	in	cases	of	corporate	succession.	
	
Despite	arguments	as	to	the	impropriety	of	such	assignment,	the	Committee	in	
the	 Sempra	 v	 Argentina	 Stay	 Decision	 ruled	 that	 it	 was	 unable	 to	 accept	 that	 CMS’s	
transfer	of	rights	under	the	Award	served	as	a	justification	of	Argentina’s	failure	to	abide	
by	 and	 comply	 with	 the	 Award.200	 Similarly,	 and	 importantly,	 in	 its	 recent	 Decision	
regarding	enforcement	of	the	CMS	award	the	US	District	Court	for	the	Southern	District	of	
New	York	held	that,	given	that	the	enforcement	of	awards	is	subject	to	local	law,	‘nothing	
in	the	.	.	.	New	York	law	prevents	an	assignee	from	seeking	recognition	and	enforcement	
of	an	ICSID	Convention	award’.245	
	
	
4.1.5 Piercing	the	Corporate	Veil		
	
Under	Article	 25(1)	 read	 together	with	Article	 25(3)	 of	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 a	
State	 may	 designate	 a	 constituent	 subdivision	 or	 agency	 to	 become	 a	 party	 to	 the	
proceedings	before	 the	Centre.	This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	attribution	 is	affected	and,	where	
such	 designation	 is	 lacking,	 the	 Tribunal	 will	 not	 uphold	 jurisdiction	 against	 the	 State.	
However,	as	remarked	by	Schreuer,	‘[i]n	some	instances	the	State	entity	may	be	the	only	
potential	respondent	under	the	rules	of	State	responsibility’.	This	happened	for	example	in	
the	cases	of	Repsol	v	Petroecuador		and	Tanzania	Electric	v	IPTL.	
	
As	the	UNCTAD	Course	points	out,	 ‘[i]n	such	a	case,	the	obligation	to	abide	by	
and	 comply	 with	 an	 award	 would	 be	 incumbent	 upon	 the	 constituent	 subdivision	 or	
agency	 rather	 than	 upon	 the	 host	 State.’	 Consequently,	 an	 award	 rendered	 against	 the	
State	may	not	be	enforced	against	such	a	constituent	subdivision	or	agency	and	vice	versa.	
	
Therefore,	 it	 would	 seem	 wise	 for	 investors—when	 instituting	 proceedings	
before	 the	 ICSID—to	 be	 cautious	 to	 ensure	 the	 participation	 of	 such	 State	 entities	 as	
																																																													
245	US	District	Court	for	the	Southern	District	of	New	York,	Order	of	30	September	2012,	10	Civ	153	(PGG)	20	
<http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1102.pdf>	
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parties	to	the	proceedings	(or	the	State,	as	the	case	may	be)	with	a	view	to	optimizing	the	
chances	of	enforcement.	
	
Similarly,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Benvenuti	 &	 Bonfant	 v	 Congo,	 the	 Award	 creditors	
sought	enforcement	in	France	of	an	award	rendered	against	The	Congo	by	seizing	assets	
of	 Banque	 Commerciale	 Congolaise	 (BCC).	 The	 Cour	 de	 cassation	 held,	 however,	 that	
Benvenuti	&	Bonfant	was	 the	 creditor	of	 the	State	of	 the	Congo	but	not	of	BCC,	 and	 it	
therefore	rejected	the	award	creditors’	claim.	
	
Still,	there	have	been	cases	in	practice	where	assets	of	State	entities	have	been	
seized	for	debts	of	the	State	itself.	For	example,	in	First	National	City	Bank	v	Banco	Para	el	
Comercio	Exterior	de	Cuba,	the	US	Supreme	Court	pierced	the	corporate	veil	of	Bancec	(a	
State-owned	 bank).	 In	 a	 similar	 vein	 and	 as	 reported	 by	 Emmanuel	 Gaillard,	 the	 Paris	
Court	 of	 Appeals	 has	 allowed	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 against	 a	 State	 through	 assets	
belonging	to	a	national	company	tightly	controlled	by	that	State	in	four	decisions.246	
	
This	 exception	 is	 relatively	 limited	 in	 that	 it	 will	 only	 apply	 ‘when	 a	 State-
controlled	 company	 exhibits	 a	 near	 total	 lack	 of	 autonomy’	 	 (and	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	
peculiarities	of	the	domestic	law),	but	this	is	better	than	nothing.	
	
This	issue	touches	also	on	the	important	question	of	asset	stripping.	Thus,	in	the	
Enron	v	Argentina	stay	decision	the	Committee	was	unable	to	attribute	asset	stripping	to	
Argentina	since	it	was	carried	out	by	an	Argentinean	province:	
	
As	 regards	 Argentina’s	 alleged	 diversion	 of	 assets	 away	 from	 New	 York	 to	
prevent	their	attachment	in	satisfaction	of	the	CMS	award,	the	Committee	further	notes	
that	the	assets	in	question	belonged	to	a	province	of	Argentina	which	was	not	alleged	to	
be	 involved	 in	 the	events	 to	which	the	claim	 in	 the	CMS	case	 related.	The	Committee	 is	
unable	to	conclude	on	the	basis	of	the	material	before	it	that	the	diversion	of	these	assets	
away	 from	New	York,	 if	 this	 occurred,	 is	 demonstrative	 of	 any	 intention	 on	 the	 part	 of	
Argentina,	if	the	stay	is	continued,	to	take	steps	that	would	frustrate	or	impede	the	future	
execution	of	the	award	in	the	event	that	it	is	not	annulled.	
	
Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	 good	 policy	 argument	 supporting	 the	 proposition	 of	
piercing	 the	 corporate	 veil	 since,	 otherwise,	 States	 would	 take	 an	 incentive	 to	 create	
separate	entities	in	order	to	avoid	enforcement	or	to	freely	strip	of	their	assets.	
	
Likewise,	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 has	 recognized	 in	 the	 Barcelona	
Traction	case	the	principle	of	lifting	the	corporate	veil:	
	
																																																													
246	Emmanuel	Gaillard,	‘Effectiveness	of	Arbitral	Awards,	State	Immunity	from	Execution	and	Autonomy	of	
State	Entities:	Three	 Incompatible	Principles’	 in	 IAI	Series	on	 International	Arbitration	No.	4	 (International	
Arbitration	Institute	2008)	179,	181.	
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[The]	veil	 is	 lifted,	 for	 instance,	 to	prevent	the	misuse	of	 the	privileges	of	 legal	
personality,	as	in	certain	cases	of	fraud	or	malfeasance,	to	protect	third	persons	such	as	a	
creditor	or	purchaser,	or	to	prevent	the	evasion	of	legal	requirements	or	of	obligations.	
	
	
4.1.6 Regional	Human	Rights	Courts:	The	Stran	Case	
	
A	second	public	 international	 law	option	potentially	available	 to	a	party	whose	
arbitral	award	has	been	wrongfully	annulled	or	 left	unenforced	 is	 to	 seek	 redress	before	
one	 of	 the	 regional	 human	 rights	 courts.	 The	 three	 major	 institutions	 established	 by	
international	 human	 rights	 treaties	 are:	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (ECtHR),	
whose	 jurisdiction	 extends	 to	 all	 47	 States	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 (COE);	 the	 Inter-	
American	Court	of	Human	Rights	(IACtHR),	with	competence	 in	respect	of	the	20	States	
within	 the	Organization	of	American	States	 that	have	adhered	 to	 its	 jurisdiction	 (out	of	
35);	and	the	nascent	African	Court	of	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights	(ACtHPR),	covering	the	
26	member	 States	 of	 the	African	Union	 to	 accept	 its	 jurisdiction	 (out	 of	 54).	 Any	 claim	
before	 these	 tribunals	 must	 be	 brought	 under	 their	 discreet	 constituent	 treaties	 –	
respectively	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 	 Rights	 (ECHR),	 the	 	 American	
Convention	on	Human	Rights	 (ACHR),247	and	the	African	Charter	on	Human	and	 Peoples’	
Rights	(ACHPR).248	
In	 addressing	 the	 human	 rights	 courts	 in	 greater	 detail,	 we	 first	 discuss	 the	
threshold	 matter	 of	 who	 can	 bring	 claims	 before	 them	 (Subsection	 1).	 Next,	 we	
consider	 the	 relevant	 human	 rights	 that	 can	 be	 invoked	 in	 cases	 involving	 the	 non-
enforcement	 or	 annulment	 of	 arbitral	 awards,	 in	 particular	 interference	 with	 property	
(Subsection	2),	and	 the	right	to	a	fair	trial	(Subsection	3).	Finally,	we	discuss	the	remedies	
available	 (Subsection	4).	 Annex	C	provides	a	summary	of	the	relevant	human	rights	cases	
decided	 to	date.	
The	 three	 regional	 human	 rights	 bodies	 differ	 materially	 in	 their	 jurisdictional	
structures.	 The	 ECtHR	 affords	 the	 greatest	 degree	 of	 access.	 There,	 both	 natural	 and	
legal	 persons	 may	 bring	 direct	 complaints	 before	 the	 Court	 on	 their	 own	 initiative,	
provided	 that	 the	 offending	State	 is	a	party	to	the	ECHR.	By	contrast,	under	the	 IACHR,	
a	 claimant	must	 petition	 the	 Inter-American	 Commission	 on	 Human	 Rights	 to	 begin	 an	
investigation	 on	 his	 or	 her	 behalf,	 and	 can	 reach	 the	 IACtHR	 only	 on	 the	 latter’s	
recommendation.	 The	 Convention	 applies	 uniquely	 to	 natural	 persons,	 thus	 depriving	
corporations	 of	 any	 access	 to	 the	 IACtHR	 –	 although	 the	 Court	 has	 extended	 the	
Convention’s	protection	to	injured	shareholders	 in	 their	personal	capacities.145		
																																																													
247	Organization	 of	 American	 States,	 American	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights,	 “Pact	 of	 San	 José,”	 Costa	
Rica,	22	Nov.	1969,	available	at	http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36510.html.	
248	Organization	of	African	Unity,	African	Charter	on	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights	 (“Banjul	Charter”),	27	 Jun.	
1981,	 CAB/LEG/67/3	 rev.	 5,	 21	 I.L.M.	 58	 (1982),	 available	 at	
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3630.html;	 and	 Protocol	 to	 the	 African	 Charter	 on	Human	 and	
Peoples’	Rights	on	the	Establishment	of	an	African	Court	of	Human	and	Peoples’	Rights,	9	Jun.	 1998,	OAU	
Doc.	OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(III)	(establishing	the	Court).	
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The	ECtHR	first	articulated	the	principles	by	which	it	would	afford	protection	
to	award	 creditors	 in	 its	 1994	decision	 in	Stran	Greek	Refineries	&	Stratis	Andreadis	 v.	
Greece	 (Stran).	 The	 Stran	 case	 concerned	 the	 validity	 and	 enforcement	 of	 a	 purely	
domestic	 arbitral	 award	 –	 although	 the	 Court	 would	 extend	 the	 same	 principles	 to	
international	 arbitral	awards	in	its	subsequent	jurisprudence.	
	
Stran	 originated	 in	 an	 application	 against	 Greece	 lodged	 by	 two	 Greek	
nationals	 –	 a	 private	 limited	 company	 and	 its	 sole	 shareholder.	 The	 underlying	
dispute	 arose	 out	 of	 a	 construction	 contract	 concluded	 in	 1972	 between	 Stran	 and	
the	 then-existing	 Greek	 military	 regime,	 which	 the	 State	 unilaterally	 terminated	 in	
1977	 after	 the	 restoration	 of	 democracy.	 Stran	 commenced	 a	 domestic	 contractual	
arbitration	against	 the	State	and	 received	a	multi-million	dollar	final	award	in	1984.	 In	
subsequent	challenge	proceedings,	 the	Greek	 courts	 upheld	 the	 validity	of	 the	 award	
at	 first	 instance	 and	 in	 the	 court	 of	 appeals.	 Then	 in	 May	 1977,	 after	 the	 judge-
rapporteur	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Cassation	 had	 circulated	 a	 draft	 opinion	 ruling	 in	 favor	 of	
Stran,	 the	 Greek	 legislature	 passed	 a	 law	 retroactively	 voiding	 the	 contract	 and	 its	
arbitration	 clause,	 as	 well	 as	 any	 arbitration	 awards	 resulting	 from	 the	 contract.152	
The	 Court	 of	 Cassation	 ultimately	 upheld	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 that	 law	 and,	
accordingly,	annulled	Stran’s	award.153	
Before	 the	 ECtHR,	 Stran	 claimed	 that	 by	 annulling	 the	 award,	 the	 Greek	
legislature	and	 judiciary	had	violated	its	right	to	property	under	Article	1,	Protocol	1	of	
the	ECHR	(P1-	 1),	as	well	as	 its	right	to	a	fair	trial	under	the	Convention’s	Article	6	(as	
to	which	more	 will	be	said	below).	 P1-1	provides:	
	
Every	 natural	 or	 legal	 person	 is	 entitled	 to	 the	 peaceful	 enjoyment	 of	 his	
possessions.	 No	 one	 shall	 be	 deprived	 of	 his	 possessions	 except	 in	 the	 public	
interest	 and	 subject	 to	 the	 conditions	 provided	 for	 by	 law	 and	 by	 the	 general	
principles	of	international	law.	
The	preceding	provisions	 shall	 not,	 however,	 in	 any	way	 impair	 the	 right	 of	
a	 State	 to	 enforce	 such	 laws	 as	 it	 deems	 necessary	 to	 control	 the	 use	 of	 property	 in	
accordance	 with	 the	 general	 interest	 or	 to	 secure	 the	 payment	 of	 taxes	 or	 other	
contributions	or	penalties.154	
In	assessing	Stran’s	claim	that	Greece	wrongfully	interfered	with	its	property,	
the	ECtHR	 divided	its	analysis	into	three	questions:	(i)	whether	the	arbitral	award	was	a	
“possession”	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 P1-1;	 (ii)	 whether	 the	 State	 interfered	 with	
Stran’s	 rights	 in	 the	 award;	 and	 (iii)	 whether	 any	 such	 interference	 was	 justifiable	
under	the	“fair	balance”	test	 typically	applied	by	the	Court	in	P1-1	cases.	
As	 to	 the	 first	 question,	 the	Court	 held	 that	 an	 arbitral	 award	 constitutes	 a	
“possession”	 for	 purposes	 of	 P1-1,	 so	 long	 as	 it	 has	 “given	 rise	 to	 a	 debt	 in	 [the	
applicant’s]	favor	that	 was	sufficiently	established	to	be	enforceable.”	The	ECtHR	looked	
to	 domestic	 law	 in	 answering	 that	 question,	 determining	 that	 	 that	 “[u]nder	 Greek	
legislation	 arbitration	 awards	have	 the	 force	of	 final	decisions	and	are	deemed	to	be	
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enforceable,”	 and	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 appeal	 on	 the	 merits.	 The	 Court	 further	 noted	
that	 in	 Stran’s	 case,	 “the	 ordinary	 courts	 had	 .	 .	 .	 already	 twice	 held	 –	 at	 first	
instance	 and	 on	 appeal	 –	 that	 there	 was	no	ground	 for	 .	 .	 .	annulment.”	 Accordingly,	
and	despite	the	contrary	ruling	by	the	 Court	of	Cassation,	the	Court	held	the	award	to	
be	sufficiently	enforceable	to	constitute	a	 “possession”	within	the	meaning	of	P1-1.	
The	 Court	 had	 no	 difficulty	 finding	 governmental	 interference	 with	 Stran’s	
property,	 carried	 out	 by	 both	 the	 Greek	 legislature	 and	 the	 judiciary.	 Through	 those	
organs,	 the	 underlying	contract,	 the	arbitration	clause	and	 the	subsequent	award	had	
all	been	 voided.	
The	ECtHR	 then	 turned	 to	 the	 third	prong,	assessing	whether	 in	acting	as	 it	
did,	 the	 Greek	 State	 had	 struck	 “a	 fair	 balance	 .	 .	 .	 between	 the	 demands	 of	 the	
general	 interest	 to	 the	 community	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 the	
individual’s	 fundamental	 rights.”160	Greece	 attempted	 to	 justify	 its	 actions	 as	 being	
“part	of	a	body	of	measures	 designed	to	cleanse	public	 life	of	 the	disrepute	attaching	
to	 the	 military	 regime.”161	In	 assessing	 this	 submission,	 the	 Court	 acknowledged	 the	
State’s	 sovereign	prerogative	 to	 amend	or	terminate	contracts	concluded	with	private	
individuals,	but	determined	that	the	 exercise	of	 that	 right	entails	an	obligation	to	pay	
compensation.	 Further,	and	similar	to	 the	reasoning	of	the	investment	tribunal	in	ATA,	
the	 Court	 found	 that	 Greece	 had	 acted	 improperly	 by	 voiding	 the	 underlying	
contract’s	 arbitration	 clause.	 In	 the	 Court’s	 words,	 “to	 alter	 the	machinery	 set	 up	 by	
enacting	an	authoritative	amendment	to	such	a	 clause	would	make	it	possible	for	one	
of	the	parties	to	evade	jurisdiction	in	a	dispute	with	 respect	 to	 which	 specific	 provision	
was	 made	 for	 arbitration.”		 Taking	 all	 of	 these	 factors	 into	 consideration,	 and	 while	
recognizing	 Greece’s	 legitimate	 interest	 in	 expunging	 vestiges	 of	 the	 dictatorship	
period,	 the	 Court	 determined	 that	 Greece’s	 actions	 had	 upset	 the	 balance	 between	
protection	 of	 the	 right	 to	 property	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 public	 interest,	
resulting	 in	 a	 violation	 of	 P1-1.	 As	 explained	 further	 below,	 the	 Court	 also	 found	
Greece’s	 actions	 to	 be	 in	 violation	 of	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial	 under	 Article	6(1).		The	
Court	proceeded	to	award	Stran	full	compensation,	ordering		Greece	 to	 pay	 the	 entire	
value	 of	 the	 award,	 plus	 6%	 interest	 as	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 award	 itself.167	
The	 ECtHR	 has	 expounded	 upon	 the	 principles	 articulated	 in	 Stran	 in	 a	
series	of	cases	 decided	in	the	period	2008	to	2010.	The	result	has	been	the	extension	of	
the	 coverage	 of	 P1-1	 to	 the	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 international	 arbitral	
awards,	and	expansion	 of	the	scope	of	protections	due.	
First,	 as	 regards	 the	 threshold	 question	 of	 when	 an	 arbitral	 award	
constitutes	 a	 “possession,”	 the	 Court	 has	 confirmed	 that	 the	 protections	 of	 P1-1	
extend	 to	 arbitral	 awards	 rendered	 in	 international	 cases,	 irrespective	 of	 the	
nationality	of	the	parties	to	the	 underlying	arbitration,	or	how	the	applicant	came	into	
possession	 of	 the	 award.	 Regent	 Company	 v.	 Ukraine,	 decided	 in	 2008,	 involved	 an	
arbitral	 award	 rendered	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 Ukrainian	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	
in	 favor	 of	 a	 Czech	 company	 and	 against	 a	 State-owned	 corporation.	 After	 seeking	
to	 enforce	 the	 award	 in	 the	 Ukraine	 for	 four	 years,	 during	 which	 period	 the	 State-
owned	 respondent	 entered	 bankruptcy,	 the	 Czech	 company	 sold	 its	 award	 to	
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Regent	 Company.	 The	 latter,	 incorporated	 in	 the	 Seychelles	 and	 thus	 outside	 the	
CoE	 region,	 continued	 enforcement	 efforts	 in	 the	 Ukraine,	 but	 was	 stymied	 by	
recalcitrant	 bailiffs	 and	 a	 law	 staying	 the	 enforcement	 of	 debts	 against	 State-owned	
entities.	 Regent	 Company	 then	 turned	 to	 the	 ECtHR,	 which	 found	 the	 award	 to	 be	
sufficiently	 enforceable	 to	 constitute	 a	 “possession”	 for	 P1-1	 purposes.	 The	 Court	
applied	 a	 similar	 analysis	 two	 years	 later	 in	 Kin-Stib	 &	 Majkić	 v.	 Serbia,	 and	 	 went	
further	 still	 in	Sedelmayer	 v.	 Germany.	
	
In	 sum,	 the	 ECtHR’s	 jurisprudence	 establishes	 that	 a	 Member	 State	 may	
violate	 P1-1	 where	 its	 courts	 fail	 to	 recognize	 or	 enforce	 a	 commercial	 arbitration	
award,	 provided	 three	 conditions	 are	 met.	 First,	 to	 be	 protected	 under	 P1-1,	 an	
award	 must	 be	 “a	 possession”	 –	 meaning	 that	 it	 must	 be	 “sufficiently	 established	
to	 be	 enforceable.”181	 Second,	 the	 State	 must	 have	 interfered	 with	 this	 possession.	
Interference	 is	 a	 relatively	 broad	 concept	 that	 includes	 not	 only	 a	 State’s	 outright	
refusal	 to	 enforce	 an	 award,	 but	 also	 a	 failure	 to	 enforce	 fully	 and	 within	 a	
reasonable	 time.	 Third,	 the	 Court	 must	 determine	 whether	 any	 such	 interference	 is	
proportional	 –	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 pursuing	 a	 legitimate	 aim	 and	 fairly	 balancing	 that	
objective	 against	 the	 individual’s	 right	 to	 property.	 This	 will	 necessarily	 be	 a	 fact-
specific	 inquiry,	 as	 to	 which	 the	 Court	 has	 reached	 divergent	 results	 in	 the	 cases	
decided	thus	far.182	
Going	forward,	 the	chief	open	question	 relates	 to	the	first	prong	of	the	P1-1	
test.	 In	 all	 of	 the	 cases	 so	 far	 adjudicated,	 the	 underlying	 arbitral	 awards	 have	 either	
been	upheld	by	the	 national	courts	against	challenge	(in	Stran	and	Sedelmayer)	or	not	
challenged	 there	 (in	 Regent	 Company	 and	 Kin-Stib).	 It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 how	 the	
ECtHR	would	view	a	case	 in	which	an	arbitral	award	had	been	set	aside	in	the	country	
of	origin,	or	denied	 enforcement	in	another	forum,	on	arguably	proper	grounds.	 If	the	
investment	treaty	cases	 are	 	any	 	guide,	 	one		might	 	 surmise	 	 that	 	 the	 	Court	 	would		
require		evidence		of		court	malfeasance	 –	 or	 at	 least	 misfeasance	 –	 before	 finding	 a	
violation	 of	 P1-1	 in	 such	 circumstances.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 finding	 a	 violation	 under	 P1-1,	 Stran	 opened	 a	 second	
avenue	 through	 which	 a	 State	 may	 incur	 liability	 for	 preventing	 or	 impeding	 the	
enforcement	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award.	 That	 avenue	 is	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 and	 reasonably	
timely	 trial,	 as	 enshrined	 in	 Article	 6(1)	 of	 the	 ECHR.249	 Article	 6(1)	 provides:	 “In	 the	
determination	 of	 his	 civil	 rights	 and	 obligations	 .	 .	 .	 everyone	 is	 entitled	 to	 a	 fair	
and	 public	 hearing	 within	 a	 reasonable	time	by	an	independent	and	impartial	tribunal	
established	by	law.	.	.	.”	
																																																													
249	See	IACHR,	art.	21	(“(1)	Everyone	has	the	right	to	the	use	and	enjoyment	of	his	property.	The	law	may	
subordinate	 such	 use	 and	 enjoyment	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 society;	 (2)	 No	 one	 shall	 be	 deprived	 of	 his	
property	except	upon	payment	of	 just	compensation,	for	reasons	of	public	utility	or	social	 interest,	and	
in	 the	 cases	 and	 according	 to	 the	 forms	 established	 by	 law”);	 ACHPR,	 art.	 14	 (“The	 right	 to	 property	
shall	 be	 guaranteed.	 It	may	 only	 be	 encroached	 upon	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 public	 need	 or	 in	 the	 general	
interest	of	the	community	and	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	appropriate	laws”).	
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As	a	threshold	matter,	the	Court	confirmed	in	Stran	that	the	right	to	recover	
the	 proceeds	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	 constitutes	 a	 “civil	 right”	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	
Article	6(1).	 That	 civil	right,	the	Court	clarified,	exists	on	the	international	plane	under	
the	 ECHR,	 such	 that	 its	 content	 may	 not	 be	 assessed	 “solely	 by	 reference	 to	 the	
respondent	 State’s	 domestic	 law.”250	And	 as	 Regent	 Company	makes	 clear,	 that	 civil	
right	extends	to	any	subsequent	 purchaser	of	the	arbitral	award,	enabling	the	latter	to	
pursue	claims	before	the	ECHR.	
Article	6(1),	 as	 interpreted	by	 the	ECtHR	 in	Stran	and	 the	 subsequent	 cases	
cited	 above,	 imposes	 two	 obligations	 on	 ECHR	 Member	 States	 in	 respect	 of	 their	
treatment	 of	 arbitral	 awards:	 (a)	 a	 prohibition	 on	 unfair	 treatment	 of	 the	 award	
creditor	in	the	courts,	and	(b)	a	 requirement	of	reasonably	prompt	enforcement	action.	
	
With	 respect	 to	 the	 first	obligation,	 the	ECtHR	has	held	 that	 the	principle	of	
equality	 of	 arms	 lies	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 fair	 trial	 right.	 “In	 litigation	 involving	
opposing	 .	 .	 .	 interests,	 that	 equality	 implies	 that	 each	 party	 must	 be	 afforded	 a	
reasonable	opportunity	 to	present	his	case	–	under	conditions	that	do	not	place	him	at	
a	substantial	disadvantage	 vis-à-vis	his	opponent.”	 In	Stran,	the	Court	thus	found	fault	
with	 both	 the	 timing	 and	 manner	 of	 Greece’s	 legislative	 intervention	 into	 the	
applicant’s	 enforcement	 proceedings	 in	 the	 Greek	 courts.	 As	 explained	 above,	 after	
the	 Court	 of	 Cassation	 had	 indicated	 to	 the	 parties	 that	 it	 would	 rule	 in	 favor	 of	
Stran,	 the	 legislature	 passed	 a	 law	 retroactively	 nullifying	 Stran’s	 claim	 and	 the	
underlying	 arbitration	 agreement.	 The	 ECtHR	 ruled	 that	 Article	 6(1)	 precludes	 “any	
interference	 by	 the	 legislature	 with	 the	 administration	 of	 justice	 designed	 to	
influence	 the	 judicial	 determination	 of	 the	 [particular]	 dispute.”	 Applying	 that	
standard	 to	 the	 facts,	 the	 Court	 held	 the	 Greek	 State	 in	 violation	 of	 Article	 6(1)	 for	
“intervening	 in	 a	 manner	 which	 was	 decisive	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 –	 imminent	 –	
outcome	of	proceedings	in	which	it	was	a	party	was	favourable	to	it.”	
The	second	standard	imposed	by	Article	6(1)	relates	to	reasonableness	of	the	
duration	 of	 enforcement	 proceedings.	 As	 noted	 earlier,	 Regent	 Company	 concerned	
an	 arbitration	 award	 originally	 rendered	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 Czech	 company	 against	 a	
Ukrainian	 State-owned	 company	 (Oriana),	 which	 later	 became	 insolvent.	 The	
original	 award	 creditor	 and	 its	 successor-in-interest	 pursued	 enforcement	 of	 the	
award	 in	 the	 Ukrainian	 courts	 beginning	 in	 1999,	 but	 to	 no	 avail.	 By	 2005,	 the	
responsible	State	entities	had	ceased	any	effort	to	 enforce	the	award	against	Oriana’s	
assets.	 Ruling	 in	 2008,	 the	 Court	 determined	 that	 ten	 years	 was	 an	 unreasonably	
long	 delay	 for	 the	 enforcement	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award,	 especially	given	 that	no	 recent	
steps	 had	been	 taken	by	Ukrainian	 authorities	 to	 remedy	 the	situation.	In	 the	Court’s	
view,	neither	 the	 insolvency	of	 the	State-owned	company,	 nor	 the	 delays	 inherent	 in	
appropriations	 for	 the	 payment	 of	 State	 debts,	 could	 excuse	 such	a	 long	delay.	 As	a	
result,	the	Court	held	the	Ukraine	in	violation	of	Article	6(1).	
	
																																																													
250	Stran,	para	39.	
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4.1.7 Conclusion	on	the	Human	Rights	Courts	
	
The	 regional	 human	 rights	 courts	 –	 and	 in	 particular	 the	 ECtHR	 –	 provide	 a	
potential	 avenue	 of	 public	 law	 redress	 to	 award	 creditors	 frustrated	 by	 a	 State’s	
interference	 with	 the	 arbitral	 process	 or	 an	 arbitral	 award.	 While	 there	 are	
substantial	 gateway	 issues	 limiting	access	 to	 the	 three	human	 rights	 courts	 surveyed	
above,	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 has	 developed	 in	 a	 reasonably	 protective	
manner.	 A	 State’s	 wrongful	 annulment	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	 or	 agreement,	 or	 its	
failure	 to	 enforce	 a	 binding	 award	 in	 full	 and	 within	 a	 reasonable	 (if	 expansive)	
timeframe,	 can	 result	 in	 liability	under	either	P1-1	or	 Article	6	of	the	ECHR.	The	chief	
open	 question	 concerns	 when	 an	 arbitral	 award	 will	 be	 sufficiently	 enforceable	 to	
constitute	 “property”	 for	 purposes	 of	 the	 P1-1	 (or	 Article	 6)	 analysis,	 and	 in	
particular	 the	 level	 of	 scrutiny	 the	 Court	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 apply	 in	 cases	 of	
arguably	justified	setting-aside	or	non-enforcement.	
	
	
4.2 Mitigating	 the	 Problem	 of	 Sovereign	 Immunity	 against	 Execution	 of	
Investment	Awards:	A	Systemic	Solution	by		Olga	Gerlich	251	
	
Absent	 the	 respondent	 state’s	 voluntary	 compliance	 with	 the	 award,	
investors	are	likely	to	be	left	with	no	effective	remedy	to	execute	the	award	due	to	the	
principle	 of	 state	 immunity	 from	 execution.	 Proposals	 for	 a	 systemic	 solution	 to	 the	
problem	 of	 state	 immunity	 from	 execution	 in	 collection	 of	 international	 investment	
awards	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 three	 groups:	 those	 pertaining	 to	 a	 change	 of	 general	
international	 law	 on	 sovereign	 immunity,	 solutions	 incorporated	 into	 the	 investment	
law	regime,	and	proposals	related	to	a	more	efficient	use	of	the	existing	framework	
	
4.2.1 A	change	in	international	law	
	
The	 ideal	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 would	 require	 a	 change	 in	 general	
international	law	on	the	issue.	States	would	need	to	adopt	uniform	restrictive	rules	on	
state	 immunity	 from	 execution.	 This	 could	 be	 achieved,	 to	 some	 extent,	 once	 the	
United	Nations	Convention	on	 Jurisdictional	 Immunities	of	States	 and	Their	Property	
(UNCSI	)		enters	into	force.	However,	it	is	unlikely	that	it	would	reach	a	ratification	rate	
similar	to	that	of	the	New	York	or	ICSID	Conventions.242	Moreover,	the	rules	contained	
in	 the	 UNCSI	 lack	 specificity	 and	 leave	 a	 substantial	 “grey	 area”	 which	 allows	 for	
diverging	interpretations	by	states	in	relation	to	the	commercial	purpose	of	the	use	of	
																																																													
251	See	State	Immunity	from	Execution	in	the	Collection	of	Awards	Rendered	in	International	Investment	
Arbitration:	 The	 Achilles'	 Heel	 of	 the	 Investor-State	 Arbitration	 System?,	 American	 Review	 of	
International	Arbitration,	Vol.	26(1)	2015	
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state	 property	 in	 Article	 18(1)(c).243	 Therefore,	 a	 creation	 of	 a	 uniform	 regime	 on	
sovereign	 immunity	 from	 execution	 in	 collection	 of	 international	 investment	 awards,	
even	though	adoption	of	the	UNCSI	by	parties	to	the	ICSID	and	New	York	Conventions,	
is	very	unlikely.	
	
4.2.2 General	Reform	of	investment	law	regime	
	
With	regard	to	potential	reform	of	investment	law,	it	is	argued	that	creating	a	
lex	specialis	regime	within	international	investment	law	is	more	realistic	than	adopting	
an	 overarching	 set	 of	 rules	 on	 state	 immunity	 by	 the	 international	 community.	 This	
could	be	achieved	by	adopting	amendments	to	the	existing	investment	law	treaties	or	
creating	of	a	specialized	treaty	or	soft	 law	 instrument	on	state	 immunity.	The	 former	
solution	is	unfeasible	given	the	number	of	existing	international	investment	treaties.	It	
would	be	unfeasible	for	states	to	review	over	3000	treaties	existing	at	the	moment	to	
introduce	 amendments	 relating	 to	 execution	 of	 international	 investment	 awards.252	
With	regard	to	harmonization	of	domestic	regimes	through	a	soft	law	instrument,	Fox	
proposed	 the	 adoption	 of	 minimal	 international	 standards	 on	 state	 immunity	 from	
execution	 in	 collection	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 through	 an	 UNCITRAL	 Model	 Law	 on	
attachment	 of	 state	 property	 and	 collection	 of	 international	 arbitration	 awards.245	
Individual	states	could	adopt	the	Model	Law	by	incorporating	it	into	their	domestic	law.	
The	plausibility	of	this	solution	is	informed	by	the	large	success	of	the	UNCITRAL	Model	
Law	on	International	Commercial	Arbitration	which	was	incorporated	in	more	than	60	
jurisdictions.	The	rules	should	also	address	special	regimes	of	immunity	from	execution,	
such	as	these	applicable	to	property	of	embassies	and	central	banks.	These	rules	should	
adopt	a	creditor-friendly	approach	expressed	in	balanced	principles	on	burden	of	proof.	
Moreover,	 such	 rules	 could	 provide	 for	 a	 uniform	 procedure	 on	 recognition,	
enforcement,	and	execution	of	 the	awards	and	eliminate	 the	problems	 related	 to	 the	
application	of	collection	mechanisms	under	the	ICSID	Convention.		
	
4.2.3 Specific	solutions	of	investment	regime	
	
According	 to	 Olga	 Gerlich	 rather	 than	 creating	 a	 comprehensive	 set	 of	 lex	
specialis	principles	on	state	immunity,	some	more	specific	solutions	could	be	adopted.	
An	 example	 of	 such	 a	 solution	 could	 be	 to	 establish	waivers	 of	 state	 immunity	 from	
execution.	The	wording	of	such	waivers	was	proposed	by	the	ICSID	in	Model	Clause	15.	
It	reads:	“the	Host	State	hereby	waives	any	right	of	sovereign	immunity	as	to	it	and	its	
																																																													
252	The	most	comprehensive	database	for	 international	 investment	agreements	by	the	UNCTAD	covers	
more	 than	 3400	 treaties	 see	 UNCTAD,	 IIA	 Database,	 available	 at	
http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/IIA-Tools.aspx.	
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property	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 enforcement	 and	 execution	 of	 any	 award	 rendered	 by	 an	
Arbitral	Tribunal	constituted	pursuant	to	this	agreement”.253		
Until	 now,	 states	 have	 been	 reluctant	 and	 hesitant	 to	 include	 waivers	 of	
immunity	in	their	investment	treaties.	Generally,	investment	treaties	do	not	include	any	
provisions	relating	to	enforcement	and	execution	of	international	investment	awards	in	
the	investment	treaties.	Changing	the	investment	law	regime	through	wide	adoption	of	
waivers	 of	 state	 immunity	 from	 execution	 is	 unfeasible	 due	 to	 the	 large	 number	 of	
investment	agreements.	Moreover,	general	waivers,	such	as	that	proposed	by	the	ICSID	
Model	clause,	could	create	some	interpretational	difficulties.	
	
Another	 alternative,	 but	 in	 my	 opinion	 a	 weak	 solution,	 would	 be	 a	
mechanism	 established	 by	 international	 convention	 whereby	 a	 fund	 would	 pay	
amounts	due	to	creditors	under	awards	against	participating	states.	Such	a	fund	could	
be	administered	by	the	 ICSID	and	established	through	contributions	from	contracting	
states	 to	 the	Convention,	 from	which	eligible	debts	would	be	paid.	Such	a	 solution	 is	
unlikely	to	raise	controversies	related	to	the	existing	rules	on	state	 immunity.	Among	
the	exceptions	from	the	principle	of	state	immunity	from	execution,	only	earmarking	is	
not	subject	to	differential	treatment	in	domestic	jurisdictions	or	creates	interpretational	
problems.	 However,	 there	 are	 some	 practical	 difficulties	 concerning	 such	 a	 solution.	
States	that	were	challenged	in	investment	arbitration	disputes	will	consider	themselves	
likely	 to	 benefit	 from	 such	 a	 solution,	 whereas	 states	 that	 do	 not	 have	 similar	
experience	may	find	the	incentive	to	join	such	a	fund	insufficient.	
	
a. transparency	of	domestic	laws	
	
The	 least	 invasive	 solutions,	 which,	 however,	 do	 not	 provide	 a	 systemic	
solution	 to	 the	 problem,	would	 include	 increased	 transparency	 of	 domestic	 laws.	 For	
example,	 the	 relevant	 laws	 on	 execution	 and	 state	 immunity	 in	 state	 parties	 to	 the	
ICSID	Convention	could	be	published	by	the	ICSID	Secretariat.		
	
b. insurance	coverage	
	
Another	 solution,	 as	 seen	above,	 	would	be	extending	 the	protection	under	
award	arbitration	default	insurance	coverage	available	in	contract-based	arbitrations	to	
investment	arbitrations.		
	
	
4.3 Post-Award	remedies	available	directly	to	investors	:	Post-award	settlement	
	
																																																													
253 ICSID	 Model	 Clauses,	 available	 at	
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?actionVal=ModelClauses&requestType=ICSIDDocRH.	
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A	post-award	settlement	can	be	an	alternative	to	voluntary	compliance	with	
an	 award	 and	 to	 the	use	of	 the	 collection	mechanism	 involving	 action	on	 the	part	 of	
domestic	 courts.	 Post-arbitral	 award	 settlement	 refers	 to	 an	 agreement	 concluded	
between	 the	parties	 to	 the	original	 award,	after	 the	award	has	been	 rendered	by	 the	
arbitral	 tribunal,	which	modifies	 the	 rights	 and	obligations	 arising	 from	 the	award	by	
changing	 the	 terms	 of	 its	 performance.254	In	 exchange	 for	 a	 guarantee	 of	 prompt	
payment,	an	investor	may	agree	to	a	lower	amount	of	compensation,	a	different	time	
frame,	 or	 payment	 in	 instalments.255	The	 quantitative	 data	 gathered	 in	 a	 survey	
conducted	 by	 Mistelis	 and	 Baltag	 in	 2008	 reveal	 that	 54%	 of	 the	 participating	
corporations	negotiated	a	post-award	settlement	amounting	to	over	50%	of	the	award,	
whereas	 35%	 of	 the	 corporations	 settled	 for	 an	 amount	 in	 excess	 of	 75%	 of	 the	
award.256
	
	
Investors	may	be	 likely	 to	accept	post-award	 settlement	 in	order	 to	avoid	a	
potentially	 lengthy	 and	 costly	 process	 of	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 the	 award.	
The	 difficulty	 of	 locating	 assets	 of	 a	 recalcitrant	 state	 susceptible	 of	 attachment	 in	 a	
third	 state	 can	 be	 another	 reason	why	 investors	 are	 inclined	 to	 settle	 in	 a	 particular	
case.	Post-award	settlement	might	also	be	regarded	as	an	alternative	to	enforcement	
when	the	investor	wishes	to	maintain	reasonably	good	business	relations	with	the	host	
state	or	a	third	state	linked	to	it.257	Although	such	settlements	are	rarely	made	public,	
there	are	reported	cases	of	investors	having	negotiated	post-award	settlements.258		For	
example,	 in	 2013	Argentina	 reached	a	post-award	 settlement	with	 award	 creditors	 in	
the	CMS,	Azurix,	Vivendi,	Continetal	Casualty,	and	National	Grid	cases.259	The	investors	
agreed	to	a	lower	amount	of	compensation,	paid	in	the	form	of	Argentinian	sovereign	
bonds.	
	
4.3.1 Claim	the	failure	to	Enforce	as	a	violation	of	investor’s	rights	under	a	
BIT		
	
																																																													
254	See,	Loukas	Mistelis	&	Crina	Baltag,	Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	and	Settlement	
and	 International	 Arbitration:	 Corporate	 Attitudes	 and	 Practices,	 19	 AM.	 REV.	 INT'L	 ARB.	 319,	 324	
(2008).	
255	Ibidem.	
256	Ibidem.	
257 	Jorge	 E.	 Viñuales	 &	 Dolores	 Bentolila,	 The	 Use	 of	 Alternative	 (Non-Judicial)	 Means	 to	 Enforce	
Investment	Awards	against	States,	 in	DIPLOMATIC	AND	JUDICIAL	MEANS	OF	DISPUTE	SETTLEMENT	
247,	257	(Laurence	Boisson	de	Chazournes,	et	al	eds.,	2012).	
258	For	 instance,	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 post–award	 settlement	 in	 Cargill	 v.	Mexico	 remain	 undisclosed.	See	
Nate	 Raymond,	 REUTERS,	 Cargill	 settles	 NAFTA	 dispute	 with	 Mexico	 (Feb.	 21,	 2013),	 at	
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/22/cargill-mexico-idUSL1N0BLEIU20130222.	
259 	Allen	 &	 Overy	 Publications,	 Argentina	 settles	 five	 investment	 treaty	 awards,	 available	 at	
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Argentina-settles-five-investment-treaty-
awards.aspx.	
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Hypothetically,	a	failure	to	recognize,	enforce,	or	execute	an	award	could	be	
considered	a	violation	of	investor’s	rights	under	a	BIT,	i.e.,	an	expropriation	or	a	denial	
of	 justice.	Such	 suggestion	 relies	on	a	determination	of	whether	 claims	 related	 to	 an	
award	 can	be	 regarded	as	 an	 investment	 enabling	 an	 investment	 tribunal	 to	 exercise	
jurisdiction.	The	application	of	such	a	proposition	in	practice	is	conceivable	taking	into	
consideration	some	more	recent	arbitral	jurisprudence.	
	
State	 responsibility	 for	 non-enforcement	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	 was	 first	
confirmed	in	Saipem	v.	Bangladesh.260	The	claimant	instituted	proceedings	at	the	ICSID	
in	 connection	 with	 the	 alleged	 violation	 of	 the	 expropriation	 provision	 of	 the	 Italy	 -	
Bangladesh	 BIT	 through	 interference	 of	 Bangladeshi	 courts	 with	 an	 ICC	 award.	 The	
dispute	before	 the	 ICC	 concerned	a	 contract	 for	 construction	of	 a	 pipeline	 concluded	
between	 Saipem,	 an	 Italian	 company,	 and	 Petrobangla,	 a	 Bangladeshi	 State-owned	
company.	The	ICC	tribunal	rendered	an	award	in	favour	of	Saipem.	On	the	subsequent	
application	by	Petrobangla	 to	set	aside	 the	award,	 the	Supreme	Court	of	Bangladesh	
held	 that	 the	award	 “is	a	nullity	 in	 the	eye	of	 the	 law	and	 ...	 cannot	be	 treated	as	an	
Award	in	the	eye	of	the	law	as	it	is	clearly	illegal	and	without	jurisdiction”.	
	
Consequently,	it	found	the	award	non-existent.	As	such	it	could	neither	be	set	
aside	 nor	 enforced.	 Saipem	 argued	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 enforcement	 deprived	 it	 of	 the	
compensation	 award	 which	 thus	 constituted	 an	 unlawful	 expropriation.	 The	 ICSID	
tribunal	 found	 jurisdiction	 and	 held	 that	 the	 unlawful	 interference	 of	 the	 court	
amounted	 to	 expropriation	 and	decided	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 investor.	 For	 the	purpose	of	
determining	whether	there	is	an	investment	under	Article	25	of	the	ICSID	Convention,	
the	tribunal	considered	the	entire	operation	and	decided	that	the	dispute	arose	out	of	
the	overall	investment.	According	to	the	tribunal,	the	award	only	crystallized	the	rights	
and	obligations	under	the	original	contract.		
The	 above	 analysis	 of	 the	 jurisprudence	 shows	 that	 a	 failure	 to	 execute	 an	
investment	arbitration	award	can	indeed	be	considered	a	violation	of	the	expropriation	
provisions	 of	 an	 investment	 treaty.	 The	 condition	 for	 a	 tribunal	 to	 make	 such	 a	
determination	is	that	the	overall	operation	which	gave	rise	to	the	claims	adjudicated	in	
the	award	must	qualify	as	an	“investment”.	
	
	
4.4 Remedies	Involving	Action	by	the	State	of	Nationality	of	the	Investor	
	
																																																													
260	Saipem	SpA	v.	People’s	Republic	of	Bangladesh,	ICSID	Case	No	ARB/05/7,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction	and	
Recommendation	on	Provisional	Measures	(Mar.	21,	2007)	[hereinafter:	Saipem,	Jurisdiction].	
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4.4.1 Interstate	 proceedings:	 Diplomatic	 protection	 according	 to	 Art.	 27	
ICSID	Convention	
	
Diplomatic	protection	is	an	alternative	and	supplement	to	the	mechanism	for	
collection	 of	 awards	 in	 Articles	 53	 -	 55	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention.	 The	 possibility	 of	
recourse	to	diplomatic	protection	as	a	remedy	available	in	case	of	non-compliance	with	
awards,	 recognized	 in	 Article	 27	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 was	 designed	 to	
counterbalance	state	immunity	against	execution	preserved	by	Article	55.	According	to	
Article	 27,	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 Convention	 renounce	 their	 right	 to	 grant	 diplomatic	
protection	to	 their	nationals	or	 to	bring	an	 international	claim	 in	 relation	to	a	dispute	
that	 they	 have	 consented	 to	 submit	 to	 arbitration,	 unless	 another	 contracting	 state	
“has	failed	to	abide	by	and	comply	with	the	award	rendered	in	such	dispute”.	Article	27	
allows	 for	 two	 types	 of	 international	 recourse	 related	 to	 breach	 of	 the	 obligation	 to	
comply	 with	 awards.	 Firstly,	 the	 state	 of	 the	 investor’s	 nationality	 can	 espouse	 the	
claim	 of	 the	 investor	 and	 exercise	 diplomatic	 protection.	 Secondly,	 the	 state	 of	 the	
investor’s	nationality	can	initiate	interstate	proceedings	without	resorting	to	diplomatic	
protection.	
Diplomatic	protection	is	a	concept	of	customary	international	law	whereby	a	
state	espouses	the	claim	of	its	national	based	on	an	injury	caused	by	an	internationally	
wrongful	act	by	another	state	and	pursues	it	 in	its	own	name.261	Despite	of	the	lack	of	
provisions	 explicitly	 allowing	 for	 diplomatic	 protection,	 an	 investor’s	 claim	 can	 be	
espoused	by	a	state	in	cases	of	non-compliance	with	non-ICSID	awards.	Violation	of	the	
obligation	to	comply	with	the	investment	award	under	international	law	should	provide	
a	 sufficient	basis	 for	a	 state	 to	espouse	 the	claims	of	 its	nationals	 in	accordance	with	
customary	international	law.	
Customary	 international	 law	 sets	 forth	 three	 conditions	 for	 exercising	
diplomatic	 protection	 by	 a	 state	 in	 relation	 to	 an	 injured	 person:	 a	 violation	 of	
international	 law,	exhaustion	of	 local	 remedies,	 and	a	 link	of	nationality	between	 the	
person	 and	 the	 state	 exercising	 protection.	 Article	 17	 of	 the	 ILC	 Draft	 Articles	 on	
Diplomatic	 Protection	 provides	 that	 the	 rules	 codified	 therein	 “do	 not	 apply	 to	 the	
extent	that	they	are	inconsistent	with	special	rules	of	 international	 law,	such	as	treaty	
provisions	for	the	protection	of	investments”.	
	
This	 can	 modify	 the	 requirements	 in	 relation	 to	 diplomatic	 protection	
exception	in	non-compliance	with	investment	awards.	
	
For	 what	 concerns	 the	 test	 of	 nationality	 of	 corporations	 for	 purposes	 of	
diplomatic	protection	exercised	in	accordance	with	Article	27	of	the	ICSID	Convention,		
																																																													
261	Draft	 Articles	 on	 Diplomatic	 Protection,	 Article	 1.	 Draft	 Articles	 on	 Diplomatic	 Protection	 with	
commentaries,	in	Report	of	the	International	Law	Commission	to	the	General	Assembly	on	the	works	of	its	
fifty-eighth	Session,	U.N.	GAOR,	51st	Sess,	Supp	No.	10,	UN	Doc	A/61/10	(2006),	22,	24-25,	paras	2-3.	
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the	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ)	has	traditionally	adhered	to	a	test	focused	on	the	
locus	of	the	corporation’s	registered	seat	and/or	of	its	incorporation.	A	similar	test	has	
been	formulated	in	Article	9	of	the	ILC	Draft	Articles	on	Diplomatic	protection.	Article	
25(2)(b)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	offers	a	more	flexible	model	in	which	the	parties	may	
determine	 the	 nationality	 of	 the	 foreign	 investor	 by	 agreement	 under	 certain	
circumstances.	For	purposes	of	non-compliance	claims	under	the	ICSID	Convention,	the	
nationality	test	under	Article	25	should	be	respected.	
The	 exclusion	 of	 the	 requirement	 of	 exhaustion	 of	 local	 remedies	 in	 ICSID	
Article	26	should	
also	 apply	 to	 cases	 of	 diplomatic	 protection	 for	 non-compliance.	 It	 seems,	
however,	that	the	 investor	should	first	use	the	mechanism	for	collection	of	the	award	
under	Article	 54	 of	 the	 ICSID	Convention.	Moreover,	 during	 negotiation	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention,	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 resort	 to	 diplomatic	 protection	 was	 regarded	 as	 an	
extrema	ratio	and	a	necessary	check	on	the	shield	provided	to	host	states	by	immunity	
from	 execution.	 This	 would	 imply	 that	 diplomatic	 protection	 can	 be	 exercised	 only	
when	the	investor	is	not	able	to	recover	his	award	under	the	ordinary	action	under	the	
ICSID	collection	mechanism	in	Article	54.	
	
	
	
4.4.2 Countermeasures	and	Inducement	
	
	
In	 the	 same	 way,	 the	 home	 State	 may	 have	 recourse	 to	 countermeasures	
subject	 to	 the	 observance	 of	 all	 the	 customary	 international	 law	 requirements.	 For	
example,	in	Archer	Daniels	v	Mexico,	the	Respondent	State	relied	on	countermeasures	
allegedly	taken	in	response	to	the	United	States’	prior	wrongful	act	in	order	to	justify	its	
imposition	of	a	20	percent	excise	tax	on	soft	drinks	and	syrups.262	
	
Thirdly,	As	 suggested	by	Bjorklund,	 ‘[i]ndividual	 states	may	also	attempt	 to	
influence	a	foreign	government’s	actions.	For	example,	 in	the	United	States,	the	1961	
Foreign	Aid	Act	 (modified	 by	 the	 1994	Helms	Amendment),	 limits	 foreign	 aid	 to	 any	
country	 that	 has	 ‘‘nationalized	 or	 expropriated	 the	 property	 of	 any	 United	 States	
person’’	and	has	not	‘provided	adequate	and	effective	compensation	.	.	.	,	as	required	by	
international	 law.’191	 Thus,	with	 regard	 to	 the	Santa	Elena	dispute,	 the	United	States	
government	 pressured	 the	 government	 of	 Costa	 Rica	 (so	 that	 the	 latter	 consents	 to	
ICSID	Jurisdiction)	by	threatening	to	invoke	the	Helms	Amendment.	
	
																																																													
262	Archer	Daniels	Midland	Company	and	Tate	&	Lyle	Ingredients	Americas,	Inc	v	United	Mexican	States,	
ICSID	 Case	 No	 	 ARB(AF)/04/05,	 	 Award	 	 (21	 	 November	 	 2007)	 	 paras	 	 89,	 	 180.	 	 Seehowever	 Inna		
Uchkunova		and	Oleg	Temnikov,	‘In	Someone	Else’s	Shoes:	Are	the	Investor’s	Rights	His	Ownor	Those	of	
the	Home	State?’	
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Moreover,	 as	 stated	 in	 Mitchell	 v	 Congo,	 ‘[a]	 State’s	 refusal	 to	 enforce	 an	
ICSID	 award	may	 have	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	 State’s	 position	 in	 the	 international	
community	with	respect	to	the	continuation	of	international	financing	or	the	inflow	of	
other	investments.’	
	
	
4.4.3 Recourse	to	the	ICJ	according	to	Art.	64	of	ICSID	Convention	
	
	
With	reference	to	the	second	type	of	non-compliance	claims,	Article	64	of	the	
ICSID	Convention	 provides	 that	 disputes	 between	 contracting	 parties	 concerning	 the	
interpretation	or	application	of	the	Convention	are	to	be	referred	to	the	ICJ.	The	scope	
of	this	provision	is	broader	than	that	of	Article	27	and,	arguably,	allows	for	submission	
of	a	dispute	relating	to	compliance	with	the	Convention	to	the	ICJ	by	every	state	party	
to	 the	 Convention	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 without	 the	 necessity	 to	 prove	 a	 connection	 of	
nationality	to	an	aggrieved	investor.	Moreover,	resort	to	the	ICJ	would	also	be	possible	
against	a	state	party	to	the	ICSID	Convention	that	was	not	a	party	to	the	original	ICSID	
proceedings	if	it	fails	to	recognize	and	enforce	an	award	in	violation	of	Article	54.	Many	
bilateral	 investment	 agreements	 contain	 similar	 provisions	 on	 state-to-state	 dispute	
settlement	 relating	 to	 interpretation	 and	 application	 of	 those	 agreements.263	Some	
investment	treaties	also	expressly	provide	for	state-to–state	arbitration	in	case	of	non-
compliance	with	awards,	 such	as	under	Article	 1136(5)	of	North	American	Free	Trade	
Agreement	(NAFTA).	
	
	In	case	of	a	 failure	to	comply	with	an	award	by	the	state	of	nationality,	 the	
investor	may	 request	 the	 Free	 Trade	 Commission	 to	 establish	 a	 panel	 in	 accordance	
with	NAFTA	Article	 1136(5).	 The	 panel	 can	 declare	 the	 failure	 to	 abide	 by	 the	 award	
inconsistent	 with	 the	 obligations	 under	 the	 Agreement	 and	 recommend	 that	 the	
recalcitrant	state	party	comply	with	the	award.309	To	date	the	establishment	of	a	panel	
under	Article	 1136(5)	 of	NAFTA	has	 not	 been	 requested.	A	 compliance	mechanism	 is	
																																																													
263	E.g.	Agreement	between	the	Republic	of	India	and	the	Kingdom	of	the	Netherlands	for	the	Promotion	
and	 Protection	 of	 Investments,	 Nov.	 6,	 1995,	 Article	 10,	 available	 at	
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1584;	 Agreement	 Between	 the	
Government	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Turkey	 and	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 Islamic	 Republic	 of	 Pakistan	
Concerning	 the	Reciprocal	 Promotion	 and	 Protection	 of	 Investments,	May	 22,	 2012	 (not	 yet	 in	 force).	
Article	 12,	 available	 at	 http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2134,	 Agreement	
Between	 the	 Government	 of	 Canada	 and	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 People's	 Republic	 of	 China	 for	 the	
Promotion	 and	 Reciprocal	 Protection	 of	 Investments,	 Sept.	 9,	 2012	 (not	 yet	 into	 force),	 Article	 1,	
available	at	http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/600	North	American	Free	Trade	
Agreement,	Dec.,	171992,	32	 I.L.M.	289.	NAFTA,	supra	note,	Article	1136(5).	2012	United	States	Model	
Bilateral	Investment	Treaty,	available	at	http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.	2004	
Model	 Canada	 Foreign	 Investment	 Promotion	 and	 Protection	 Agreement,	 available	 at	
http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf.	
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also	provided	in	Article	34(8)	of	the	2012	United	States	Model	BIT.310	It	allows	for	state-
to-state	proceedings	before	an	arbitration	tribunal	which	can	make	determinations	as	
to	 whether	 the	 non-compliance	 of	 the	 respondent	 state	 is	 consistent	 with	 its	
obligations	 under	 the	 Convention	 and	 recommend	 that	 the	 respondent	 abide	 by	 or	
comply	with	the	award.	A	similar	mechanism	is	prescribed	by	Article	45(5)	of	the	2004	
Canadian	model	BIT.311	
	
4.4.4 Diplomatic	Pressure:	retorsion	and	reprisals	
 
The	unilateral	measures	of	retaliation	that	can	be	taken	by	a	state	to	compel	
another	 state	 to	 comply	with	 obligations	 under	 international	 law	 can	 be	 divided	 into	
two	 categories.	 The	 first	 describes	 measures	 which	 do	 not	 interfere	 with	 countries’	
rights	and	obligations	under	international	law	(retorsion);	whereas	the	second	refers	to	
measures	which	would	 otherwise	 be	 inconsistent	with	 international	 law	 as	 breaching	
the	 rights	 of	 the	 target	 state	 under	 international	 law	 (reprisals).264	Within	 the	 first	
category,	 a	 state	 could	 suspend	 trade	benefits	granted	 to	host	 states	 in	 case	of	non-
compliance	with	arbitration	awards	rendered	in	favour	of	the	first	state’s	nationals.	The	
Generalized	System	of	Preferences	(“GSP”)	established	by	the	Enabling	Clause	allows	
members	 of	 the	World	 Trade	Organization	 to	 reduce	 or	 eliminate	 tariffs	 on	 imports	
from	developing	 states	without	 necessitating	 the	 lowering	 of	 tariffs	 on	 imports	 from	
developed	states	without	violating	the	Most	Favoured	Nation	obligation.	This	regime	is	
optional	 for	 developing	 countries	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 have	 a	 right	 to	 include	
programs	in	their	national	laws,	but	they	do	not	have	an	obligation	to	do	so.	Currently,	
only	select	countries	maintain	GPS	programs.	Suspension	of	trade	benefits	applied	as	a	
form	of	retorsion	for	failure	to	comply	with	investment	awards	already	has	a	precedent.	
In	May	2012	the	United	States	suspended	Argentina’s	preferential	status	under	its	GSP.	
The	suspension	was	a	response	to	Argentina’s	failure	to	comply	with	the	ICSID	awards	
rendered	in	favour	of	United	States	investors	in	CMS,	Azurix,	and	Continental	Casualty.	
The	 United	 States’	 Trade	 Act	 of	 1974	 explicitly	 provides	 that	 the	 President	 shall	 not	
designate	a	developing	country	as	a	beneficiary	of	the	GSP	if	that	country	fails	to	act	in	
good	 faith	 in	 recognizing	as	binding	or	 in	enforcing	arbitral	awards	 in	 favor	of	United	
States	citizens	or	corporations.265		
	
																																																													
264	Articles	on	Responsibility	of	States	for	Internationally	Wrongful	Acts	with	commentaries,	in	Report	of	
the	 International	 Law	 Commission	 on	 the	 work	 of	 its	 fifty-third	 session,	 U.N.	 Doc	 A/56/10,	 reprinted	 in	
[2001]	2(2)Y.B.	INT’L	L.	COMM’N,	(UNDOC	A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1	(Part	2)	30,	128,¶3.	
265Trade	Act,	 19	U.S.C.,	 c12,	 §	 2462(b)(2)(E)	 (1974)	 (“[t]he	 President	 shall	 not	 designate	 any	 country	 a	
beneficiary	 developing	 country	 under	 this	 subchapter	 if	 …	 .	 Such	 country	 fails	 to	 act	 in	 good	 faith	 in	
recognizing	as	binding	or	in	enforcing	arbitral	awards	in	favour	of	United	States	citizens	or	a	corporation,	
partnership,	 or	 association	which	 is	 50	 per	 cent	 or	more	 beneficially	 owned	 by	United	 States	 citizens,	
which	have	been	made	by	arbitrators	appointed	for	each	case	or	by	permanent	arbitral	bodies	to	which	
the	parties	involved	have	submitted	their	dispute”).	
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Moreover,	 the	 state	 of	 investor’s	 nationality	 can	 lobby	 in	 international	
financial	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 International	 Monetary	 Fund,	 to	
withhold	loans	to	host	states	which	fail	to	comply	with	investment	arbitration	awards.	
Operational	Policy	 7.40	of	 the	World	Bank	 specifically	 addresses	 such	a	 situation	and	
provides	 that	 the	 World	 Bank	 takes	 an	 interest	 in	 disputes	 over	 a	 failure	 to	 service	
external	 debt.	As	 a	 consequence,	 the	World	Bank	 can	decide	not	 to	make	new	 loans	
when	the	country	is	unwilling	to	take	steps	to	resolve	such	a	dispute.266	A	state	of	origin	
can	also	vote	against	granting	loans	to	the	state	which	is	in	breach	of	its	obligation	to	
comply	with	the	award	in	these	institutions.	With	regard	to	measures	inconsistent	with	
international	 rights	 of	 a	 state	 that	 fails	 to	 comply	with	 an	 award,	 possible	measures	
include	withholding	payments	due	 to	a	 state	or	 freezing	assets	of	 the	host	 state	 that	
are	 located	 in	 the	state	which	takes	 reprisals.	To	be	 legal,	 these	actions	must	comply	
with	the	requirements	for	 lawful	countermeasures	under	customary	 international	 law.	
These	 conditions	 have	 been	 codified	 in	 Articles	 49	 –	 54	 of	 the	 ILC’s	 Articles	 on	
Responsibility	 of	 States.	 These	 requirements	 include	 proportionality	 of	
countermeasures,	prohibition	of	breaching	certain	obligations	under	international	law,	
and	notification	to	the	targeted	state	of	intent	to	take	countermeasures.	
	
It	has	been	argued	 that	attaching	property	within	 the	 territory	of	a	 state	of	
origin	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 legitimate	 countermeasure.	 As	 suggested	 by	 Prof.	
Schlachter	“it	seems	logical	that	…	if	the	successful	state	is	free	under	international	law	
unilaterally	to	apply	coercive	measures	against	the	recalcitrant	state	[…],	 it	should	be	
free	to	seize	assets	of	the	debtor	state	within	its	control	for	the	purpose	of	satisfying	an	
award	 of	 damages”.267	Yet,	 such	 a	 measure	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 further	 conditions	
under	Article	50(2)(a)	and	(b)	of	the	Articles	on	Responsibility	
of	States	which	provide	 that	 a	 state	 taking	 countermeasures	 is	not	 relieved	
from	 fulfilling	 its	 obligations	 under	 any	 dispute	 settlement	 procedure	 applicable	
between	 it	 and	 the	 responsible	 state	 and	 that	 it	 must	 respect	 the	 inviolability	 of	
diplomatic	 or	 consular	 agents,	 premises,	 archives	 and	 documents.	 It	 might	 be	
debatable	whether	the	mechanism	for	collection	of	the	award	under	Article	54	qualifies	
as	 an	 “obligation	 under	 any	 dispute	 settlement	 procedure”.	 Article	 50(2)(b)	 of	 the	
Articles	 on	 Responsibility	 of	 States	 clarifies	 that	 execution	 in	 the	 framework	 of	
countermeasures	cannot	affect	the	immunity	of	state	property	under	diplomatic	law.	
	
																																																													
266World	Bank,	Operational	Manual,	Operational	Policy	7.40	 -	Disputes	over	Defaults	on	External	Debt,	
Expropriation,	 and	 Breach	 of	 Contract,	 available	 at	
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentM
DK:2	0064628~menuPK:4564185~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html.	
267	Oscar	Schlachter,	The	Enforcement	of	International	Judicial	and	Arbitral	Decisions,	54	AM.J.INT’L	L.	1,	
7	(1960).	
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4.4.5 Conclusion	of	Olga	Gerlich	
According	to	the	above	proposed	solutions	the	opinion	of	Olga	Gerlich	is	that	
currently,	 there	are	no	 remedies	 that	directly	address	 the	problem	of	 state	 immunity	
from	execution	 in	 the	 collection	of	 international	 investment	arbitration	awards	under	
the	 ICSID	 Convention.	 Sovereign	 immunity	 does	 constitute	 the	 Achilles’	 heel	 of	
investor-state	 arbitration.	 The	 drafters	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 considered	 it	 highly	
unlikely	that	state	parties	to	the	Convention	would	fail	to	carry	out	their	obligation	to	
comply	with	awards,	but	the	 instances	where	 investors	have	sought	to	collect	awards	
against	 recalcitrant	states	show	that	 the	drafters’	assumption	of	absolute	compliance	
proved	to	be	naïve,	or	short-sighted.	The	reference	to	laws	on	execution	in	the	state	of	
execution	creates	a	systemic	problem	as	it	undermines	some	fundamental	principles	of	
investor–state	 arbitration.	 It	 re-politicizes	 the	 disputes,	 and	 exposes	 execution	 to	
national	bias	and	deficiencies	of	domestic	judicial	systems.	The	rules	on	state	immunity	
applied	 by	 domestic	 courts	 are	 a	mixture	 of	 customary	 international	 law,	 treaty	 law,	
and	national	laws.	An	investor	seeking	collection	of	his	award	must	have	knowledge	of	
the	 particularities	 of	 domestic	 legal	 systems.	 Furthermore,	 the	 availability	 of	 assets	
amenable	 to	 execution	 is	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 overlap	 between	 general	 and	 special	
regimes	of	 state	 immunity	under	 international	 law	Existing	 legal	 remedies	 that	 could	
mitigate	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 systemic	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 state	 immunity	 from	
execution	are	lacking	on	the	investor’s	side	and	the	ones	involving	action	by	the	state	of	
investor’s	nationality	are	not	likely	to	provide	an	effective	remedy	for	non-compliance	
with	 investment	arbitration	awards	by	recalcitrant	states.	When	exercising	diplomatic	
protection,	a	state	pursues	its	own	right	to	ensure,	in	the	person	of	its	subjects,	respect	
for	 the	 rules	 of	 international	 law. 268 	The	 exercise	 of	 diplomatic	 protection	 lies,	
therefore,	entirely	within	 the	discretion	of	 the	state.	The	state	of	origin	might	not	be	
interested	in	espousing	the	claim	of	its	national	since	such	diplomatic	protection	indeed	
re-politicizes	 investment	 disputes.	 It	 exposes	 the	 state	 of	 origin	 to	 deterioration	 of	
relations	with	 the	 host	 state.	 This	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	Sedelmayer	 case.	 The	German	
government	 refused	 to	 espouse	 Sedelmayer’s	 claim	 and	 even	 pressured	 him	 not	 to	
“create	a	diplomatic	incident”	by	seizing	Russian	assets	exhibited	at	the	aviation	show	
in	Germany.	Diplomatic	protection	also	deprives	 investment	arbitration	of	 their	most	
attractive	 attributes	 from	 the	 investor’s	 perspective,	 i.e.	 direct	 compensation	 and	
control	over	the	course	of	proceedings.		The	situation	is	not	particularly	different	in	the	
case	 of	 individual	 remedies	 available	 to	 investors.	 Post-award	 settlements	 do	 not	
always	 present	 an	 attractive	 alternative.	 They	 require	 concessions	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
investor	 and	put	 the	 investor	 in	 a	 less	 advantageous	 position	 than	 if	 the	 award	were	
properly	 executed.	 Reduction	 of	 the	 value	 of	 the	 arbitral	 award	 undermines	 the	
compensatory	function	of	the	remedy	under	international	law.	Post-award	settlements	
can	 hardly	 represent	 a	 satisfactory	 systematic	 solution	 to	 the	 problem.	 They	 rather	
demonstrate	that	 investors	recognize	the	deficiencies	of	the	system	and	are	aware	of	
the	difficulties	they	may	face	when	seeking	collection	of	their	awards.	
																																																													
268	See	Conforti.	
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	Among	 the	many	 suggested	 improvements,	 creating	 a	 lex	 specialis	 regime	
within	the	international	investment	law	system	through	a	soft	law	instrument	seems	to	
be	the	most	feasible	solution.	Such	an	instrument	governing	recognition,	enforcement,	
and	execution	of	investment	awards	against	state	property	could	be	adopted	under	the	
auspices	 of	 the	 UNCITRAL.	 	 Indeed,	 a	 soft	 law	 instrument	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	
UNICITRAL	that	would	address	the	 issues	of	recognition,	enforcement,	and	execution	
of	 investment	 awards	 could	 provide	 for	 a	 uniform	 approach	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 state	
immunity	from	execution.	
	
	
4.5 The	back	door	solution	proposed		by	B.Rice	
	
At	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 sovereign	 states	 enjoyed	 nearly	
unfettered	 immunity	 from	 suit	 in	 foreign	 jurisdictions	 thanks	 to	 the	 then-ubiquitous	
theory	 of	 absolute	 immunity.	 By	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	 1900s,	 however,	 the	 balance	
between	 sovereign	 states’	 rights	 and	 their	 obligations	 abroad	 had	 changed	
significantly.	 The	plethora	of	 post-WWII	 conventions	 and	newly	 created	 international	
institutions	all	chipped	away	at	a	sovereign’s	freedom	to	act	at	home	and	abroad.	And	
as	 concerns	 sovereign	 immunity,	 the	 default	 view	went	 from	 absolute	 to	 restrictive,	
with	 many	 jurisdictions	 adopting	 rules	 that	 stripped	 immunity	 from	 states’	
“commercial”	 activities	 and	 assets.	 It	 was	 in	 this	 spirit	 that	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	
Settlement	 of	 Investment	 Disputes	 between	 States	 and	 Nationals	 of	 Other	 States	
(“ICSID	Convention”)	was	drafted	 and	 first	 signed	 in	 1965.	By	 signing	onto	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 developing	 states	 (at	 least	 to	 some	 extent)	 sought	 to	 signal	 to	 foreign	
investors	 that	 they	 were	 “open	 for	 business”	 and	 offered	 reasonable	 investment	
protection	 through	 the	 Convention’s	 binding	 arbitration	 mechanisms.	 However,	 the	
ICSID	Convention	was	more	 than	 just	a	general	arbitration	agreement	and	applicable	
rules/protocols.269	
	
The	procedures	and	rules	established	in	the	ICSID	Convention	were	intended	
to	 create	 an	 entirely	 self-contained	 adjudication	 and	 remedial	 process	 for	 aggrieved	
investors.	 As	 per	Article	 53,	 there	 is	 no	 recourse	 to	 appeal	 a	 final	 ICSID	 decision	 in	 a	
national	court	or	 in	 set-aside	proceedings.	Moreover,	Article	54	obligates	Contracting	
parties	to	recognize	and	enforce	ICSID	awards	as	if	they	were	domestic	judgments.	As	a	
result,	the	ICSID	Convention	has	long	been	assumed	to	produce	final	and	self-executing	
awards, 270 	and	 the	 drafters	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 themselves	 used	 the	 term	
																																																													
269	Brandon	Rice,		ICSID	Article	53:	A	Back	Door	to	Thwarting	Sovereign	Immunity	from	Execution?,	TDM,	
Vol.	14,	issue	1,	January	2017	
270	Edward	Baldwin	et	al.,	Limits	to	Enforcement	of	ICSID	Awards,	23(1)	J.	OF	INT’L	ARB.	1,	1	(2006).	
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“[s]ystem	of	‘automatic’	enforceability	of	awards.
”271
	That	design	may	hold	true	for	the	
recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 awards,	 but	 as	 any	 practitioner	 can	 attest,	
recognition	and	enforcement	are	not	the	same	as	actual	execution.	Seemingly	counter	
to	the	rest	of	the	ICSID	Convention’s	post-award	provisions,	Article	55	provides	that	the	
sovereign	 immunity	 laws	 of	 the	 state	 where	 execution	 is	 sought	 affirmatively	 apply,	
effectively	 throwing	 a	 spanner	 in	 the	works	 of	 the	 agreement’s	 otherwise	 efficiency-
focused	 award-	 satisfaction	 aims.	 Christoph	 H.	 Schreuer	 has	 called	 Article	 55’s	
presumed	 capitulation	 to	 national	 sovereign	 immunity	 laws	 “the	Achilles’	 heel	 of	 the	
Convention.”	272	He	goes	 further	and	argues	that	“[t]he	otherwise	effective	machinery	
of	arbitration	has	its	weak	point	when	it	comes	to	the	actual	execution	against	States	of	
pecuniary	obligations	under	awards.”	273	Similarly,	a	working	group	created	during	the	
negotiation	 process	 argued	 that	 by	 granting	 state	 property	 sovereign	 immunity,	 the	
ICSID	Convention	would	 “place	 the	State	party	 to	 the	dispute	 in	an	unduly	privileged	
position”	 vis-à-vis	 the	 investors	when	 it	 came	 to	 collecting	an	award	 in	 a	 third-	party	
state.	
6
	Irrespective	of	such	concerns	and	despite	the	conscious	creation	of	a	“system	of	
automatic	 enforceability	 of	 awards,”	 in	 the	 executive	 directors’	 report	 that	
accompanied	 the	 final	 version	of	 the	 ICSID	Convention,	 the	 authors	 dryly	 noted	 that	
“[t]he	doctrine	of	sovereign	 immunity	may	prevent	the	 forced	execution	 in	a	State	of	
judgments	obtained	against	 foreign	States	or	 against	 the	State	 in	which	execution	 is	
sought.”274		
In	the	decades	since	the	 ICSID	Convention’s	signing,	this	tension	has	played	
out	 across	 the	 globe.	 In	 the	 United	 States	 (“US”),	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (“UK”)	 and	
France,	 courts	 developed	 robust	 case	 law	 that	 effectively	 shielded	 sovereign	 assets	
from	 execution	 if	 a	 losing	 state	 refused	 to	 voluntarily	 comply	with	 the	 ICSID	 award.	
However,	 in	Société	Creighton	v.	Ministère	des	Finances	de	 l’Etat	du	Qatar,	 the	French	
Cour	 de	 cassation	demonstrated	 that	 it	might	 be	 possible	 to	 circumvent	 some	of	 the	
strictures	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 by	 interpreting	 certain	 arbitration	 convention	
provisions	as	a	waiver	of	immunity	from	execution.275	Admittedly,	that	French	decision	
pertained	to	a	provision	in	the	ICC	Rules	of	Arbitration	(which	is	extremely	similar	but	
not	identical	to	that	in	ICSID)	and	has	not	led	to	progeny	of	cases	following	its	logic.		
	
	
Unlike	 other	 conventions	 and	 sets	 of	 rules	 on	 international	 commercial	
arbitration,	 ICSID	 Convention	 Articles	 53	 and	 54	 were	 intended	 to	 ensure	 a	 “self-
																																																													
271	World	Bank	Legal	Committee	on	the	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes,	Working	Group	VI	Report	on	
Article	 57,	 Doc.	 No.	 SID/LC/50,	 at	 2	 (Dec.	 8,	 1964),	 reprinted	 in	 ICSID,	 2	 HISTORY	 OF	 THE	 ICSID	
CONVENTION	892,	
893	(1968)	[hereinafter	HISTORY	OF	ICSID].	
272	CHRISTOPH	H.	SCHREUER	ET	AL.,	ICSID	CONVENTION:	A	COMMENTARY	1154	(2009).	
273	Id.	
274	International	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development,	Report	of	the	Executive	Directors	on	the	ICSID	
Convention,	para	43	(Mar.	18,	1965),	reprinted	in	HISTORY	OF	ICSID,	supra	note	3,	at	1069,	1083.	
275	Civ.	1ère,	6	juil.	2000,	Bull	civil	I,	n°207	
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contained	 system	 for	 limited	 review”	276	and	 “created	 an	 autonomous	 and	 simplified	
regime	 for	 recognition	 and	 execution.”	277	At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 Article	 55	was	
included	in	the	ICSID	Convention	to	preserve	state	immunity	from	execution.	Because	
Article	 55	 can	 thus	be	used	 to	 “prevent	 the	 forced	execution	 in	a	State	of	 judgments	
obtained	against	foreign	States	or	against	the	State	in	which	execution	is	sought,”278	it	
has	the	ability	to	upset	the	entire	simplified	regime	and	“may	be	seen	as	the	Achilles’	
heel	of	the	Convention.”279		
	
Articles	 53	 and	 54	 make	 up	 two-thirds	 of	 ICSID	 Convention’s	 Section	 6,	
pertaining	to	the	“Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	the	Award.”		
	
While	 perhaps	 not	 evident	 on	 the	 face	 of	 the	 text,	 Christoph	 Schreuer	 has	
argued:	
The	 Convention’s	 drafting	 history	 shows	 that	 domestic	 authorities	 charged	
with	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 have	 no	 discretion	 to	 review	 the	 award	 once	 its	
authenticity	has	been	established.	Not	even	the	ordre	public	(public	policy)	of	the	forum	
may	 furnish	 a	 ground	 for	 refusal.	 The	 finality	 of	 awards	 would	 also	 exclude	 any	
examination	of	their	compliance	with	international	public	policy	or	international	law	in	
general.280		
	
Therefore,	 taken	 together	 Articles	 53	 and	 54	 “created	 an	 autonomous	 and	
simplified	 regime	 for	 recognition	 and	 execution	 which	 excluded	 the	 otherwise	
applicable	 provisions	 of	 the	 [local	 civil	 procedure	 law]	 and	 the	 remedies	 provided	
therein.”281		
	
Unfortunately	for	ICSID	arbitral	award	winners,	collecting	from	a	recalcitrant	
sovereign	 debtor	 is	 complicated	 by	 Articles	 54(3)	 and	 55.	 Article	 54(3)	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 provides	 that	 “[e]xecution	 of	 the	 award	 shall	 be	 governed	 by	 the	 laws	
concerning	 the	execution	of	 judgments	 in	 force	 in	 the	State	 in	whose	 territories	 such	
execution	 is	 sought.”282	Meanwhile	 Article	 55	 clarifies	 that	 such	 laws	 concerning	 the	
execution	 of	 judgments	 includes	 laws	 on	 sovereign	 immunity:	 “Nothing	 in	 Article	 54	
																																																													
276	Edward	Baldwin	et	al.,	Limits	to	Enforcement	of	ICSID	Awards,	23(1)	J.	OF	INT’L	ARB.	1,	4	(2006).	
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278	INT’L	BANK	FOR	THE	RECONSTRUCTION	AND	DEV.,	REPORT	OF	THE	EXECUTIVE	DIRECTORS	ON	
THE	ICSID	CONVENTION,	¶	43	(Mar.	18,	1965).	
279	SCHREUER	ET	AL.,	supra	note	,	at	1154.	
280	SCHREUER	ET	AL.,	supra	note	,	at	1140–41	
281	SCHREUER	ET	AL.,	supra	note	4,	at	1132	(paraphrasing	SOABI	v	Senegal,	Cour	de	cassation,	June	11,	
1991,	2	ICSID	Rep.	341	(1991)).	
282	SCHREUER	ET	AL.,	 supra	 note	4,	 at	 1154	 (citing	Broches,	A.,	 The	Convention	on	 the	Settlement	of	
Investment	Disputes	between	States	and	Nationals	of	Other	States,	136	Recueil	des	Cours	331,	403	(1972-
II);	Aron	Broches,	Awards	Rendered	Pursuant	to	the	ICSID	Convention:	Binding	Force,	Finality,	Recognition,	
Enforcement,	Execution,	2(2)	ICSID	REV.	287,	333,	334	(1987).	
131	
	
shall	be	construed	as	derogating	from	the	law	in	force	in	any	Contracting	State	relating	
to	immunity	of	that	State	or	of	any	foreign	state	from	execution.”		
	
While	the	decision	to	leave	the	law	on	sovereign	immunity	untouched	was	a	
conscious	 one,	 it	 was	 done	 with	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 issue	 would	 never	 arise	
because	 states	 would	 always	 comply	 voluntarily. 283 	The	 “father	 of	 ICSID,”	 Aron	
Broches,284	remarked,	 “Since	 any	 State	 against	 which	 an	 award	 was	 granted	 would	
have	 undertaken	 in	 advance	 a	 solemn	 international	 obligation	 to	 comply	 with	 the	
award,	the	question	of	enforcement	against	a	State	was	somewhat	academic.”285	Thus,	
because	“the	host	State	would	have	undertaken	to	abide	by	the	award[,]	the	problem	
of	enforcement	in	a	third	State	was	not	likely	to	arise.”286		
Professor	 Schreuer	 also	 notes	 that	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Convention	
demonstrates	that	State	compliance	was	not	a	major	concern:	
During	 the	 Convention’s	 drafting	 there	 was	 a	 general	 expectation	 that	
compliance	by	the	host	State	with	ICSID	awards	would	not	be	a	practical	problem	and	
that	 voluntary	 compliance	 would	 be	 a	 natural	 consequence	 of	 the	 treaty	 obligation	
expressed	in	Art.	53.	Any	other	course	of	conduct	was	likely	to	lead	to	adverse	reactions	
by	 other	 States	 and	 would	 affect	 the	 standing	 of	 the	 State	 concerned	 with	 the	
international	business	community.	This	view	is	supported	by	a	cost/benefit	analysis	of	
non-compliance	and	by	most	of	the	practice	following	ICSID	awards.	
Thus,	the	drafters	of	the	Convention	were	not	concerned	that	a	State	would	
seek	 to	 avoid	 compliance	 with	 its	 obligations.	 	 In	 fact,	 early	 in	 the	 negotiations	
Chairman	Broches	stated	that:	
	
[B]y	definition	the	host	State	would	have	undertaken	to	abide	by	the	award	
and	the	problem	of	enforcement	in	a	third	State	was	not	likely	to	arise.	
	
In	later	discussions,	Chairman	Broches	explained	that	in	his	view:	
	
[I]t	was	 not	 necessary	 to	 provide	 for	 forced	 execution	 against	 States	 under	
this	Convention	since	the	Convention	imposed	a	direct	obligation	on	States	to	carry	out	
the	award.	
	
																																																													
283	Alexandrov,	 supra	 note	 16,	 at	 5–6	 (“State	 compliance	 was	 never	 a	 concern	 for	 the	 drafters.	 It	 was	
assumed	that	all	State	parties,	with	due	respect	for	the	solemn	and	binding	nature	of	their	commitments	
as	Contracting	States	to	the	 ICSID	Convention,	would	abide	by	and	comply	with	awards	automatically.	
Article	53	creates	a	public	international	law	obligation	on	a	losing	State.	The	drafters	assumed	that	States	
would	comply	based	on	the	international	law	maxim	pacta	sunt	servanda,	and	in	light	of	the	effect	that	
non-compliance	would	have	on	a	State’s	standing	in	the	international	community.”).	
284	Aron	Broches,	1914–1997,	14(2)	NEWS	FROM	ICSID	3,	3	(1997).	
285	World	 Bank	 Legal	 Committee	 on	 the	 Settlement	 of	 Investment	 Disputes,	 Summary	 Record	 of	
Proceedings	of	Consultative	Meeting	of	Legal	Experts,	at	5	(June	12,	1964),	reprinted	in	HISTORY	OF	ICSID,	
supra	note	3,	at	298,	304.	
286	Id.	
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Chairman	Broches	also	alluded	to	the	option	of	Articles	27	and	64	as	recourse	
in	the	event	that	the	State	failed	to	comply:	
	
In	 the	 unlikely	 event	 that	 a	 losing	 State	 failed	 to	 comply	 with	 an	 award	 it	
would	 be	 in	 clear	 violation	of	 the	Convention	 itself,	 and	 the	 investor’s	 national	 State	
could	take	up	his	case.9	
	
Later	in	life,	Chairman	Broches	observed:	
	
I	 felt	then,	and	I	do	now,	that	as	regards	enforcement	against	governments,	
as	distinguished	 from	 that	against	private	parties,	what	has	become	Article	53	of	 the	
Convention	is	the	primary	provision	and	that	while	Article	54	is	important,	concern	with	
the	possibilities	offered	by	that	provision	should	not	be	permitted	to	obscure	or	weaken	
the	 importance	 of	 Article	 53.	 The	 obligation	 of	 governments	 to	 abide	 by	 awards	
remains	unaffected	by	the	limitations	on	their	forcible	execution.	
	
Given	 this	 trust	 in	 States’	 compliance	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 international	 legal	
obligation	imposed	by	Article	53,	one	might	ask	which	is	the	meaning	for	the	existence	
of	Article	54.	 	The	answer,	according	to	Alexandrov,287	lies	in	the	fact	that	the	drafters	
perceived	 an	 imbalance	 between	 States,	 who	 were	 bound	 as	 signatories	 to	 the	
Convention	to	comply	with	its	terms	(including	Article	53),	and	investors,	who	faced	no	
such	obligation.		The	Convention	is	constructed	to	entertain	not	only	treaty	claims,	but	
also	cases	based	on	contractual	claims	and	counterclaims,	in	which	either	party	(State	
or	investor)	might	face	an	award	ordering	payment.		Investment	treaty	awards	may	also	
impose	obligations	on	 investors,	 such	as	payment	of	 costs.	 	Chairman	Broches	noted	
that	“[w]hile	the	investor	was	also	under	an	obligation	to	comply	with	the	award,	there	
was	 no	 direct	 sanction	 under	 the	 Convention	 for	 his	 failure	 to	 do	 so.”	 11	 	 Thus	 the	
drafters	were	concerned	that:	
	
The	State	 itself,	having	undertaken	to	accept	an	award	as	final	and	binding,	
could	not	evade	the	obligation.	On	the	other	hand,	refusal	by	private	investor	to	comply	
with	 an	 award	 would	 have	 to	 be	 taken	 before	 a	 national	 court	 and	 the	 New	 York	
Convention	did	provide	some	grounds	for	attacking	the	award.288			
	
Article	 54	 responds	 to	 this	 concern	 that	 the	 binding	 force	 of	 awards	 under	
Article	53	of	the	Convention	would	not	be	symmetrical	between	States	and	investors.		It	
was	agreed	that:	
[F]or	 the	 purposes	 of	 ensuring	 compliance	 with	 an	 arbitral	 award	 between	
States,	Section	14	[Article	53]	would	have	been	sufficient	but,	since	one	of	the	parties	to	
																																																													
287	S.A.	 Alexandrov,	 Enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 Awards:	 Articles	 53	 and	 54	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 TDM,	
VOL.	6	Issue	1.	
288	ICSID,	DOCUMENTS	CONCERNING	THE	ORIGIN	AND	THE	FORMULATION	OF	THE	CONVENTION	
VOL.	II,	at	304	(1968)	[hereinafter	ICSID,	DOCUMENTS	VOL.	II].	
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a	dispute	brought	before	 the	Center	would	be	a	private	 individual,	Section	15	 [Article	
54]	was	necessary	to	give	a	State	the	means	of	enforcing	an	award	in	its	favor	against	
an	individual.	
Although	originally	drafted	with	enforcement	against	 investors	 in	mind,	 the	
drafters	 recognized	 that	 Article	 54	 could	 also	 serve	 as	 a	 backup	 mechanism	 for	
collecting	 from	 defaulting	 States.	 	 There	 was	 no	 reason	 to	 limit	 the	 provision	 to	
enforcement	 actions	 against	 investors.	 	 Professor	 Schreuer	 explains	 in	 his	
Commentary:	
[T]he	 travaux	préparatoires	 to	 the	Convention	 show	clearly	 that	 the	original	
motive	for	the	 inclusion	of	a	provision	on	enforcement	was	to	give	recourse	against	a	
defaulting	 investor.	 It	 was	 considered	 highly	 unlikely	 that	 a	 State	 party	 to	 the	
Convention	would	not	carry	out	 its	 treaty	obligation	under	 the	Convention	 to	comply	
with	an	award.	 .	 .	 .	A	provision	on	enforcement	was	seen	as	necessary	to	balance	the	
situation	in	favour	of	the	host	state,	should	the	investor	not	comply	with	an	award.	But	
all	 the	drafts	 leading	to	 the	Convention	 refer	 to	 recognition	and	enforcement	against	
the	parties	 in	equal	 terms,	without	distinguishing	between	 investors	and	host	States,	
and	it	is	clear	that	this	was	also	the	intention	of	the	drafters.289	
	
As	 Alexandrov	 concluded	 in	 his	 work:	 ‘any	 other	 interpretation	 of	 the	
relationship	 between	 Articles	 53	 and	 54	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 would	 essentially	
render	Article	53	meaningless	and	without	useful	effect.	If	a	prevailing	claimant	is	in	fact	
required	to	seek	enforcement	under	Article	54	as	a	condition	of	the	respondent	State’s	
compliance	with	 an	 ICSID	 award,	 or	 if	 a	 respondent	 State’s	 affirmative	 obligation	 to	
comply	 with	 an	 ICSID	 award	 arises	 only	 upon	 a	 claimant’s	 exhaustion	 of	 the	 State’s	
domestic	 enforcement	 mechanisms,	 then	 Article	 53	 would	 be	 read	 out	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	altogether’.	
Article	 53’s	 obligation	 to	 abide	 by	 and	 comply	 with	 an	 award	 must	 be	
independent	of	the	enforcement	mechanisms	provided	for	in	Article	54.	
The	 consequence	 in	 the	 opposite	 scenario	 is	 clear:	 ‘if	 an	 award	 is	 only	
complied	with	through	the	enforcement	mechanism	of	Article	54,	and	if	Article	54	only	
provides	for	the	enforcement	of	pecuniary	provisions	of	an	award,	then	a	State	would	
be	 under	 no	 obligation	 to	 comply	with	 any	 non-pecuniary	 terms	 of	 any	 ICSID	 award	
against	 it.	 This	 would	 be	 an	 untenable	 outcome	 for	 the	 ICSID	 system:	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 clearly	 contemplates	 that	 awards	 may	 include	 such	 non-pecuniary	
terms.’290	
	
	
	
4.5.1 A	choice	between		sovereign	immunity	and	effective	arbitral	awards	
	
																																																													
289	Schreuer,	ICSID	CONVENTION,	supra	note,	at	1102-03	(citations	omitted).	
290	Alexandrov,	ut	supra.	
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In	the	practice	in	the	vast	majority	of	cases,	claimants	never	need	to	resort	to	
collection	mechanisms	 in	Article	 54.	 Rather,	 States	 simply	make	 payment	 consistent	
with	the	terms	of	the	award.	
In	 large	part,	 that	good	 faith	belief	 in	voluntary	 compliance	has	borne	 itself	
out	in	reality.291	However,	with	the	massive	growth	in	investor-state	disputes	in	the	21st	
century292	(and	no	shortage	of	contentious	decisions),	there	has	also	been	an	increase	
in	 losing	 states’	 attempts	 to	 resist	 paying	 up,	 often	 hiding	 behind	 the	 dual	 veils	 of	
sovereign	 immunity	 and	 separate	 legal	 personhood	 of	 state-owned	 entities.293	In	 the	
non-ICSID	 realm,	 the	 most	 notable	 recent	 example	 of	 a	 state	 refusing	 to	 pay	 its	
arbitration	 judgment	 debts	 is	 Russia’s	 heretofore	 fight	 to	 avoid	 paying	 a	 $50	 billion	
award	 in	 favor	 of	 Yukos	 shareholders.294	As	 frustrating	 as	 it	 may	 be	 whenever	 a	
sovereign	 state	 effectively	 deploys	 sovereign	 immunity	 to	 skirt	 its	 liabilities,	 a	
recalcitrant	 state’s	 refusal	 to	 satisfy	 an	 award	 rendered	 by	 an	 ICSID	 tribunal	 seems	
especially	 unpleasant	 considering	 the	 ICSID	 Convention’s	 aim	 to	 create	 “an	
autonomous	and	simplified	regime	for	recognition	and	execution.”		
	
In	 recent	 memory	 there	 have	 been	 a	 handful	 of	 ICSID	 awards	 that	 the	
misbehaving	 state	 managed	 to	 avoid	 satisfying	 in	 court.	 In	 Benvenuti	 &	 Bonfant	 v.	
Congo,	 for	 example,	 after	 obtaining	 an	 ICSID	 award	 in	 its	 favor295	and	 recognition	 in	
Paris	 courts,	 the	 investor	 sought	 to	 execute	 against	 funds	 owned	 by	 Banque	
Commerciale	 Congolaise.296	Because	 the	bank	was	 a	 legally	 separate	 entity	 and	 could	
not	be	considered	an	emanation	of	the	state,	the	French	Cour	de	cassation	held	that	the	
assets	 were	 not	 amenable	 to	 execution.	Similarly,	 in	 AIG	 v.	 Kazakhstan,	 investors	 in	
																																																													
291	Alexandrov,	supra	note	16,	at	10.	As	regards	compliance	with	arbitral	awards	generally	(i.e.	 ,	not	 just	
those	 rendered	 by	 ICSID),	 a	 joint	 report	 by	 the	 School	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 at	 Queen	 Mary	
(University	of	London)	and	PricewaterhouseCoopers	found	that	“84%	of	respondents	indicated	that	the	
opposing	party	had	honoured	the	award	in	full	in	more	that	76%	of	cases”	and	that	“in	only	11%	of	cases	
did	participants	need	to	proceed	to	enforce	an	award.”		INTERNATIONAL	ARBITRATION:	CORPORATE	
ATTITUDES	 AND	 PRACTICES	 8,	 10	 (2008).	 Beyond	 the	 aforementioned	 figures,	 it	 appears	 that	 “[n]o	
official	 statistics	 exist	 regarding	 the	 compliance	 rates	 with	 ICSID	 and	 non-ICSID	 awards.”	 S.	 Tonova,	
Compliance	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 Awards:	 Is	 There	 a	 Practical	 Difference	 Between	 ICSID	 and	 Non-ICSID	
Awards,	 in	5	 INVESTMENT	TREATY	ARBITRATION	AND	 INTERNATIONAL	LAW	229,	 235	 (I.A.	 Laird	&	
T.J.	Weiler	eds.	2012).	
292	UNCTAD,	 	 RECENT	 	 DEVELOPMENTS	 	 IN	 	 INVESTOR-STATE	 	 DISPUTE	 	 SETTLEMENT	 	 (ISDS)	 	 2		
(2014),	
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf.	
293	See	 generally	Emmanuel	Gaillard,	 Effectiveness	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards,	 State	 Immunity	 from	Execution	
and	Autonomy	of	State	Entities:	Three	Incompatible	Principles,	in	STATE	ENTITIES	IN	INTERNATIONAL	
ARBITRATION,	 IAI	SERIES	ON	 INTERNATIONAL	ARBITRATION	NO.	4,	at	 179	 (E.	Gaillard	&	 J.	Younan	
eds.,	2008)	(arguing	that	sovereign	 immunity,	 legal	autonomy	of	state	entities	and	the	effectiveness	of	
arbitral	 awards	 are	 ultimately	 incompatible,	 which	 at	 present	 means	 one	 of	 them	must	 be	 sacrificed	
(usually	effectiveness	of	arbitral	awards)).	
294	Brandon	 Rice,	 States	 Behaving	 Badly:	 Sovereign	 Veil	 Piercing	 in	 the	 Yukos	 Affair	 (Oct.	 12,	 2015),	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2673335.	
295	Benvenuti	&	Bonfant	v.	Congo,	Award,	Aug.	15,	1980.	
296	SCHREUER	ET	AL.,	supra	note	4,	at	1134.	
135	
	
possession	of	an	ICSID	award297		attempted	to	enforce	its	winnings	in	the	UK	by	way	of	
a	 third-party	 debt	 and	 charging	 order	 against	 assets	 of	 the	 National	 Bank	 of	
Kazakhstan	 held	 by	 another	 (private)	 bank.	 	 The	High	 Court	 prevented	 execution	 on	
grounds	that	the	assets	in	question	were	held	by	the	Kazakh	central	bank,	not	the	state	
itself.298		
Furthermore,	 the	 court	 noted	 that	 the	 property	 of	 foreign	 states’	 central	
banks	 or	 monetary	 authorities	 are	 completely	 immune	 from	 execution.	 Lastly,	 in	
Liberian	Eastern	Timber	Corp.	v.	Liberia,	the	US	District	Court	for	the	Southern	District	of	
New	 York	 found	 that	 regardless	 of	 any	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 from	 execution,	 the	
plaintiff’s	attempts	to	attach	fees	and	taxes	owed	to	the	Liberian	government	must	fail	
because	 the	 assets	 in	 question	 were	 not	 “commercial”	 as	 required	 by	 relevant	 US	
sovereign	immunity	laws.299	
	
As	 the	 foregoing	examples	demonstrate,	when	a	sovereign	debtor	does	not	
want	to,	it	is	rather	easily	able	to	escape	its	international	responsibilities.	
	
4.6 Bypassing	Sovereign	Immunity	
	
As	the	ICSID	ad	hoc	committee	in	MINE	v.	Guinea	noted,	
	
State	 immunity	may	well	afford	a	 legal	defense	 to	 forcible	execution,	but	 it	
provides	neither	argument	nor	excuse	for	failing	to	comply	with	an	award.	In	fact,	the	
issue	of	State	 immunity	 from	 forcible	 execution	of	 an	award	will	 typically	 arise	 if	 the	
State	 party	 refuses	 to	 comply	with	 its	 treaty	 obligations.	Non-compliance	by	 a	 State	
constitutes	a	violation	by	that	State	of	 its	 international	obligations	and	will	attract	 its	
own	sanctions.300	
	
Simply	 because	 a	 state	 is	 able	 to	 avoid	 execution	 on	 sovereign	 immunity	
grounds	 (and	 perhaps	 through	 the	 legal	 fiction	 of	 separate	 legal	 personality	 of	 state	
entities	 as	 well)	 does	 not	mean	 that	 it	 has	 not	 violated	 its	 Article	 53	 obligations.	 As	
Professor	Schereur	commentated	:	
	
“The	 impossibility	 to	 enforce	 an	 ICSID	 award	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 law	
concerning	 the	 execution	 of	 judgments	 in	 one	 or	 several	 States	 in	 no	 way	 affects	 the	
obligation	of	the	party	to	the	ICSID	arbitration	to	abide	by	and	comply	with	the	award	in	
																																																													
297	AIG	v.	Kazakhstan,	Award,	Oct.	7,	2003.	
298	AIG	 Capital	 Partners	 Inc.	 and	 another	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Kazakhstan	 (National	 Bank	 of	 Kazakhstan	
Intervening),	High	Court,	Queen’s	Bench	Division	(Commercial	Court),	Oct.	20,	2005,	[2005]	EWHC	2239	
(Comm),	11	ICSID	Reports	118,	134/5	
299	In	 re	Liberian	E.	Timber	Corp.	v.	Gov't	of	Republic	of	Liberia,	650	F.	Supp.	73,	 77–78	 (S.D.N.Y.	1986)	
aff'd	sub	nom.	Liberian	E.	Tymber	v.	Rep.	Liberia,	854	F.2d	1314	(2d	Cir.	1987).	
300	MINE	v.	Guinea,	Interim	Order	No.	1	on	Guinea’s	application	for	Stay	of	Enforcement	of	the	Award,	 12	
August	1988,	4	ICSID	Rep.	111,	¶25	
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accordance	 with	 Art.	 53(1).	 In	 particular,	 a	 State	 that	 successfully	 relies	 on	 the	 laws	
concerning	State	 immunity	 from	execution	will	be	 in	violation	of	 its	obligation	under	 the	
Convention.”		
	
In	fact,	 in	such	instances	ICSID	Convention’s	Article	27(1)	revives	the	right	of	
diplomatic	 protection	 and	 includes	 the	 possibility	 of	 bringing	 the	 issue	 before	 the	
International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 as	 per	 Article	 64.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 such	 recourse	
remains	on	the	table,	B.W.	Rice	argued	that	 it	 is	possible	for	arbitral	award	holders	to	
avoid	that	additional	step	by	circumventing	some	of	the	 limits	of	sovereign	 immunity	
altogether	if	they	can	successfully	argue	that	ICSID	Convention’s	Article	53	amounts	to	
a	waiver	of	immunity	from	execution.	That	is	precisely	what	France’s	Cour	de	cassation	
did	 with	 a	 similar	 provision	 in	 the	 ICC	 Rules	 of	 Arbitration	 in	 Société	 Creighton	 v.	
Ministère	des	Finances	de	l’Etat	du	Qatar.	
	
4.6.1 Société	Creighton	v.	Ministère	des	Finances	de	l’Etat	du	Qatar	
	
The	case	Société	Creighton	v.	Ministère	des	Finances	de	l’Etat	du	Qatar	an	ICC	
arbitration	arose	in	connection	with	the	performance	of	a	contract	for	the	construction	
of	 a	hospital	 in	Doha	between	 the	Government	of	Qatar	 (specifically,	 the	Ministry	of	
Municipal	 Affairs	 and	Agriculture)	 and	Creighton,	 a	 private	US	 company.301	Two	 final	
arbitration	awards	on	October	18,	1993,	were	rendered	in	favor	of	Creighton,	according	
to	which	the	Government	of	Qatar	was	ordered	to	pay	approximately	12	million	QAR,	
plus	 interest.
46
	 Creighton	 took	 to	 French	 courts	 to	 collect	 its	 arbitral	 spoils,	 seizing	
money	 and	 shareholder	 rights	 held	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Qatari	 Ministry	 of	 Municipal	
Affairs	and	Agriculture	at	 the	Banque	de	France	 and	Qatar	National	Bank.
47
	Although	
Qatar	 failed	 to	 have	 the	 award	 set	 aside	 outright,	 it	 successfully	 invoked	 sovereign	
immunity	 in	 the	 court	 of	 first	 instance	 and	 on	 appeal.	 The	 French	Cour	 de	 cassation,	
however,	 ultimately	 held	 that	 the	 seized	 assets	 were	 amenable	 to	 execution	 in	
satisfaction	 of	 the	 arbitration	 award.	 Crucially,	 the	 court	 determined	 that	 that	 there	
was	 an	 implied	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 from	 execution	 because	 Qatar	 had	 expressly	
consented	to	arbitrate	pursuant	to	the	ICC	Rules	of	Arbitration,	which	in	Article	24	(now	
Article	34(6))	provided:	
	
The	arbitral	award	shall	be	final.	By	submitting	the	dispute	to	arbitration	by	
the	 International	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 the	 parties	 shall	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	
undertaken	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 resulting	 award	without	 delay	 and	 to	 have	waived	 their	
right	to	any	form	of	appeal	insofar	as	such	waiver	can	validly	be	made.302		
	
																																																													
301	Nathalie	Meyer-Fabre,	Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	Against	Sovereign	States,	A	New	Milestone:	
Signing	 ICC	 Arbitration	 Clause	 Entails	 Waiver	 of	 Immunity	 from	 Execution	 Held	 French	 Court	 of	
Cassation	in	Creighton	v.	Qatar,	July	6,	2000,	15(9)	MEALEY’S	INT’L	ARB.	REP.	1,	1	(Sept.	2000).	
302	C.	Annacker	&	R.	Greig,	State	Immunity	and	Arbitration,	15(2)	ICC	INT’L	CT.	OF	ARB.	BULL.	70,	74	(Fall	
2004).	
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Interestingly,	however,	 the	Creighton	 decision	goes	against	a	 leading	 line	of	
cases	that	concluded	that	a	state’s	agreement	to	arbitrate	does	not,	by	itself,	waive	its	
immunity	 from	 execution.	 Instead,	 such	 cases	 held	 that	 a	 separate	 and	 unequivocal	
manifestation	 of	 intent	 to	 waive	 execution	 immunity	 was	 required	 to	 trigger	 the	
consent-based	 exception	 to	 immunity	 from	 execution.	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 noting	 that	
Creighton	v.	Qatar	has	not	led	to	a	seismic	shift	in	French	courts’	view	that	a	consent	to	
arbitration	 is	 insufficient	 to	 prove	 a	 waiver	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 from	 execution.	
Despite	that,	Rice	sought	to	explore	whether,	based	on	the	logic	of	Creighton,	a	court	
could	 similarly	 find	 ICSID	 Convention	 Article303	to	 amount	 to	 a	 waiver	 of	 sovereign	
immunity	from	execution	and,	if	so,	how	that	would	be	applied	in	various	legal	regimes	
around	the	globe.	
	
4.6.2 Applying	Creighton	to	ICSID	disputes	
	
Looking	at	the	text	of	the	relevant	provisions	 in	the	 ICC	Rules	of	Arbitration	
and	 the	 ICSID	Convention,	 their	 similarities	are	 striking.	The	old	Article	24	of	 the	 ICC	
Rules	provided	 that	 “[t]he	arbitral	 award	 shall	be	 final”	 and	 that	 “[b]y	 submitting	 the	
dispute	to	arbitration	by	the	 International	Chamber	of	Commerce	the	parties	shall	be	
deemed	to	have	undertaken	to	carry	out	the	resulting	award	without	delay	and	to	have	
waived	 their	 right	 to	any	 form	of	appeal	 insofar	as	 such	waiver	can	validly	be	made.”	
Correspondingly,	 ICSID	 Convention	 Article	 53(1)	 states	 that	 “[t]he	 award	 shall	 be	
binding	on	 the	parties	and	shall	not	be	subject	 to	any	appeal	or	 to	any	other	 remedy	
except	those	provided	for	in	this	Convention.”	In	other	words,	the	award	is	final	and	the	
parties	have	no	recourse	to	appeal	in	domestic	courts.	What	is	more	is	more,	the	ICSID	
Convention	 language	 goes	 further	 than	 the	 ICC	 Rules	 of	 Arbitration	 in	 that	 the	
availability	 of	 appeal	 in	 set-aside	 proceedings	 is	 not	 conditioned	 upon	 the	 ability	 to	
waive	one’s	right	to	such	appeals.	Considering	the	ICSID’s	underlying	goal	for	creating	
an	 autonomous	 and	 self-	 executing	 regime,	 Rice	 is	 convinced	 that	 if	 a	 court	were	 to	
follow	the	logic	of	Creighton,	there	is	an	even	stronger	argument	for	ICSID	Article	53(1)	
to	be	construed	as	a	waiver	of	 immunity	 from	execution	 than	the	old	Article	24	 (now	
Article	34(6))	of	the	ICC	Rules	of	Arbitration.	
Interpreting	Article	53(1)	as	a	waiver	of	 immunity	from	execution	 is	only	the	
first	 step,	 however.	 Importantly,	 domestic	 laws	 governing	 sovereign	 immunity	 still	
apply.	Whether	 a	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 from	 execution	 has	 any	marked	 impact	 on	 an	
investor’s	ability	to	forcibly	collect	on	its	arbitral	award	depends	on	the	specifics	of	the	
immunity	 laws	 in	 force	 in	 the	 country	 where	 it	 seeks	 enforcement.	 For	 example,	
																																																													
303	International	Chamber	of	Commerce	(ICC),	Rules	of	Conciliation	and	Arbitration,	in	force	from	Jan.	1,	
1988	until	Dec.	31,	1997.	
	
138	
	
whether	a	waiver	from	executional	immunity	needs	to	be	explicit	or	whether	a	state	can	
only	waive	 immunity	 as	 regards	 “commercial”	 assets	will	 ultimately	 determine	 if	 the	
Creighton	v.	Qatar	approach	would	change	the	status	quo.	
	
4.6.3 How	that	might	work	in	other	legal	systems		
	
Simply	 treating	 Articles	 53	 as	 an	 implied	 waiver	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 all	 of	 a	
sovereign’s	 assets	 abroad	 become	 automatically	 amenable	 to	 execution.	 Far	 from	
displacing	 domestic	 sovereign	 immunity	 laws,	 accepting	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 as	
including	a	waiver	merely	improves	an	arbitration	winner’s	ability	to	satisfy	one	of	the	
exceptions	to	immunity	from	execution.	Each	state’s	specific	rules	governing	immunity	
will	ultimately	determine	(1)	whether	an	implicit	waiver	is	sufficient	to	pierce	the	veil	of	
sovereignty	 and	 (2)	 if	 so,	 what	 property	 becomes	 a	 fair	 target	 for	 execution.	 Given	
nations’	 existing	 rules	 on	 immunity	 from	 execution,	 viewing	 ICSID	 Articles	 53	 as	 an	
implicit	 waiver	 will	 not,	 as	 some	 commentators	 have	 seemed	 to	 suggest,	
inappropriately	 upset	 the	 careful	 balance	 struck	 between	 respecting	 sovereign	
privileges	abroad	and	offering	aggrieved	investors	a	remedy	for	their	infringed	rights.	In	
fact,	in	US	courts,	treating	the	ICSID	Convention	as	containing	a	waiver	of	executional	
immunity	will	not	change	anything.	
	
In	the	United	States,	the	restrictive	view	of	sovereign	immunity	was	codified	
in	 federal	 law	 by	 the	 Foreign	 Sovereign	 Immunities	 Act	 of	 1976	 (FSIA).304	The	 FSIA	
provides	 the	 sole	 basis	 for	 obtaining	 jurisdiction	 over	 foreign	 governments	 and	 their	
agencies	 and	 instrumentalities.	 Under	 the	 FSIA,	 there	 is	 a	 statutory	 presumption	 in	
favor	of	 immunity	and	plaintiffs	must	 identify	one	of	 the	 specific	exceptions	 to	avoid	
dismissal. 305 	Section	 1610(a)	 provides	 seven	 specific	 exceptions	 to	 the	 presumed	
immunity	 from	 attachment	 or	 execution	 provided	 in	 §	 1609,	 including	 when	 the	
sovereign	waives	immunity	(either	explicitly	or	implicitly).		However,	in	addition	to	the	
waiver	 of	 immunity	 from	 execution,	 the	 court	must	 also	 find	 that	 the	 property	 is	 (1)	
used	for	commercial	activity	in	the	U.S.	and	(2)	located	in	the	US.	The	absence	of	any	
point	 is	 fatal	 to	 any	executional	 immunity	 exception	 inquiry.	 Therefore,	 if	 a	US	 court	
were	 to	construe	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 to	 include	a	waiver	 (even	 if	only	 implicit),	 the	
sovereign	 defendant	 would	 lack	 the	 protection	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 as	 regards	
“commercial”	assets	in	the	US.	
	
																																																													
304	Pub.	L.	No.	94-583,	90	Stat.	2891	 (1976)	 (codified	as	amended	at	28	U.S.C.	§§	1330,	1391(f),	1441(d),	
and	1602–11	(2013))	[hereinafter	FSIA].	
305	§	1604	(“[A]	foreign	state	shall	be	immune	from	the	jurisdiction	of	the	courts	of	the	United	States	and	
of	the	States	except	as	provided	in	sections	1605	to	1607	of	this	chapter.”);	§	1609	(“[T]he	property	in	the	
United	 States	 of	 a	 foreign	 state	 shall	 be	 immune	 from	 attachment	 arrest	 and	 execution	 except	 as	
provided	in	sections	1610	and	1611	of	this	chapter.”);	Peterson	v.	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran,	627	F.3d	1117,	
1125	(9th	Cir.	2010)	(citing	Phaneuf	v.	Republic	of	Indonesia,	106	F.3d	302	(9th	Cir.	1997));	accord	Walters	
v.	Indus.	&	Commer.	Bank	of	China,	Ltd.,	651	F.3d	280,	290	(2d	Cir.	2011).	
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Unfortunately	for	arbitral	award	holders,	however,	this	does	not	change	much	
from	the	status	quo.	Ever	since	the	adoption	of	the	Federal	Arbitration	Act	of	1988,	306	
US	sovereign	 immunity	 law	has	 included	an	exception	 to	executional	 immunity	when	
“the	judgment	is	based	on	an	order	confirming	an	arbitral	award	rendered	against	the	
foreign	state,	provided	that	attachment	in	aid	of	execution,	or	execution,	would	not	be	
inconsistent	with	any	provision	 in	the	arbitral	agreement.”	This,	too,	 is	also	 limited	to	
execution	 against	 commercial	 assets	 located	 in	 the	 US.	 Thus,	 in	 US	 courts,	 the	
Creighton	 approach	would	do	nothing	 to	make	 it	 easier	 for	 an	 ICSID	award	holder	 to	
collect	its	arbitral	spoils.	
	
In	 the	UK	whether	a	state	or	 related	entity	can	claim	sovereign	 immunity	 is	
governed	by	the	State	Immunity	Act	1978	(“SIA”).307	Similar	to	the	FSIA,	under	§	1	of	the	
SIA	 a	 foreign	 state	 is	 presumptively	 immune	 from	 jurisdiction	 unless	 one	 of	 the	
exceptions	in	the	SIA	applies.	As	regards	the	SIA’s	relevant	waiver	exception,	it	permits	
execution	against	a	state’s	assets	only	when	the	state	has	expressly	consented	to	such	
an	action.	While	that	waiver	exception	to	immunity	must	be	explicit	(whereas	under	the	
US	 FSIA	 it	 can	 also	 be	 implied),	308	it	 applies	 to	 non-commercial	 property	 as	 well	 as	
commercial	 property	 (whereas	 under	 the	 FSIA,	 that	 the	 property	 is	 “used	 for	
commercial	activities”	is	a	prerequisite).309		
	
Therefore,	if	a	UK	court	considered	ICSID	Article	53	to	be	an	implicit	waiver,	it	
would	not	have	any	significant	 impact	on	an	award	holder’s	ability	to	forcibly	execute	
against	 sovereign	 property.	 However,	 if	 a	 court	 took	Creighton	 one	 step	 further	 and	
interpreted	it	as	an	explicit	waiver	of	execution	immunity,	that	would	appear	to	open	up	
a	whole	number	of	possibilities,	given	the	lack	of	limitation	to	commercial	property.	Of	
course,	Rice	goes	on,	given	the	generality	of	the	language	of	Article	53	(and	considering	
the	fact	that	many	observers	think	it	is	a	stretch	to	find	it	to	be	an	implied	waiver),	it	is	
very	unlikely	that	a	court	would	deem	it	to	be	an	explicit	consent	to	execution	against	
sovereign	 assets.	 Thus,	 a	 court	 applying	 the	 Creighton	 approach	 to	 UK	 sovereign	
immunity	 law	would	 only	 affect	 the	 status	 quo	 insofar	 as	 it	 viewed	 the	waiver	 as	 an	
express	one.	
	
Most	 civil	 law	 courts	 have	 adopted	 the	 restrictive	 approach	 to	 sovereign	
immunity	 not	 through	 domestic	 legislation,	 but	 instead	 through	 customary	
international	law	(CIL).	
	
																																																													
306	Pub.	L.	No.	100-669,	102	Stat.	3969	(1988)	(codified	as	amended	at	9	U.S.C.	§	9,	28	U.S.C	§§	1605(a)	&	
1610(a)).	
307	State	Immunity	Act	1978	c.	33	(Butterworth's	2003)	[hereinafter	SIA].	
308	George	 K.	 Foster,	 Collecting	 from	 Sovereigns:	 The	 Current	 Legal	 Framework	 for	 Enforcing	 Arbitral	
Awards	 and	 Court	 Judgments	 Against	 States	 and	 Their	 Instrumentalities,	 and	 Some	 Proposals	 for	 its	
Reform,	25(3)	ARIZ.	J.	OF	INT’L	&	COMP.	L.	666,	684	(2008).	Compare	FSIA,	§	1610(a)(1)	with	SIA,	§	13(3).	
309	Burkhard	Hefi,	The	International	Law	Commission's	Draft	Convention	on	the	Jurisdictional	Immunities	
of	States	and	Their	Property,	4	EUR.	J.	INT’L	L.	269,	271	(1993).	
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The	 ILC’s	 Draft	 Articles	 on	 Jurisdictional	 Immunities	 of	 States	 and	 their	
Property310		 was	 tasked	with	 codifying	 international	 law	 on	 sovereign	 immunity,	 and	
the	 Draft	 Articles	 were	 the	 result	 of	 more	 than	 a	 decade	 of	 work,	 with	 discussions,	
meetings	and	revisions	going	on	from	1978	to	1991.311		
	
Article	18	addresses	the	primary	issues	of	immunity	from	execution.	Crucially,	
Article	 18(1)(a)(i)	 provides	 that	 a	 sovereign	 is	 immune	 from	 measures	 of	 constraint	
(including	execution)	against	state	property	unless	the	state	has	expressly	consented	to	
such	measures,	 including	by	an	arbitration	agreement.	Much	 like	 the	 relevant	UK	SIA	
provision,	 such	waiver	needs	 to	be	explicit,	but	 its	 reach	 is	not	 limited	 to	commercial	
property	(as	is	true	under	the	US	FSIA).	Therefore,	just	as	was	the	case	under	the	SIA,	if	
a	 court	 guided	by	 the	 ILC	Draft	Articles	 considered	 ICSID	Article	 53	 to	 be	 an	 implicit	
waiver,	it	would	not	have	any	significant	impact	on	an	award	holder’s	ability	to	forcibly	
execute	against	sovereign	property.	On	the	other	hand,	(unlikely	as	it	may	be)	if	a	court	
interpreted	the	provision	as	an	express	waiver	of	execution	immunity,	commercial	and	
traditionally	“sovereign”	property	may	be	deemed	ready	for	the	taking.	
	
4.6.4 Conclusion	
	
Recent	 experience	 with	 recalcitrant	 sovereign	 debtors	 has	 shown	 that	
sovereign	 immunity	may	 be	 the	 Achilles’	 heel	 of	 any	 enforcement	 regime,	 even	 one	
designed	to	offer	simplified	and	straightforward	procedures	like	the	ICSID	Convention.	
One	way	to	get	around	this	problem	is	to	view	certain	provisions	whereby	a	sovereign	
government	 expressly	 consents	 to	 final,	 binding,	 unreviewable	 arbitration	 and	
affirmatively	agrees	to	fulfill	its	obligations	arising	thereunder	as	a	waiver	of	sovereign	
immunity	 from	 execution.	 That	 is	 what	 the	 French	 Cour	 de	 cassation	 did	 in	 Société	
Creighton	v.	Ministère	des	Finances	de	l’Etat	du	Qatar	as	regards	Article	24	of	the	old	ICC	
Rules	of	Arbitration.	Rice	has	explored	whether	 ICSID	Convention	Article	 53	 could	be	
similarly	construed	as	a	waiver	of	executional	immunity.	Determining	that	it	is	possible,	
Rice	further	concluded	that	doing	so	would	only	have	a	tangible	effect	on	an	investor’s	
ability	 to	 forcibly	execute	against	sovereign	assets	where	Article	53	was	viewed	as	an	
explicit	waiver	and	where	non-commercial	property	was	amenable	to	execution.	
	
	
	
																																																													
310 	United	 Nations,	 Draft	 Articles	 of	 Jurisdictional	 Immunities	 of	 States	 and	 Their	 Property,	 with	
Commentaries,	YEARBOOK	ILC	1991	II(2)	[]hereinafter	ILC	Draft	Articles].	
311	Thomas	 Geigerich,	 The	 Holy	 See,	 a	 Former	 Somalian	 Prime	 Minister	 and	 a	 Confiscated	 Pissarro	
Painting:	Recent	US	Case	Law	on	Foreign	Sovereign	Immunity,	in	IMMUNITIES	IN	THE	AGE	OF	GLOBAL	
CONSTITUTIONALISM	51	(eds.	Anne	Peters	et	al.)	(2014).	
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4.7 The	Better	Way	proposed	by	Barbosa	
	
	
According	 to	 Barbosa,	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 boost	 of	 international	
investment	 treaties	 (specially	 the	 so-called	BITs	 –	Bilateral	 Investment	Treaties),	 	 the	
number	 of	 arbitration	 cases	 and	 consequently	 the	 number	 of	 awards	 to	 be	 enforced	
have	 increased	 significantly.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	whole	 ICSID	 system	 started	 to	 be	more	
questioned	in	practice,	including	its	recognition	and	enforcement	formula.	
As	 a	 result,	 although	 ICSID	 arbitration	 is	 still	 the	 one	 mostly	 chosen	 for	
settling	 investor-State’s	 disputes,	 investors	 have	 been	 more	 and	 more	 taking	 into	
account	not	only	the	rules	of	recognition	and	enforcement	when	making	their	choice	of	
arbitration,	but	also	the	effectiveness	of	the	arbitral	award	execution,	since	satisfaction	
of	the	award	is	the	common	goal	in	any	kind	of	arbitration.	
 
 
4.7.1 The	solution	proposed:	The	waiver	of	the	immunity	from	execution	
	
Once	 immunity	 from	 execution	 is	 considered	 an	 independent	 issue	 from	
immunity	 from	 jurisdiction	 in	 almost	 every	 national	 law	 and	 national	 case	 law,	
questions	 about	 the	 State’s	 waiver	 of	 such	 immunities	 started	 also	 to	 be	 faced.	 If	
immunity	 from	jurisdiction	can	be	easily	waived	only	by	the	State	decision	to	settle	a	
dispute	by	arbitration,	what	 should	happen	 to	 the	 immunity	 from	execution?	As	case	
law	has	shown,	immunity	from	execution	is	more	likely	to	face	more	limited	and	strict	
conditions	in	order	to	be	considered	as	been	waived	by	the	State.	
	
National	 courts’	 decisions	 and	 scholars’	 opinions	 have	 substantially	 divided	
the	waiver	of	the	immunity	from	execution	in	two	positions:	the	first	one	considers	that	
such	 waiver	 may	 only	 be	 effected	 expressly	 and	 unequivocally	 by	 the	 State,	
independent	 and	 detached	 from	 the	 waiver	 of	 the	 immunity	 from	 jurisdiction.	 The	
second	 position	 understands	 that	 the	waiver	 of	 the	 immunity	 from	execution	 can	 be	
effective	without	the	express	and	clear	statement	of	the	State,	directly	resulting	from	
the	waiver	of	 immunity	from	jurisdiction.	Anyhow,	each	and	every	State	will	have	full	
authority	to	provide	for	its	own	rules	on	this	subject.	
	
As	for	the	first	position,	Carias-Borjas	is	of	the	opinion	that	“[i]mmunity	from	
execution	 is	 a	 principle	 of	 public	 international	 law	 that	 cannot	 be	 set	 aside	 unless	
expressly	waived	or	abolished	 in	a	particular	State	by	statue	or	case	 law”	 .	Under	this	
position,	investors	have	failed	to	convince	national	courts	in	the	US,	in	Germany	and	in	
France,	 that	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 NYC	 in	 the	 arbitral	 agreement	 (Libancell	 and	
Sedelmayer)	 or	 a	 reference	 to	 an	 arbitration	 clause	 (Iran	 v.	 EURODIF)	 should	 be	
considered	as	a	waiver	of	immunity	from	execution.	
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However,	 “in	 some	 countries,	 acceptance	 of	 arbitrat	 ion	 is	 taken	 to	 imply	
waiver	of	immunity	from	execution”	312.	In	France,	the	Cour	d’appel	de	Rouen	,	in	Société	
Bec	 Frères,	 has	 innovated	 the	 French	 position	 when	 it	 decides	 that	 the	 arbitration	
clause	shows	that	the	parties	have	chosen	to	submit	their	dispute	under	 international	
commercial	 law,	waiving	the	 immunity	from	jurisdiction	and,	as	a	consequence,	when	
making	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	 arbitration	 agreements	 in	 good	 faith,	 it	 should	 be	
considered	that	the	parties	have	also	waived	the	immunity	from	execution.	Moreover,	
in	 Creighton	 v.	 Qatar,	 this	 position	 was	 emphasized	 by	 a	 decision	 of	 the	 Cour	 de	
Cassation.	After	 the	Court,	Qatar	has	waived	 its	 immunity	 from	execution	because	of	
the	Article	 24	 of	 the	 ICC	Arbitration	 Rule	 then	 in	 force.	 At	 the	 time,	 the	 parties	 had	
submitted	 their	 dispute	 to	 an	 ICC	 tribunal	 and	 the	 applicable	 Article	 24	 of	 the	 ICC	
Arbitration	 Rules	 provided	 for	 that	 “[b]y	 submitting	 the	 dispute	 to	 arbitration	 by	
International	Chamber	of	Commerce,	the	parties	shall	be	deemed	to	have	undertaken	
to	 carry	 out	 the	 resulting	 award	without	 delay	 and	 to	 have	waived	 their	 right	 to	 any	
form	of	appeal	 insofar	as	 such	waiver	can	validly	be	made”313	.	 It	was	considered	 that	
immunity	from	execution	was	one	of	the	“forms	of	ap	peal	insofar	as	such	waiver	could	
validly	be	made”.	However,	this	decision	was	not	ve	ry	well	accepted	by	scholars.	
	
French	 case	 law	 shows	 that	 only	 post-judgment	 attachments	 have	 an	open	
wide	application.	Pre-judgment	attachments	do	not	allow	the	French	courts	to	use	the	
same	position	 taken	 in	EURODIF	and	Creighton.	 In	 the	 famous	NOGA	v.	Russia	case,	
even	 though	Russia	 had	 expressly	waived	 its	 immunity	 from	 execution	 by	 a	 contract	
signed	up	by	NOGA,	 the	Cour	d’appel	de	Paris	 stated	 that	pre-judgment	attachments	
were	 not	 authorized	 against	 those	 who	 benefited	 from	 immunity	 from	 execution,	
regardless	its	waiver.	
	
As	we	can	 see,	 since	 the	 ICSID	Convention	adopts	 the	 independence	of	 the	
immunity	 from	 execution	 from	 immunity	 from	 jurisdiction,	 waiver	 of	 the	 immunity	
from	jurisdiction	will	never	authorize	a	broader	interpretation	to	consider	it	as	a	waiver	
of	immunity	from	execution	as	well,	due	to	the	mere	fact	that	the	Article	55	sets	forth	
that	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 rules	 shall	 not	 be	 construed	 as	 derogating	 the	
immunity	from	execution	law	in	force	in	any	Contracting	State.	However,	the	non-ICSID	
practice	 shows	 the	 possibility	 to	 have	 an	 implied	 waiver	 of	 the	 immunity	 from	
execution,	as	national	laws	are	free	to	consider	the	possibility	of	having	implied	waiver	
of	immunity	from	execution,	giving	a	more	favourable	treatment	if	compared	to	ICSID	
awards.	
	
4.8 The	solution	of		Baldwin,	Kantor	and	Nolan	
 
																																																													
312	PAULSSON	(J.),	“Review	and	enforcement	of	state-inv	estor	awards”,	§2.	
313	The	Article	 24	was	 replaced	 by	 the	 current	Article	 28(6)	 of	 the	 ICC	Arbitration	 Rules,	 in	 force	 since	
January	1st,	2008	
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It	 is	 commonly	 said	 by	 proponents	 of	 the	 ICSID	 investor-state	 arbitration	
system	 that	 the	 ICJ	 is	 available	 to	 be	 enlisted	 in	 its	 defense.	 Article	 27	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	forbids	Contracting	States	from	bringing	an	international	claim	on	behalf	of	
an	 investor	 related	 to	 an	 ICSID	 dispute	 unless	 another	 “Contracting	 State	 shall	 have	
failed	 to	 abide	 by	 and	 comply	with	 the	 award	 rendered	 in	 such	 dispute.”	 Consistent	
with	 this	provision,	Article	64	of	 the	 ICSID	Convention	states	 that	any	dispute	arising	
from	the	“interpretation	or	application”	of	the	ICSID	Convention	shall	be	referred	to	the	
ICJ,	 therefore	 allowing	 Contracting	 States	 to	 bring	 an	 action	 against	 another	
Contracting	State	for	failing	to	honor	its	treaty	obligations	under	the	ICSID	Convention.	
This	possible	counter-action	to	the	resistance	of	an	ICSID	award,	however,	presents	its	
own	difficulties.	First,	the	investor	would	have	to	convince	its	home	Contracting	State	
to	bring	the	claim	on	 its	behalf.	The	decision	by	a	state	to	bring	an	 ICJ	action	against	
another	state	will	undoubtedly	 involve	a	balancing	of	political,	economic	and	security	
issues	 outside	 the	 control	 of	 that	 investor.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 some	 states	 at	 least,	 this	
course	of	action	may	be	complicated	by	a	lack	of	confidence	in	the	ICJ,	as	was	recently	
addressed	 by	 Professor	 Eric	 Posner	 in	 a	 New	 York	 Times	 opinion	 piece.314	Professor	
Posner	noted	that,	 in	“the	 last	30	years,	 the	countries	with	the	ten	 largest	economies	
have	brought	only	two	contentious	cases”	before	the	ICJ.92	Moreover,	a	case	before	the	
ICJ	would	likely	take	a	substantial	length	of	time	to	prosecute.	And,	finally,	there	is	no	
guarantee	that	a	disappointed	state	would	pay	an	ICJ	award	if	ordered	to	do	so.	
	
Difficult	 issues	 also	 exist	 as	 to	 the	 remedies	 available	 for	 an	 investor	 in	
connection	with	 an	 Article	 64	 ICJ	 proceeding	 brought	 by	 that	 investor’s	 state.315	The	
ICJ’s	 Statute	 does	 not	 authorize	 the	 orders	 of	 specific	 performance,	 only	
“recommendations.”	 It	 is	 therefore	 unclear	 whether	 the	 ICJ	 could	 compel	 the	
respondent	state	to	comply	with	the	ICSID	award.	Moreover,	ICSID	Convention	Article	
64	does	not	necessarily	give	the	ICJ	juris-diction	over	the	investor’s	claims	as	espoused	
by	 the	 investor’s	 state.	 Instead,	 Article	 64	 addresses	 only	 disputes	 between	 the	 two	
states	about	“interpretation	or	application”	of	the	ICSID	Convention.	It	is	therefore	also	
unclear	how	the	investor’s	state	can	bring	a	damage	claim	on	behalf	of	the	investor	to	
the	 ICJ	 without	 a	 separate	 ICJ	 jurisdictional	 consent	 from	 the	 respondent	 state	 with	
respect	to	that	claim.	
Some	observers	suggest	that	the	World	Bank	could	withhold	certain	benefits	
to	Contracting	States	if	those	states	take	actions	to	avoid	the	enforcement	of	awards.	
The	Operational	Procedures	of	 the	World	Bank	allow	Regional	Vice	Presidents	of	 the	
Bank	 to	withhold	 loans	 from	 states	 that	 do	 not	 comply	with	 their	 obligations	 to	 the	
World	Bank.94	ICSID	itself	is	undeniably	a	part	of	the	World	Bank	Group.	In	contrast,	an	
ICSID	tribunal	is	clearly	not	an	arm	of	the	World	Bank	Group.	Moreover,	an	award	of	an	
ICSID	 tribunal	 is	 not	 an	 obligation	 owing	 to	 the	World	 Bank	Group.	Accordingly,	 the	
																																																													
314	Eric	A.	Posner,	All	Justice,	too,	is	Local,	N.Y.	TIMES,	December	30,	2004.	
315	Art.	 64	 of	 the	 I.C.J.	 arguably	 allows	 any	 interested	 Contracting	 State,	 not	 just	 the	 investor’s	 home	
state,	to	bring	a	claim	against	another	Contracting	State	before	the	I.C.J.	
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World	 Bank’s	Operational	 Procedures	 (and	 the	 Bank’s	 Articles	 of	 Agreement)	 do	 not	
directly	 address	 the	 situation	 where	 a	 member	 country	 refuses	 to	 honor	 an	 ICSID	
arbitration	 award.	 Additionally,	 the	World	 Bank	 has	 not,	 to	 the	 authors’	 knowledge,	
spoken	publicly	about	the	consequences	(if	any)	for	new	loans	to	a	Contracting	State	if	
that	state	refused	to	honor	its	obligations	under	the	award	and	the	ICSID	Convention.	
	
The	 IMF	 recently	did	 threaten	 to	withhold	 loans	 from	Argentina	 in	order	 to	
remedy	 Argentina’s	 failure	 to	 reach	 agreements	 with	 its	 bondholders	 following	 the	
failure	to	honor	the	bonds.	The	IMF	has	stated	that	it	would	require	Argentina	to	reach	
agreements	with	 its	 bondholders	 before	 restructuring	Argentina’s	 existing	 loans	with	
the	 IMF.	 Possibly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 pressure	 from	 the	 IMF,	 Argentina	 reached	
agreements	 with	 many	 of	 its	 bondholders	 on	 a	 controversial	 exchange	 offer	 for	
sovereign	 Argentine	 debt.	 Ultimately,	 however,	 the	 IMF	 agreed	 to	 restructure	
Argentina’s	 loans	 despite	 Argentina’s	 failure	 to	 reach	 agreements	 with	 all	 of	 its	
bondholders.	Moreover,	the	terms	of	the	exchange	offer	were	seen	by	the	international	
financial	 community	 to	be	 favourable	 to	Argentina.	Thus,	 it	 is	unclear	 to	what	extent	
IMF	 pressure	 influenced	 the	 conduct	 of	 Argentina.	 Although	 the	 efficacy	 of	 possible	
pressure	 from	 the	World	Bank	 to	 cause	 the	 enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 awards	 is	 far	 from	
clear,	the	commitment	of	the	World	Bank	itself	may	well	be	the	most	important	factor	
in	the	ultimate	success	of	the	ICSID’s	investor-state	arbitration	regime.	
 
	
4.9 The	Solution	of	Vincent	O.	Orlu	Nmehielle	
	
In	 Nmehielle’s	 opinion	 it	 appears	 to	 be	 two	 possible	 ways	 to	 remedy	 this	
situation.		The	first	one	is	the	waiver	of	immunity.		
From	 the	 time	 of	 entering	 into	 an	 investment	 contract,	 an	 investor	 should	
properly	 address	 the	 possibility	 of	 waiving	 immunity	 from	 execution.	 At	 present,	
unfortunately,	the	attorney	of	a	private	investor	has	no	choice	but	to	insist	on	including	
a	clause	explicitly	waiving	immunity	from	execution	in	a	contract	with	a	state.	Waiver	of	
immunity	is	controversial,	and	thus	will	depend	on	who	has	greater	bargaining	power.	
Where	 the	 private	 party	 is	 in	 a	 stronger	 position,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 state	 party	will	
succumb	 to	 the	 pressure	 of	 waiving	 immunity	 from	 execution.	 Whether	 the	 private	
party	 is	 in	a	 stronger	position	depends	upon	 the	kind	of	 investment	contemplated.74	
Experience	 has	 shown	 that	 though	 waivers	 of	 immunity	 in	 economic	 development	
agreements	 vary	 from	 case	 to	 case,	 waivers	 of	 immunity	 are	 commonplace	 in	
transnational	loan	agreements.	Lenders	almost	never	fail	to	see	that	borrowing	states	
or	other	public	entities	waive	 immunities	 from	 jurisdiction	and	enforcement,	whether	
before	or	after	recovery	of	judgment.	75	It	can	be	expected	that	as	long	as	the	relevant	
provision	 is	 clearly	 worded	 and	 does	 not	 lend	 itself	 to	 restrictive	 interpretation,	 or	
border	on	other	considerations	 impacting	the	act	of	state	doctrine,	 there	 is	 reason	to	
have	 confidence	 in	 the	 merits	 of	 such	 waivers.76	 Recognizing	 the	 Convention's	
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shortcomings	regarding	execution	of	 its	awards,	the	 ICSID	recommends	the	following	
model	 clause	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 waiving	 immunity:	 The	 [Name	 of	 Contracting	 State]	
hereby	 irrevocably	 waives	 any	 claim	 to	 immunity	 in	 regard	 to	 any	 proceedings	 to	
enforce	 any	 arbitral	 award	 rendered	 by	 a	 Tribunal	 constituted	 pursuant	 to	 this	
agreement,	 including	immunity	from	service	of	process,	 immunity	from	jurisdiction	of	
any	court,	and	immunity	of	any	of	its	property	from	execution.	
	
There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 waiver	 of	 immunity	 will	 be	 a	 difficult	 issue	 in	 the	
negotiation	of	any	investment	agreement	with	state	parties	to	the	contract,	one	which	
most	states	will	vehemently	oppose.	The	real	issue	boils	down	to	the	bargaining	power	
of	the	investor,	which	depends	on	the	attendant	need	of	the	state	party	with	regard	to	
the	investment	contemplated.	It	has	been	suggested	that	waivers	of	immunity	outside	
the	 financial	 field	 are	 relatively	 rare.	While	private	parties	 engaged	 in	giving	 loans	 to	
states	may	be	 in	a	better	bargaining	position	 to	demand	a	waiver	of	 immunity,	other	
aspects	 of	 investments	 may	 require	 such	 waivers,	 especially	 if	 the	 parties	 proceed	
under	the	ICSID	Convention.	It	is	not	uncommon	to	see	certain	economic	development	
agreements	contain	a	waiver	of	immunity	c1ause.	
Apart	from	being	in	a	strong	bargaining	position,	the	interest	of	the	investor	
may	also	influence	the	decision	whether	to	negotiate	for	a	waiver	of	immunity	clause.	
The	investor	may	very	well	take	a	business	risk,	hoping	for	the	best.	This	kind	of	action	
will	depend	upon	the	existing	business	relationship	between	the	investor	and	the	state	
party	to	the	agreement.	
	
4.9.1 A	New	Era:	The	Solution	of	Duke	and	Blue	Ridge	
Some	 years	 ago,	 Argentina	 announced	 its	 intention	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	
International	 Centre	 for	 Settlement	 of	 Investment	 Disputes	 (ICSID),	 making	 it	 the	
fourth	 Latin	 American	 country	 to	 do	 so	 and	 signaling	 a	 growing	 resistance	 to	 the	
obligations	 imposed	 by	 the	 international	 arbitration	 regime	 -	 namely,	 treating	 ICSID	
awards	as	binding	and	 immediately	enforceable	 in	any	signatory	state.	Alongside	 the	
public	denunciations,	certain	signatory	states	have	directly	challenged	ICSID's	authority	
by	 raising	 various	 and	 novel	 defenses	 to	 the	 confirmation	 and	 enforcement	 of	 ICSID	
awards	 in	 other	 signatory	 states,	 particularly	 in	 the	 US.	 Despite	 this	 trend,	 recent	
federal	court	decisions	illustrate	the	US	judiciary's	resolve	to	uphold	ICSID	awards	and	
resist	sovereign	attempts	to	evade	pecuniary	obligations	imposed	by	ICSID	awards.	
Resort	 to	 the	 ICSID	 system	 is	 voluntary	 and	 requires	 consent	 by	 both	
investors	 and	 signatory	 states	 to	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 (the	 ‘Convention’)	 but	 once	
consent	 is	 given,	 the	 obligations	 under	 the	 Convention	 become	mandatory	 and	 the	
outcomes	of	the	arbitration	binding.	It	is	this	feature	that	is	perhaps	the	most	defining	
of	 the	 ICSID	 system:	 national	 courts	 may	 not	 intervene	 in	 an	 ICSID	 proceeding	 and	
awards	are	binding	and	enforceable	 in	all	 signatory	 states.	 Indeed,	when	drafting	 the	
Convention,	 its	 authors	 repeatedly	 emphasized	 the	 binding	 nature	 of	 the	 arbitral	
award,	 believing	 it	 to	 be	 essential	 in	 instilling	 party	 confidence	 in	 the	 neutrality	 and	
efficacy	 of	 the	 process.	 As	 Aaron	 Broches,	 the	 ‘father’	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	
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explained,	 drafters	 of	 the	 Convention	 sought	 to	 create	 ‘“a	 complete,	 exclusive	 and	
closed	jurisdictional	system,	insulated	from	national	law”	with	respect	to	the	arbitration	
proceedings,	awards,	and	review	of	award.’316	
The	Convention's	provisions	concerning	the	binding	force	and	finality	of	ICSID	
awards	appear	in	Chapter	IV,	section	6	of	the	Convention,	Articles	53	and	54.	
The	remedies	referenced	in	Article	53(1)	are	limited	to	annulment,	revision	or	
interpretation	of	an	award	and	can	be	obtained	only	through	ICSID.317	That	 is,	only	an	
ICSID	 tribunal	 may	 review	 or	 interpret	 the	 award,	 and	 only	 a	 specially	 constituted	
annulment	committee	may	annul	the	award.	No	setting	aside	or	other	review	of	ICSID	
awards	is	permitted	by	national	courts.	
As	noted,	 signatory	 states	 are	obligated,	 under	Article	 54(1),	 to	 codify	 their	
obligations	under	the	Convention	through	national	
legislation.	 In	the	US,	the	federal	 implementing	statute	 is	 located	 in	22	USC	
section	l650a(a)	(the	'implementing	statute'),	which	provides:	
‘The	pecuniary	obligations	 imposed	by	such	an	award	shall	be	enforced	and	
shall	be	given	the	same	full	faith	and	credit	as	if	the	award	were	a	final	 judgment	of	a	
court	of	general	jurisdiction	of	one	of	the	several	States.	The	Federal	Arbitration	
Act	 (9	U.S.C.	 1	 et	 seq.)	 shall	 not	 apply	 to	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 rendered	
pursuant	to	the	convention.’	
The	 latter	 caveat	 that	 the	 Federal	 Arbitration	 Act	 (FAA)	 does	 not	 apply	 to	
ICSID	 awards	 serves	 to	 further	 strengthen	 the	 enforceability	 of	 ICSID	 awards	 as	 it	
means	 that	 defenses	 available	 under	 the	 FAA	 are	 not	 available	 to	 parties	 seeking	 to	
challenge	enforcement	of	an	ICSID	award.	
Together	 with	 the	 Convention's	 binding	 force	 and	 enforcement	 provisions,	
the	implementing	statute	should	render	an	ICSID	award	nearly	impervious	to	challenge	
in	US	 courts.	This,	 after	 all,	was	 the	 idea	behind	 the	Convention	 in	 the	 first	place:	 to	
create	a	comprehensive,	self-sufficient	system	of	international	arbitration	in	the	area	of	
investment	disputes	free	from	national	interference	and	in	which	the	‘tribunal's	award	
would	be	directly	enforceable	within	the	territories	of	the	States	parties.’318	
Notwithstanding	the	former,	in	recent	years,	certain	states	have	nonetheless	
attempted,	albeit	unsuccessfully,	to	raise	defenses	to	the	confirmation	or	enforcement	
of	ICSID	awards.	Two	recent	opinions,	issued	within	two	weeks	of	each	other,	illustrate	
the	 federal	 courts'	 unwillingness	 to	 allow	 states	 to	 circumvent	 the	 mandatory	
enforcement	provisions	of	the	Convention	and	the	implementing	statute:	
• in	Duke	Energy	Int'l	v	Republic	of	Peru,	No	l:	11-cv-01602	(JEB)	2012	WL	5839206	
(DDC	 19	 November	 2012),	 the	 DC	 District	 Court	 rebuffed	 Peru's	 attempt	 to	
avoid	payment	of	interest	applicable	under	an	ICSID	award;	and	
• in	Blue	Ridge	Investments,	LLC	v	Republic	of	Argentina,	No	10	CIV.	153	PGG,	2012	
WL	 4714819	 (SDNY30	 September	 2012),	 the	 Southern	 District	 of	 New	 York	
																																																													
316	Christina	Binder	et	al.	International	Investment	Law	for	the	2l.st	Century:	Essays	in	Honor	of	Christoph	
Schreuer	(2009)	at	323.	
317	Convention,	Articles	50-52.			
318	E.	Lauterpacht.	‘Foreword’	to	C.	Schreuer,	The	ICSID	Convention:	A	Convention	(2001)	p	xi.	
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likewise	 rejected	 Argentina's	 asserted	 defenses	 to	 confirmation	 of	 an	 ICSID	
award.	
In	Duke,	 Duke	 Energy	 International	 (‘Duke’),	 an	 investor	 in	 Peru,	 petitioned	
the	DC	District	 Court	 to	 confirm	 an	 underlying	 ICSID	Award	 (‘Award’)	 that	 had	 been	
granted	 in	 its	 favor.	 The	 petition	 to	 confirm	 related	 to	 the	 amount	 of	 interest	 Peru	
owed	 Duke	 under	 the	 Award.	 Having	 lost	 the	 ICSID	 arbitration,	 Peru	 paid	 Duke	 the	
principal	amount	 it	owed	and	a	certain	sum	of	 interest.	However,	prior	 to	 issuance	of	
the	 ICSID	 award,	 but	 after	 the	 closing	 of	 arguments,	 the	 Peruvian	 Tax	 Authority	
amended	the	Peruvian	tax	code,	changing	the	applicable	interest	rate.	Peru	claimed	it	
need	only	pay	Duke	the	interest	rate	as	it	existed	before	the	amendment;	Duke	argued	
in	 its	 petition	 to	 confirm	 that	 it	 was	 owed	 an	 additional	 US$2m	 under	 the	 adjusted	
interest	rate.	Peru	moved	to	dismiss.	
At	 issue	 in	 the	Duke	 case	was	 a	 phrase	 in	 the	Award	 requiring	 Peru	 to	 pay	
Duke	 a	 principal	 amount	 plus	 ‘simple	 interest	 calculated	 thereon	 ...	 using	 the	 actual	
interest	rate(s)	stipulated	for	that	period	by	[the	Peruvian	Tax	Authority]	for	refunds	to	
tax	payers’.	 In	 its	motion	 to	dismiss,	Peru	argued	 first	 that	Duke	had	 failed	 to	state	a	
claim,	based	on	Peru's	contention	tl1at	it	had	fully	paid	its	obligation.	
In	the	alternative,	Peru	argued	that	the	Award	was	ambiguous	and	should	be	
remanded	to	the	Tribunal	for	clarification.	Finally,	Peru	fought	the	petition	on	grounds	
of	 forum	 non	 conveniens,	 arguing	 that	 the	 Peruvian	 courts	 were	 better	 suited	 to	
determine	which	 interest	 rate	applied:	 the	new	 rate	under	 the	amended	 tax	 code,	or	
the	 previous	 rate.	On	 14	 September	 2012,	DC	District	 Judge	Boasberg	 denied	 Peru's	
motion.	The	Court	easily	 rejected	Peru's	 first	defense,	 failure	 to	state	a	claim,	 finding	
that	a	claim	for	unpaid	interest	was	valid	and	that	Duke	had	‘giv[en]	[Peru]	fair	notice	of	
what	the	claim	is	and	the	grounds	upon	which	it	rests.’319		
The	Court	also	rejected	Peru's	request	for	remand,	concluding	that	Peru	had	
not	met	the	threshold	for	the	‘exceptional’	remedy	of	remand,	‘a	procedure	to	avoid	if	
possible,	 given	 the	 interest	 in	 prompt	 and	 final	 arbitration’.320		 In	 rejecting	 Peru's	
request	for	remand,	the	Court	noted	that	the	DC	Circuit	‘has	strongly	cautioned	against	
remanding	arbitral	awards,	finding	that	in	the	“balance	between	...	rooting	out	possible	
error	 and	 ...	 assuring	 that	 judgment	 be	 swift	 and	 economical”	 ...	 the	 latter	 must	
generally	prevail.’321		
Substantively,	the	Court	held	that	the	Award	was	‘clear	on	its	face’	and	thus	
required	no	 interpretation	by	 the	Court	or	by	a	 tribunal.	 Furthermore,	embracing	 the	
judiciary's	general	deference	to	arbitration,	the	Court	warned	that	a	remand	based	on	
ambiguity	 ‘requires	 something	 more	 substantial	 than	 a	 disagreement	 between	 the	
parties	...	Rather,	the	award	must	be	so	ambiguous	that	a	court	is	unable	to	discern	how	
to	enforce	it,	with	the	arbitrator's	intent	hopelessly	difficult	to	determine.’322	Finally,	in	
view	 of	 its	 determination	 that	 the	 Award	 was	 unambiguous	 and	 required	 neither	
																																																													
319	Duke	Energy	Int'l	Peru	Investments	No	1	Ltd	v	Republic	of	Peru,	CIV	A.	ll-1602	JEB,	2012	WL	4045191	*3	
(DDC	14	September	2012)	(citing	Bell	Atlantic	Corp	v	Twonbly,	550	us	544,	555	(2007)).	
320	Ibid.	
321	Ibid.	(citing	Sargent	v	Paine	Webber	Jackson	&	Curtis,	Inc,	882	F	2d	529,	533	(DC	Cir	1989)).	
322	Ibid,	(internal	citations	omitted).	
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judicial	nor	arbitral	clarification,	the	Court	declined		to	consider	Peru's	argument	under	
the	doctrine	of	forum	non	conveniens.		
Having	rejected	Peru's	motion	to	dismiss,	the	Court	found	itself	in	somewhat	
unchartered	territory.	Judge	Boasberg	held	a	status	conference	 in	which	 it	 invited	the	
parties	 to	 propose	 how	 next	 to	 proceed.	 Duke	 argued	 that	 the	 Court	 should	 simply	
confirm	 the	 award,	while	 Peru	 requested	 a	 final	 chance	 to	 brief	 Peruvian	 law.	 Judge	
Boasberg	opted	to	permit	Peru	a	‘limited	opportunity’	to	present	any	other	arguments	
against	confirmation.323		
Peru	filed	a	‘Motion	to	Deny	Confirmation’	 in	response	to	which	Duke	cross-
moved	for	confirmation.	Again,	the	Court	denied	Peru's	motion,	finding	that	‘Peru	now	
seeks	what	amounts	to	a	second	bite	at	the	apple	and	meets	the	same	fate.’324	Indeed,	
Peru	offered	no	new	arguments	and	 largely	 reiterated	 those	 it	had	brought	under	 its	
motion	to	dismiss,	namely	that	the	amended	tax	code	did	not	apply	to	the	Award.	In	its	
opinion,	the	Court	repeated	that	the	‘question	presented	is	a	narrow	one:	whether	the	
ICSID	Award	is	sufficiently	clear	for	this	Court	to	determine	the	applicable	interest	rate.’	
It	continued:			
‘If	so,	this	Court	 is	required	by	statute	to	give	the	Award	full	faith	and	credit	
and	 confirm	 it	 accordingly.	 (See	 22	 U.S.C.	 §1650a).	 The	 legal	 standards	 governing	
judicial	 review	 of	 arbitration	 awards	 are	 not	 complicated.	 As	 the	 Court	 previously	
noted,	such	review	‘is	limited	by	design.’	Remand	is	the	only	relief	available,	and	it	is	‘an	
exceptional	 remedy	 ...	 ‘to	 avoid	 if	 possible,	 given	 the	 interest	 in	 prompt	 and	 final	
arbitration.’’	Remand	is	only	warranted	where	the	award	is	“so	ambiguous	that	a	court	
is	 unable	 to	 discern	 how	 to	 enforce	 it.”	 Although	 styled	 as	 a	 Motion	 to	 Deny	
Confirmation,	 then,	 Peru's	 Motion	 is	 really	 just	 a	 second	 motion	 for	 remand.	 Once	
again,	 Peru	 would	 only	 be	 entitled	 to	 such	 remand	 if	 this	 Court	 were	 at	 a	 loss	 to	
determine	the	arbitrator's	meaning.’325	
Once	again,	the	Court	determined	that	the	Award	was	unambiguous.	It	thus	
deemed	 the	 ICSID	 tribunal's	 ruling	binding	 and	 conclusive,	 denied	Peru's	motion	 and	
granted	Duke's	petition	to	confirm.	
Not	 two	 weeks	 after	 the	 DC	 District	 Court's	 denial	 of	 Peru's	 motion	 to	
dismiss,	judge	Gardephe	of	the	Southern	District	of	New	York	ruled	against	Argentina	
on	 its	motion	 to	dismiss	 a	petition	 for	 confirmation.	 In	Blue	Ridge,	 the	 investor,	CMS	
Gas	Transmission	Company	 (CMS),	 prevailed	against	Argentina,	winning	an	award	of	
US$133.2m.	Argentina	filed	an	application	with	the	 ICSID	to	annul	the	Award	but	was	
rebuffed.	 The	 ICSID	 Annulment	 Committee	 ‘confirmed	 Argentina's	 obligation	 to	 pay	
CMS	$133.2	million	plus	interest	in	compensation,	holding	that	‘payment	by	Argentina	
of	the	sum	awarded	is	..	.	obligatory.’’326	Unlike	Peru,	Argentina	did	not	pay	any	portion	
of	the	Award.	
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In	 2008,	 Blue	 Ridge	 Investments,	 LLC	 ('Blue	 Ridge'),	 a	 Delaware	 company	
wholly-owned	 by	 Bank	 of	 America	 Corp,	 notified	 Argentina	 of	 its	 purchase	 and	
assignment	of	the	Award	from	CMS.	Blue	Ridge	thereafter	filed	a	petition	to	confirm.	
Argentina	moved	to	dismiss.	
Argentina	moved	to	dismiss	based	on	several	grounds,	including:	
i. Argentina	 was	 immune	 pursuant	 to	 the	 Foreign	 Sovereign	 Immunities	 Act	
(FSIA);	
ii. Blue	Ridge,	as	an	assignee	of	the	Award,	lacked	standing	to	bring	the	petition;	
and		
iii. the	petition	was	 time-barred	under	New	York's	one-year	statute	of	 limitations	
for	the	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards.	
Judge	Gardephe	ruled	against	Argentina	on	each	of	 its	arguments.	First,	the	
court	 agreed	 with	 Blue	 Ridge	 that	 Argentina	 had	 waived	 immunity	 under	 two	
exceptions	to	the	FSIA:	28	USC	section	1605(a)(6),	the	exception	for	the	confirmation	of	
arbitral	 awards:	 and	 28	 USC	 section	 l605(a)(l),	 the	 exception	 for	 explicit	 or	 implicit	
waivers	 of	 immunity.	 Citing	 Article	 54(1)	 of	 the	 Convention,	 the	 Court	 rejected	
Argentina's	 contention	 that	 ‘[c]onsenting	 to	 arbitrate	 before	 an	 ICSID	 tribunal	 hardly	
constitutes	proof	of	a	foreign	state's	intent	to	waive	immunity	to	suit	in	United	States	
courts	under	Section	1605(a)(l).’327	To	the	contrary,	the	Court	found	that	consenting	to	
arbitrate	before	the	ICSID	did	just	that:	
‘[W]here,	as	here,	a	foreign	state	has	chosen	to	become	a	Contracting	State	
for	purposes	of	the	TCSID	Convention	—	which	provides	for	the	automatic	recognition	
and	 enforcement	 of	 awards	 in	 Contracting	 States	 —	 that	 foreign	 state	 clearly	
anticipates	 the	 availability	 of	 a	 cause	 of	 action	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 at	 least	 with	
respect	to	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	an	award.’328		
For	 similar	 reasons,	 noting	 that	 the	 Award	 was	 governed	 by	 the	 ICSID	
Convention	 and	 was	 therefore	 entitled	 to	 ‘full	 faith	 and	 credit’	 under	 the	 federal	
implementing	 statute,	 the	 Court	 found	 that	 Argentina's	 agreement	 to	 submit	 its	
dispute	to	ICSID	arbitration	constituted	a	waiver	to	immunity	under	section	1605(a)(6).	
The	Court	likewise	rejected	Argentina's	claim	that	Blue	Ridge	lacked	standing	
to	bring	the	petition.	Argentina's	argument	turned	on	the	meaning	of	the	word	‘party’	
used	in	Article	54(2)	of	the	Convention:	
‘A	party	seeking	recognition	or	enforcement	in	the	territories	of	a	Contracting	
State	shall	furnish	to	a	competent	court	or	other	authority	which	such	State	shall	have	
designated	for	this	purpose	a	copy	of	the	award	certified	by	the	Secretary-General..’.	
Argentina	argued	that	the	term	party	as	used	in	Article	54(2)	was	restricted	to	
a	‘party	to	the	arbitration’	and	that	therefore	an	assignee	could	not	seek	confirmation.	
The	 Court	 rejected	 this	 assertion,	 noting	 in	 particular	 that	 the	 Convention	 did	 not	
define	the	term	and	in	fact	used	it	differently	throughout	the	Convention	depending	on	
the	 context.	 The	Court	 noted	 that,	 in	most	 cases,	 the	Convention	 applies	 descriptive	
																																																													
327	Ibid		
328	Ibid	 at	Duke	 Energy	 Int'l	 Peru	 Investments	 No	 1	 Ltd	 v	 Republic	 of	 Peru,	 CIV	 A.	 ll-1602	 JEB,	 2012	WL	
4045191	(international	citations	omitted).	
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terms	to	limit	the	scope	of	the	term	party,	such	as	‘party	to	the	arbitration’	or	‘party	to	
the	 dispute’.	 It	 thus	 could	 not	 conclude	 that	 the	 term	 ‘party’,	 without	 a	 further	
descriptive.	 was	 restricted	 to	 a	 ‘party	 to	 the	 arbitration’.329	Finally,	 the	 Court	 agreed	
with	Blue	Ridge	 that,	given	 the	 implementing	statute's	 imperative	 that	 the	Award	be	
entitled	to	‘the	same	full	faith	and	credit	as	a	final	judgment	of	a	state	court’,	New	York	
law	 on	 assignments	 was	 relevant.	 Under	 New	 York	 law,	 an	 assignee	 ‘has	 the	 same	
standing	to	enforce	an	arbitration	award	in	this	Court	as	its	assignor	would	have.’		The	
Court	thus	concluded	Blue	Ridge	had	standing.330	
Likewise,	 it	 rejected	 Argentina's	 argument	 that	 a	 one-year	 statute	 of	
limitations	 should	 apply	 to	 the	 claim,	 noting	 that	 so	 holding	 could	 produce	 ‘absurd	
results’	 because	Argentina	 had	 asked	 for	 -	 and	 obtained	 –	 a	 stay	 of	 enforcement	 for	
more	 than	 one	 year	 while	 it	 sought	 to	 annul	 the	 Award.331	Instead,	 noting	 that	 the	
Award	was	to	be	treated	as	a	‘final	judgment	[]	of	a	state	court	‘,	and	not	as	an	arbitral	
award,	 the	 Court	 borrowed	 the	 most	 analogous	 state	 statute	 of	 limitations,	 CPLR	
section	211.	which	governs	money	judgments.332	Under	CPLR	section	211,	a	party	may	
enforce	money	judgments	within	20	years333.	Thus,	Blue	Ridge's	petition	was	not	time-
barred.	
But	 the	 fight	 continues.	 Like	 the	 DC	 District	 Court,	 the	 SDNY	 did	 not	
immediately	 confirm	 the	 petition	 when	 it	 denied	 Argentina's	 motion,	 meaning	
confirmation	 is	 currently	 pending.	 Argentina	 promptly	 filed	 an	 interlocutory	 appeal	
based	 on	 FSIA	 immunity	 grounds	 and	 concurrently	moved	 in	 the	 SDNY	 to	 certify	 its	
remaining	claims	to	the	Second	Circuit	Blue	Ridge	has	cross-moved	in	the	district	court	
for	confirmation	and	for	certification	of	tl1e	appeal	as	frivolous.	
Duke	and	Blue	Ridge	exemplify	US	deference	to	foreign	arbitral	awards	even	
in	the	face	of	varied	challenges	to	their	recognition	and	enforcement.	With	their	strong	
language	and	probing	analysis	on	 issues	such	as	 interpretation,	 foreign	 immunity	and	
remand,	 they	 stand	 as	 important	 precedents	 in	 upholding	 the	 binding	 force	 of	 ICSID	
awards.					
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4.10 Towards	Non-Judicial	Means	To	Enforce	Investment	Awards 
	
Having	 a	 legal	 right	 does	 not	 mean	 much	 in	 practice,	 if	 such	 right	 cannot	 be	
enforced.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 order	 for	 a	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 successfully	 give	 effect	 to	 the	
important	values	set	out	in	the	substantive	law,	attention	should	also	be	paid	to	actual	
compliance,	either	voluntary	or	coerced	via	enforcement	mechanisms.334	
In	a	2008	survey	on	“Corporate	Attitudes	Towards	Recognition	and	Enforcement	of	
International	Arbitral	Awards”,	61%	of	 the	80	corporations	surveyed	declared	to	have	
encountered	difficulties	in	enforcing	arbitral	awards	and,	out	of	this	61%,	68%	indicated	
that	they	had	been	unable	to	identify	and	access	the	assets	of	the	State.335	In	addition,	
there	are	risks	of	a	procedural	and	economic	nature.		
According	 to	 Vinuales	 and	 Bentolilla,	 there	 are	 two	 kind	 of	 hurdles.	 	 The	 first	
difficulties	arise	 from	the	host	State’s	 immunity	 from	execution	and	the	autonomy	of	
State	entities.	In	addition	there	are	procedural	and	economic	difficulties.		
The	specific	scope	of	the	rules	on	sovereign	immunity	significantly	depends	on	the	
domestic	law	of	the	State	of	enforcement	and	it	would	be	pointless	to	provide,	in	this	
contribution,	 a	 catalogue	of	 the	different	 legal	 regimes.	 	 The	basic	 rule	 is	 that	 assets	
serving	 governmental	 purposes	 (iure	 imperii)	 benefit	 from	 immunity	 of	 enforcement,	
whereas	 assets	 serving	 commercial	 purposes	 (iure	 gestionis)	 do	 not.	Overall,	 a	 rather	
restrictive	 view	 of	 the	 assets	 covered	 by	 sovereign	 immunity	 seems	 to	 prevail	 in	
practice,	 but	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 awards	 against	 sovereigns	 are	 easily	 enforceable.	
Diplomatic,	 	 military,	 	 central	 bank,	 	 and	 cultural	 assets	 are,	 as	 a	 rule,	 excluded.	 In	
addition,	 as	 seen	 above,	 States	 often	 conduct	 their	 iure	 gestionis	 activities	 through	
separate	legal	entities.	Commercial	assets	will	often	be	property	of	these	entities,	such	
as	national	companies	or	central	banks.	This	makes	 it	difficult	 for	 the	 investor	 to	 find	
assets	that	can	be	subject	to	attachment	because	the	assets	belong	to	a	separate	legal	
entity	and	not	to	the	State	itself.	As	noted	by	one	commentator:	
‘[t]he	end	result	is	that	the	State	will	be	effectively	shielded	from	its	creditors:	when	
creditors	 try	 to	 enforce	 a	 decision	 against	 a	 State	 through	 assets	 allocated	 to	 jure	
imperii	activities,	the	State	will	raise	its	immunity	from	execution;	when	creditors	try	to	
																																																													
334	For	 this	part	 see	 	 the	work	 see	Viñuales,	 J.	E.	 and	D.	Bentolila,	 ‘The	use	of	 alternative	 (non-judicial)	
means	to	enforce	investment	awards’,	in	Boisson	de	Chazournes,	L.,	M.	Kohen	and	J.	E.	Viñuales	(eds.),	
Diplomatic	 and	 Judicial	 Means	 of	 Dispute	 Settlement	 :	 Assessing	 their	 Interactions	 (The	 Hague:	 Brill,	
forthcoming	in	2012).	
335	C.	 Baltag,	 "Special	 Section	 on	 the	 2008	 Survey	 on	 Corporate	 Attitudes	 towards	 Recognition	 and	
Enforcement	of	International	Arbitral	Awards:	Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	against	States",	Am.	Rev.	
Int’l	Arb.	19	(2008),	404-05.	
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seize	 assets	 allocated	 to	 jure	 gestioni	 activities,	 they	 will	 be	 told	 that	 they	 are	 not	
pursuing	the	right	debtor.’336	
When	 these	 entities	 lack	 independence	 or	 are	 the	 alter	 ego	 of	 the	 State,	 the	
principle	 of	 autonomy	of	 these	 entities	may	be	 tempered.	This	 said,	 domestic	 courts	
are	reluctant	to	find	these	entities	as	a	mere	façade	and	pierce	the	veil.337	Moreover,	in	
some	cases,	a	link	between	the	dispute	and	the	assets	to	be	attached	was	considered	as	
a	necessary	requirement.	
Enforcing	awards	before	the	courts	of	the	host	State	has	its	own	specific	problems.	
The	 potential	 hostility	 of	 the	 local	 authorities,	 including	 domestic	 courts,	 makes	
investors	 reluctant	 to	 pursue	 this	 avenue.	 In	Azurix	 v	 Argentina	 and	CMS	 v	 Argentina	
(subsequently	 acquired	 by	 Blue	 Ridge),	 the	 investors	 explored	 several	 avenues	 to	
enforce	 two	 ICSID	 awards	 but	 they	 paid	 little	 attention	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 seeking	
enforcement	before	Argentine	courts	as	Argentina	has	adopted	a	policy	of	challenging	
each	 award	 in	 the	 annulment	 proceedings	 as	 a	matter	 of	 routine	 dilatory	 practice	 to	
resist	compliance.	Furthermore	the	Attorney	General	of	Argentina	stated	to	the	press	
that	 if	 an	 ICSID	 tribunal	 were	 to	 render	 an	 award	 considered	 by	 Argentina	
unconstitutional,	 Argentine	 courts	 would	 be	 empowered	 to	 decide	 on	 its	
constitutionality	(Rosatti	doctrine).	
	
Plus,	there	are	procedural	and	economic	difficulties.	Aside	 from	the	 risk	 that	
the	 court	 seized	 may	 refuse	 recognition	 or	 enforcement,	 some	 other	 procedural	
difficulties	 include	 excessive	 delays,	 high	 expenses	 and	 the	 potential	 disclosure	 of	
confidential	 information.	 In	 some	 cases,	 investors	 may	 have	 to	 initiate	 several	
proceedings	in	different	countries	 where		they	 find		assets		of	 the		host		State.	
	
In	 addition,	 the	 enforcement	 of	 investment	 awards	 may	 also	 be	
constrained	 by	 business-	 related	 difficulties	 The	 enforcement	 of	 investment	 awards	
may	 also	 be	 constrained	 by	 business-	 related	 difficulties.	 Investors	 may	 wish	 to	
preserve	a	reasonably	good	business	relationship	with	either	the	host	State	or	a	third	
State	linked	to	this	latter.	In	this	context,	enforcement	proceedings	may	be	prejudicial	
to	the	business	relationship.	In	some	cases,	investors	may	go	as	far	as	to	avoid	recourse	
to	arbitration	altogether.	This	was	the	case	of	many	oil	companies	exploiting	heavy	oil	
																																																													
336	E.	Gaillard,	"Effectiveness	of	Arbitral	Awards,	State	Immunity	from	Execution	and	Autonomy	of	State	
Entities.	 Three	 Incompatible	 Principles",	State	 Entities	 in	 International	 Arbitration.	 Iai	 Series,	 in	 eds.	 E.	
Gaillard	and	J.	Younan	(Juris	publishing,	2008),	183.	
337	Enforcement	 was	 refused	 against	 these	 entities	 assets	 in	 First	 National	 City	 Bank	 v.	 Banco	 para	el	
Comercio	 Exterior	 de	 Cuba,	 462	 U.S.	 611,	 626-27	 (1983);	 Benvenuti	 &	 Bonfant	 Srl	 v.	 Banque	
Commercial	 Congolaise,	 Cour	 de	 cassation	 Paris,	 21	 July	 1987,	 1	 ICSID	 Reports	 373,	 374;	 AIG	 Capital	
Partners	 Inc.	 and	 Another	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Kazakhstan	 (National	 Bank	 of	 Kazakhstan	 Intervening),	
High	 Court,	 Queen’s	 Bench	 Division	 (Commercial	 Court),	 20	 October	 2005,	 [2005]	 EWHC	 2239	
(Comm),	 11	 ICSID	 Reports	 118;	 Cass.	 1e	 civ.,	 4	 January	 1995,	 Office	 des	 cereals	 de	 Tunisie	 v.	 Bec	
frères,	122,	JDI	649	(1995);	Cass.	1e	civ.,	May	12,	 2004,	Compagnie	Noga	d’importation	et	d’exportation	
v.	EADS	France,	2004	Bull.	Civ.	I,	No.	 135;	Gaz.	Pal.,	Somm.	3405	(2004).	
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in	 the	Orinoco	belt	 in	Venezuela	after	 the	 forced	conversion	of	oil	production	sharing	
contracts	 into	mixed	companies	 controlled	by	 the	State	 in	2009.338	Or,	 if	 the	 investor	
has	 pursued	 arbitration	 proceedings,	 it	 may	 prefer	 to	 negotiate	 a	 post-award	
settlement	in	order	to	maintain	the	business	relationship.339	
	
In	this	regard	I	fully	share	the	view	of	Jorge	Viñuales	and	Dolores	Bentolila	who	
proposed	a	variety	of	“alternative”	or	“non-judicial”	means	that	can	be	used	either	as	a	
supplement	to	the	judicial	framework	for	enforcement	or	on	a	stand-alone	basis,	when	
judicial	enforcement	has	been	pursued	unsuccessfully.	
The	alternative	means	 in	the	 light	of	current	practice	can	be	divided	in	three	
categories.	The	f irst 	ones	are	the	means	available	to	the	 investor	 (or	the	assignee	
of	 an	 award);	 then	we	 have	 	 those	 requiring	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	 investor’s	 home	
State	 or	 other	 third	 States,	 and	 in	 the	 end	 those	 requiring	 the	 intervention	 of	 an	
international	organization	 or	a	private	institution	.	
The	 most	 frequent	 means	 pursued	 by	 investors	 and	 debt-collection	 funds	
include:	 the	 negotiation	 of	 a	 post-award	 settlement	 (i);	 	 public	 relations	 campaigns	
targeting	the	 creditworthiness	of	the	host	State	(ii);	and,	in	some	cases,	the	initiation	of	
new	arbitration	proceedings	to	put	pressure	on	the	host	State	to	comply	with	a	previous	
award	(iii).	
	
4.10.1 Means	 Available	 To	 The	 Investor	 (Or	 The	 Assignee	 Of	 An	 Award):	
Post-Award	Settlements	
According	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 survey	 on	 “Corporate	 Attitudes	 Towards	
Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 International	 Arbitral	 Awards”	 post-award	
settlements	 are	 not	 uncommon.	 Some	 40%	 of	 the	 corporations	 surveyed	 have	
negotiated	 post-award	 settlements.340			Although	 	 these	 	 numbers	 	 are	 	 applicable	 	 to		
international	 	arbitration	 	 in	general,	not	only	mixed	arbitrations,341	a	settlement	of	an	
award	rendered	against	a	 sovereign	has	advantages	for	both	the	investor	and	the	host	
State.	 Whereas	 the	 investor	 will	 avoid	 spending	 time	 and	 money	 in	 enforcing	 the	
																																																													
338 	La	 migración	 de	 los	 contratos	 de	 servicios	 en	 la	 industria	 petrolera	 venezolana"	 "Entorno-	
Empresarial.Com".Nov.2006,www.entorno-	 mpresarial.com/?ed=70&pag=articulos&aid=596	 (last	
accessed	December	2011).	
339	L.		Mistelis		and		C.		Baltag,		"Special		Section		on		the		2008		Survey		on		Corporate		Attitudes	
towards	 Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 International	 Arbitral	 Awards.	 Special	 Section:	 Recognition	
and	 Enforcement	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards	 and	 Settlement	 in	 International	 Arbitration:	 Corporate	Attitudes	
and	Practices	",	339-40.	
340	L.		Mistelis		and		C.		Baltag,		"Special		Section		on		the		2008		Survey		on		Corporate		Attitudes	 towards		
Recognition		and		Enforcement		of		International		Arbitral		Awards.		Special		Section:	
Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards	 and	 Settlement	 in	 International	 Arbitration:	
Corporate	Attitudes	and	Practices	",	339.	
341	5%	against	 States	 and	 21%	against	 State	 legal	 entities	 of	 the	 total	 number	 of	 arbitrations	 in	
which	 the	 corporations	 surveyed	 participate	 in.	 Balatag,	 C.,	 "Special	 Section	 on	 the	 2008	 Survey	
on	 Corporate	 Attitudes	 Towards	 Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 International	 Arbitral	 Awards:	
Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	against	States,"	Am.	Rev.	Int’l	Arb.	19	(2008),	398.	
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award,	the	host	State	will	comply	with	its	obligation	at	a	discount	or	in	installments.342	
The	 risks	 associated	 with	 the	 enforcement	 of	 an	 award	 against	 States	 together	with	
the	relative	bargaining	power	of	the	 parties	have	an	 impact	on	the	value	of	the	award	
and	 represents	 the	 value	 at	 which	 the	 creditor	 would	 be	 willing	 to	 settle	 or	 sell.343	
When	 an	 investor	 anticipates	 that	 it	 will	 be	 difficult	 and/or	 expensive	 to	 find	
attachable	 assets,	 a	 post-award	 settlement	 may	 offer	 a	 suitable	 alternative.	 In	 the	
abovementioned	 survey,	 54%	 of	 the	 corporations	 interviewed	 said	 that	 they	 had	
negotiated	 a	 settlement	 at	 an	 amount	 between	 50%	 and	 75%	 of	 the	 value	 of	 the	
award	whereas	 only	 35%	of	 them	 settled	 for	 an	 amount	 above	 75%	of	 the	 value	the	
award.	
Settlements	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	 direct	 negotiations	 between	 the	 parties	 or	
assisted	 by	 other	 means	 through	 the	 intervention	 of	 conciliators	 or	 mediators.344	
Technically,	 a	 settlement	 is	 an	 agreement	 whereby	 the	 parties	 relinquish	 their	
rights	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 compromise	 on	 the	 amount	 and	modalities	 of	 payment	 of	 the	
award.	 A	 settlement	 does	 not	 necessarily	 involve	 direct	 cash	 payments.	 It	 may	
instead	 involve	 creative	 solutions	 with	 forward-looking	 terms,	 such	 as	 declaratory	
relief	 and	 future	 benefits,	 such	 as	 tax	 benefits	 or	 regulatory	 dispensations.	 The	
agreement	 may	 also	 include	 other	 terms,	 such	 as	 the	 release	 of	 guarantees	 and	
obligations	 regarding	 the	 investment	 (e.g.	 the	 release	 of	 certain	 machinery	 or	 the	
completion	of	certain	works).345	
At	 the	 treaty	 level,	 it	 has	 been	 considered	 that	 economic	 and	 physical	
coercion	 exercised	 by	 the	 host	 State	 over	 the	 investor	 to	 conclude	 an	 unfair	 post-
award	 settlement	 is	 null	 and	 void	 and	 a	 violation	 of	 the	 fair	 and	 equitable	 standard	
(FET)	 of	 a	 BIT.	 In	 Desert	 Line	 Projects	 LLP	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Yemen,	 the	 investor	 had	
failed	 to	 enforce	 a	 previous	 award	 against	 Yemen.	 In	 a	 context	 characterized	 by	
																																																													
342	L.		Mistelis		and		C.		Baltag,		"Special		Section		on		the		2008		Survey		on		Corporate		Attitudes	 towards		
Recognition		and		Enforcement		of		International		Arbitral		Awards.		Special		Section:	
Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards	 and	 Settlement	 in	 International	 Arbitration:	
Corporate	Attitudes	and	Practices	",	340.	
343	Arbitral	 awards	 have	 a	market	 value	 depending	 on	 the	 risks	 to	 enforce	 it,	 and	 can	 be	 sold	 to	 third	
parties.	 Such	 is	 the	 case	 of	 CMS	 who	 basically	 sold	 the	 dishonoured	 award	 to	 Blue	 Ridge.	 As	 an	
investment	 strategy,	 these	 vulture	 funds	 will	 buy	 awards	 for	 less	 and	 develop	 an	 aggressive	 tactic	 of	
diplomatic	and	economic	pressure	over	the	host	State	to	induce	compliance.	
344	D.	 	 	 Bishop,	 	 	 "Introduction:	 	 The	 	 	 Enforcement	 	 	 of	 	 	 Arbitral	 	 	 Awards	 	 	 against	 	 	 Sovereigns",	
Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	against	Sovereigns,	in	ed.	Doak	Bishop	(JurisNet,	2009),	4.	
345	In	 the	 case	Desert	 Line	 Projects	 LLP	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Yemen,	 the	 tribunal	 disclosed	 the	 content	 of	 a	
post-award	 settlement.	 Although	 the	 settlement	 was	 reached	 under	 duress,	 it	 remains	 useful	 as	 an	
illustration	 of	 the	 contents	 of	 this	 type	 of	 settlements.	 The	 agreement	 contained	 the	 following	 main	
obligations:	 a)	 waiver	 of	 the	 claims	 and	 rights	 arising	 out	 of	 the	 award;	 b)	 the	 obligation	 to	 pay	 the	
settled	 sum	 according	 to	 the	 agreed	modalities,	 c)	 the	 obligation	 of	 the	 investor	 to	 release	 the	 bank	
guarantees	 provided	 by	 the	 host	 State;	 d)	 the	 obligation	 of	 the	 investor	 to	 receive,	 complete	 and	
maintain	 all	works	 in	 addition	 to	 provisional	 facilities	 established	 by	 the	 Company;	 e)	 the	 obligation	
of	 the	 host	 State	 to	 release	 all	 machinery,	 equipment	 and	 vehicles	 belonging	 to	 the	 investor;	 and	 f)	
formalities	 regarding	 endorsement.	 Desert	 Line	 Projects	 LLC	 v	 Yemen,	 Award	 (ICSID	 Case	 No	
ARB05/17)	16	February	2008,	§	 144.	
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bankruptcy	proceedings	and	 a	 variety	 of	 threats	 and	 attacks,	 	 the	 investor	 agreed	 to	
sign	a	post-award	settlement	in	which	the	claimant	relinquished	over	50%	of	the	value	
of	 the	award.	Yemen	did	not	pay	 and	the	 investor	 initiated	a	 treaty-based	arbitration	
against	Yemen	 for	 the	violation	of	 the	 BIT,	 arguing	 that	 the	 settlement	was	 null	 and	
void	due	 to	economic	and	physical	duress	 and	 that	 the	measures	 adopted	by	Yemen	
were	 contrary	 to	 the	 BIT.	 The	 tribunal	 found	 that	 although	 financial	 pressure	per	 se	
does	 not	 render	 a	 settlement	 null,	 some	 element	 of	 abuse	 by	 the	 other	 contracting	
party	 does.	 The	 measures	 challenged	 had	 been	 abusive	 depriving	 the	 post-award	
settlement	of	any	'international	effect'	and	breaching	the	fair	and	 equitable	treatment	
standard	of	the	BIT.	 Yemen	was	ordered	to	pay	the	 initial	award.	 It	 is	noteworthy	that	
the	 tribunal	 considered	 that	 the	 relinquishment	 of	 50%	of	 the	 value	 of	 the	 award	 in	
a	 post-award	 settlement	 is	 unfair.	 In	 this	 connection,	 it	 held	 that	 a	 settlement	 is	 a	
standard	 of	 contractual	 practice	 where	 each	 party	 waives	 its	 rights	 and	 claims	
arising	 out	 of	 a	 dispute	 on	 a	 quid	 pro	 quo	 basis,	 and	 given	 that	 the	 domestic	
arbitration	 had	 already	 decided	 the	 dispute	 there	 was	 no	 longer	 a	 dispute.	Thus	 “to	
accept	 that	 the	 amount	 awarded	 be	 amputated	 by	 half,	 falls	 well	 short	 of	
minimum	 standards	of	 international	 law	and	cannot	be	the	result	of	an	authentic,	fair	
and	equitable	negotiation.”	This	said,	the	amount	at	which	the	parties	settled	was	not	
the	only	element	 considered	by	the	tribunal	in	reaching	its	conclusion.	
	
4.10.2 Reputational	damage	
Another	 option	 is	 a	 public	 relations	 campaign	 targeting	 the	 refusal	 of	 the	
State	 to	 honor	 the	 arbitral	 award.	 According	 to	 one	 commentator	 “some	 investors	
apparently	 believe	 this	 may	 be	 their	 best	 leverage	 in	 collecting	 an	 award”.	346	 Bad	
publicity	might	 affect	 the	 reputation	of	the	host	State,	 its	 investment	climate,	and	 its	
credit	worthiness.	
Non-compliance	 with	 awards	 may	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 country’s	 credit	
risk	 ratings.	 Credit-rating	 agencies,	 such	 as	 Moody’s,	 Standard	 &	 Poor’s	 and	 Fitch,	
regularly	 carry	out	sovereign	risk	rating	exercises	in	which	the	capacity	and	willingness	
of	 States	 to	 service	 their	 debt	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 conditions	 agreed	 with	 the	
creditors	 are	 taken	 into	 account.347 	 The	 determinants	 for	 payment	 capacity	 and	
willingness	 to	 repay	 the	 debt	 are	 of	 a	 different	 nature,	 reflecting	 macroeconomic	
variables,	 such	 as	 stock	 of	 foreign	 currency	 reserves	 and	balance	of	 payments	 flows,	
economic	growth	prospects	and	capacity	to	generate	tax	receipts,	a	variety	of	political	
factors,	 etc.	Raising	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	 public	 and	 of	 credit-rating	 agencies	 about	
unpaid	awards	may	influence	the	 assessment	of	 the	unwillingness	of	 the	sovereign	to	
pay	 its	private	debt.	Countries	with	 risky	sovereign	ratings	may	experience	difficulties	
in	 accessing	 private	 capital	 markets.348	And	 even	 if	 the	 country	 does	 not	 borrow	
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348	Bank	for	International	Settlements,	Committee	on	the	Global	Financial	System	-	CGFS	Papers	 No	43,	
“The	impact	of	sovereign	credit	risk	on	bank	funding	conditions”	Report	submitted	by	a	
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money	 internationally,	 sovereign	 ratings	 are	 used	 by	 analysts	 to	 impute	 a	 country	
risk	premium	 to	be	 included	 in	 the	 cost	of	 capital	 computations.	 Such	 costs	 are	 then	
used	 for	 foreign	 direct	 investment	 evaluation.71	 For	 these	 reasons,	 information	 on	
non-compliance	is	a	significant	instrument	to	induce	a	State	 to	comply	with	an	award.	
An	 illustration	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 	 post-award	 settlement	 concluded	 between	 Azurix	
and	 Argentina	 (further	 discussed	 below)	 where	 the	 investor	 undertook	 to	 assist	
Argentina	 in	 communicating	 to	 credit-rating	 agencies	 and	 banks	 Argentina’s	
compliance	with	its	credit	obligations.349	
Such	 public	 relations	 campaigns	 could,	 however,	 violate	 confidentiality	
undertakings.	 This	 issue	 arose	 in	 Amco	 v.	 Indonesia,	 where	 the	 investor	 conducted	
a	 campaign	 against	 Indonesia	 while	 the	 arbitration	 was	 pending.350	The	 host	 State	
requested	 provisional	 measures	 from	 the	 tribunal	 to	 restrain	 the	 investor	 from	
making	 the	 dispute	 public	 based	 on	 confidentiality	 grounds.	 However,	 the	 tribunal	
found	 that	 neither	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 nor	 the	 arbitration	 rules	 impose	 an	
obligation	on	the	parties	to	 maintain	confidentiality	of	the	arbitral	proceedings.	
	
4.10.3 A	new	arbitration	as	bargaining	strategy	
Another	 alternative	 is	 to	 initiate	 a	 new	 arbitration	 arguing	 that	 the	 non-
enforcement	of	 (or	 non-compliance	with)	 an	 award	 amounts,	 as	 such,	 to	 a	 breach	of	
investment	disciplines.351	 The	investor	could	pursue	this	as	a	strategy	to	pressurise	the	
host	State	to	comply	with	the	award	or	to	conclude	a	post-award	settlement	while	the	
new	 arbitration	 is	 pending.	 If	 the	 State	 pays	 the	 award,	 the	 arbitral	 proceedings	
would	 be	 discontinued;	 if	 a	 settlement	 is	 achieved,	 it	 could	be	 incorporated	 into	 the	
new	award.	
As	 a	 rule,	 award	 creditors	 are	unwilling	 to	 initiate	 a	 new	arbitration	against	
the	very	same	respondent	for	rather	obvious	reasons.352	However,	such	a	strategy	may	
be	 useful	 when	 the	 new	 arbitration	 benefits	 from	 a	 more	 favorable	 regime	 of	
enforcement	than	the	 one	applicable	 to	 the	unpaid	award.	 By	way	of	 illustration,	 this	
would	 be	 the	 case	 of	 a	 domestic	 award	 (by	 contrast	 to	 an	 international	 award)	or	of	
one	where	the	losing	party	is	a	State	entity	 (by	contrast	 to	 the	State	 itself).353				These	
																																																																																																																																																																																					
Study	 Group	 established	 by	 the	 Committee	 on	 the	 Global	 Financial	 System	 (2011).	 Available	 at:	
www.bis.org	(last	accessed	22	July	2011).		
349	Generalized	 System	 of	 Preferences:	 2009	 Annual	 GSP	 Country	 Practices	 Review;	 Case	 No.	 001-
CP-09;	Azurix	Pre-Hearing	Brief,	9.	
350	Amco		Asia		Corporation		and		others		v.		Republic		of		 Indonesia,		Decision		on		Request		for	 Provisional	
Measures	 (ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/81/1)	 9	December	 1983,	 1	 ICSID	Reports	377	(1993).	
351	D.	Bishop,	"Introduction:	The	Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	against	Sovereigns,"	7.	
352	L.		Reed		and		l.		Martinez,		"Treaty		Obligations		to		Honour		Arbitral		Awards		and		Diplomatic	
Protection",	Enforcement	of	Arbitral	Awards	against	Sovereigns,	in	ed.	Doak	Bishop	(JurisNet,	 2009),	23	
353	As	to	awards	against	bankrupts’	states	entities	these	include:	GEA	Group	Aktiengesellschaft	v	
Ukraine,	Award,	 (ICSID	Case	No	ARB/08/16)	31	March	2011	 [GEA	v.	Ukraine]	 (ICC	award	 against	 Oriana	
which	 was	 bankrupt);	 Petrobart	 Ltd	 v	 Kyrgyzstan,	 Award,	 (SCC	 Case	 No	 126/2003),	 29	 March	 2005	
[Petrobart	 v.	 Kyrgyztan]	 (award	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 court	 of	 arbitration	 against	 RSM,	 the	 government	
obtained	 a	 suspension	 of	 enforcement	 proceedings	 3	 months	 before	 it	 was	 declared	 bankrupt).	 As	
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cases	 are	generally	 triggered	 in	situations	where	the	investor	holds	an	award	against	a	
bankrupt	State	entity	or	a	State	entity	that	only	has	assets	in	the	host	State	where	local	
courts	make	particularly	difficult	the	enforcement	of	the	award.354	Although	the	investor	
could	 try	 to	 enforce	 the	 award	 against	 the	 State	 and	 claim	 that	 the	 legal	 entity	 is	 an	
instrumentality	of	the	State,	the	investor	may	also	sue	the	State	based	on	a	breach	of	a	
BIT.	 The	 availability	 of	 this	 latter	 option	will	 depend	on	 (a)	whether	 the	 award	or	 the	
rights	 it	 declares	 qualify	 as	 protected	 investments	 under	 a	 treaty	 as	 well	 as	 on	 (b)	
whether	non-compliance	may	amount	to	a	violation	of	the	treaty	standards.	
Regarding	 (a),	 tribunals	 tend	 to	 consider	 that	 arbitral	 awards	 are	 not	per	 se	
investments.	 Yet,	 the	 underlying	 rights	 enforced	 through	 such	 awards	may	 qualify	 as	
investments.	 In	Saipem	v.	Bangladesh,	the	protected	investments	were	the	contractual	
rights	which	were	crystallized	or	declared	by	the	award.355	According	to	this	tribunal	an	
arbitral	 award	 and	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 (as	 a	 contractual	 remedy)	 are	 part	 of	 the	
investment	as	an	overall	operation	and,	as	 such,	may	be	protected	by	 the	 investment	
treaty.	In	FPS	v.	Czech	Republic,	the	investments	were	the	contractual	rights	transformed	
into	new	rights	 in	 the	award	whose	 investment	character	was	maintained	by	virtue	of	
Article	1(a)	of	the	applicable	BIT.	The	tribunal	in	GEA	v.	Ukraine	took	a	more	restrictive	
stance	 and	 rejected	 the	 argument	 that	 an	 ICC	 award	was	 an	 investment	 because	 the	
rights	 it	 declared	 resulted	 from	a	 settlement	which	was	 not	 itself	 an	 investment.	 The	
tribunal	 further	 noted	 in	 arguendo	 that,	 even	 if	 the	 settlement	were	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 an	
investment,	‘the	fact	that	the	Award	rules	upon	rights	and	obligations	arising	out	of	an	
investment	does	not	equate	the	Award	with	the	investment	itself.	In	the	Tribunal’s	view,	
the	two	remain	analytically	distinct,	and	the	Award	itself	involves	no	contribution	to,	or	
relevant	 economic	 activity	 within,	 Ukraine	 such	 as	 to	 fall—itself—within	 the	 scope	 of	
Article	1(1)	of	the	BIT	or	(if	needed)	Article	25	of	the	ICSID	Convention.’356	
The	 rights	 arising	 out	 of	 an	 award	 relating	 to	 an	 investment	 are	 first	 and	
foremost	 pecuniary	 obligations.	 They	 are	 a	 remedy	 against	 damage	 suffered	 in	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																																					
for	 non-bankruptcy	 situations	 but	 where	 assets	 exist	 only	 in	 the	 host	 State	 is	 Saipem	 SpA	 v	
Bangladesh,	 Award	 (ICSID	 Case	 No	 ARB/05/7)	 20	 June	 2009.	 [Saipem	 v.	 Bangladesh]	 (ICC	 award	
against	 Petobanga	 but	 domestic	 courts	 of	 Bangladesh	 revoqued	 arbitrators	powers	 and	 annulled	 the	
award).	
354	As	 to	 awards	 against	 bankrupts’	 states	 entities	 these	 include:	 GEA	 Group	 Aktiengesellschaft	 v	
Ukraine,	Award,	(ICSID	Case	No	ARB/08/16)	31	March	2011	[GEA	v.	Ukraine]	(ICC	award	
against	 Oriana	 which	was	 bankrupt);	 Petrobart	 Ltd	v	 Kyrgyzstan,	 Award	(SCC	 Case	No	 126/2003),	 29	
March	 2005	 [Petrobart	 v.	 Kyrgyztan]	 (award	 of	 the	 Kyrgyz	 court	 of	 arbitration	 against	 RSM,	 the	
government	 obtained	 a	 suspension	 of	 enforcement	 proceedings	 3	 months	 before	 it	 was	 declared	
bankrupt).	As	to	non-bankruptcy	situations	but	where	assets	exist	only	in	 the	host	State	is	Saipem	SpA	v	
Bangladesh,	 Award	 (ICSID	 Case	 No	 ARB/05/7)	 20	 June	 2009	 [Saipem	 v.	 Bangladesh]	 (ICC	 award	
against	 Petrobangla	 but	 domestic	 courts	 of	 Bangladesh	 revoked	 arbitrators	 powers	 and	 annulled	 the	
award).	
355	The	 tribunal	 said	 “the	 rights	 embodied	 in	 the	 ICC	Award	were	 not	 created	by	 the	Award,	 but	 arise	
out	of	the	Contract.	The	ICC	Award	crystallized	the	parties'	rights	and	obligations	under	
the	 original	 contract.”	 The	 tribunal	 did	 not	 consider	 necessary	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 award	
constituted	 an	 investment	 as	 such,	 Saipem	 SpA	 v	 Bangladesh,	 Decision	 on	 jurisdiction	 and	
recommendation	on	provisional	measures	(ICSID	Case	No	ARB/05/07)	21	March	2007,	§	127.	
356	GEA	v	Ukraine,	§	162.	
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investment	 rights,	 be	 these	 contractual	 or	 not.	 This	 obligation	 is	 ancillary	 to	 and	
separate	 from	 the	 investment	per	 se.	 It	 is	 ancillary	because	as	 a	 remedy,	 its	 existence	
depends	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 contractual	 or	 property	 right	 (the	 investment)	 and	 its	
violation	will	 affect	 the	 effectiveness	of	 such	 right.	 It	 is	 separate	 from	 the	 investment	
because	 the	 pecuniary	 debt	 can,	 as	 such,	 be	 waived	 or	 assigned	 to	 third	 parties	
independently	 from	 the	 investment.	The	assignment	of	 the	 rights	 arising	out	 from	an	
award	 relating	 to	an	 investment	 to	 third	parties	does	not	make	 these	parties	 the	new	
owner	 of	 the	 investment.	 Therefore,	 a	 debt-collection	 fund	 who	 acquires	 the	 rights	
arising	 from	an	award	 could	not	 launch	a	new	arbitration	 as	 an	 enforcement	 strategy	
because	it	does	not	have	an	investment.	Arguably	a	distinction	should	be	made	between	
situations	where	the	investment	continues	to	exist	and	situations	where	the	investment	
no	longer	exists.	In	the	former	case,	the	investment	and	the	award-related	rights	would	
be	 more	 easily	 distinguished	 than	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 where	 the	 award-related	 rights	
embody	the	value	of	the	initial	investment.	In	those	cases	where	the	award	transforms	
the	 rights	 the	 parties,	 e.g.	 by	 changing	 their	 contractual	 rights	 into	 a	 settlement,	 the	
award	 itself	 would	 arguably	 embody	 the	 investment.	 By	 way	 of	 illustration,	 in	 FPS	 v	
Czech	Republic	the	original	contractual	rights	(i.e.	payments	made	to	MA	and	Davidová)	
were	transformed	in	the	arbitral	award	into	an	entitlement	to	a	first	secured	charge.	
With	respect	to	(b),	for	this	strategy	to	be	pursued	the	non-enforcement	of	an	
award	would	have	to	amount	(prima	facie	and	after	the	assessment	of	the	merits)	to	a	
breach	of	a	BIT.	In	Saipem	v.	Bangladesh,	the	tribunal	concluded—quite	debatably—that	
the	 non-enforcement	 of	 an	 ICC	 award	 by	 Bangladeshi	 courts	 amounted	 to	 an	
expropriation	of	the	rights	declared	by	the	award.	But	this	case	is	exceptional	and,	as	a	
rule,	a	refusal	of	enforcement	or	a	challenge	before	domestic	courts	would	not	amount	
to	a	violation	of	investment	disciplines.	Such	was	the	conclusion	of	the	tribunals	in	FPS	v.	
Czech	 Republic	and	GEA	 v.	 Ukraine,	where	 a	 refusal	 by	 domestic	 courts	 to	 enforce	 an	
award	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 in	 conformity	 with	 the	 BIT	 because	 no	 'egregious'87	
mistreatment	nor	any	arbitrariness,	discrimination	or	bad	faith	could	be	discerned	in	the	
conduct	 of	 the	 local	 courts.357	For	 these	 reasons,	 this	 strategy	 should	 be	 limited	 to	
situations	 where	 non-compliance	 and	 non-enforcement	 of	 the	 award	 are	 blatantly	
unfair.	
One	 important	 consideration	 in	 deciding	whether	 to	 initiate	 new	 arbitration	
proceedings	as	a	tool	to	facilitate	the	enforcement	of	an	unpaid	award	lies	in	the	nature	
of	the	arbitration.	Specifically,	when	the	new	arbitration	is	formally	conducted	under	the	
ICSID	 Convention,	 rather	 than	 helping	 this	 approach	 may	 delay	 collection	 of	 the	
amounts	 claimed.	 Article	 26	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 provided	 indeed	 that	 ICSID	
																																																													
357	In	SPS	v.	Czech	Republic	the	tribunal	considered	that	 the	refusal	 to	enforce	an	arbitral	award	 on	the	
grounds	of	public	policy	is	not	a	violation	of	the	BIT.	“As	far	as	the	alleged	violation	of	
the	fair	and	equitable	treatment	standard	…	this	Tribunal	concludes	that	there	is	no	indication	 that	 the	
courts	 determining	 Claimant’s	 requests	 for	 the	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 the	 Final	 Award	
acted	 arbitrarily,	 discriminatorily,	 or	 in	 bad	 faith.	 Claimant’s	 requests	were	 entertained	 by	 four	 levels	
of	 courts	 and	 Claimant	 had	 several	 opportunities	 to	 submit	 legal	 arguments	 on	 the	 proper	
interpretation	and	application	of	the	exceptions	to	the	recognition	and	 enforcement	of	the	Final	Award	
established	under	Article	V	of	the	New	York	Convention.”,	§	 529.	
159	
	
arbitration	is	an	exclusive	remedy,	which	may	have	the	effect	of	freezing	other	parallel	
enforcement	proceedings.	This	can	be	illustrated	by	reference	to	MINE	v.	Guinea,	where	
the	 investor	 pursued	 ICSID	 proceedings	 against	 Guinea	 in	 parallel	 with	 other	
proceedings	in	Belgium	and	Switzerland	seeking	enforcement	of	an	unpaid	AAA	award.	
The	 courts	 of	 both	 countries	 considered	 that	 enforcement	 proceedings	 are	 a	 remedy	
and	as	such	prohibited	under	Article	26	of	the	 ICSID	Convention,	a	position	which	was	
also	taken	by	the	ICSID	tribunal.	
	
	
4.11 Means	available	to	international	organizations	or	private	institutions	
	
A	 number	 of	 alternative	 means	 of	 enforcement	 can	 be	 pursued	 by	
international	 organizations	 or	 private	 institutions.	 Among	 these,	 two	 are	 particularly	
noteworthy.	 First,	 arbitration	 institutions,	 either	 inter-governmental	 (e.g.	 ICSID)	 or	
private	 (e.g.	 the	 International	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce)	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	
enforcement	of	arbitral	awards	by	reminding	the	debtor	of	its	obligation	to	comply	with	
the	 arbitral	 award	 or	 by	 facilitating	 the	 negotiation	 of	 a	 settlement	 (a).	 Second,	
international	development	banks,	such	as	the	World	Bank	or	other	regional	banks,	may	
play	a	significant	role	in	the	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards	through	a	variety	of	channels	
(b).	
	
4.11.1 Arbitral	institutions	
Arbitration	 institutions	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 enforcement	 of	 investment	
awards	 in	 several	 ways.	 They	 may,	 for	 instance,	 host	 post-award	 settlement	
discussions358	or,	more	frequently,	remind	the	debtor	of	its	obligation	to	comply	with	the	
award.	According	to	some	commentators,	despite	the	absence	of	a	clear	 legal	basis	 in	
the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 the	 ICSID	 Secretariat	 sometimes	 reminds	 recalcitrant	 award	
debtors	of	the	importance	of	payment,	if	only	to	avoid	the	accrual	of	further	interest	on	
the	outstanding	amount	of	the	debt.359	
Another	 possibility	 is	 to	 make	 non-compliance	 public.	 The	 reasons	 why	
making	an	award	public	may	incite	the	debtor	to	comply	have	already	been	discussed	in	
connection	with	the	question	of	reputational	damage.	Suffice	it	to	add	here	that	arbitral	
institutions	 benefit	 from	 a	 legitimacy	 that	 the	 creditor	 cannot	 claim.	 Although	 an	
arbitral	 institution	 may	 not	 go	 as	 far	 as	 pursuing	 an	 awareness	 campaign	 on	 unpaid	
awards,	their	mere	posting	of	the	information	on	unpaid	awards	significantly	facilitates	
the	efforts	of	creditors	and	may	add	a	measure	of	objectivity	to	their	claims.	
	
																																																													
358	According	 to	 reports,	 ICSID	 has	 hosted	 such	 negotiations	 at	 least	 once.	 See	 A.	 R.	 Parra.,	 "The	
Enforcement	 of	 ICSID	 Awards",	 Enforcement	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards	 against	 States,	 in	 ed.	 Doak	 Bishop	
(JurisNet,	2009),	138.	
359	D.	 Bishop,	 "Introduction:	 The	 Enforcement	 of	 Arbitral	 Awards	 against	Sovereigns,"	7.	
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4.11.2 The	World	Bank	
The	World	Bank	 is	 an	 important	 source	of	 financial	 assistance	 to	developing	
countries.	 The	 access	 of	 these	 countries	 to	 international	 financial	 markets	 is	 often	
difficult	or	very	expensive	(in	terms	of	the	 interest	rates	they	have	to	pay	to	borrow	in	
international	 markets).	 This	 situation	 places	 the	 World	 Bank	 in	 a	 key	 position	 as	 a	
provider	of	financial	and	technical	assistance	as	a	result	of	which	the	Bank	may	exercise	
substantial	 leverage	 over	 its	 clients.360	For	 present	 purposes,	 the	 question	 is	 to	 what	
extent	the	World	Bank	may	use	this	leverage	to	incite	borrowers	to	comply	with	unpaid	
arbitral	awards.	
According	 to	 the	World	Bank's	Operational	Manual	 there	 are	 three	 types	 of	
disputes	 between	 a	member	 country	 and	 the	 nationals	 of	 other	member	 countries	 in	
which	the	Bank	takes	an	 interest:361	(a)	disputes	over	a	failure	to	service	external	debt;	
(b)	 disputes	 over	 compensation	 to	 aliens	when	 their	 property	 has	 been	 expropriated;	
and	(c)	disputes	over	the	breach	of	governmental	contracts.	When	a	borrower	country	is	
unwilling	to	take	steps	or	make	necessary	efforts	to	resolve	or	settle	these	disputes,	the	
World	Bank	may	be	led	to	withhold	or	suspend	lending	to	the	country	until	such	disputes	
have	been	solved.137	The	decision	of	the	Bank	must	be	based	on	an	assessment	that	the	
conduct	 of	 the	 borrower	 country	 is	 ‘substantially	 harming’	 its	 credit	 worthiness.138	
Under	 such	 circumstances,	 the	 Bank	 “may	 not	 appraise	 proposed	 projects	 in	 such	 a	
country	unless	it	has	good	grounds	for	believing	that	the	obstacles	to	lending	will	soon	
be	 removed.”	The	Bank	may	also	call	on	 the	parties	 to	 find	a	 settlement	or	otherwise	
seek	to	promote	a	prompt	and	adequate	settlement.140	When	the	dispute	concerns	a	
project	 financed	 by	 World	 Bank,	 the	 Bank	 may	 even	 assist	 in	 the	 negotiation	 of	 a	
settlement.	
Although	 non-compliance	 with	 arbitral	 awards	 is	 not	 specifically	 listed	 as	 a	
motive	to	withhold	loans	or	to	urge	the	parties	to	settle	the	dispute,	it	could	arguably	be	
seen	as	 failure	 to	 take	 the	necessary	 steps	or	make	appropriate	efforts	 to	 reach	a	 fair	
settlement	between	 the	parties.	Given	 the	 institutional	 links	between	 ICSID	and	 IBRD	
and	IDA,	which	are	all	part	of	the	World	Bank’s	Group,	Schereur	has	suggested	that	this	
connection	 could	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 fostering	 compliance	 with	 ICSID	 awards.	
Although	the	World	Bank	has	used	this	leverage	in	the	post-war	nationalisations	of	the	
1960s	or	in	the	Suez	Canal	dispute	in	the	early	1950s,	there	is	little	practice	in	connection	
with	unpaid	ICSID	awards.	In	Azurix	v	Argentina	and	CMS	v	Argentina,	the	lobby	efforts	
of	Azurix	and	Blue	Ridge	 led	the	US	government	to	sanction	Argentina	 for	 the	unpaid	
arbitral	awards	by	voting	in	the	World	Bank	and	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank	
to	withdraw	or	suspend	loans	to	Argentina.	This	strategy	could	potentially	affect	certain	
applications	for	credit	made	by	Argentina	amounting	to	some	USD	millions.	
	
																																																													
360	H.	 Shams,	 "The	World	 Bank	 and	 Investment	 Protection:	 A	 Question	 of	 Accountability,"	 Arbitrating	
Foreign	 Investment	 Disputes.	 Procedural	 and	 Substantive	 Legal	 Aspects,	 in	 eds.	 Norbert	 Horn	 and	
Stefan	Michael	Kröll	(Kluwer	Law	International,	2004),	111-1142.	
361	Bank	 Operational	 Manual,	 Operational	 Policies,	 (WB	 OP	 7.40)	 and	 as	 to	 the	 procedure	 see:	 The	
World	Bank	Operational	Manual,	Bank	Procedures,	(WB	BP	7.40).	
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4.12 Political	Risk	Insurance	For	Collection	Of	Arbitral	Awards	
 
Another	 strategy	 that	 seems	 though	 still	 in	 fieri	 is	 a	 type	 of	 international	
investment	insurance	known	as	political	risk	insurance.		
Arbitration	 is	 a	 long	 process.	 The	 outcome	 may	 be	 unpredictable	 and	
enforcement	can	be	difficult	at	best.	Not	only	is	an	arbitral	award	inevitably	subject	to	
considerable	 collection	 risk,	 but	 host	 government	 actions	 or	 conditions	 in	 the	 host	
country	can	thwart	or	frustrate	the	arbitration	process,	resulting	in	no	arbitral	award	at	
all.	
A	type	of	international	investment	insurance	known	as	political	risk	insurance	
has	long	existed	to	compensate	foreign	investors	for	expropriations	and	similar	actions	
of	 a	 host	 government.	 A	wide	 variety	 of	 political	 risk	 insurance	 can	 be	 purchased	 to	
protect	assets	or	other	 forms	of	 investment,	whether	 located	 in	a	 single	country	or	a	
portfolio	 of	 countries,	 from	 various	 specified	 risks,	 including	 expropriation,	 political	
violence	and	currency	inconvertibility.	
Among	them,	arbitral	award	default	coverage	and	denial	of	 justice	coverage	
are	specifically	designed	to	facilitate	collection	of	arbitral	awards	arising	from	contracts	
with	a	host	government.	Arbitral	award	default	coverage	is	designed	to	compensate	an	
investor	 if	the	host	government	breaches	 its	contractual	obligations,	the	parties	go	to	
arbitration,	and	the	 investor	obtains	an	arbitral	award	that	the	government	cannot	or	
will	not	pay.	Denial	of	 justice	coverage,	often	provided	 in	 tandem	with	arbitral	award	
default	coverage,	is	designed	to	compensate	an	investor	if	 it	cannot	obtain	an	arbitral	
award	 in	 the	 first	 place	 because	 the	 government	 has	 thwarted	 or	 frustrated	 the	
arbitration	 process.	 In	 recent	 cases,	 host	 governments	 have	 obtained	 injunctions	 in	
local	courts	against	arbitration	proceedings,	had	fines	charged	against	parties	involved	
in	 arbitrations,	 and	 even	 detained	 arbitrators	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 derail	 the	 arbitration	
process.	
Together	 these	 two	 specialized	 coverages	 provide	 strong	 protection	 for	
investors	 relying	 on	 arbitration	 as	 a	 dispute	 resolution	mechanism	 in	 their	 contracts	
with	the	host	government.	
In	 theory,	 or	 at	 least	 generally,	 BIT’s	 or	 multilateral	 treaties	 cannot	 be	
covered.	 But	 if	we	want	 to	 look	 for	 solutions,	 and	 take	 a	 perspective	 to	 address	 any	
possible	chance	to	recover	what	is	due	for	a	victorious	award,	we	must	follow	another	
idea	 and	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 Frederik	 E.	 Jenney,	 expanding	 arbitral	 award	 default	
coverage	to	cover	awards	resulting	from	international	arbitrations	arising	from	treaties,	
rather	than	only	from	direct	agreements	with	the	host	government.	
 
4.12.1 Collection	Risk	Following	An	Arbitral	Award	For	Breach	of	Contract	
Managing	political	risk	has	always	been	an	important	element	of	international	
project	 financings	 and	 other	 complex	 international	 business	 transactions.	One	 of	 the	
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biggest	 risks	 faced	 by	 investors	 in	 large	 international	 projects	 is	 that	 the	 host	
government	will	 breach	or	 attempt	 to	unilaterally	 revise	 the	 terms	of	 a	 key	 contract,	
such	as	an	investment	agreement,	concession	contract,	or	offtake	agreement362.	
For	many	 international	 investors,	 the	most	 important	 assets	 in	 an	 overseas	
project	are	not	the	physical	assets,	such	as	property,	plant	and	equipment,	but	rather	
rights	to	payment	by	the	host	government	under	a	long-term	contract	to	supply	goods	
or	services	to	the	government.	
Investors	rightly	perceive	that	the	strength	of	those	contract	rights	depends	
on	the	availability	of		
i. a	meaningful	 remedy	 for	 breach	 by	 the	 government	 of	 its	 payment	
obligations,		
ii. a	workable	forum	and	dispute	resolution	mechanism	for	the	inevitable	
disputes	with	the	host	government	regarding	non-payment,	and		
iii. a	 reliable	 mechanism	 for	 collecting	 an	 awarded	 amount	 from	 the	
government.	
 
4.12.2 Contractual	Remedy	of	Breach	
 
The	first	element-a	meaningful	remedy	for	a	breach-is	typically	the	subject	of	
much	 negotiation	 between	 the	 investor	 and	 the	 government,	 but	 there	 are	 certain	
general	approaches.	Most	off-take	agreements		provide	for	a	stream	of	payments	from	
the	government	for	the	product	or	service	provided	by	the	investor.	
Given	 the	 impracticality	 of	 pursuing	 a	 government	 for	 a	 series	 of	 unpaid	
periodic	payments,	investors	typically	negotiate	a	right	to	terminate	the	contract	upon	
repeated	 material	 breach	 and	 receive	 a	 large	 termination	 payment	 from	 the	
government.	 The	 termination	 payment	 amount	 is	 typically	 sized	 to	 compensate	 the	
investor	fully	for	its	investment,	and	often	an	anticipated	return	on	investment,	so	as	to	
in	essence	preserve	 the	benefit	of	 the	 investor's	bargain	 in	entering	 into	 the	contract	
with	 the	 government.	 Given	 the	 size	 of	 the	 periodic	 payments	 and	 the	 long	 term	 of	
many	offtake	contracts,	it	is	not	unusual	for	the	required	termination	payment	to	be	in	
the	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars.	
	
The	second	element	for	protecting	an	international	investor's	contract	rights	
is	 finding	 a	 workable	 forum	 and	 mechanism	 for	 resolving	 disputes	 regarding	 non-
payment	of	these	large	termination	amounts.	Unlike	the	first	element,	this	is	more	the	
province	of	lawyers	than	of	business	people.	
																																																													
362	An	offtake	agreement	is	an	agreement	between	a	producer	of	a	resource	and	a	buyer	of	a	resource	to	
purchase	 or	 sell	 portions	 of	 the	 producer's	 future	 production.	 An	 offtake	 agreement	 is	 normally	
negotiated	prior	to	the	construction	of	a	facility	such	as	a	mine,	in	order	to	secure	a	market	for	the	future	
output	of	the	facility.	If	lenders	can	see	the	company	has	a	purchaser	of	its	production,	it	makes	it	easier	
to	 obtain financing	 to	 construct	 a	 facility.	
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Many	 investors	 are	 fundamentally	 dissatisfied	 with	 local	 dispute	 resolution	
procedures	 typically	 available	 with	 respect	 to	 international	 investment,	 indeed	
investors	 are	 appropriately	 wary	 of	 resolving	 a	 dispute	 under	 a	 contract	 with	 a	 host	
government	 party	 by	 resorting	 to	 local	 courts	 that	 are	 agencies	 of	 the	 same	 host	
government.	
For	this	reason,	foreign	investors	often	refuse	to	submit	to	the	jurisdiction	of	
local	 courts	 in	 countries	 where	 the	 judicial	 system	 is	 not	 seen	 as	 sufficiently	
independent	 from	 the	 executive	 branch	 of	 the	 host	 government	 that	 is	 party	 to	 the	
contract.	Similarly,	host	governments	often	for	various	reasons	refuse	to	submit	to	the	
jurisdiction	of	 the	 investor's	 home	country.	This	 creates	 a	 stand-off	 as	 to	 the	dispute	
resolution	 procedure.	 Therefore,	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 mechanism	 of	 choice	 for	
contracts	with	off	takers	and	other	government	parties	is	international	arbitration	at	an	
administered	forum	(such	as	ICSID)	or	on	an	ad	hoc	basis	under	the	rules	of	one	of	many	
arbitration	 regimes	 (such	 as	 the	 AAA	 or	 UNCITRAL).	 In	 any	 case,	 the	 arbitration	 is	
usually	 specified	 to	 be	 at	 a	 neutral	 site	 before	 disinterested	 arbitrators	 selected	 by	
some	 method	 perceived	 as	 being	 free	 from	 bias.	 Today	 virtually	 all	 international	
contracts	 of	 any	 type	 requiring	 significant	 payments	 by	 a	 host	 government	 contain	
international	arbitration	as	the	stipulated	dispute	resolution	procedure.	
This	 leaves	 only	 the	 third	 element	 finding	 a	 dependable	 mechanism	 for	
collecting	from	the	government	an	amount	awarded	in	an	international	arbitration.	
 
4.12.3 Arbitral	Award	Default	Coverage:	Overview	of	Arbitral	Award	Default	
Coverage	
	
Even	if	a	carefully	negotiated	off-take	contract	and	a	well-drafted	arbitration	
clause	lead	to	an	arbitral	award,	an	investor	is	faced	with	a	significant	collection	risk.	It	
can	be	a	difficult	process	to	collect	any	amount	from	a	government-much	less	the	very	
large	 lump-sum	 termination	payments	 typically	 involved	 in	off-take	 contracts.	This	 is	
where	 political	 risk	 insurance	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	 default	 can	 be	 a	 solution.	 The	
coverage	provides	compensation	if	the	investor	is	unable	to	obtain	timely	enforcement	
of	 an	 international	 arbitral	 award	 arising	 from	 a	 contract	 dispute	 with	 a	 sovereign	
government,	and	thus	effectively	protects	the	investor	against	the	risk	that	an	arbitral	
award	in	its	favor	cannot	be	collected.	
The	 basic	 requirements	 for	 an	 investor	 to	make	 a	 claim	 for	 payment	 under	
arbitral	award	default	coverage	are	as	follows:	
i. A	 dispute	 between	 the	 host	 government	 and	 the	 investor	 (or	 the	
project	company	from	which	the	investor	derives	its	interest)	must	be	
submitted	to	the	international	arbitration	procedure	contained	in	the	
insured	contract.	
ii. 	The	arbitral	procedure	must	yield	a	final	and	binding	monetary	award,	
not	 subject	 to	 appeal,	 against	 the	 sovereign	 and	 in	 favor	 of	 the	
investor	(or	the	project	company);		
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iii. The	 investor	 must	 make	 reasonable	 efforts	 to	 enforce	 the	 arbitral	
award	 in	 a	 court	 of	 competent	 jurisdiction.	 This	 is	 typically	 a	 local	
court	 in	 the	 host	 country,	 but	 depending	 on	 the	 circumstances	 the	
investor	may	be	required	to	seek	enforcement	elsewhere.		
iv. The	 host	 government	 must	 fail	 to	 pay	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 arbitral	
award	within	a	short	waiting	period	(usually	60	to	90	days)	of	the	date	
of	such	attempted	enforcement.	
If	 these	 four	conditions	are	satisfied,	 the	political	 risk	 insurer	will	pay	 to	 the	
investor	the	full	amount	of	the	arbitral	award,	in	exchange	for	assignment	to	the	insurer	
of	 the	 investor's	 interest	 in	 the	 award.	 If	 there	 are	 multiple	 investors	 in	 a	 project,	
compensation	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 insured	 investor's	 share	 (based	 on	 ownership	
percentage)	of	the	award.		
 
4.12.4 Requirements	for	Arbitral	Award	Default	Coverage	
 
As	with	all	political	risk	insurance,	however,	there	are	a	few	requirements	for	
investors	to	consider	with	respect	to	the	types	of	contractual	arrangements	eligible	for	
arbitral	award	default	coverage.	
Insurers	generally	require	that	the	contractual	dispute	resolution	mechanism	
be	 international	 arbitration.	 Generally,	 to	 be	 “international”,	 the	 location	 of	 the	
arbitration	must	be	outside	the	host	country	or	the	home	country	of	one	of	the	parties.	
By	 virtue	 of	 the	 “New	 York	 Convention”	 and	 other	 similar	 international	
treaties	 such	 as	 ICSID,	 international	 arbitral	 awards	 have	 the	 force	 of	 law	 and	 are	
enforceable	without	judicial	review	both	in	the	countries	are	now	party	to	the	New	York	
Convention,	so	an	international	arbitral	award	is	recognized	around	the	world	as	being	
a	binding	obligation	of	the	host	government.	
Another	reason	for	the	requirement	that	an	arbitration	be	international	is	the	
allowance	under	the	New	York	Convention	for	local	court	annulment	of	an	award.	The	
New	 York	 Convention	 entitles	 an	 enforcing	 court	 to	 refuse	 enforcement	 of	 an	
arbitration	award	 that	 “has	been	set	aside	or	 suspended	by	a	competent	authority	of	
the	country	in	which	.	.	.	that	award	was	made.”	Therefore,	annulment	of	an	award	by	a	
court	at	the	seat	of	the	arbitration	(i.e.,	the	host	country	in	the	case	of	local	arbitration)	
is	 one	 of	 the	 few	 defenses	 to	 enforcement	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	 specifically	
contemplated	under	the	New	York	Convention.	Because	the	choice	of	the	host	country	
as	the	place	of	arbitration	can	impair	the	practical	enforceability	of	an	eventual	award,	
most	political	risk	insurers	insist	on	arbitration	outside	the	host	country.	
Note	 also	 that	mediation	 and	 conciliation	procedures	 and	other	 less	 formal	
dispute	resolution	mechanisms,	such	as	resort	to	a	special	master	or	other	expert,	are	
not	 enforceable	 under	 international	 treaties	 and	 therefore	 are	 not	 insurable	 under	
arbitral	award	default	coverage.		
All	 this	 generally	means	 that	 any	 dispute	 resolution	mechanism	 other	 than	
binding	international	arbitration	is	not	insurable.			
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Plus,	insurers	also	generally	require	that	the	insured	contract	obligations	(and	
the	resulting	arbitral	award)	be	binding	on	the	central	government	of	the	host	country,	
rather	than	on	a	provincial,	municipal	or	local	government,	or	on	an	agency,	company,	
or	 other	 parastatal	 entity	 controlled	 by	 the	 host	 government.	 This	 is	 because	 the	
international	treaties	that	make	arbitral	award	obligations	binding	under	international	
law	do	not	 clearly	 apply	 to	obligations	of	 host	 government	 agencies,	 parastatals	 and	
other	subsidiary	entities.	In	some	cases	a	sub-sovereign	entity	may	be	acceptable	to	the	
political	 risk	 insurer,	 but	 usually	 only	 if	 its	 obligations	 are	 expressly	 backed	 by	 the	
central	sovereign	government.	
Yet,	only	contract-based	arbitration	mechanisms	are	 insurable.	 International	
arbitration	 under	 Bilateral	 Investment	 Treaties	 (BITs)	 or	 multilateral	 treaties	 such	 as	
NAFTA,	 for	 example,	 generally	 cannot	 be	 covered.	 	 Also	 insurers	 can	 cover	 only	
contract	 disputes	 that	would	 result	 in	 a	monetary	 award	 to	 the	 investor.	 This	means	
that	 actions	 to	 compel	 performance	 and	 other	 non-monetary	 remedies	 are	 not	
insurable.	The	arbitral	award	must	be	 final	and	binding	under	 the	 rules	of	 the	arbitral	
regime,	 which	 generally	means	 that	 it	 must	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 further	 review	 by	 the	
arbitral	panel	that	properly	rendered	it.	The	award	also	must	be	non-appealable.	Most	
arbitration	 rules	 provide	 for	 only	 limited	 rights	 of	 appeal	 —	 even	 if	 those	 rights	 are	
frequently	invoked.	Normally,	an	arbitral	award	can	be	treated	as	being	final	and	non-
appealable	by	a	political	risk	 insurer,	notwithstanding	that	 it	 is	subject	to	challenge	or	
contest	by	the	host	government	in	the	courts	of	the	host	country	or	otherwise	outside	
the	dispute	resolution	procedure.	
The	 arbitral	 award	must	meet	 the	 customary	 standard	 for	 enforceability	 of	
legal	 obligations.	 It	 must	 be	 valid,	 binding	 and	 legally	 enforceable	 against	 the	 host	
government.	Note	that	this	does	not	require	that	the	award	be	practically	enforceable,	
in	the	sense	that	there	is	a	likelihood	of	being	able	to	successfully	enforce	it	in	order	to	
get	paid,	but	instead	only	that	the	award	is	in	proper	legal	form	for	enforcement.	In	this	
sense	the	political	risk	insurer	is	taking	the	collection	risk	on	the	arbitral	award.	
 
4.12.5 Concerns	about	Host	Government	Interference	
 
One	 concern	 that	 investors	 have	 about	 arbitration	 as	 a	 dispute	 resolution	
mechanism,	 even	 with	 arbitral	 award	 default	 coverage,	 is	 the	 potential	 for	 the	 host	
government	 to	 thwart	 the	 international	 arbitration	 process	 altogether.	 Despite	 its	
advantages	 over	 litigation,	 international	 arbitration	 in	most	 instances	 remains	 a	 long	
process.	
Insured	investors	are	concerned	that	host	government	actions	might	bring	an	
already	 slow	 arbitration	 process	 to	 a	 complete	 halt,	 and	 thereby	 prevent	 an	 arbitral	
award	 from	being	 issued.	Actions	of	concern	may	 include	host	government	 refusal	 to	
participate	in	agreed-upon	arbitration	procedures,	frustration	of	arbitration	procedures,	
and	 other	 actions	 rendering	 arbitration	 impossible	 or	 impracticable.	 This	 is	 critical	
because,	as	noted	above,	arbitral	award	default	coverage	requires	that	there	be	a	final	
and	binding	arbitral	award	against	the	host	government.	
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These	 risks	 are	 not	 just	 theoretical.	 An	 excellent	 article	 by	 professor	 and	
international	 arbitrator	 Mark	 Kantor	 reviews	 three	 recent	 investment	 disputes	
regarding	power	projects	in	Indonesia,	as	well	as	power	projects	in	Pakistan	and	India.		
Kantor	 notes	 that	 in	 each	 of	 these	 disputes,	 courts	 in	 the	 host	 country	 enjoined	
international	arbitration	proceedings	or	took	 jurisdiction	over	project	disputes	despite	
mandatory	arbitration	clauses	in	the	project	documents.	
Kantor	 describes	 a	 case	 in	which	 an	 Indonesian	 court,	 at	 the	 request	 of	 an	
Indonesian	 parastatal	 entity	 that	 was	 involved	 in	 an	 arbitration,	 issued	 an	 injunction	
against	 the	 arbitration	 proceeding,	 with	 fines	 of	 $1	 million	 per	 day	 if	 the	 order	 was	
violated.	An	arbitral	 tribunal	 in	 a	parallel	 action	against	 the	government	of	 Indonesia	
reacted	 by	 relocating	 its	 hearings	 from	 Indonesia	 to	 The	 Hague.	 	 In	 response	 to	 the	
relocation	of	arbitral	proceedings,	the	Indonesian	government	in	quick	succession		
i. filed	an	application	with	the	appointing	authority	seeking	removal	of	
the	tribunal	chairman	for	bias,		
ii. 	requested	a	Dutch	court	to	enjoin	the	hearings	in	The	Hague,	and		
iii. forcibly	 prevented	 the	 Indonesian	 arbitrator	 appointed	 by	 the	
government	from	participating	in	the	proceedings.		
In	the	last	action,	Kantor	notes	“Officers	from	the	Indonesian	embassy	in	The	
Netherlands	 intercepted	the	arbitrator	at	the	Amsterdam	airport	and	escorted	him	to	
Jakarta	in	a	scene	described	by	one	witness	as	very	‘frightening’.”		
These	 types	of	extreme	actions	may	well	 amount	 to	a	denial	of	 justice	 that	
constitutes	 a	 violation	 of	 international	 law.	 However,	 although	 the	 instances	 just	
mentioned	 are	 certainly	 clear-cut	 cases,	 denial	 of	 justice	 concepts	 can	 be	 murky	 in	
general	and	can	 lead	 to	confusion	 if	an	 investor	attempts	 to	 fit	 them	within	standard	
expropriation	coverage.		
Hence,	 if	 the	question	 is	what	 can	be	done	 to	address	denial	of	 justice	 risk,	
again,	the	answer	is	that	there	is	a	political	risk	insurance	solution.	
 
4.12.6 Denial	Of	Justice	Coverage	:	Overview	of	Denial	of	Justice	Coverage	
 
Political	 risk	 insurers	provide	11	denial	of	 justice"	coverage	to	cover	events	-
such	as	those	mentioned	above-	that	signal	unambiguously	that	the	dispute	resolution	
procedure	 has	 gone	 seriously	 awry	 and	 will	 not	 yield	 a	 meaningful	 determination.	
Insurers	 offer	 denial	 of	 justice	 coverage	 on	 a	 stand-alone	 basis,	 and	 more	 often	 in	
conjunction	 with	 arbitral	 award	 default	 coverage,	 but	 only	 in	 a	 specific	 set	 of	
circumstances.	
The	typical	requirements	for	denial	of	justice	coverage	are	as	follows:	
i. Dispute	Submitted	 to	Arbitration.	The	 investor	must	have	submitted	
the	 dispute	 to	 arbitration	 or	 another	 approved	 dispute	 resolution	
procedure.	 Note	 that	 “submitting	 the	 dispute”	 is	 broader	 than	
“initiating	 the	 dispute	 resolution	 procedure”	 because	 host	
government	acts	that	result	in	the	arbitral	panel	not	being	named	can	
be	said	to	have	prevented	the	initiation	of	the	arbitration.	
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ii. Timely	 Submission	 and	 Diligence.	 The	 initiation	 of	 the	 dispute	
resolution	mechanism	must	 be	 timely.	 Some	 insurers	may	 prefer	 to	
add	 a	 stated	 time	 period	 (e.g.,	 “no	 later	 than	 180	 days	 after	 the	
disputed	 payment	 was	 originally	 due”)	 to	 avoid	 stale	 claims.	 The	
investor	 must	 diligently	 pursue	 the	 specified	 dispute	 resolution	
procedure.	 This	 requirement	 may	 be	 subject	 to	 varying	 standards	
(e.g.,	“use	its	best	efforts”	or	“use	all	reasonable	efforts”).		
iii. Wrongful	Action	of	Host	Government.	There	must	be	wrongful	failure	
or	 refusal	 by	 the	host	 government	 to	 submit	 to	 or	 participate	 in	 the	
dispute	resolution	procedure.	Note	that	 this	 is	described	as	action	or	
inaction	by	the	host	government.	 Indeed,	many	of	 the	actions	that	a	
host	government	might	take	to	thwart	an	arbitration	fall	more	into	the	
category	of	inaction.	
iv. Arbitration	 Rendered	 Impossible.	 That	wrongful	 failure	 or	 refusal	 by	
the	 host	 government	 must	 principally	 and	 directly	 cause	 the	
invocation,	 operation	 or	 formal	 conclusion	 of	 dispute	 resolution	
procedure	to	be	either	(a)	rendered	 impossible	or	(b)	prevented	from	
proceeding	 as	 provided	 by	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 dispute	 resolution	
procedure	and	the	terms	of	the	covered	agreement.	
v. Required	 Duration.	 Generally,	 this	 failure	 or	 refusal	 by	 the	 host	
government	 must	 last	 for	 a	 continuous	 period,	 typically	 365	
consecutive	days.		
	
4.12.7 Requirements	for	Denial	of	Justice	Coverage	
 
As	 with	 arbitral	 award	 default	 coverage,	 there	 are	 also	 a	 few	 special	
requirements	 for	 investors	 to	 consider	 with	 respect	 to	 eligibility	 for	 denial	 of	 justice	
coverage.	
First,	 as	 with	 arbitral	 award	 default	 coverage,	 frustration	 of	 international	
arbitration	under	bilateral	investment	treaties	or	the	GATT	is	not	covered.		
Second,	denial	of	justice	is	usually	limited	to	actions	of	the	host	government	
itself,	although	some	insurers	may	be	willing	to	include	action	(or	even	inaction)	by	any	
agency,	 authority,	 ministry,	 company,	 or	 other	 entity	 controlled	 by	 the	 host	
government.	(Uncertainty	whether	courts	could	be	added	to	this	list,	which	would	cover	
situations	where	there	is	no	independent	judiciary.)	
Third,	 the	host	government	action	must	be	wrongful,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 is	
not	a	legitimate	legal	defense	or	procedural	requirement	under	applicable	law.	This	can	
involve	a	subjective	judgment,	and	is	not	a	bright	line.			
Finally,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	note	that	the	“rendered	impossible	or	
prevented	 from	 proceeding”	 requirement	 sets	 a	 high	 standard,	 but	 provides	 a	 clear	
test:	the	dispute	resolution	procedure	must	be	completely	halted,	not	merely	interfered	
with.		
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In	 fact,	 some	 political	 risk	 insurers	 have	 experimented	 recently	 with	 lower	
standards	with	respect	to	the	required	consequences	to	the	arbitration	process	of	the	
wrongful	 host	 government	 action.	 For	 example,	 some	 insurers	 offer	 coverage	 in	 the	
following	circumstances:	
a)	 The	 process	 has	 been	 rendered	 futile.	 This	 is	 not	 as	 high	 a	 standard	 as	
impossibility.	 The	 dispute	 resolution	 procedure	 may	 not	 be	 completely	 halted,	 but	
going	 forward	 becomes	 pointless.	 (Exactly	 when	 a	 process	 becomes	 pointless	 is	
admittedly	a	bit	vague.)			
b)	 The	 process	 has	 been	 obstructed,	 frustrated	 or	 thwarted.	 This	 is	 a	
significantly	lower	·	standard	than	impossibility.	The	dispute	resolution	procedure	must	
be	interfered	with,	but	perhaps	not	completely	halted.	
c)	 The	 process	 has	 been	 rendered	 impracticable	 or	 ineffective.	 This	 is	 low	
standard,	and	so	is	rarely	used.	This	requires	only	that	the	dispute	resolution	procedure	
be	rendered	less	practical	or	effective	than	some	unspecified	standard.	
Note	 that	 denial	 of	 justice	 coverage	 does	 not	 typically	 address	 inability	 to	
arbitrate	 due	 to	 deterioration	 in	 conditions	 in	 the	 host	 country	 (e.g.,	 due	 to	 political	
violence	or	other	unspecified	problems	not	directly	caused	by	the	host	government).	
Some	insurers,	however,	do	offer	denial	of	justice	coverage	if	the	arbitration	
process	 has	 been	 rendered	 exceptionally	 hazardous	 to	 the	 physical	 safety	 of	
representatives	of	any	required	party.	This	is	special	coverage	to	address	threats	to	the	
investor's	representatives.	In	some	cases	this	concept	can	even	be	broadened	to	include	
“witnesses	on	behalf	of	any	required	party.”	This	broadens	the	coverage	substantially,	
since	one	credible	threat	to	one	witness	would	allow	a	claim.	
Some	 investors	might	 question	 whether	 the	 combination	 of	 arbitral	 award	
default	and	denial	of	justice	coverages	really	works.	In	his	article	regarding	investment	
disputes	in	Indonesia,	Kantor	notes	that	in	one	dispute	the	investors	had	obtained	OPIC	
(Overseas	Private	 Investment	Corporation-known	as	OPIC)	political	 risk	 insurance.	He	
adds	 that	 “The	 terms	 of	 the	 insurance	 policies	 were	 somewhat	 unusual,	 as	 they	
explicitly	 treated	 the	 improper	 refusal	 to	 recognize	an	 international	arbitration	award	
as	a	recoverable	event.”		In	fact,	OPIC’s	policy	included	both	arbitral	award	default	and	
denial	 of	 justice	 coverages,	 under	 which	 OPIC	 paid	 the	 insured	 investors	 over	 $200	
million	in	December	1999.	
 
4.12.8 Political	Risk	Insurance	In	General	
	
Insurance	 represents	 another	 option,	 though	 at	 an	 additional	 cost	 for	 the	
investor.	 Bjorklund	 points	 out	 that	 ‘[i]nsurance	 possibilities	 fall	 into	 two	 categories:	
political	 risk	 insurance	 and	 BIT	 award	 insurance’.184	 As	 to	 political	 risk	 insurance—
which	covers	the	risk	of	loss	of	property	due	to	actions	of	the	host	State—she	notes	that	
it	 covers	only	 the	book	value	of	 the	 investment	 (which	 is	 lower	 than	 for	example	 the	
actual	 or	 going	 concern	 value)	 in	 the	 event	 of	 an	 expropriation	 and	 coverage	 is	 not	
provided	 in	 cases	 of	 indirect	 or	 creeping	 expropriation.	 As	 to	 BIT	 award	 insurance,	
Bjorklund	observes	that	it	is	costly;	and	moreover,	it	is	difficult	to	obtain	coverage.	
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Political	risk	insurance	is	typically	available	for	up	to	100%	of	the	value	of	an	
investor’s	 interest	 in	 specified	assets	or	 investments.	Premium	 rates	are	 fixed	 for	 the	
term	of	the	insurance	and	unless	otherwise	agreed	the	policy	is	non-cancelable,	so	that	
insurers	 cannot	 remove	 cover	 if	 the	 political	 circumstances	 in	 a	 country	 change.	
Standard	 political	 risk	 insurance	 coverages	 offer	 protection	 against	 political	 violence,	
currency	inconvertibility,	and	other	host	government	actions.	Perhaps	the	best	known	
of	 these	 coverages	 is	 expropriation	 coverage,	 which	 protects	 an	 investor	 against	
confiscation,	 expropriation,	 nationalization	 of	 assets,	 and	 other	 acts	 by	 the	 host	
government	that	impair	fundamental	investor	rights	in	the	insured	investment.	
Generally,	 political	 risk	 insurance	 is	 available	 from	 governmental	 and	
multilateral	organizations	as	well	as	from	the	private	sector.	
Governmental	 organizations	 offering	 political	 risk	 insurance	 include	 the	
Overseas	Private	 Investment	Corporation	 (known	as	OPIC),	 the	 investment	 insurance	
agency	of	the	U.S.	government,	as	well	as	export	credit	agencies	of	the	major	investor	
nations,	such	as	U.S.	Eximbank,	Export	Development	Canada,	ECGD	(for	the	UK),	MITI	
(Japan),	 COFACE	 (France),	 and	 HERMES	 (Germany).	 Governmental	 organizations	
offering	political	 risk	 insurance	 include	the	Multilateral	 Investment	Guarantee	Agency	
(known	 as	MIGA),	 a	 part	 of	 the	World	 Bank,	 Inter-American	 Development	 Bank	 (for	
Latin	America),	and	Asian	Development	Bank.	
Private	 political	 risk	 insurers	 include	 the	 American	 International	 Group	
(known	as	AIG),	based	in	New	York,	Zurich	Emerging	Markets	Solutions,	which	is	based	
in	Washington,	but	part	of	the	larger	Zurich	group	of	 insurance	companies,	Sovereign	
Risk	 Insurance	 Ltd.,	 based	 in	Bermuda,	 and	 various	 syndicates	 in	 the	 Lloyd's	 London	
market.	
Virtually	 all	 of	 these	 public	 and	 private	 insurers	 offer	 arbitral	 award	 default	
coverage	and	most	also	offer	denial	of	justice	coverage.	
 
4.12.9 Expanding	the	Political	Risk	Insurance	Theory	
 
As	 the	 name	 suggests,	 political	 risk	 insurance	 is	 designed	 to	 cover	 political	
risks	 only.	 Therefore,	 political	 risk	 insurers	—	 as	 distinct	 from	 all-risk	 guarantors,	 for	
example	—	seek	to	draw	the	line	between	commercial	and	political	risks.	
Most	 political	 risk	 insurance	 coverages	 apply	 to	 investments	 that	 have	 no	
host	government	involvement.	A	government	may	expropriate	a	purely	private	project	
in	which	it	(previously)	had	no	interest.	However,	where	the	project	involves	a	contract	
with	 the	 host	 government,	 the	 line	 between	 commercial	 and	 political	 actions	 can	 be	
blurred.	Just	because	a	dispute	arises	under	a	contract	with	the	host	government	does	
not	 make	 it	 a	 political	 dispute.	 In	 other	 words,	 governmental	 disputes	 may	 be	
commercial	or	political	or	(more	often)	a	mix	of	both.	
	
Investors	often	mistakenly	assume	that	the	breach	by	a	governmental	party	
of	its	payment	obligations	under	an	offtake	contract	is	(or	should	be)	an	expropriation	
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covered	 by	 political	 risk	 insurance.	 That	 is,	many	 investors	 assume	 that	 political	 risk	
insurance	coverage	 for	expropriation	covers	all	wrongful	acts	of	 the	host	government	
which	 of	 course	 leads	 to	 the	 question	 of	 what	 government	 acts	 are	 “wrongful.”	
Investors	often	assert	 that,	especially	 if	a	breach	of	contract	by	a	host	government	 is	
blatant	and	deliberate,	it	is	a	wrongful	governmental	act	that	should	be	covered	by	the	
general	concept	of	expropriation.	
Most	political	risk	insurance	policies,	however,	distinguish	actions	by	the	host	
government	as	a	government,	which	may	be	covered	if	they	otherwise	meet	the	tests	
for	 expropriation,	 and	 actions	 by	 the	 host	 government	 as	 a	 commercial	 party,	which	
generally	are	not	 covered.	 In	 fact,	most	expropriation	policies	expressly	exclude	 from	
the	 scope	of	 coverage	 any	 failure	 of	 the	 host	 government	 (or	 its	 relevant	 agency)	 to	
honor	its	obligations	under	any	contract	in	favor	of	the	project	company.	
Moreover,	 most	 political	 risk	 insurance	 policies	 require	 that	 to	 be	
expropriatory	(and	thus	be	compensable	under	the	policy)	an	action	must	be	a	violation	
of	 international	 law.	Generally,	a	host	government’s	breach	of	contract	with	a	foreign	
investor	is	not	a	violation	of	international	law.	
The	prevailing	 international	 law	standard	makes	a	clear	distinction	between	
(a)	abrogation	or	repudiation	of	a	contract-in	essence	the	host	government	tearing	up	
the	contract-which	could	constitute	an	expropriation,	and	 (b)	 lesser	non-performance	
that	is	a	mere	breach	of	a	contract,	which	is	not	an	expropriation.		
Recent	 international	 law	 cases	 confirm	 this	 distinction.	 An	 ICSID	 tribunal	
convened	under	a	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	proceeding	recently	issued	a	
unanimous	 award	 holding	 that	 a	 significant	 breach	 of	 an	 investment	 agreement	was	
not	 “tantamount	 to	 expropriation”	 for	 purposes	 of	NAFTA,	Article	 1110.	 The	 tribunal	
noted:		
The	mere	non-performance	of	a	contractual	obligation	 is	not	 to	be	equated	
with	 a	 taking	 of	 property,	 nor	 (unless	 it	 is	 accompanied	 by	 other	 elements)	 is	 it	
tantamount	to	expropriation	…	[I]t	is	one	thing	to	expropriate	a	right	under	a	contract	
and	another	to	fail	to	comply	with	the	contract.	Non-compliance	by	a	government	with	
contractual	 obligations	 is	 not	 the	 same	 thing	 as,	 or	 equivalent	 or	 tantamount	 to,	 an	
expropriation.		
Of	 course,	 excluding	 a	 risk	 from	 coverage	 does	 not	 solve	 the	 problem	 for	
investors.	 Because	 investors	 recognize	 breach	 of	 contract	 as	 a	 risk	 they	 cannot	
adequately	manage	or	mitigate,	there	is	a	healthy	demand	for	a	political	risk	insurance	
product	that	addresses	it.	However,	true	breach	of	contract	coverage,	which	would	pay	
immediately	 upon	 a	 breach	 (or	 better	 yet,	 upon	 an	 alleged	 breach)	 by	 the	 host	
government	of	its	contractual	obligations,	is	not	generally	available	in	the	political	risk	
insurance	market.	
Instead,	 arbitral	 award	 default	 coverage	 is	 available,	 and	 it	 fits	 within	 the	
overall	 theory	of	political	 risk	 insurance.	 	Arbitral	Award	Default	and	Denial	of	 Justice	
Are	Specialized	Coverages.	
Arbitral	award	default	coverage	is	not	new:	it	has	been	available	for	years	in	
various	forms	from	most	public	and	private	political	risk	insurers.	As	noted	above,	it	 is	
separate	 from	 other	 standard	 coverages	 offered	 by	 political	 risk	 insurers,	 such	 as	
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expropriation	coverage,	which	are	designed	specifically	to	address	confiscatory	acts	by	
the	government.	
The	key	 requirement	 is	 that	 commercial	disputes	between	 the	parties	must	
go	 through	 arbitration	 first.	 The	 dispute	 resolution	 mechanism,	 not	 a	 political	 risk	
insurer,	 is	 best	 able	 to	 distinguish	 between	 (i)	 a	 commercial	 dispute,	where	 the	 host	
government	has	a	legitimate	reason	for	not	making	a	payment,	and	(ii)	a	political	action	
by	 the	 host	 government,	 where	 the	 host	 government	 is	 just	 making	 excuses.	 The	
implicit	principle	is	that	when	a	host	government	is	in	a	commercial	dispute,	its	actions	
are	not	necessarily	political.	
Particularly	 in	 off-take	 contracts	where	 there	might	 be	 legitimate	 issues	 of	
non-performance	 by	 the	 project	 company,	 it	 would	 be	 imprudent	 for	 a	 political	 risk	
insurer	 to	 agree	 to	 pay	 an	 amount	 before	 it	 has	 been	 finally	 determined	 to	 be	 due.	
However,	 when	 a	 host	 government	 refuses	 to	 honor	 an	 international	 arbitral	 award	
resulting	 from	 a	 dispute	 resolution	 procedure	 to	 which	 it	 has	 expressly	 agreed,	 its	
actions	 are	 more	 akin	 to	 the	 high-handedness	 normally	 associated	 with	 an	
expropriation	without	compensation.	
	
Lastly,	it	must	be	taken	into	account	the	recent	feeling	of	dissatisfaction	with	
arbitration	as	dispute	resolution	mechanism.	
Some	 investors	 are	 dissatisfied	 with	 political	 risk	 insurance	 coverage	 that	
requires	 completion	 of	 an	 international	 arbitration,	 which	 often	 can	 take	 years.	 But	
political	risk	insurers	note	that	arbitral	award	default	coverage	puts	an	insured	investor	
in	 exactly	 the	 position	 it	 bargained	 for	with	 respect	 to	 commercial	 disputes	with	 the	
host	government:	 the	dispute	 should	be	 resolved	 through	arbitration,	 and	 if	 the	host	
government	is	the	losing	party,	then	it	should	pay.	Insurers	point	out	that	a	political	risk	
insurance	 policy	 that	 pays	 sooner	 (e.g.,	 when	 the	 dispute	 arises)	 than	 could	 be	
reasonably	 expected	 under	 the	 contract	 would	 improve	 the	 investor's	 bargained-for	
position,	rather	than	maintain	it.	Political	risk	insurance	policies	are	not	letters	of	credit.	
If	 investors	 want	 a	 clearer	 and	 faster	 right	 to	 payment	without	 resort	 to	 arbitration,	
they	should	bargain	for	it	with	the	host	government.	
Indeed,	 this	 is	 exactly	 the	 principle	 behind	 OPIC’s	 recent	 introduction	 of	
“Non-Honoring	of	Government	Guaranty”	coverage.	 If	a	host	government	is	willing	to	
issue	a	standard	unconditional	financial	guaranty,	under	which	payment	is	not	subject	
to	any	realistic	possibility	of	defenses	or	commercial	disputes,	OPIC	is	willing	to	insure	
payments	 on	 that	 host	 government	 guaranty	 without	 resort	 to	 a	 dispute	 resolution	
mechanism	such	as	arbitration.	
 
4.12.10 A	New	Idea	For	Arbitral	Award	Default	Coverage:	Coverage	of	Treaty-
based	Arbitration	
	
As	 recent	 events	 in	 Argentina	 and	 elsewhere	 demonstrate,	 an	 investor	 can	
find	 itself	 in	 a	 dispute	 regarding	 a	 host	 government	 action,	 such	 as	 a	 wrongful	
regulatory	change	or	even	classic	expropriation,	that	does	not	arise	out	of	a	contractual	
172	
	
relationship.	A	possibility	that	some	political	risk	insurers	are	exploring	is	to	use	arbitral	
award	 default	 coverage	 more	 broadly	 to	 cover	 awards	 resulting	 from	 international	
arbitrations	arising	from	treaties,	rather	than	only	from	direct	agreements	with	the	host	
government.	
In	 theory	 at	 least,	 treaty-based	 rights	 should	 be	 insurable.	 Investors	 often	
have	standing	and	rights	to	compensation	under	international	agreements	such	as	BITs	
or	 multilateral	 treaties	 such	 as	 NAFTA.	 The	 responsibilities	 of	 a	 state	 under	
international	agreements	to	which	 it	 is	party	are	 in	addition	to,	and	therefore	may	be	
broader	than,	its	obligations	under	general	principles	of	international	law.		International	
arbitral	 awards,	 including	 those	 arising	 from	 treaty-based	disputes,	 have	 the	 force	of	
law	 under	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 and	 otherwise,	 and	 so	 are	 enforceable	 without	
judicial	review.	
One	practical	issue	for	offering	this	sort	of	political	risk	insurance	coverage	is	
the	 timing	 of	 its	 availability	 for	 purchase.	 Although	 some	 investors	 would	 want	 to	
purchase	 coverage	 against	 non-contractual	 risk	 when	 they	 make	 their	 initial	
investment,	certainly	more	investors	would	be	interested	in	purchasing	coverage	later,	
if	concerns	about	those	risks	arise.	This	creates	problems	of	what	 is	referred	to	 in	the	
insurance	industry	“adverse	selection”,	which	is	purchasing	insurance	coverage	against	
a	risk	when	that	risk	arises,	or	at	least	when	it	has	a	greater	than	normal	probability	of	
arising.	
Some	practical	 issues	remain	to	be	resolved.	 Insurers	clearly	will	need	to	set	
sensible	limits	to	avoid	adverse	selection	problems,	and	will	need	to	make	underwriting	
determinations	 regarding	 their	 prospective	 recovery	 rights	 under	 the	 relevant	
international	 treaties.	 Investors	 will	 need	 to	 determine	 whether	 buying	 coverage	
against	 government	 action	 is	 of	 value	 for	 investments	 where	 there	 is	 no	 direct	
relationship	with	the	host	government.	
Subject	to	resolution	of	these	issues,	this	form	of	coverage	could	significantly	
broaden	the	pool	of	investors	able	to	take	advantage	of	political	risk	insurance.	
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CONCLUSION	
The	 previous	 analysis	 suggests	 that	 the	 enforcement	 of	 investment	 awards	
can	 be	 pursued	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 avenues	 in	 addition	 to	 (or	 aside	 from)	 the	 basic	
legal	regime	for	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards.	This	may	be	good	
news	 for	 an	 aggrieved	 investor	 seeking	 to	 recover,	 as	 they	 would	 be	 able	 to	 avail	
themselves	of	a	wider	range	of	means.	Yet,	from	a	policy	perspective	this	contribution	
leads	to	a	more	nuanced	conclusion.	
The	 investment	 arbitration	 regime	 was	 specifically	 developed	 to	 limit	 the	
incidence	 of	 inter-State	 politics	 on	 the	 resolution	 of	 investment	 disputes,	 but	 it	 left	
open	 the	possibility	 to	 resort	 to	diplomatic	protection	 to	overcome	the	difficulties	on	
the	 enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 due	 to	 immunity	 of	 execution.	 Yet,	 diplomatic	
protection	has	proved	to	be	a	difficult	option	in	practice	because:	(i)	as	a	general	matter	
States	seem	increasingly	reluctant	to	exercise	diplomatic	protection;	 (ii)	such	exercise	
is,	 in	 all	 events,	 subject	 to	 rather	 demanding	 conditions;	 and	 (iii)	 the	 remedies	
available—including	 potential	 compensation—are	 entirely	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 home	
State,	not	the	investor.	The	alternative	means	are	perhaps	a	better	option	to	collect	a	
debt	 arising	 from	 an	 award.	 They	 mobilize	 a	 variety	 of	 actors	 (States,	 IOs,	 private	
institutions)	 and	 measures	 (affecting	 creditworthiness,	 influencing	 the	 operation	 of	
certain	 IOs	 or	 the	 availability	 of	 a	GSP)	 and,	 thereby,	 they	 rely	 on	 different	 pressure	
strategies.	 In	practice,	these	means	have	achieved	a	reasonable	level	of	effectiveness.	
This	effectiveness	is	perhaps	due	to	the	involvement	of	debt	collecting	funds,	which	can	
mobilize	(i)	specific	know-how	in	the	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards,	(ii)	an	institutional	
structure	facilitating	the	adoption	of	enforcement	measures	and	(iii)	effective	lobbying	
strategies.	Investors	with	limited	resources	or	coming	from	States	with	fewer	means	of	
political	persuasion	may	sell	their	awards	to	these	entities,	as	did	CMS.	The	market	has	
thus	created	an	alternative	 fall	back	mechanism	to	enforce	arbitral	awards	where	 the	
bargaining	power	of	the	investor	is	unnecessary	to	collect	the	value	of	the	award.	The	
investor	 will	 certainly	 have	 to	 pay	 a	 price	 for	 it,	 but	 it	 will	 dispose	 of	 an	 alternative	
mechanism	to	the	volatile	institution	of	diplomatic	protection.	
Of	course,	the	use	of	these	alternative	means	to	enforce	awards	is	sometimes	
problematic.	An	excessively	 intrusive	strategy	may	be	very	disruptive	to	the	economy	
of	 the	country	and	 to	wider	social	 interests.	An	example	would	be	 the	 triggering	of	a	
lower	 sovereign	 credit	 rating	 due	 to	 disproportional	 reputational	 damage. 363 	In	
addition,	 in	 cases	 of	 defaulting	 States,	 such	 as	 Argentina	 in	 2005,	 sovereign	 debt	
creditors	 compete	 with	 award	 creditors.	 While	 default	 often	 requires	 complex	
restructuring	of	sovereign	debt,	award	creditors,	in	particular	vulture	funds,	will	pursue	
																																																													
363 	“U.S.	 Credit	 Downgraded:	 S&P	 Reduces	 Rating	 To	 AA+”,	 Haff	 Post	 Business,	 available	 at	
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/05/downgrade-us-standard-and-poors_n_919867.html,	 last	 accessed	
(1	March	2012)	
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the	full	value	of	the	debt	through	independent	channels.	This	might	be	 	disruptive	 	to	
the	 	 restructuring	 	 of	 the	 	 sovereign	 	 debt	of	 	 the	 	 host	State,	 	 in	 particular	 after	 the	
Abaclat	decision	on	jurisdiction,	where	an	arbitral	tribunal	asserted	jurisdiction	over	the	
claims	of	60,000	Argentine	sovereign	bondholders.364	While	some	concerns	have	been	
raised	 in	 connection	 with	 litigation	 to	 collect	 sovereign	 debts	 against	 Zambia	 and	
Liberia,	which	 led	 to	 the	Highly	 Indebted	Poor	Countries	 initiative	 (HIPC)	 limiting	 the	
collection	 of	 debts	 by	 vulture	 funds,365	enforcement	 of	 investment	 arbitral	 awards	
remains	 an	 area	 where	 further	 regulation	 is	 needed.	 The	 best	 avenue	 remains	 the	
negotiation	of	 post-award	 settlements,	which	despite	 their	many	 intricacies,	 offer	 an	
option	 adapted	 to	 the	 parties	 circumstances	 and	 needs.	 Post-award	 settlements	will	
normally	 entail	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 value	 of	 the	 award,	 but	 the	 adoption	 of	 intrusive	
stances	and	measures	affecting	wider	social	interests	will	be	more	easily	avoided.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																													
364 	Abaclat	 and	 ors	 v	 Argentina,	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction	 and	 Admissibility	 (ICSID	 Case	 No	
ARB/07/5)4August2011,availableat	 http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisiononJurisdiction.pdf	 (last	
accessed	1	March	2012);	 and	Dissenting	opinion	of	Georges	Abi	Saab	of	 28	October	2011,	 available	 at		
http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_Dissenting_Opinion.pdf	(last	accessed	1	March	2012).	
365	The	 	 effects	 	 of	 	 vulture	 	 funds’	 	 litigation	 	 raised	 	 concerns	 	 after	 	 certain	 	 litigation	 	 to	 	 collect	
sovereign	 debts	 against	 Zambia	 and	 Liberia.	 These	 concerns	 however	 are	 focused	 on	 the	 hurdles	
of	highly	indebted	poor	countries	to	restructure	their	public	external	debt.	As	a	result	of	 these	concerns	
the	World	Bank	adopted	an	 initiative	 to	 reduce	 the	amount	 commercial	 creditors	may	 recover	against	
Highly	 Indebted	 Poor	 Countries	 (HIPC).	 This	 initiative	 has	 been	 implemented	 by	 some	 countries	
through	national	laws,	such	as	the	UK	by	the	UK	Debt	Relief	 2010	Act.	
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